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
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A HISTORY OF PORTUGAL



Map 1.

A HISTORY OF PORTUGAL

BY H. V. LIVERMORE

CAMBRIDGE
AT THE UNIVERSITY PRESS
1947

Printed in Great Britain at the University Press, Cambridge
(Brooke Crutchley, University Printer)
and published by the Cambridge University Press
(Cambridge, and Bentley House, London)
Agents for U.S.A., Canada, and India: Macmillan

In memory of MY FATHER AND MOTHER

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INTRODUCTION

In 1940 Portugal commemorated perhaps the two most important events in the story of her national development. These events were the foundation of the independent monarchy by the warrior-king Afonso Henriques eight centuries ago, and the recovery of independence by dint of the national rising of 1640, which put an end to two generations of submission to the Spanish crown. The anniversary of these events was kept with befitting solemnity: the spirit of rejoicing was damped by the fall of France, which seemed to expose not only Portugal, but all the nations of Europe, to the militant rapacity of the Germans, yet in those dark days the emphasis given to the commemorations was a useful reminder that the main theme of Portuguese history has been the establishment and preservation of national independence.

To the rest of the world the Portuguese are best known for the enterprise of the Discoveries, in the course of which they explored or made available to Europe much of the Atlantic, the West African coast, India and the Indian Ocean, the Far East, Oceania and Brazil, and in peopling the Atlantic Islands, led the revival of the art of colonization. These achievements are the more worthy of attention because at the time of the expansion the Portuguese race numbered a bare million persons, whose territory, standing at the remote edge of Europe, was poor in commerce and not rich in agriculture. The story of the Discoverers is one of the greatest and strangest episodes in history, and it is not surprising that their deeds should have supplied the material for one of the few great epic poems of modern times. But without in any way detracting from the just fame of these pioneers, it is perhaps necessary to point out that their exploits form a part of the course of Portuguese history, and it is a mistake to regard them as an isolated phenomenon.

To England Portugal is of special concern as the partner in a community of interest conveniently known as the Anglo-Portuguese, or simply the Ancient, Alliance. This Alliance may be said to have been foreshadowed as early as 1147 by the participation of English crusaders in Afonso Henriques' reconquest of Lisbon from the Moslems: the story of this feat of arms is preserved in the *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, written by one of the crusaders, probably a native of Suffolk, who thus becomes the earliest and one of the best of foreign historians of Portugal. It was, however, nearly two and a half centuries later, in 1373, that Dom Fernando of Portugal made a treaty with the English against Castile, which was more strongly taken up by his successor, John of

Avis, who sealed the Alliance by marrying our Princess Philippa of Lancaster: from this match issued five brothers, of whom the best known, and one of the greatest of Portuguese, was Henry the Navigator. The engagements entered into by Fernando and John of Avis were renewed in 1640, when by her own effort Portugal had thrown off the Spanish voke and required allies against a possible reconquest. Since the period of the Restoration the old treaties have been reiterated or revised from time to time, and they remain the cornerstone of Portuguese foreign policy. Here again, however, it is necessary to correct a wrong perspective: after-dinner speakers have so long toasted the Ancient Alliance that there is a tendency to believe that the English assisted at the birth of Portugal and have been responsible for guaranteeing her independent existence ever since. Such a conception is fit only for propaganda. The Alliance was invaluable to Portugal at the end of the fourteenth century, and has done good service since 1640. The Alliance is not the only, or even the main, theme of Portuguese history, though it has been a strong support in the struggle to establish and develop national independence.

Small nations live, and must live, by their nationality to a much greater extent than large ones: a sense of national solidarity is a requisite to self-protection and to the building up of a distinct way of life. Such a sense of nationality pervaded the period of the formation of Portugāl. The first duty of the early monarchs was to the nation: in the interests of national security Inês de Castro was murdered and John of Avis raised to the throne.

Because of the same consciousness, the work of the Discoverers became a national vocation and a national industry: though foreigners played their part in the voyages, there was never any doubt of the Portuguese character of the whole enterprise, and all precautions seem to have been taken to preserve it as a Portuguese monopoly. When, in 1580, Philip II of Spain improved his dubious title to the Portuguese crown, he was prudent enough to become Philip I of Portugal and to offer guarantees of unimpaired independence, an arrangement which was accepted until Castilian ambitions began to threaten Portuguese nationhood. The Church too was expected to recognize the rights of nationality: in the early days of the monarchy the issue not infrequently arose, and there was a long period during which relations between the first kings and the Holy See were surprisingly bad, in spite of the special connection binding the Portuguese throne to Rome. In a widely differing period the piety of John V was only exceeded by his sense of the national dignity.

the Portuguese throne to Rome. In a widely differing period the piety of John V was only exceeded by his sense of the national dignity.

I have no wish to be dogmatic about the origins of this national feeling, nor indeed about those of Portuguese nationality. For many Portuguese writers, including the great historian Alexandre Herculano,

the story of their country begins with the foundation of the monarchy. or at most with the creation of the County of Portugal, which attained a considerable measure of independent life under Henry of Burgundy, the father of Afonso Henriques. Those who take this view insist on the lack of correspondence between the ancient Lusitania and the modern Portugal, and on the common history of the Peninsula during the Roman, Gothic and Moslem periods, alleging its then uniformity of language and its geographical unity. Political independence, conceived by Count Henry and achieved by Afonso Henriques, generated those innumerable divergencies of speech, behaviour, outlook and way of life that are now unmistakably Portuguese. While there are some objections to the complete acceptance of this view, it at least suggests an important aspect of the formation of Portugal compared with that of other states of western Europe. Portugal was founded within remarkably definite territorial limits and with the bounds of expansion at the expense of the Moslems clearly implied, so that from the first the confines of the state coincided with those of the nation, and there was none of the struggle to weld together cognate but centrifugal parts that marked long periods in the history of neighbouring nations. The sense of entirety and nationhood was thus a birthright, and its value was felt already in the first half of the twelfth century. Afonso Henriques forwent the dangerous temptation to seek the incorporation of Galicia into his kingdom, and accepted frontiers that differed little from those of the present day. Once the Moslems of the Algarve were reduced, the national territory was complete, and it has remained intact for seven centuries, with perhaps the single exception of the district and town of Olivença, lost to Spain in 1801.

The presence of a strong centralizing power on the eastern frontier, and one that grew stronger as Leon was absorbed by Castile and Castile became Spain, made the preservation of Portuguese nationhood imperative. For about a century from the foundation of the kingdom, Portugal was engaged in the reconquest, and the task of holding off the Moslems made it convenient to keep on good terms with her neighbour. In the middle of the thirteenth century Portugal finished her reconquest and could strengthen her own resources while co-operating with Castile against the common racial and religious enemy in Andalusia. But at the end of the fourteenth century the dwindling of the Portuguese dynasty of Burgundy aroused the centralizing ambitions of Castile, and the existence of the smaller state was menaced. However, the crisis seemed to sharpen the Portuguese sense of nationality, and around the leader John of Avis people and chivalry rose to defend the right to independence in a seemingly desperate struggle, crowned by the resounding victory

of Aljubarrota in 1385. Though on the surface the issue was a dynastic one, the action of John of Avis and his remarkable general Nun'Álvares Pereira was the answer to a national emergency.

The successful struggle to vindicate Portuguese nationality led directly to the inception of the voyages of discovery. After Aljubarrota Portuguese independence was assured, though the state of war with Castile was merely suspended, not ended, by a series of truces that preceded the treaty of 1411. It was at some time during the same decade that the third son of John of Avis began the exploration of the African coast, and in 1415, partly to engage the military vigour of a generation trained to warfare and rendered restless by the conclusion of final peace, John and three of his sons descended on Morocco and captured the town of Ceuta, Portugal's first foothold in Africa. Somewhere in these years, and probably in the person of Prince Henry himself, is to be found the source of the great diversion of energies from the struggle for national independence to the enterprise of the Discoveries.

Gradually in the early years of the fifteenth century the race that had long pitted its small pinewood ships against the tempests of the open Atlantic tried out the arduous and at first thankless circuit of the African coast. In spite of the limited progress of these navigations in their early stages-at the death of Prince Henry in 1460 the equator had not yet been reached—the remarkable advance of Bartolomeu Dias and Vasco da Gama at the turn of the century carried the Portuguese to India. In a hundred years they had gone from Ceuta to Calicut and had found the Brazilian shore. From India they spread round the periphery of the newly discovered ocean. East Africa, Arabia and Persia and the western arc of the Indian coast, the Spice Islands, Malacca, Macau in China, and the archipelagos of Oceania came within their orbit. Lisbon was able to tap the commerce of the eastern Mediterranean at its source and became a great emporium for the merchandise of the Orient. On the mainland of India the Portuguese launched themselves into a furious struggle for the establishment of an empire which should comprise most of the coastal regions of the East.

The enterprise was one of gigantic scope, but it did not suffice to absorb the whole energies or quench the insatiable thirst for greatness of the million inhabitants of Portugal. Already the Atlantic Islands had been settled. Colonization as it had been practised in the Azores or Madeira could not be carried to the East, where only empire and evangelization were feasible; but Brazil offered a new field for the development of Portugal in the new world. There seemed nothing disproportionate in that a small race from a corner of Europe should embark on the peopling of what was to become the largest country of

South America; and indeed, far from being a hopeless gamble, it proved to be an undertaking of the greatest circumspection. With the loss of the eastern dominions, chiefly to the Dutch, the value of the solid labour of colonization, as opposed to mere conquest, became apparent. In due time Brazil ripened and obtained its independence. Still the exploring and colonizing talents of the Portuguese were not exhausted, though the separation of Brazil caused a profound upheaval in the life of the mother-country whose effects have never been fully assessed. It was only when this upheaval and that caused by the Peninsular wars eventually died down that Portugal was able to take in hand her third empire—her fourth if we include Morocco—and largely within the past fifty years the structure of a new colonial empire, comparable in size with half Europe, has been raised.

The Portuguese race, it is clear, has played a not undistinguished part in the world's affairs. Before narrating the course of its history, it is perhaps necessary to say a word about its early formation. If we accept the view that the story of Portugal begins in 1140, the three periods of Roman-Lusitanian, Gothic and Moslem domination form only a preface, and the history of the County from 1095 becomes necessarily an introduction. But the questions of Portugal's original ethnical, geographical and linguistic unity with the rest of the Peninsula are, to say the least, open ones. Taking only the geographical point, we find the arguments that Portugal has only a very limited natural frontier (if her coastline be excepted) and that she possesses natural continuations of the mountainstructure of the rest of the Peninsula countered with arguments showing that her general altitude and even her climate are in strong contrast with those of most of Spain. There is indeed no possibility of proving that anything but political independence began in 1140. The records of Portugal ought to go back to the period when the Romans added the Peninsula to their trophy of the Punic Wars and first came into conflict with the Lusitanian tribes. It is a matter for regret that so little material of the early periods refers specifically to the far west: in order to obtain a consecutive narrative we are driven to rely upon the general history of the Peninsula and can only guess those divergencies that were to prove important.

The origin of the Lusitanians is not clear. The tribe, whose name was probably extended by the Romans to various of its neighbours, was probably of pre-Celtic or Iberian derivation. The formation of the racial background took place before the west was drawn into the world of Carthage or of Rome. The mysterious Ligures, or some other race of doubtful origin, tentatively identified with the later Conii of the Algarve, whither they would have been forced by later invasions, may have been

the first interlopers known to history. Later, Iberians, a Hamitic people, settled on the east and Andalusian seaboard of the Peninsula and had probably come to form the main body of the population when the Phoenicians first made contact with the southern coast. Two legends, that Tubal son of Ham built the town of Setúbal, and that Ulysses in his long absence from Ithaca founded Ulissipo on the banks of the Tagus, would show the impingement of the conception of Portugal on the Greek and Phoenician worlds, if (and this is highly unlikely) we could grant them a respectable antiquity.

The emporium of Cadiz may date from the twelfth century before Christ. Strabo confirms that in Homeric times the Phoenicians had great markets in Spain. Certainly the foundations of civilization in the Peninsula were laid in Andalusia, whither apparently precious metals were conveyed from the region of the Guadiana. But inner Portugal remained hidden. Before the year 500 the Celtic invasion, overspreading the Peninsula from the Pyrenees, thrust through the primitive inhabitants, though at first leaving aside the Iberian fringe. Thus Herodotus describes the Celts as dwelling beyond the pillars of Hercules and next the Cynetes, 'the most western people of Europe' in the Algarve. The Greeks and Phoenicians probably confined their attentions to the coast, while unknown feuds and fusions took place in the interior. The passage of Phoenician power from Tyre to Carthage did not interrupt their activity in the Peninsula; some penetration occurred in Andalusia and the east, and even perhaps in southern Algarve; but the interior remained aloof. The First Punic War brought the Peninsula into the forefront of international politics, and the Carthaginians sought to make it an advanced post for the clash with Rome. In the Portuguese Algarve the settlement of Portus Hannibalis may perhaps be identified with Portimão or Alvôr. The final defeat of the Carthaginians made Roman penetration inevitable.

CHAPTER I

LUSITANIA

i. PRE-ROMAN LUSITANIA. The territory of the Lusitani corresponds fairly well with the central part of modern Portugal from the Tagus to the Douro. Though there were in addition Lusitanian tribes settled on the south bank of the Tagus, and the Callaeci, a people related to them, inhabited the region between the Douro and the Minho, it was the 'Herminian Mountains', the high and wild Serra da Estrêla, strewn with boulders and still haunted by wolves, that gave the Lusitanians shelter and inaccessibility, demanding in return a vigorous struggle for existence. These conditions they seem willingly to have accepted, for they despised the possibilities of an easier and richer life in the valleys or on the plains, and only descended into the Guadiana region to maraud and rob. The limits of Lusitanian territory, broadly extending from the Minho to the Tagus, suggest the outline of modern Portugal much more closely than does the Roman province of Lusitania, founded only in the time of Augustus and including a large area of eastern Spain, where, moreover, it had its capital at Mérida in Spanish Extremadura.


The Lusitani were a number of tribes belonging to the same ethnical group, but probably not of uniform provenance or history. The account of Strabo suggests that just as the Celtiberi dominated and gave their name to neighbouring peoples, so the Lusitani may have incorporated other tribes. After describing the Lusitanian region—'northward from the Tagus lies Lusitania, embracing the greater part of the peoples of Hispania, and longest engaged in war with Rome'—he tells how there were there descendants of the Celtic tribes of the Guadiana: these Celts, together with some of the non-Celtic Turduli, migrated northwards beyond the Lima, where their chieftain was killed by treachery and they remained dispersed, forming the clans known as the Callaeci. Further evidence of the mixed origins of these hill peoples has been advanced: their language is said to have had some of the characteristics of Celtic tongues, and the name Luso itself to occur in Celtic areas, whilst their arms and warfare were Iberian. They used the round Ibero-African shield for defence and the Iberian dart for attack, and practised Iberian guerrilla tactics, of which the greatest master was Viriatus.

At the time of the Second Punic War these tribes were remote from Carthaginian influence. When Livy mentions that Lusitani fought for Hannibal as mercenaries, there is no reason to suppose that any kind of 2 LUSITANIA

penetration had yet taken place. The Vettones, the nearest eastern neighbours of the Lusitani, were probably equally undisturbed. Some contact may have existed between ancient civilization and the Conii of the extreme Algarve: by their position these were more exposed to influences from the southern seaboard, the most highly cultured part of the Peninsula. There existed a strong contrast between the rising civilization of Andalusia, praised by Polybius for the beauty of its white towns and the richness of its lands, and the poor and desolate region where the Lusitani strove and starved. It was as raiders on the fertile Baetis that the Lusitani first made themselves known to Rome.

For information about the tribes and their mode of life, the descriptions of Polybius and Strabo are vivid and full. The region between the Tagus and the Artabri (the north coast) was inhabited by fifty tribes. Though in places the land was not lacking in fruit, cattle, gold and silver, the inhabitants preferred raiding to cultivation and lived at war with one another and with their neighbours beyond the Tagus. This strife was only stopped when the Romans turned their fortified settlements into open villages and moved some tribes to better land. The robbers were poor mountaineers whose land was so unfertile that they coveted better soil belonging to others, who defended themselves at first, but later abandoned their lands and became robbers too. Of the Lusitani in particular we are told that they were much addicted to sacrifices, and examined entrails, but without extracting them. Haruspication was also practised on prisoners of war. Furthermore they cut off the hands of their prisoners, a practice soon adopted by the Romans.

The most detailed part of the description applies strictly to the Callaeci, but may be taken as generally true of the Lusitani. Strabo says: All the mountain tribes live simply, drink water and sleep on the bare earth. The men wear long hair like women; in war they tie it up with a band across the forehead. They prefer goatsflesh, and to their god of war they sacrifice a goat and also prisoners with horses. Like the Greeks. they organize mass-sacrifices, or hecatombs, of all kinds. They love tourneys, both gymnastic and with arms and on horseback, and practise pugilism, throwing, and fighting in bands. Two-thirds of the year they live on acorns, which they roast and grind to make bread. They also have beer. They lack wine, but when they have it they drink it up, gathering for a family feast. Instead of oil they use butter. At banquets they sit on a bench against the wall according to age and rank. The food goes round. For drinking they use wooden cups, like the Celts. When they assemble to drink, they perform round dances to the flute or horn, leaping in the air and crouching as they fall. Their clothes are usually a black cloak—the natural colour of Peninsular sheep—in which they



Map 2.

also sleep on the ground. Yet the women also like coloured cloths. Instead of money they use articles for barter or bits of raw silver. Those condemned to death are flung from the rocks; parricides are stoned before the boundaries. They have only one wife, like the Greeks. They put the sick out on the roads for any passer-by to explain the disease. Till Brutus' time (136 B.C.) they used leather boats for the floods and the lakes, and also dugouts, now rare. The salt they use is red; crumbled, it whitens. Such is the life of the mountain tribes, including the inhabitants of the northern region, the Callaeci, the Astures and the Cantabri as far as the territory of the Vascones and to the Pyrenees.

The social organization was patriarchal. Parental authority did not end with the marriage of the sons. Each clan had its village and made a fort or castro for defence. A number of clans made a tribe: if the tribe was important, it would have a central castle with a common temple and place of law. The authority of the tribal chief was modified by an assembly, the conventus vicinorum, in which fathers of families debated the common interest. Various tribes formed a 'state', but federations were weak and impermanent. Only leaders such as Viriatus and Sertorius could hold them together, and even they were at the mercy of the primitive emotions of elation in times of expectation, and sudden boredom at the moment of triumph. Astute, nimble, fickle, Strabo calls them. Their religion was polytheistic. There was no priestly class, and sacrifices were made privately or by their leaders. Nevertheless, their god Endovelicus had his oracle like Zeus and Ammon, which argues some degree of religious organization.

In war they executed rapid movements and surpassed at feints and sham retreats, turning back and cutting their pursuers to pieces. Their cavalry, which excelled—although the horses were small and ugly, they were swift as the wind—wore swords or daggers and a small shield and leather helmet for defence. Their infantry was armed with a spear, darts and missiles, and wore woollen shinguards.

ii. VIRIATUS. 'In Hispania, Viriatus, first a shepherd, then turned to hunting, then from a hunter turned robber, and soon became the general of a veritable army and occupied the whole of Lusitania', says the epitome of Livy rather grudgingly. The name of bandit or robber is a patriotic understatement for one who defeated five Roman generals and came to control the south and west of the Peninsula from Oporto to Murcia.

After the reverses of Carthage in the First Punic War (264-241), Hamilcar hoped to compensate in the Peninsula for the loss of Sicily and Sardinia. Possibly part of Spain had revolted, for he found it necessary to reconquer it and came into contact with the Celtic tribes south of the Tagus, whom he defeated and whose leaders Istolatius and Indortes he crucified. During the course of the second war, the western Peninsula lay quiet. Only after the battle of Zama (201) did the realization gradually dawn on the central tribes that they were to be absorbed in a new empire. The intruding power divided the Peninsula into Citerior and Ulterior, and unwitting Lusitania became the outer fringe of the Roman world.

As early as 193 the southern tribes of Lusitania assaulted the Romanized settlements of Andalusia, despoiling villages and fields from across the Guadiana. On their return from this expedition, laden with plunder, they were intercepted and defeated by P. Cornelius Scipio near Ilipa (Alcalá del Río, Seville). In spite of this reverse, the Lusitani two vears later attacked Aemilius Paulus and killed several thousands of his men, and sharing in the siege of Asta of 186, defeated C. Atinius with heavy loss. For a spell T. Sempronius Gracchus dealt fairly with them and established peace, which was maintained from 178 until 154, but in the latter year the Lusitani began a new incursion, sacked the land of the Conii and took their city of Conis-torgis, crossed the Straits of Gibraltar to Africa and reached Okilé (Arzila), some twenty-five miles south of Tangier, where the consul L. Mummius at length routed them. In the Peninsula the army of the praetor Servius Sulpicius Galba was badly defeated, and the Romans were obliged to make a counter-invasion. They were not long in destroying the invading forces and penetrating into Lusitanian territory, laying waste at least the Tagus region (150). The tribes asked for terms. On promise of being given better lands they came out of their mountains and laid down their arms. When they were at his mercy, Galba had the most part butchered and the rest enslaved thirty thousand according to Suetonius; seven thousand according to Valerius Maximus. Galba's action did not go uncriticized in Rome, but though Cato accused him, he defended himself in three speeches and secured his acquittal by producing his little sons and a well-timed flood of tears.

The effect of Galba's treachery was not to cow the Lusitani, although their southern neighbours, the Conii, had accepted the sovereignty of Rome in 151. On the contrary, they made an attack on the Baetis valley in 147, but coming into contact with Gaius Vetilius' strong forces, they were defeated, almost surrounded and reduced again to ask for terms, promising submission in return for land to subsist on. It was at this crisis that their leader appeared. One of the few to escape the massacre of Galba, a certain warrior Viriatus, a shepherd of the Mons Herminius, appealed to the tribes not to listen to Roman promises and urged them not to surrender merely for want of a leader to save them from the

encircling legions, but to follow him. Viriatus' personality was strong enough to vanquish their despair. They agreed to adopt his plan. He, accompanied by only a thousand men, suddenly and violently attacked the Romans and made a breach, whilst the rest of the Lusitani, dissolving into small groups, disappeared through the demoralized Roman lines.¹

The meeting-place of the Lusitani was to be Tribola, in the Sierra de Ronda, whither Vetilius pursued them. Viriatus, taking advantage of the ravines of the Ronda mountains, bottled up the whole Roman force, killed four thousand out of ten, including Vetilius himself, and sent the rest fleeing to Carteia to beg for reinforcements from the Hither Province, which were cut to pieces to the last man on the way. In 146 C. Plautius, sent with ten thousand infantry and thirteen hundred horse, put the Lusitani to apparent flight, but when he detached four thousand men to chase them, Viriatus wheeled round and destroyed his pursuers. Viriatus now took up a fortified position on the olive-crested Mount of Venus, perhaps the Sierra de San Vicente, north-west of Toledo. Here Plautius again approached, was defeated and fled southward 'to take up winter-quarters in midsummer', according to the classical witticism.

Although Viriatus' victories brought him plentiful adherents, there were still tribes that refused to break with Rome. Viriatus had to take Segobriga, the capital of the Carpetani, by a stratagem—a sham siege soon raised and followed by a rapid dash back into the relieved and unsuspecting town. In 146 he also defeated the governor of the Hither Province, Claudius Unimanus, and in the following year his successor C. Nigidius.

Rome was faced with an urgent problem. The Senate resolved to send out consuls instead of praetors to deal with Viriatus. Scipio, who regarded the Peninsula as a perquisite and hoped to build up a family ascendancy there, secured the election of his brother Fabius Maximus, who, however, was given only half the usual consular army, and this raw. Fabius passed a year accustoming his fifteen thousand recruits to Peninsular warfare, and at the end of it was able to drive the Lusitani up the valley of the Baetis as far as Baecula (Bailén), the first Roman success for ten years. Yet his successor Q. Pompeius was defeated, and Viriatus regained control of both provinces, sacking Bastetania (Murcia) in 142 and 141. His example stirred up the long-pacified Celtiberians, who were now ready to fight against Rome, though even Viriatus could not succeed in uniting the two peoples.

¹ The name Viriatus, derived from *viriae*, bracelets, has been thought to be a mere nickname. Three reasons, none very good, have been advanced against this: (1) so great a warrior would not have been anonymous; (2) all Lustanians wore bracelets, therefore there was no point in calling Viriatus after his; (3) Viriatus corresponds to the Roman name Torquatus, which is not a nickname.

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The Senate next sent out Fabius Maximus' adopted brother Q. Fabius Maximus Servilianus, with two weak legions of eighteen thousand foot and sixteen hundred horse. Viriatus had his camp at Tucci (Martos), not far from the Roman headquarters in Corduba. When Servilianus attempted to recover Tucci, Viriatus met him with six thousand Lusitani and forced him to retire into his camp, then hurriedly to strike it and return to Corduba with a loss of three thousand men. However Viriatus himself had lost men and supplies, and was constrained to retire west, allowing Servilianus to reduce some of the towns of Andalusia and to attack the Conii. Apparently in attempting to enter Lusitania from the south, he was defeated by two guerrilla chieftains, whose Roman names, Curius and Apuleius, suggest renegades. Another guerrilla chief, Connobas, surrendered and was himself spared, though the Romans cut off the right hands of his warriors.

The culmination of Viriatus' career was reached when Servilianus was preparing to besiege the city of Erisana or Arsa in Baeturia. By stealth and under cover of darkness, Viriatus entered the city and attacked the Romans from inside as they were entrenching themselves round it, guiding them into a closed defile as they fled. At this moment Viriatus had the whole Roman force, perhaps even Roman power in the Peninsula, at his mercy, but instead of dealing a mortal blow he treated for terms, either in the belief that his position was unassailable, or because his men had grown indifferent with success. The condition on which he agreed to release the captured army was the cession to him of Baeturia (the part of Andalusia south of the Sierra Morena stretching from Huelva to Cordova). It was accepted, and Viriatus was praised n Rome—how falsely he was soon to discover—for displaying clemency when he might have shown arrogance, and declared a 'friend of the Roman people'. Many senators found the peace a shameful one, and held that equal terms with barbarians, imposed by barbarians, were not binding. When Servilianus' brother, Servilius Caepio, took over the province in 139, he was tacitly permitted to provoke the renewal of hostilities, treachery similar to that practised against Numantia. Viriatus, taken unawares and much weakened, retreated from Andalusia into the territory of the. Carpetani. Whilst he was rallying his forces, Servilius crossed the territory of the Vettones, the eastern neighbours and allies of the Lusitani, and made the first permanent Roman camp between the Guadiana and the Tagus, Castra Servilia near Cáceres. With his superior forces and those of the consul of Hispania Citerior, Pompilius Laenas, he hoped to trap Viriatus by a simultaneous advance from north and south. The result of the operation has not been recorded. Servilius' own men were on the verge of revolt and he may have been unable to strike. Never8 LUSITANIA

theless, Viriatus asked for peace. The Romans demanded the surrender of the worst rebels. Viriatus agreed to put some to death, including perhaps his own father-in-law, Astolpas, and to surrender others. After some cutting of hands, Servilius made fresh demands, including the surrender of all weapons. Viriatus refused his assent to this, but his people, in an access of war-weariness, demanded the continuation of negotiations. Viriatus' three emissaries, Audax, Ditalkon and Minuros, were bribed by the Romans to kill him in his sleep. So by treachery, in 139, the backbone of Lusitanian resistance was broken.

Something compelling about the figure of Viriatus justifies Mommsen's epithet of 'homeric' and Lucilius' of 'the Hannibal of the Iberians'. Like Hannibal, Viriatus gains involuntary sympathy, and the few anecdotes that have survived colour his personality. When he married the daughter of the wealthy Astolpas, the bride's family displayed its vases of gold and all the luxury it could muster at a great feast; but Viriatus stood by, leaning on his spear in enigmatic but ironical silence, and would only take a little bread and meat: when the feast was over he rode back with his bride to his fastnesses. His short incisive speech, combined with a talent for allegory, gave him control over the tribes. With a parable he explained to the inhabitants of Tucci the consequences of their wavering between him and the Romans: a man had two wives, one old, one young; the old pulled out his black hairs, the young pulled out his white; so that soon he was left bald.

iii. SERTORIUS. To celebrate Viriatus' funeral, which was also the end of their independence, the Lusitani raised a great pyre, sacrificing many animals, whilst the army, horse and foot, marched round the flames singing the praises of the dead hero. After the blaze had died down, they sat round the ashes in silence; and when they built his tomb two hundred pairs of warriors fought a mock combat in his honour. For a while his successor Tautalus kept up some resistance, but the campaign of Decimus Junius Brutus between 138 and 136 quelled the most active opposition. Brutus was the first Roman to penetrate the unknown country above the Douro. Fortifying Olisipo, the modern Lisbon, he marched northward, laying waste Lusitanian settlements and establishing a fortified camp at Viseu. Crossing the Douro into Callaecia, he reached the Lima, which his men refused to pass because they believed that it was the river of Forgetfulness, until the consul himself seized the standard and entered the water. Brutus was able to win over many of the northern tribes by peaceful means as well as hostile; he despatched a number of Viriatus' warriors to be settled in Valentia, founded in 138, and his work was recognized in Rome by the addition of the epithet Callaecus to his name. He is said to have founded Cale, the site of the future Oporto.

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The peace he established was, however, interrupted, probably by repercussions of the invasion of the Cimbri, between the years 109 and 93. When in the latter year the pro-consul, Publius Licinius Crassus, finished the campaign, many Lusitani were moved from the hills to the plains where surveillance was easier. Penetration was steady and Roman influence irresistible. When, a lifetime later than Viriatus, the second and last great movement for independence took place under Sertorius, the circumstances had already changed. Viriatus had been a native fighting for native independence with native forces; Sertorius was a Roman fighting to establish an independent empire in the west with troops trained by Romans. The resistance to Roman ideas and the Roman way of life ended with the death of Viriatus; the very acceptance of Sertorius as leader of the western peoples implied an acceptance of Roman life and the adoption of Roman civil and military administration.

Quintus Sertorius was born at the Sabine town of Nursia in 121, had fought against the Cimbri and under Marius in 104, became military tribune in Spain in 97 and quaestor in Cisalpine Gaul in 90, commanded armies that marched into Rome on the triumph of Marius, but repudiated the savagery of the proscriptions and was sent in 83 as praetor to Hispania Citerior. His was a party appointment, and he exercised his influence over the Celtiberi and Lusitani to enhance the popularity of the Marian faction and of himself by offering favours, lifting the burden of taxation and staying encamped to spare the towns the rigours of Roman billeting. Although he collected some nine or ten thousand men, he foresaw the collapse of his plans with the return to Rome of Sulla. The rival faction sent Caius Annius to drive Sertorius out of the Peninsula, and this was done without serious opposition. Sertorius took ship with a small force of supporters at Nova Carthago and cruised across the Mediterranean, striving to rekindle Marian sympathies in the Balearic Islands and in Africa, where he captured Tangier. At this time the Lusitani rebelled against their governor and sent Sertorius an embassy, asking him to return and lead them. In 80 he crossed to Lusitania, avoiding the Roman fleet, and landing with two and a half thousand men, his own followers, Mauretanians and deserters.

In the field he soon defeated Lucius Fufidius, pro-praetor of the Further Province. Sulla appointed Quintus Metellus Pius, an able soldier, but without experience of unorthodox Peninsular warfare: he was beaten back, and the general of Hither Spain, Marius Domitius Calvinus, defeated and killed on the banks of the Guadiana by Sertorius' lieutenant, Lucius Hirtuleius, in 79. Sertorius now held all the western province and his defeat of Lucius Manlius, the governor of Gallia Narbonensis, who had been called to Metellus' assistance, put the eastern

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into his hands. He marched to Dianium (Denia) on the Mediterranean coast, whilst Metellus retreated to Norba (Cáceres) and shut himself up in Corduba for the winter of 77. The defeat of Lepidus in Etruria brought Sertorius reinforcements under Perpenna and other magistrates of the Marian party.

The movement for separation in the Peninsula strengthened the influence of Rome more than the foregoing conquest had done, for Quintus Sertorius laid down the basis of an organized state. In Ebora he established a senate of three hundred Romans. At Osca (Huesca) he founded a college where Latin, Greek and jurisprudence were taught to the sons of native leaders, and himself awarded prizes for the best work and conduct. In this way the indigenous peoples grew eager to qualify for posts of honour in the state, and their studies hastened the progress of Romanization. The Peninsula was distributed into two new provinces; the artificial Roman distinction between Citerior and Ulterior was replaced by the native division between Celtiberia and Lusitania.

In 77 Aquitania revolted at the instigation of Sertorius, and Pompey was sent to deal with the situation in the Peninsula as pro-consul. Meeting Sertorius in the Valentia region, he was soon in difficulties and only saved from defeat by the arrival of Metellus Pius, who had beaten Sertorius' western army under Hirtuleius. The course of the struggle in the following year is obscure, but it appears that Pompey penetrated into Lusitania and was expelled. A year later fighting was resumed in the Ebro valley. Pompey and Metellus endeavoured to reduce Sertorius' allies, but on their besieging the town of Pallantia they were forced to raise the siege, and both were defeated at Calagurris. Nevertheless the protraction of the struggle told against Sertorius.

Five years after Pompey's appointment, Sertorius was assassinated at a banquet at Osca: Perpenna, jealous of Sertorius' ascendancy over his own soldiers, incited the murder, and was repaid for his treachery by the repudiation of the Lusitani and prompt defeat and death at the hands of Pompey. Sertorius has often been compared with Viriatus. The resemblance is indeed striking—the same cryptic, allusive speech, the same authority over the centrifugal tribes, the same simplicity of manner, the same use of guerrilla tactics, ambushes, feints and sham retreats, the same superiority over their contemporaries and the same treacherous end. The difference is equally plain; Viriatus, a native patriot whose only aim was independence and barbarian tradition: Sertorius, a Roman democrat who hoped to kindle anew the light of civilization that appeared to be guttering in the capital of the Republic.

iv. Julius Caesar and Augustus. It was left to Julius Caesar to impose the stamp of Rome on the towns of Lusitania. As pro-praetor

of the Further Province in the year 60, he reduced a rebellion in the Mons Herminius and attacked Brigantium (Bragança). The pacification completed, he amassed great wealth from the receipt of tributes and was able to pay off his creditors in Rome and to purchase the consulate in 59. According to Suetonius, 'neither when in command of armies nor as a magistrate at Rome did he show a scrupulous integrity; for as certain writers have declared in their memoirs, when he was pro-consul in Spain he not only begged money from the allies to help pay his debts, but also attacked and sacked some towns of the Lusitanians, although they did not refuse his terms and opened their gates to him on his arrival'.

Caesar was again in the Peninsula in 49, when all the legions and auxiliaries of Lusitania—somewhat naturally if Suetonius is to be believed—declared for Pompey, and fought under Afranius in the battle of Ilerda (Lérida). Caesar's victory, obtained by weight of numbers and superior command, led to a severe repression of Lusitania by Quintus Cassius Longinus, who assaulted the native town of Medobriga and plundered the whole province, but perished with his booty by shipwreck. In 45 Caesar was almost vanquished by the forces of Pompey in the great battle of Munda (near Osuna), but an error of Labienus allowed him to snatch victory. Even after Caesar's death the sons of Pompey held out in the Peninsula until the campaign of Augustus.

Caesar's occupation of the west included the settlement of poor colonists of Italian origin as centres of Roman civilization. Of the twentysix such colonies mentioned by Pliny in the middle of the first century, five are in Lusitania. One of these is anterior to the time of Caesar— Medellín, on the banks of the Guadiana, named after Sertorius' opponent, Metellus Pius. Cáceres is identified with Colonia Norba Caesarina. Beja was founded possibly in part to remove rebellious tribes from the Mons Herminius to flatter ground; its modern name, corrupted from Pax Julia, shows its foundation or restoration by Caesar. Santarém was founded as Colonia Scallabis Praesidium Julium. The fifth colony mentioned by Pliny is Mérida (Emerita Augusta) founded by Augustus in 25 to reward the Italian veterans (emeriti) of the fifth and tenth legions. Apart from these special settlements, Caesar bestowed the grandiloquent honorifics of Felicitas Julia on Lisbon and Liberalitas Julia on Évora, transforming the former into the only city with Roman rights in Lusitania. Jus latinum was granted to Évora, and also held by Myrtilis (Mértola) and Urbs Imperatoria Salacia (Alcácer do Sal). Pliny records the existence of thirty-six tributary cities in the province.

Even before Augustus' time, in 29, according to Dio Cassius, the north-west corner of the Peninsula had been reduced: in 26, however, the Princeps himself led a desultory campaign against the tribes north

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of the Douro and included his name in those of Bracara Augusta (Braga) and Asturica Augusta (Astorga). Roman occupation was now complete.

In the time of Augustus the organization of the Peninsula was considerably altered. The old division of Hither and Further was replaced by a system of three provinces, initiated by Augustus' relative Marcus Agrippa, who created that of Lusitania in the year 27. Some twenty years later the frontiers and names of the provinces were finally fixed. Hitherto all of what is now Portugal had fallen within the bounds of the Further Province. Now Portugal above the Douro was split off and joined to the northern strip of the Peninsula governed from Tarraco. Almost all the rest of the country, with the name Lusitania, now had its capital at Emerita, but a small section of south-eastern Portugal was included in the Andalusian province of Baetica. The Lusitania of the first century thus included the great bulk of Portugal with in addition an extensive eastern bulge into Spanish Extremadura. Over the 130,000 square kilometres of its total area—compared with the 89,600 of modern Portugal—there was scattered a free population of perhaps a million.

Distant from the internal struggles of Rome, the western extremity of the Empire lay almost without recorded history until the invasion of the barbarians. In the Roman municipium, the native population beheld the institutions and privileges of Roman life, aspired to attain these and might receive them as a prize for distinctive Romanness. The process was slow but solid. The characteristics of the Roman west were tranquillity and provincialism. A couple of cohorts sufficed to maintain order in the north-west; of provincialism there is ample architectural evidence. Of the provinces of the Peninsula, Baetica and Tarraconensis assimilated Roman civilization the most rapidly. In Lusitania Mérida, the centre of administration, reached the highest degree of development. There still stand the sixty-arch bridge over the Tagus, the theatre, and the circus, capable of holding some 25,000 spectators: near by at Alcántara was the great bridge across the Tagus, whose centre spans are over thirty yards wide. Lisbon, elevated by Julius Caesar to municipal rank, attained the distinction of a theatre in the first century, and from the second the delegate of the provincial legate appears to have governed there.

Though the south of Lusitania developed more rapidly than the north, if only because of its proximity to Andalusia, the erasive effect of the Moslem invasion was much more acutely felt below the Tagus. Of the three principal Roman monuments existing in Portugal the southernmost is at Évora, where the so-called Temple of Diana of the second or third century still stands. Long used as a shambles, the parts that have survived comprise a rectangular podium with fourteen columns surmounted by a fragmentary architrave. The Roman and pre-Roman station at

Conimbriga (Condeixa-a-Velha) near Coimbra, still under excavation, has yielded some fine mosaics; and the bridge over the Tamaca (Tâmega) at Aquae Flaviae (Chaves) has recorded on it the names of the neighbouring tribes that took part in the construction.

v. CHRISTIANITY. The date of the introduction of Christianity into Lusitania cannot be even roughly fixed. The claim that it was brought to the Peninsula by the apostles Paul and James lacks documentation. The first references to Christianity in Lusitania are ascribed to the third century, later than its appearance in other parts of the Peninsula. From the middle of the third century until its official recognition in 313, its progress can best be traced by its repressions. After the persecution of Decius in 250 the Bishops of Astorga and Mérida are mentioned as having signed false certificates of sacrifice to the official deities, and purchased immunity through apostasy as libellatici. In about 300 a council held at Illiberi (Elvira, near Granada) was attended by the Bishops of Ossonoba, Évora and Mérida: at it continence was imposed upon priests; the austere life was recommended; attendance at mass every Sunday was enjoined; painted images were forbidden in churches, and rules were adopted for days of fasting, the celebration of Whitsuntide, baptism, confirmation and marriage. The persecutions ordered by Diocletian in 3Q4 were rigorously carried out by the prefect Dacian, and various virgins and confessors perished at Mérida, Seville and Valencia: St Eulalia is said to have suffered a precocious martyrdom at the age of thirteen at this time. Of the three saints Verissimus, Maxima and Julia, brother and sisters, attributed to Lisbon in Mozarabic calendars, nothing is known.1

Towards the end of the fourth century the Priscillian heresy, originating perhaps in Galicia, swept over the Peninsula and rivalled the official creed for a long period. Priscillian, originally a layman, but later Bishop of Avila, evolved his doctrines of mystic communion with God from the text 'Know ye not that ye are the Temple of God?' and enjoined a rigid asceticism, with extreme continence, if not renunciation of marriage. Only when Priscillian had converted many priests, and even the Bishops Instantius and Salvianus, was any protest made. This came from Bishop Hyginus of Cordova—later himself a Priscillianist—who warned Bishop Idatius of Mérida against the spread of unorthodox beliefs. The latter used rigorous methods, which did nothing to abate the heresy. At the Council of Saragossa of 380, the leaders of the movement were condemned, but in Mérida there occurred popular demonstrations against the orthodox Bishop Idatius. Far from declining, the new sect obtained

¹ There are early references to Bishops of Lisbon (Potamius, 357), Évora (Quintianus, 300?), Braga (Paternus, 400), and Ossonoba (Vicente, 300?).

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the election of Priscillian as Bishop of Avila and Paternus as Bishop of Braga. The Priscillianist bishops endeavoured to secure their recognition in Rome, without complete success, though they got imperial authority to hold the bishoprics. The Emperor Gratian was murdered in 383, and Maximus, a Spaniard chosen in Britain, took his place; with the change of ruler, there came a change of ideas. A council at Bordeaux condemned and deposed Instantius, and Priscillian took the case, upon which recognition of his doctrine depended, before the emperor. Curiously enough, the attitude of St Ambrose and other churchmen was for leniency; but the emperor, possibly not undesirous of confiscating the goods of the heretics, condemned Priscillian and six more to be burnt alive at Treves, and exiled others to the Scilly Isles (385 or 386). The martyrdom of Priscillian led to a new expansion of his doctrines on the death of Maximus. At their height these were current not only over a large part of the Peninsula but in the south of France as far as Arles and Marseilles. In 400 all the Galician bishops save two were Priscillianists, and Braga continued to be the headquarters of dissent, while Mérida was the outpost of the official creed. Opposition was much more bitter from the Spanish bishops than from official sources, which could hardly condemn a doctrine that promoted asceticism and contained no real heresy. For this reason Priscillian has been called the earliest victim of the Spanish Inquisition. By the second synod of Braga, held in 563, Priscillianism had disappeared as a publicly held creed, though it had survived the synods of Astorga and Toledo and numerous repressive measures.

CHAPTER II

THE GOTHIC KINGDOMS

i. THE DIVISION OF THE PENINSULA. The Roman period had transformed the Peninsula. Even the far west had become acquainted with the standards of the Romans, and with their capacity to organize and to produce ordered thought. Christianity had taken slow root and gradually appropriated the faith once given to Roman altars and native gods. During the centuries of Roman provincialism these things permeated the indigenous brain so deeply as not to be eradicated by the material overrush of the Gothic and Moslem periods. But not even Christianity could cope with the corruption of the Roman nobility and the demoralization of a society based on slavery. Such writers as Orosius and Salvianus give evidence that this corruption prevailed in the provinces to such a degree that many people preferred the rule of the barbarians. though how far it had gone in the remote west is doubtful, since the opportunities for luxury and dissipation on a Roman scale were presumably far less than in the wealthier regions of Andalusia and Provence.

It is difficult to imagine the extraordinary psychological, economic and social upheaval into which the Romanized Peninsula was plunged by the successive arrivals of Vandals and Visigoths, now contracted by the Empire for the purposes of defence, now independent and at war with it, but always in demand of the corn and vital space that northern and eastern Europe could not give. The first entrants into the Peninsula were the Vandals, who came by tolerated force. They took a northern route. Mentioned by Tacitus as dwelling between the Elbe and Vistula, they later moved into Dacia, where they were granted freedom of traffic on the Danube in exchange for a levy of cavalry. When they were subsequently exposed to the pressure of the Goths, Constantine allowed them to shift across the Danube into Pannonia, whence in the earliest years of the fifth century, driven apparently by famine, they began to move westwards, taking with them the Alans, a non-Germanic people. In the Rhine district the migrants clashed with the Franks, suffered a heavy defeat and lost a large proportion of their number. Diverted into Gaul, where opposition was less, they ravaged the province for three years. Their first attempt to cross the Pyrenees was held up by the Basques, but in 409 they were let through into the Peninsula with the assent of the Emperor Honorius' mercenaries. In a treaty their incursion

was accepted by the emperor, who agreed to their settling in the Peninsula provided that they defended it from future raiders.

Most of the west and south of the occupied territory was shared among the four tribal groups of the barbarians. The Silingian Vandals occupied Baetica; the Alans, under the rule of Atax, received Lusitania, and Galicia was divided between the Swabians under Hermeric and the Asdingian Vandals. With this division Honorius could hope that at least the north-east would remain Roman; but his plans went astray. The division lasted only a few years, during which time the mercenary-settlers showed no desire to be constrained by their agreement with the emperor. At the same time new and more powerful invaders presented themselves, the Western Goths.


In the middle of the third century the Visigoths separated from the Ostrogoths, abandoned the region of the Black Sea and attempted to cross the Danube. Imperial forces resisted the unauthorized movement and the Visigoths split into two groups, the one taking to the wilds of Transylvania and the other bargaining for territory in Thrace on condition of fighting the enemies of the empire. But the million or more Visigoths who settled in part of Thrace did not find sufficient means of sustenance there, and surging up, defeated and killed the eastern emperor in the battle of Adrianople (378) and overflowed all Thrace. For a time, the new emperor cultivated the friendship of the Visigothic leader, but his successor Arcadius, enthroned in 395, was faced with a new uprising of the barbarians, who occupied Greece and threatened Constantinople. Arcadius sought the help of Honorius, Emperor of the West, whose German minister Stilicho for a time penned the Visigoths in the mountains of Arcadia until they broke through and successfully demanded the cession to them of the region of Illyria. From here they thrust their way into Italy in 401. Their leader Alaric was preparing for the conquest of Rome and the south, when the forces of Stilicho reappeared to drive him north of the Po. Once Stilicho had been assassinated, Alaric again invaded southern Italy, and would have entered Rome but for a large ransom. Honorius refused to come to terms, and Alaric declared him dethroned, forcing the senate to acknowledge a puppet-emperor, Attalus, who in his turn proved inconvenient and was deposed. Having offered to return the empire to Honorius and met with a refusal, Alaric sacked Rome in 410, and himself died not long after. His successor Ataulf negotiated with Honorius and agreed to pass into Gaul in 412, in order to reduce the province to order. This as far as possible done, Ataulf fell out with the Romans and marched upon Toulouse and Bordeaux. Honorius refused to send him corn, and he was forced by lack of supplies to lead his people across the Pyrenees into Spain, where he seized the

city of Barcelona. In 415 the Visigoths again came to terms with the emperor, who set them the task of reducing the Vandals in the Peninsula to obedience.


This task completed, the Visigoths, now under the leadership of Walia, followed the Mediterranean coast down to Cadiz with the intention of crossing into Africa, where booty, land and corn were still to be had. Handicapped by lack of ships, they again turned to Honorius, and in return for the usual contract to fight against the enemies of the Empire, received over half a million measures of corn and authorization to settle in the eastern part of the Peninsula, which they had wrested from the Vandals, Alans and Swabians, and especially the possession of part of south-western France, including Toulouse. This was the situation in 418.

ii. THE SWABIAN KINGDOM OF PORTUGAL. Of the four divisions of the barbarians who had preceded the Visigoths into the Peninsula the first to be eliminated had been the Alans. Numerically weaker, they were easily mastered and absorbed by the Vandals, whose kings they recognized. The Vandals, when they were faced with the onslaught of Walia, were obliged to unite their two sections, but with the treaty of 418, which assigned to the Visigoths control of the eastern Peninsula and southern France, pressure on them was relieved, and they turned their newly unified force against the Swabians. For two years they penned these in Galicia and northern Portugal, until they themselves were beset in the rear by the reaction of Roman forces that had remained in the, Peninsula. Breaking away from the encirclement of Swabian Portugal and Galicia, the Vandals turned south, defeated the Roman armies and seized the hitherto purely Roman cities of Seville and Cartagena. From here they prepared to take advantage of their position to invade Mauretania, a province rich in corn, the economic mainspring of the wanderings of the barbarians, and which offered considerable plunder, since many wealthy Romans had retired to it as the one corner of the ancient world where there was still tranquillity and law. The tranquillity was however precarious. The governor Boniface had refused to appear in Rome to answer certain accusations, and had been declared a traitor. To resist the forces of his enemies he called upon the Vandals for help, and promised to divide Mauretania with their leaders. In 429 the Vandals, with the groups of Goths and Alans they had picked up in the course of their wanderings, crossed into Africa.

With this wholesale evacuation there remained only three elements in the Peninsula, the Visigoths, whose centre of power was still in southern France, the Romans, strongest in the south, and the small, but forceful Swabian kingdom in Galicia and Portugal. This now began to



Map 3. The Western Peninsula in Roman times, showing roads, towns, etc.



Map 4. The Swabian and Visigothic Peninsula.

expand. In the partition of 411 the tribe had received western Galicia with some or all of the district between the Minho and Douro, but it was able to extend these boundaries to the south and east when the Vandals departed for Africa. Previously the smaller number of the Swabians, not more than 60,000, had prevented their expansion; but now that their more powerful neighbours were taken away, they became conquerors, seizing eastern Galicia, the districts of Lugo and Astorga, and moving down the Atlantic seaboard as far as the Tagus. This kingdom had an independent history for just a century and three-quarters, and the outlines of its earlier period have been preserved in the chronicle of Idatius, Bishop of Chaves.

The first king of Swabian Portugal, Hermeric, reigned from about 410 until 440. Even during his lifetime, his son Rechila seized the Roman towns of Mérida and Myrtilis (Mértola), and later, in the course of a short reign of ten years, conquered the Roman south from Seville to Cartagena. Rechila's son, Rechiarius, who married a daughter of Theodoric I of the Visigoths, extended the power of his not numerous but bellicose subjects as far as Saragossa and Lérida, laying waste the north of the Peninsula. In doing this, however, he over-reached himself, for when he refused to fulfil his people's contract with Rome by assisting to drive back the Huns, and even threatened to take arms against his brother-in-law Theodoric II in Toulouse, both Visigoths and Romans turned on him, and advancing deep into his territory, defeated him near Astorga. Theodoric sacked the Roman capital of Braga, and sent troops to Portucale, where in 456 after another battle they captured and killed Rechiarius. Theodoric left one of his followers, Ataulf or Aiulf, in charge of the Swabians, but the governor revolted and set himself up in Portucale as an independent king. A Swabian, Maldra, proclaimed himself king in Lisbon, and when Ataulf and his successor had been murdered, remained the master of Swabian Portugal.

The battles of Braga and Portucale are of some interest in tracing the origin of the name of Portugal. That the name derives from Cale or Portus Cale, on or near the site of the present Oporto, has been generally accepted, but the development of the name from the Cale of Decimus Junius Brutus or earlier to the erection of the county of Portugal by Alfonso VI of Leon is not clear. The addition of Portu- to the place-name Cale is as early as Swabian times: the suggestion seems tenable that Cale was not regarded as a seaport, but as a landport where toll or portorium was exacted from those who crossed the Douro from Tarraconensis into Lusitania. The ferrying of the Douro presupposes settlements on either side, and in this way the name Portucale seems to have been used for both the north and south banks from at least the seventh

century. Thus Portucale came to designate the district of the Douro mouth, and an even larger area. When the Swabians first settled in the north-west, the Roman name for the district was Gallaecia, a word which the Swabians seem to have carried south with them at the time of their expansion. Gonzaga de Azevedo stresses the importance of Portucale in Swabian times—Rechiarius' flight thither, the collapse of Swabian resistance on its capture, and the acclamation of Ataulf there suggest that it may have been the capital—and conjectures that Portucale was already the popular name for the region known in literary and official language as Gallaecia. From the fifth century until the seventh, beginning with Idatius' chronicle, only the word Portucale is used. The form Portucalense appears in the ninth century, when it seems to be interchangeable with the title Gallaecia provincia—'totius Gallaeciae seu Portucalensi Provinciae summum suscipit praesulatum', says a document of the time of Alfonso II (841).

Of the later period of the Swabian kingdom there is very little record. For a time Maldra and his son Remismund made war on the Visigoths, but when a pretender named Fromarius threatened to usurp royal authority, Remismund married a Visigothic princess in order to gain political support. The marriage, through the agency of a Bishop Ajax, was the means of introducing the Visigothic religion of Arian Christianity among the Swabians, who had hitherto retained their pagan gods, except in such cases as that of Rechiarius, converted to Catholicism. With the help of this alliance Remismund re-established Swabian rule in Coimbra and Lisbon, but not for long, for Euric, succeeding to the Visigothic kingdom in 466, was determined to consolidate his authority in the Peninsula and took Mérida and Lisbon from the Swabians, confining them to the extreme north-west. Here they enjoyed another century of independence, of which very little is known after the death of the chronicler Idatius.

iii. THE VISIGOTHIC MONARCHY; THE END OF THE SWABIAN KINGDOM, 585. By the treaty of 418 the Visigoths had been established in the south of France; their duties as defenders of the Empire carried them now into Gaul, now below the Pyrenees, and it was only in the first years of the sixth century that the southern thrust of Clovis forced them back finally into the Peninsula. The details of the wars of the Visigoths as servants of the Empire scarcely concern the history of Portugal except when they illustrate the centralization of Visigothic power in Toledo. Theodoric I, in spite of the wars against the Vandals and, in 446, against the Swabians in Roman service, was chiefly interested in Visigothic expansion in Gaul; after his death in the battle of Campi Catalauni, his son Theodoric II, though again carrying on the campaigns of 456 and

463 against the Swabians, turned towards Roman politics and proclaimed his own emperor, Avitus.

His brother, murderer and successor, Euric, reigned from 466 to 486. The decline of the Roman Empire had lasted so long that its fall was perhaps difficult to foresee, but Euric carried the slowly-forming national policy of the Visigoths to its natural conclusion and began to consolidate an empire in the west. Walia had contracted his people to Rome: Theodoric I had served Rome and his own interests: Theodoric II patronized Rome, and now Euric scorned Rome and made his own empire, consisting of Gaul from Loire to Rhône and nearly all the Peninsula. He took Coimbra from the Romans, and Mérida and Lisbon from the Swabians. When Romulus Augustulus, the last emperor, fell in 476, Euric detached himself from his allegiance to Rome and completed his conquest of the Peninsula, except for the Swabian corner. Yet the Visigothic Empire lasted less than a quarter of a century. In the reign of Euric's successor, Alaric II, Clovis, king of the Catholic Franks, set out with the approval of Rome to drive the Arian Visigoths out of Gaul, and only through the intervention of Theodoric the Ostrogoth, related by marriage to the Visigothic line, was the Peninsula saved. Theodoric sent his general Theudis to hold Spain whilst Alaric's son and successor was a child, and in 531 Theudis succeeded to the throne. The Visigoths, by this time confined to the province of Septimania in Gaul, were now faced with a new danger. The Emperor of the East, Justinian, had broken the power of the Vandals in Africa and sought to recover the Peninsula from the south.

In the reign of Athanagild the struggle was no longer simply racial, but also religious. The Arian Visigoths were faced with three Catholic enemies, the Franks, the recently converted Swabians and the Romans of the south. When Athanagild accepted the assistance of the eastern emperor, the new intruders, also Catholics, joined forces with the Romans and formed a Byzantine fringe along the whole south coast of the Peninsula, extending as far as the Sacred Promontory of Sagres.

Only with the succession of Leovigild did the Visigoths find a leader sufficiently strong to meet the threefold enemy and to resolve the internal difficulties caused by the anarchy of the nobles and the deep cleft of religious antagonism existing between the Arian Visigoths and the Catholic native population. Before coming to the throne Leovigild had worsted the Byzantines and recovered Cordova and other cities. The Swabians of Portugal and Galicia had made alliance with the Byzantines, and Leovigild defeated them. Aware of the weaknesses of Visigothic organization, he established the first permanent capital at Toledo, and attempted to end the unstable elective monarchy by associating his two

sons Hermenegild and Reccared in his government. Hermenegild was established at Cordova, and Reccared in the newly-founded city of Recopolis. In this way it was possible to hold in check the turbulent Visigothic nobility.

But the religious crisis was not long in coming to a head. Leovigild, though a faithful Arian, had married a Catholic, and his son Hermenegild embraced Catholicism, revolted against his father, and made an alliance with the Byzantines and Swabians. Leovigild did not at once take up arms against his son. In order to pave the way for a reconciliation, he called an Arian council, at which it was agreed to abolish a feature of Arianism which was repugnant to Catholics, the repetition of baptism. The move attracted some Catholics, but was not radical enough to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, which were commenced by all three enemies together and accompanied by a revolt of the Basques. However, temporizing with the Franks, Leovigild surrounded Seville and defeated the king of the Swabians, Miro, who was coming to assist Hermenegild. Miro and his successor both became vassals of Leovigild, but in 585, on the grounds of civil conflict in Galicia, the kingdom of the Swabians was suppressed, and its territory incorporated in the Visigothic state. The unsuccessful revolt of Maloric was the last effort for the preservation of Swabian independence, and on Leovigild's death the Peninsula was politically unified, except for parts of the south coast which remained in the hands of the Byzantines.

iv. THE CONVERSION OF RECCARED, 586. Reccared, the son and successor of Leovigild, abandoned Arianism and adopted Catholicism. The circumstances of his conversion are obscure: political motives certainly existed, in view of the instability of the Visigothic state, composed largely of Catholics and bordered by the powerful Franks. The correspondence of Pope Gregory addressed to Archbishop Leander of Seville suggests that Leovigild before his death repented of his harsh treatment of Hermenegild, who had been murdered at Tarragona, and even that he himself had been converted and had had Reccared instructed in Catholicism. Whatever were the antecedents of the act, Reccared called Arian and Catholic bishops to a religious controversy at Toledo in the first year of his reign, 586, and having heard them debate, declared that for not only spiritual, but also temporal reasons, he had chosen Catholicism, which therefore became the official religion. Some of the nobility followed Reccared at once; others, excluded from office, banded together and revolted in Mérida and elsewhere, but without success. The immediate result of the conversion was to raise the Church to a position of great political preponderance. The numerous councils held during the seventh century were to a considerable degree national assemblies, but yet overwhelmingly ecclesiastical in composition—the third Council of Toledo was for instance attended by sixty-seven prelates and only five lay officials.

On the death of Reccared, the Arian party, led by a Count Witeric, who had rebelled in Mérida at the time of Reccared's conversion, overthrew the latter's twenty-year-old son. Witeric, reigning from 603 to 610, did not restore Arianism, though no council of the Church was held during this time. He engaged in war with the Byzantine fringe, which was now declining, and finally disappeared during the two following reigns. The religious bond between the Byzantines and the Catholic subjects of the Visigoths had lost its effect with the conversion of Reccared. Swintila (621–631) finally defeated the Byzantines in the Algarve and they withdrew by ship from the ports of southern Portugal. The period of Byzantine occupation had lasted some eighty years.

v. INFLUENCE OF THE VISIGOTHS. The Visigoths came to the Peninsula in pursuit of corn and booty, and they remained to establish an empire. They were comparatively few in number: estimates between a quarter and half a million seem to be the most reliable. Strongly differentiated by language, customs and religion from the conquered peoples of the Peninsula, they formed themselves from the first into a superior caste. In doing this they made far-reaching changes in the structure of Roman society. For themselves they appropriated two-thirds of the land they took, leaving one-third in the hands of its original owners. Thus two-thirds of the wealth of the Peninsula was held by a small part of the total population, and the Visigoths formed the élite of a baronial society, based on extensive serfdom and shaped by tribal custom instead of Roman law.

Until the conversion of Reccared the differences between conquerors and conquered were probably strongly preserved. Only with the disappearance of the religious barrier did the Visigoths adopt the Latin language, the toga and other Roman garments, the villa, furniture, mosaics and decorations, and Roman manners. In Arian times, the Jewish population enjoyed considerable liberty, holding office in the judicature and in the treasury, owning slaves and intermarrying with Christians. In the reign of Sisebut (612–620), the pious author of a lost chronicle and a Life of St Desiderius, the first persecutions of Jews took place, though the impulsive action of the bishops was restrained to some extent by the influence of the civil power: Sisebut's law decreeing the baptism of all Jews was ascribed to 'unenlightened zeal' by St Isidore of Seville. It was said to have led to 90,000 conversions, the majority of which were certainly only temporary.

In the seventh century the position of the Church was extremely strong. The two councils held in the reign of Chintila (636-640) showed

the continued tendency for the Church to supply the state with the unity it had hitherto lacked. The influence of the Church in this direction was especially evident at the seventh Council of Toledo of 646, when it recommended banishment and confiscation as the punishment for all those who had sought to undermine the royal authority by provoking revolt and had escaped abroad. The fifth and sixth councils had already authorized the excommunication of those who rebelled against the king, and recommended that each king be obliged to take vengeance on the murderers of his predecessor. The continuance of regicide is a proof that these measures could not altogether remedy the inherent lawlessness of the Visigothic state. The majority of kings came to violent ends; indeed the chronicler expresses some surprise in recording the natural death of Athanagild. Only too often the nobility and clergy who expressed the will of the councils were the very sponsors of revolt and anarchy. Leovigild's attempt to stabilize the monarchy by the introduction of hereditary succession did not survive his own son, for Reccared's successor was once more elected. The continuation of the chronicle of Gregory of Tours records of Chindaswinth how 'the king well knew the disease of the Goths to depose their kings, since he had had a share in many conspiracies, but for the same reason he knew the highest and most dangerous families, who did not escape his sure blows, for he ordered all those who had taken part in previous dethronements to be put to death or executed, and it may be reckoned that he did away on these grounds with two hundred of the highest caste and five hundred less prominent men, dividing their wives, children and goods among his own followers'.

Until the middle of the seventh century the Visigoths maintained their law and left the Hispano-Roman population the use of its own code. Alaric II had even codified the law of the Hispano-Romans, perhaps to gain their support in fighting the Franks. But in the reign of Chindaswinth the two codes were replaced by one law, the *Liber Judicum*. His son Recceswinth (652–672) published the last Visigothic code, with additions which indicate that the decrees of Chindaswinth intended to fortify the position of the monarchy were now unheeded, and that the Church and nobility had again encroached on royal power. Reccesswinth himself proposed a pardon for those who had been punished by his father for rebellion. Once more the right to elect successors to the monarchy was granted. Even more, the election must take place at the spot where the last king died, thus affording his murderers every protection in setting up his successor.

There is no evidence that Portugal played any independent part in the Visigothic state. Presumably uniformity was completed by the con-

version of Reccared and the end of the religious distinction in Galicia. Currency was minted at various Portuguese towns from the time of Leovigild, in whose name coins were struck at Bracara, Portucale and Elvora (Évora). The effigy of Reccared appears on coins minted at Portucale and Elvora, and also Eminio (Coimbra) and Egitania (Idanha-a-Velha). Succeeding kings issued money from the same five centres; only Sisebut by way of exception appears on coins from Vizeo and Lameco. The absence of any mint south of Évora is explained by the Byzantine occupation of the Algarve, but the lack of coinage from Lisbon is a curious omission, and suggests a decline under Visigothic rule.

The Visigoths had been almost the earliest of the barbarians to come under Roman influence, the first to reduce their language to writing in the Codex Argenteus of Wulfila. Already on their entry into the Peninsula they had thus been tinged by Roman culture, which they developed in their own way. The school of St Isidore of Seville is the summit of Visigothic culture, and his twenty volumes of Etymologies are a remarkable encyclopaedia of erudition.

Of Visigothic culture Portugal had its share, despite the evident backwardness of the far west. A Lusitanian was Paulus Orosius, a pupil of St Augustine and author of Historiarum Libri VII contra Paganos, purporting to show, like the City of God, that the sufferings of humanity were not to be ascribed to the vengeance of the angry gods, since such evils had been even greater before. St Fructuosus of Braga brought some of the culture of Seville to the west, writing to St Braulius of Saragossa for books and advice. 'Do not think yourself worthy of scorn because you are relegated to the extremity of the west', Braulius replied; 'in an ignorant country, as you say, where naught is heard but the sound of tempests, for this is a case when we may say that those who were plunged into darkness shall see light. Moreover the province in which you dwell is not so barbarous as you say. It was peopled by the Greeks, by the masters of eloquence and genius, and I know that from it there came men very learned and able in letters, such as Father Orosius, Bishop Turribius, Idatius and Carterius, a pontiff no less worthy of respect for the extent of his erudition than for his great age.'

In the middle of the sixth century, Charraric, King of the Swabians, his son Theodemir being desperately ill, invoked the aid of St Martin of Tours, whose tomb was already a centre of pilgrimage. Theodemir recovered, and his father sent for relics of St Martin and founded a church in his name at Dume, near Braga. Here he established a Pannonian priest also called Martin, and later canonized as St Martin of Dume or of Braga, who made many conversions among the Swabians. In his work for the propagation of Catholicism, Martin founded the

metropolitanate of Lugo, and a monastic house at Dume. He regularized the doubtless fluid conceptions of dogma, liturgy, and morality—'Correcting the rustics' is the title of one of his sermons—and seated Catholicism firmly in the place of dying Priscillianism. In 561 the calling of the first Council of Braga by King Theodemir marked an important stage in the development of the ancient ecclesiastical centre. St Martin of Dume directed the activities of the second Council of Braga in 572, and pursued his labours of evangelization and unification until his death in 579.¹

vi. The collapse of the visigothic state. The causes of the sudden, catastrophic decline of the Visigothic state, which permitted the African invaders to seize almost the whole Peninsula in the space of a few years, lie partly in the general instability of Visigothic authority and partly in the immediate weakening deriving from Reccessionships concessions to the pressure of the exorbitantly powerful magnates. The widening social rifts were fully exploited by these magnates. Wamba, who was elected king on the death of Reccessinth in 672, was faced with revolts in Gaul and of the Basques, which he successfully suppressed. On his return he found it necessary to reorganize the army, which was much reduced, and abandoned the traditional Germanic law that only free men should have the right to bear arms, ordering nine-tenths of all slaves and serfs to be presented for military duty. The reason for this was probably the decline in the number of free men, many of whom had preferred the protection of patronage or serfdom in the service of the strongest nobles to the hazards and exactions of free existence in times of continuous violence. The reorganization was repealed in the following reign: Wamba had defied canon law by ordering all the clergy to do military service.

Wamba's grotesque end, shorn of his hair by a favourite, and banished and deposed by a council of nobles and priests on the ground that a cropped head was the mark of a slave, was a sign of the demoralization of the times. Ervigius, the favourite and successor, had his position secured by the twelfth and thirteenth Councils of Toledo, which declared his person inviolable, and took his wife and children under its aegis. He purchased the acquiescence of Wamba's nephew, Egica, by marrying him to his daughter. Ervigius, with the Metropolitan of Toledo, Julian, a converted Jew, promulgated a series of strong oppressive measures against the Jews, which caused them to hail the arrival of the African invaders as liberators.

¹ The Liturgy known as the Braga Rite is frequently held by Portuguese writers to derive from this period. While the introduction of special practices may date from Swabian times, there seems to be little evidence to suggest that the Rite is pre-Cluniac.

Egica, coming to the throne in 687, called a council at Toledo to help him decide whether to obey an oath he had made to protect Ervigius' family or a second oath to do justice to his vassals, many of whom were followers of Wamba despoiled by Ervigius. The council absolved him from the first oath, but the president of the fifteenth Council of Toledo, the Metropolitan Sisbert, led an unsuccessful conspiracy against him, and was condemned for treason, deposed and cloistered by order of the sixteenth Council. The times were bad; plots, plague and idolatry were rife. The sons of Ervigius plotted against Egica; even his own son Witiza was exiled to Galicia, though apparently he was later forgiven. He was associated in the government from 697, and governed alone from Egica's death in 701 until 710.

Of Witiza's reign the most conflicting accounts exist. Unfortunately the transactions of the eighteenth and last Council of Toledo have disappeared, and it is impossible to tell whether he was beloved by his people, as an early version has it, or a depraved brute, as later chronicles assert. Gonzaga de Azevedo depicts him as popular, but weakly led into the path of license; the tradition of his monstrous vices was possibly built up on his abolition of ecclesiastical celibacy. On his death in 710 the last of the Visigothic kings, Rodrigo (Rudericus, Roderick) acceded, and the last two years are a welter of conflicting legend with almost no reliable documentation. Rodrigo was the son of Duke Theufred of Cordova, who was a bitter enemy of Witiza, and had been blinded for conspiring against him. Possibly the kingdom was divided on Witiza's death, in which case Rodrigo received Baetica and tried to seize the rest from Witiza's sons. 'Rodrigo riotously usurped the kingdom with the encouragement of the senate', says Isidore of Beja.

CHAPTER III

THE MOSLEM OCCUPATION

i. THE ISLAMIC INVASION, 710-712. In the first decade of the eighth century there was in the town of Septum, now Ceuta, a semi-independent Byzantine ruler, whose name was variously recorded as Urbano, Orban, Olban, and, in the record of Silos, by the name which has been generally adopted, Julian. Gravely offended by Rodrigo-one point on which Arabic and Latin authors agree—he offered the Moslem governor of North Africa, Emir Musa ibn Nusair, assistance in conquering the Peninsula. The first landing, made in July 710, was a tentative raid; Abu Zur'a Tarif took a small force, consisting of some four hundred men and a hundred horse, but returned safely and laden with plunder. The simplicity and profit of the raid led naturally to a larger enterprise. In 711 a stronger force, consisting chiefly of Berbers under the command of Tariq ibn Ziyad, was ferried over the Straits in only four ships and seized Gibraltar, from which the nearby city of Carteia was captured. Tariq, Musa's lieutenant in the government of Africa, collected some twelve thousand men, his original army being reinforced on the news that Rodrigo was preparing to resist. The King of the Visigoths had been engaged in a campaign against the Basques, but now he hastened south and met the Saracens, who had already brushed away minor resistance, on the road to Cordova, between Medina Sidonia and Veier de la Frontera. Here a battle was fought on July 19, 711. Bishop Oppas and others deserted from the Visigothic army, apparently to spite Rodrigo. He himself seems to have perished in the action, and his forces were scattered or killed, leaving the road open to Cordova and Toledo.

Learning of this decisive victory, and unwilling to miss the glories of conquest, the Emir Musa landed in the Peninsula with 18,000 men and occupied Seville in July 712. As he advanced into Lusitania, Mértola and Beja quickly fell, but Mérida was only reduced after a protracted siege. With its capture, Musa diverted his attention to the north-east. Only in Murcia and Valencia did one of the Visigothic governors, Duke Theodemir, make a resistance and obtain reasonable terms and recognition as a tributary prince. Before the conquest was completed, Musa and Tariq, who had fallen out about the treatment to be accorded to the conquered, were both summoned to Damascus to substantiate their mutual accusations, and Musa's son 'Abdu'l-'Aziz remained in Spain to

govern the new Moslem dominions from Seville. 'Abdu'l-'Aziz, who had married Rodrigo's widow Egilona, displayed lenience towards his Christian subjects, but in 716 he was murdered by order of the new caliph. His nephew and successor, Aiyub ibn Habib al-Lakhmi, moved the seat of government from Seville to Cordova and organized the administration of the overlapping civilizations.

Broadly speaking, the conquered territory was divided into that which had submitted without a struggle and that which had been reduced by force. In the former case, the inhabitants were allowed to use and keep possession of the land on payment of a capitation and property tax. Those who came under the second category were subject to the sack of their possessions, the loss of ownership of their land and the reduction of their own status to that of serfs: one-fifth of the land thus acquired was reserved for the state, and the remainder divided among Musa's army. Most of the north and west of the Peninsula submitted and was therefore not rigorously dealt with; in certain instances, such as that of Coimbra and Santarém, submission was accepted although resistance had been made. In many cases the yoke of the Saracens was not heavy except in point of taxation. The capitation tax of twelve, twenty-four and fortyeight dirhems a month, according to the status of the contributor, labouring, middle-class or wealthy, applied to all males who were not monks, beggars, cripples or slaves. The property-tax, which was claimed from Christians and Moslems alike, consisted of a payment of a fifth of the income. On occasions the onus of this simple system of taxation was increased by the fraudulence of the gatherers and the illegal reduplication of instalments. At first, however, a separate administration was allowed, for an Arabic writer declares that one Ardabastus, a son of Witiza, was recognized as count of the Christians and director of the property-tax, and records that on his advice a division of Syrian soldiers was settled in Ossonoba and Beja by Abu'l-Khattar (743-745).

ii. THE MOSLEM PENINSULA; THE GOVERNORS; THE ESTABLISHMENT OF UMAIYAD RULE, 755. Neither the Gothic nor the Moslem invasions led to the deep permeation and reorganization that had followed the Roman conquests. In the first case, far from obliterating the Roman tradition of culture, the violent half-literate Goths were slowly steeped in it themselves; in the second, the Moslems, satisfied by the tribute they were able to extract from the vast conquered areas of the Peninsula, and tempted by the possibility of carrying their faith into Gaul, disregarded the little nucleus of Gothic resistance in the Asturian mountains until it had grown sufficiently strong to secure its own existence.

Until 755 the Moslem Peninsula was ruled by governors, all of whom failed to enforce a continuous administrative policy or to obtain a firm

foothold in Gaul. Thus Aiyub's successor, al-Hurr ibn 'Abdu'r-Raḥman ath-Thaqafi, completed the reduction of the Peninsula except the Asturian pocket of resistance which was to bring forth the reconquest, and prepared incursions across the Pyrenees, but was deposed after failure in these attempts. His successor, as-Samah ibn Malik al-Khaulani, victoriously carried Moslem arms as far as the Rhône and brought back spoils and captives from Burgundy, but on his failure to take Toulouse and subsequent death in battle, the Saracens retired to Narbonne. After a succession of unsatisfactory governors, 'Abdu'r-Rahman ibn 'Abdillah al-Ghafiki took power, purged the administration and returned the Christian churches to their state before the conquest, restoring some and pulling down others that had been built by dint of bribing the Moslem magistrates. He prepared a large-scale invasion of France, but after the capture of Bordeaux and siege of Tours, the Saracens were totally defeated by Charles Martel at Poitiers in 732, and 'Abdu'r-Rahman killed. His ninety-year old successor proved unfortunate in the pursuit of the war with the Franks, and the Emir of Africa, 'Uqba ibn al-Hajjaj, came to the Peninsula to reorganize the administration, founding mosques and schools, but was prevented from avenging the shattering reverse of Poitiers by the outbreak of Berber disorders in Africa. When, four years later, he was able to return to the Peninsula, he found all in chaos again and the Saracen power in Septimania declining.

'Uqba himself died in Cordova, and fierce racial conflicts broke out between Arabs and Berbers, which divided the Peninsula and Africa until the government of Yusuf ibn 'Abdu'r-Raḥman al-Fihri, from 746 until 755, the last and longest-tolerated of the governors. His work of restoration after the devastations of civil war was interrupted by conspiracies and revolutions which gradually undermined his power; and 'Abdu'r-Raḥman, an Umaiyad who as a youth of twenty had taken refuge from the 'Abbasid persecutions with the Berbers, appeared in the Peninsula, rallied all the enemies of Yusuf and made himself king in Cordova.

The Peninsula was now a separate Moslem state. But the atmosphere of rebellion and disorder still prevailed: 'Abdu'r-Raḥman I's enemies called in Charlemagne's forces, and the defeat of the Frankish rearguard as it crossed the Pyrenees on the way back to repel the Saxons provided the subject-matter of the Chanson de Roland. 'Abdu'r-Raḥman's innumerable enemies in the Peninsula, in Damascus and Africa, and in France, made it necessary for him to raise a permanent army of mercenaries, with which he drove out an African invasion supported by Damascus and suppressed the rebellions of his adversaries. In Lusitania he built numerous mosques for the Egyptian and Berber settlers, none

of which have survived to rival his great mosque at Cordova; he died at Mérida in 787.

Though the Arabs had now established themselves over the Berbers, his son Hisham I was faced with the rebellion of two elder brothers: when it was quelled, he diverted the martial spirit of his subjects in two expeditions, one an invasion of France which brought great spoils from the sack of Narbonne and Carcassonne, the other an attack on the small Christian monarchy of Asturias which was now over-spreading Galicia.

iii. THE RECONQUEST UNTIL 842. The foundation of the Asturian state and the first victory of Pelayo over the Moslems, probably between 721 and 725, are the beginning of the long process of reconquest; the territory that had been lost in a few months took in the case of Portugal over five, and in that of Leon and Castile seven and a half centuries to recover.

The earliest steps towards the reconquest of Galicia and Portugal were made by Alfonso I. His predecessors had made their capital at Cangas: the area they controlled was still extremely restricted. Alfonso raided and seized the territory of Braga, Oporto and Viseu in modern Portugal, and Astorga, Leon, Zamora, Salamanca, Simancas, Avila and Miranda del Ebro in Spain. According to the Chronicon Albeldense he 'laid waste the land as far as the Douro': whilst the Chronicon Sebastiani names the cities Alfonso took and adds: 'Killing also the Arabs who occupied the said cities, he led the Christians back with him to their country.' That northern Portugal was at this time completely cleared of population, a supposition based on the texts mentioned above, has been contested since the time of Herculano. In his will, dated 747, and another document of 760, Bishop Odoarius describes the restoration of Lugo under his direction. A native of the city, he had been exiled and 'dwelt long in waste places', whence he and 'many of our families and other people, both noble and commoners', returned to find their home deserted and uninhabitable, so that it had to be rebuilt from its foundations. His companions he installed in neighbouring estates, and provided with oxen for ploughing and beasts of burden. It seems unlikely that he should have brought enough men to rebuild the city and occupy its rural dependencies, not to mention the supply of cattle, and it may reasonably be supposed that local labour and colonists who had survived the incursions of the Saracens and of Alfonso I were available. The vilas to which Odoarius refers by name have been identified with existing parishes in Galicia and Portugal: if his Provecendi, Avezani, Guntini and Veremundi correspond with Provesende (Vila Nova de Cerveira), Abação (Guimarãis), Gontim (Fafe) and Vermoim (Famalicão), and his Desterit with Desteriz (near Orense, Galicia), then Odoarius repeopled a considerable area between and above the Minho and the Douro. The work was patronized by Alfonso I, and at his command Odoarius would have proceeded to restore the diocese of Braga, had not the bishop's death cut short this task. It seems likely that whilst Alfonso I had razed the cities north of the Douro, where the sparse Saracen population was concentrated, killing the Moslems and carrying off the Christians, the rural areas, occupied chiefly by the original inhabitants, were left little altered by his inroads, and by remaining, facilitated the task of repopulation. Although the conquests of Alfonso I were not permanent, his action in breaking up the towns from which the Saracens governed and in promptly resettling the district was responsible for the reduction of Moslem influence to very small proportions in the north-west of the Peninsula.

From the death of Alfonso I in 757 until the accession of his grandson Alfonso II in the last years of the century, there was a lull in the progress of the reconquest: the most important event of this period is the foundation of Oviedo by Alfonso I's son Fruela. Alfonso II, like his immediate predecessor, had to face the heavy attacks of Hisham I and al-Hakam I. The former's generals on two occasions, in 794 and 795, succeeded in sacking the Asturian capital, and as a protection Alfonso II sought an alliance with Charlemagne. In spite of the internal troubles of the Gothic state, in which it is possible to detect the old weakness of indirect succession, Alfonso succeeded in frustrating the attempts of the Moslems to crush the rising state. But if Alfonso had his own troubles, the court of Cordova was, under al-Hakam I, shot through with dissension and jealousy; and the retirement of Alfonso's adversaries permitted him to lead a deep drive into their territory in the course of which Lisbon was sacked in 798. Just three and a half centuries elapsed before this unsustained raid could be turned into a definite conquest.

By 812 the Moslem state was rent with internal strife, and had lost Barcelona to the Franks: the peace of that year with Charlemagne and Alfonso II spelt the end of the concerted effort of the Emirate of Cordova to destroy the Asturian state. Three years later the struggle was recommenced, but this time the Moslems were driven off. From 833 a three-cornered struggle went on in the north-west between Alfonso II, 'Abdu'r-Rahman II and the rebel Muhammad who had set himself up independently at Monsalud. On the approach of regular forces he fled to Galicia and held out against the emir's forces, either as an ally of Alfonso's or separately. The dissensions of the Moslems could not be more plainly written on Alfonso's own wall.

On his death in 842, Alfonso II had not extended the Christian territories: his efforts had all been devoted to stemming the threatened reaction. However, the restoration of Braga, intended by Alfonso I, was now begun. According to a document whose original dated from 840,

a council of counts and bishops was called by Alfonso II at Guimarãis in order to foster the repopulation of the whole region. Many people accepted possession of lands as *presúrias*—the old ceremony of dividing up lands which were ownerless when they were recovered from the Saracens was celebrated with banner and trumpet throughout the reconquest. After the council at Guimarãis, the king himself came to Braga and held a new assembly at which various prelates and others were appointed to fix the ancient boundaries of the city. A second document of the following year, preserved at Lugo Cathedral, contains Alfonso's decision that, as Braga was still in great decadence, it should be embraced in the jurisdiction of the see of Lugo.

iv. THE RISE AND DECLINE OF CORDOVA. Al-Ḥakam I came to the throne at the age of twenty-two on the death of his father Hisham I in 796. The authority of the emir in Cordova was now challenged by the rising power of the class of jurists (fuqaha'), who joined forces with the neo-Moslem population in a series of rebellions. Soon the whole of the Moslem Peninsula was in a turmoil, which al-Ḥakam only dominated by his presence and his cruelty. Mérida was repressed in 806, and all the notables of Toledo were slain in the 'day of the ditch' in the following year. In Cordova itself the 'affair of the suburb', the bloody suppression of the discontented inhabitants of the southern quarter of Cordova (817), led to the deportation of many Moslems to Africa, and al-Ḥakam was driven to rely upon his guard of mercenaries. Meanwhile, the Franks had seized numerous towns between Lérida and Narbonne, including Barcelona in 801. After 812, however, a peace was made.

'Abdu'r-Rahman II, who acceded in 822, proved quite incapable of dealing with the situation he had inherited, and during his reign the Mozarabs dared to revolt in Cordova itself, where several Christian illuminati obtained martyrdom in what appears to have been a nationalist movement. Ludovic, king of the Franks, in a letter to the inhabitants of Mérida, apparently chiefly Mozarabs, incited them to rebellion with promises of help, and the movement spread from Lusitania to Toledo, which was able to hold out for nine years.

At this time the first invasion of the Northmen began to devastate the western coast of the Peninsula. They appeared off Lisbon as early as 844 with a force of fifty-four large ships and were able to plunder the outskirts of the town. From Lusitania they proceeded to round Cape St Vincent and sailed up the Guadalquivir to sack the suburbs of Seville. Here they were driven off and returned along the Portuguese shore. The governors of Santarém and Coimbra were ordered to man the coast, and fleets were built to constitute a guard against future expeditions.

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Six years before his death, which occurred in 852, 'Abdu'r-Raḥman had desolated and burnt Leon. Under his successor, Muhammad I, the Christians came to an understanding with the Mozarabs of Saragossa, Huesca and Toledo, and raised a rebellion across a large part of the Peninsula, with the support of Navarre. Scarcely had Toledo been subjected, when the Northmen reappeared on the west coast. Though the governor's cavalry drove them back to their boats, already laden with spoil, they returned to winter in the Peninsula after raiding the African coast, the Balearic Islands and even farther afield. The Christians under Ordoño I again reached Lisbon, and Muḥammad penetrated Galicia in return, an exploit he repeated in the early years of Alfonso III. But famine and plague weakened the Moslems, and a truce was made in Cordova in 883. Disintegration was widespread: powerful families had established independent governments in Saragossa, Mérida and Barbastro. The rebellion of 'Umar ibn Ḥafṣun, who collected ten thousand horsemen, apart from infantry, and held Toledo, lasted for some thirty years and set an example to numerous other seekers for independence. Two Moslems of Peninsular origin established their own governments in Portuguese territory, Bakr at Ossonoba, and ibn Abi'l-Jawad in Beja and Mértola. Throughout the reigns of al-Mundir and 'Abdu'llah the anarchy continued: in Seville a prolonged family feud divided the city between the Arab family of Banu'l-Ḥajjaj and the native family of Angelino, in which Berbers and other Moslems intervened.

Only the accession of 'Abdu'r-Rahman III, the most successful of the rulers of Cordova, changed the situation. He, acclaimed at the age of twenty-two in 912, appropriated the titles applied to the Caliph of Bagdad, and with irresistible energy recovered one by one the castles and cities that had rebelled. Even ibn Hafsun fought a losing battle, and after his death his two sons were reduced in their fortress of Barbastro. Not only did 'Abdu'r-Rahman stave off anarchy, but he reformed the administration and taxation; the measures with which he maintained unity were harsh, but they were accepted. Ceasing to rely for military support on the levies of the tribes, too often withheld, he formed a professional army strong enough in foreign elements to make him independent of his own magnates. His mercenaries, generally called Slavs because of the presence among them of many Southern Russians, included also Franks, Lombards and Galicians—the latter the usual Arabic name for the Asturo-Leonese. In the campaign of 939 a number of the tribal leaders deserted, apparently because the Slav Najda had been put in command. The seeds of future anarchy had indeed been sown, but the army of mercenaries enabled 'Abdu'r-Rahman to reduce his own people to obedience and to intervene in the Christian states of the north.

When a usurper, Ordoño IV, possessed himself of Leon, it was to 'Abdu'r-Raḥman that Sancho I and his grandmother Tota appealed; and when they recovered the throne with his help, Ordoño in turn betook himself to Cordova. So renowned a prince received embassies from the Byzantines and from the Germans. Ramiro of Leon, however, held his own against the Moslem conqueror until the five-year truce of 942 elapsed and 'Abdu'r-Raḥman took vengeance for an attack on Talavera by again penetrating into Galicia.

After the conspiracy of his second son, who was punished by execution, 'Abdu'r-Rahman soon died, leaving the bibliophile al-Hakam II to add wisdom and peace to what had been won by severity and arms. During the fifteen years of al-Hakam's reign, the caliphate of Cordova reached its greatest degree of civilization, a summit that did not long survive his death in 976. Already Abu 'Amir Muhammad, later known as the Victorious, al-Mansur, had appeared as a statesman whose liberality and courtesy, combined with wealth and natural subtlety, won him a place of prominence in Cordova. Under Hisham II, who acceded as a boy of ten, he became prime minister, tutor and general with the favour of al-Hakam's widow. His campaigns, covering the last twenty years of the tenth century, took him to Galicia and Barcelona and strained the Christian states to their utmost. His triumphs, bringing great spoils and numerous captives, encouraged al-Mansur to think of raising himself to the one degree of power he did not already possess. Favouring his allies, dismissing his enemies, flattering or doing away with his rivals, building his own castle and arsenal, and issuing decrees and proclamations in his own name, al-Mansur collected all the attributes of monarchy: according to Arab sources, certainly exaggerated but none the less significant, he had in Cordova a force of two hundred thousand cavalry and three times as many infantry. Though his wish to occupy the caliphate was not fulfilled, he maintained complete sway over the Peninsula and in North Africa until 1002, when he raised a large force to meet the combined armies of Leon, Castile, Navarre and the Basque provinces, near the source of the Douro. In the battle the Saracen forces entered Canales, but al-Mansur himself died shortly afterwards, after governing for twenty-five years.

His son 'Abdu'l-Malik succeeded him as hajib, while Hisham II continued, with his mother's connivance, to lead a life of mild hedonism. 'Abdu'l-Malik had something of his father's gifts and character, but his early death brought his younger brother 'Abdu'r-Rahman to power. The son of a Christian mother, 'Abdu'r-Rahman's religious orthodoxy was suspect, and he combined a love of military pomp and dissolute habits with the energy and ambition of his father. The childless Hisham declared.

him his successor, thus exciting the jealousy of the Umaiyads. Whilst 'Abdu'r-Rahman was at war with the Christians, Hisham was deposed by a cousin who compelled him to abdicate in his own favour and collected sufficient forces in Cordova to be able to resist 'Abdu'r-Rahman on his return and capture and assassinate him. So in 1009 the central authority again dissolved. The new caliph sought to expel from Cordova the Berbers on whom al-Manşur had relied: after heavy fighting in the streets, the Africans were forced out and made an alliance with the Christians. Hisham, or a pretender resembling him, reappeared and vanished again in the midst of the wars between the Berbers and the caliph. Gradually the mercenaries upon whom al-Mansur based his power were drawn into the confusion; Slavs, Berbers, Arabs fought for power and laid the heart of the Moslem kingdom waste. Those in power found it necessary to make concessions to the various adversaries, which merely encouraged the strife. At length in 1031 the inhabitants of Cordova, weary of feuds and pillage, expelled the caliph and established a republic. The rest of the Saracen dominions were not long in splitting up into independent governments, or taifas. Seville became a republic: in the provinces many families carved out their own principalities—the Aftasids of Badajoz held most of southern Lusitania, whilst below the Tagus there appeared three states, Mértola under ibn Taifur, Silves under the Banu'l Muzaiyin, and Santa Maria, whose modern name of Faro is derived from ibn Harun.

v. The reconquest to the accession of fernando i. After the death of Alfonso II, his successor Ramiro had to fight revolts of his own nobility and drive off the Northmen from the coast of Galicia. His son Ordoño I, reigning from 850 until 866, carried the reconquest a stage further by rebuilding various towns, including Leon, Astorga and Tuy: Orense was lost and won again. On Ordoño's death his son Alfonso III was still a boy, though he had already been elected to the monarchy. His reign of forty-four years was composed of alternate spells of warfare and settlement. Already on his father's death, a baron, Count Froilanus of Galicia. had declared himself king, and Alfonso was driven into exile in Castile. until the usurper was shortly after assassinated. A war against the Basques, followed by a lull, preceded twelve years of heavy campaigning on the southern frontiers. Crossing the Douro, he reoccupied Salamanca, but was driven back by the superior cavalry of the Saracens. In the ding-dong struggle that followed the towns of Lamego, Viseu and Coimbra were temporarily recaptured, and the area of devastation carried down as far as Mérida. Alfonso even penetrated the Sierra Morena and inflicted a reverse on the enemy, who reacted and launched a heavy attack in Castile. In 883 a truce was agreed to, which continued in force between Cordova and Oviedo for the remaining twenty-seven years of the reign. In 901

however a lieutenant of ibn Ḥafṣun besieged Zamora, and Alfonso defeated him and carried his attack on to Toledo, which he left unharmed on payment of a ransom. During these campaigns a number of important restorations and repopulations took place, some north of the Douro, such as Oporto and Braga, and some south—Lamego, Viseu and Coimbra. The document ordering the repopulation of Braga still exists in the District Archives.

In the last years of Alfonso III's reign various members of his family attempted to secure his abdication, which was obtained by force a year before his death. His three sons divided up his realms between them; the eldest, García, took Leon, whilst the others, Fruela and Ordoño, governed Asturias and Galicia. The independence of Galicia, though not long maintained, seems to have favoured the resettlement of the west. In 911 Ordoño ordered the limits of the ancient bishopric of Dume to be marked out, and in the following year the church of Lourosa (Oliveira do Hospital) was built. The building, whose style has no counterpart in Portugal, consists of a central nave with shorter aisles divided from it by broad horse-shoe arches: the ajimez over the principal door is unique in Portugal. Whilst the church may have been constructed by Mozarabs, it seems more probable that Lourosa was settled at this time and that the church was therefore the work of Ordoño II.

On the death of García, the dismemberment of the Christian kingdom was partly remedied by the union of Leon with Ordoño's dominions. Ordoño now raided Moslem Lusitania between the Tagus and Guadiana and brought back rich spoils from Badajoz. 'Abdu'r-Raḥman took vengeance in an invasion of Ordoño's territory, but was defeated in 917 at Gormaz. Ordoño's acquisition of Leon led to the dislocation of the battle-area to the centre of the Peninsula, where most of the incursions until the end of his reign in 923 took place. Fruela II restored the unity of the Christian kingdoms in 924.

The next ruler, Alfonso IV, abdicated in 931 in favour of his brother Ramiro II, but he repented of his decision and left the cloister to reclaim the crown; Ramiro refused to return it and had him and the three sons of Fruela II imprisoned and blinded. Having thus violently established his power, Ramiro began to invade Saracen territory, in combination with the opponents of 'Abdu'r-Raḥman in Toledo. After two years of peace, Ramiro received the submission of the governor of Santarém, Umaiya ibn Iṣhaq Abu Yaḥya, whose brother, a vizir, had been executed by 'Abdu'r-Raḥman. Numbers of Saracens shared in the defection and Ramiro took advantage of it to lay waste Lusitania as far as Badajoz and Mérida, returning safely by way of Lisbon. In revenge 'Abdu'r-Raḥman collected over a hundred thousand men (the figure is from Arabic sources) near

Salamanca, whence the towns of the Christian frontiers were devastated and Zamora besieged. Ramiro in reply assembled at Burgos Galicians, Asturians, Leonese and Castilians, together with the Navarrese of Queen Tota and the Moslems of Abu Yaḥya: but the great battle fought near Simancas in August 939 was indecisive, and the siege of Zamora was not apparently relieved. Although Ramiro had been able to assemble sufficient forces to face the might of 'Abdu'r-Raḥman, the Christians soon quarrelled among themselves. In 944 ambassadors went to Cordova to negotiate a truce, which lasted until shortly before Ramiro's death in 951.

Lisbon was again sacked in the only expedition carried out by Ordoño III, and his brother Sancho the Fat was ejected from the kingdom by a son of Alfonso IV, Ordoño IV, and obliged to seek the assistance of 'Abdu'r-Raḥman, by which means he recovered his capital at the head of a Saracen army, and forced his rival to take refuge in his turn at the court of Cordova. Sancho I was faced with the revolt of a number of barons in Galicia in conjunction with the Bishop of Santiago de Compostela; the ringleaders pretended to offer submission and took advantage of an interview to poison him. His son Ramiro III was only five years of age. Under the regency of Elvira, the new king's aunt, fresh raids of the Northmen were repelled from the coast of Galicia. In 968, Gundered, the viking leader, established himself on Galician soil and held out for a year and a half: Bishop Sisnand of Santiago died fighting him, and his successor St Rudesind carried on the struggle until Count Gonzalo Sánchez defeated the invaders and killed Gundered himself.

On the accession of Hisham II in Cordova and the rise of al-Manṣur, the war of the two religions recommenced. When Ramiro III came to govern, he sought to meddle in the affairs of the caliphate by taking sides with the enemies of al-Manṣur. In return the hajib made his first lightning raid on the northern kingdom. But for a great snowstorm the capital would have fallen. Ramiro's defeat encouraged a pretender, Bermudo II, to raise forces against him and declare himself king in Santiago. When Ramiro challenged him, a battle was fought with no decisive result, and Ramiro returned to Leon and Bermudo to Compostela. Bermudo succeeded in seizing Leon in 984, and drove Ramiro to Astorga, whence he sought the help of al-Manṣur. In spite of Ramiro's death, Bermudo was so beset with internal strife that he himself was constrained to seek al-Manṣur's help, with which he subdued the nobles who opposed him. At this time Leon became a tributary state to Cordova, and was forced to support an army of occupation. At length Bermudo attempted to throw off the yoke and expel his masters, bringing a sharp reaction from al-Manṣur in the campaigns of 987 and 988. Lusitania was overrun, Leon and Zamora conquered, Coimbra sacked

and, after lying abandoned for seven years, repeopled with Moslems. Many Christian counts acknowledged al-Manṣur's authority; others tried to take advantage of the crisis to found their own kingdoms, as did Gonçalo Menendes in Galicia. Meanwhile, as central authority vanished among the Leonese, al-Manṣur vanquished the Navarrese and Castilians. In 996 Bermudo tried to obtain peace, but the negotiations were not concluded. A year later al-Manṣur began his most devastating campaign, a double onslaught by land and sea aimed at Compostela. Successful in razing the city, he used the high altar as a manger, and carried off the city gates and cathedral bells as trophies to Cordova. On his return, he destroyed Leon. The conquest of what the Moslems regarded as the ka'ba of the Christian Peninsula was a triumph for al-Manṣur: certain Galician counts who had assisted him were well rewarded for their treachery.

In the midst of these misadventures Bermudo II died in 999, having seen the Christian kingdom approach extinction. His son Alfonso V was five years old when he was acclaimed in Leon, now rebuilding. The culminating disaster was held off by the African wars of al-Manşur, and perhaps by a renewed sense of responsibility among the Christians during Alfonso's minority. In 1002 al-Mansur attacked the centre of the Peninsula, and in this campaign the Christians scored their first and last victory against him. Nevertheless in 1003 Leon was again destroyed, and in 1007 the Saracens ravaged Galicia. Ten years later the Northmen under Olaf Haraldsson, the future St Olave, depredated the same region. Little by little the demoralization of the Christian states passed. By 1020 Leon had been restored, and the inventory of the possessions of one Gonçalo ibn Egas dated 1017 shows that Alfonso V had recovered Montemór, near Coimbra: two years later a document incorporating the monastery of Sever do Vouga with that of Vacarica shows that the district to the north and west of Coimbra had been recovered. Once more the Northmen had assailed Galicia, sailed up the Minho as far as Tuy, which they sacked, and penetrated inland towards Braga. In 1028 Alfonso V besieged Viseu, and was killed by a bolt fired from the walls.

The new king, Bermudo III, was the son of Alfonso and still a boy—the dynastic if not hereditary nature of the throne had been established by Alfonso V who declared himself to rule 'as by my royal origin I am entitled'. However, the dynasty was approaching its end. The tutors of Count García Sánchez of Castile, still a minor, asked for the hand of

Documents of 999, a donation to Leon Cathedral on his coronation, and of 1012, a grant of the castle of San Salvador to the Bishop of Leon, contain the words 'sicut me ex regali origo containts' (sic), Peres, Historia de Portugal, I, 260.

Bermudo's sister Sancha, and the concession of the title of king. There is no proof that these requests were refused; indeed the nobles of Burgos brought their young count to Leon on the way to meet Bermudo in Oviedo, but his enemies forced their way into the city at dawn and murdered him. The heiress of Castile was now García's elder sister, married to King Sancho of Navarre, who entered Castile, took vengeance on his brother-in-law and declared himself his successor, uniting Castile to Navarre. Bermudo and the Leonese opposed the removal of the county of Castile from their suzerainty. Sancho invaded Leon whilst Bermudo was engaged in reducing rebels in Galicia, but the intervention of the Bishops of Leon and Navarre prevented the continuance of war. Fernando, the second son of Sancho of Navarre, contracted to marry Bermudo's sister, receiving the disputed territories between the rivers Pisuerga and Cea. The agreement was reached the year after the collapse of the caliphate, 1032. Nevertheless Sancho's ambitions were not satisfied; in 1034 he seized all of Leon and part of Galicia. On his death in 1035, Leon returned to Bermudo III and his three sons shared Navarre, Aragon and Castile. Bermudo attempted to recover the Pisuerga-Cea district from Fernando of Castile, who with the help of his brother, García of Navarre, defeated and killed Bermudo and acquired the Leonese monarchy for himself in 1038. Some years later Fernando fell out with his brother García and killed him in the battle of Atapuerca near Burgos, thus becoming from 1054 sole ruler of the Christian domains from Galicia to the Ebro.

vi. THE CONQUEST OF COIMBRA, 1064. The anarchy of the Moslem Peninsula and the unity of the Christian kingdoms brought about on the deaths of Bermudo III and García of Navarre by Fernando I afforded the best of opportunities for the reconquest. The change in the balance of power makes a remarkable contrast between the tenth and eleventh centuries. While in terms of territory the Christian gains of three hundred years had been wiped out at the beginning of the eleventh century, in reality the disastrous reign of Bermudo II did not take the reconquest back to its beginning. Much settlement and colonization had been carried out, and survived the brief decline. The internal strife of its last days proved much more disastrous to the caliphate than the temporary occupation of Leon by the forces of al-Mansur was to the Christian kingdoms.

In the reign of Fernando I, the frontier of the two civilizations was again carried forward to the Mondego. Montemór, recaptured by Alfonso V, seems to have been lost again, for the *Chronicon Gothorum* and *Chronicon Conimbricense* record its conquest by Gonçalo Trastemires in 1034. After the death of García, the advance was continued: in 1055

Fernando took the castle of Sena (Seia) and certain other fortresses. Two years later, Lamego fell; in the next year, Viseu; and soon after, Tarouca, Travanca, Penela and other districts were absorbed into the Christian reconquest. Having carried the Castilian border south of the Douro, Fernando turned aside to attack Alcalá de Henares, but retired on the payment of a heavy ransom. The campaign of 1063, directed against Seville, was so successful that the emir did homage to the king of Leon and Castile and paid him tribute.

Returning at length to the west, Fernando invested the strong city of Coimbra, which after a siege of six months returned finally to Christian possession in 1064. In this enterprise he was assisted by a Mozarab or Moslem, Sisnand son of David, lord of Tentúgal and thus presumably a native of Beira. Sisnand had been a minister at the court of ibn 'Abbad in Seville, but for some unknown reason he abandoned the Saracens and took service with Fernando. Since the attack on Coimbra had been initiated by him, he was recompensed by the appointment as governor of the newly conquered region of central Portugal.¹ This region, the county of Coimbra, consisted of all the area south of the Douro, bounded on the east by Lamego, Viseu and Seia, and on the south by the Moslem dominions below the Mondego: in it Count Sisnand had full authority under the king.

vii. MOZARABS. The Moslem invasion had been carried out by Arabs and Berbers: some thirty years after it large numbers of Arabs were settled in the south of the Peninsula, Yemenites as well as natives of Egypt, Palestine and Damascus. Until the empire of the Umaiyads, these Arabs constituted the governing aristocracy, maintaining, in spite of discord, an ascendancy over the Berbers. The Umaiyads established a military nobility, and continually strengthened it to balance the anarchical tendencies of the older aristocracy, so that gradually administrative power passed into its hands. At the other end of the scale slaves and serfs were employed as labourers and soldiers. At the beginning of the Moslem occupation, many of the serfs of the Visigoths had adopted

^{1 &#}x27;Obsedit Colimbriam civitatem cum consilio D. Sisenandi consulis, qui antea honorifice in urbe Hispali morabatur et sublimis habebatur. Et dedat eam illi...', Livro Preto, f. 37, in P.M.H., Diplomata et Chartae, p. 392. A story connected with the capture of Coimbra is told in the Chronicon Silene. Before the siege, Fernando had spent three days in prayer at Santiago. When he had left a Greek pilgrim mocked those who treated a saint who had only been a fisherman and never rode a horse as if he were a soldier. By night in a trance the Apostle appeared to the Greek with some keys in his hand, and upbraided him. A white horse, whose radiance filled the whole church, appeared, and Santiago mounted it, saying to the Greek 'With these keys I will deliver the city of Coimbra to King Fernando to-morrow at the third hour.' Next day the pilgrim told the priests and authorities of Compostela and it was later found that Fernando had indeed entered Coimbra at that hour. Cf. the legend of the battle of Clavijo. V. Padre Miguel de Oliveira, História Eclesiástica de Portugal, Lisbon, 1940, p. 70.

Mohammedanism and thus gained their liberty; the wholesale abandonment by these serfs of the Visigothic cause explains its sudden collapse, and their general conversion to Islam accounts for the rapidity with which the new religion was carried across the Peninsula. These early converts continued to be despised by the Arabs and Berbers for their lowly origin. The class of original inhabitants that gained most from the change was that of the Jews, who came to occupy distinguished positions in commerce, industry, medicine and various professions. Much of the financial machinery of the central government was handled by them, and the Andalusian town of Lucena was practically all Jewish. From the collapse of the Visigoths until the movements of Islamic revival there were no persecutions of Jews.

The Christian subjects of the Saracens, now called Mozarabs ('made Arabs'), at least in Cordova and almost certainly elsewhere, enjoyed freedom of religion, and preserved their schools and other institutions. Many subsequently adopted Islam, owing to the economic pressure of the capitation tax, and in order to take advantage of the official positions that were open to converts. Others sought martyrdom, comparing their position with that of the early Christians in Rome, though even the defenders of the martyrs say that this was opposed by many of their co-religionists: 'Why did the priests of Christ, doctors of the church, bishops, abbots, presbyters, nobles and magnates cry out publicly that these were heretics?' asks Álvaro in his Indiculum. Naturally over a long period and a large territory great differences and variations of conditions were experienced. Hatred and tolerance were both well known, but on the whole the necessity for a modus vivendi was the strongest influence. Thus Isidore of Beja could write that the Christians were reduced by the sword, starvation and slavery, that cities were burnt, the elders and leaders crucified, and children and sucklings murdered with cold steel, and that some who fled to the mountains risked death or starvation: 'In this unhappy Spain they have set up a reign of terror.' Yet the same author elsewhere says of the government of 'Uqba that 'no one is condemned save by the justice of the law'. Alvaro, whose Indiculum depicts and deplores the great change in the Mozarabs, says: 'Alas! Christian youths with talent only know the Arabic language and literature; they read and study Arabic books with great enthusiasm: they make great libraries of them and they proclaim everywhere that this literature is wonderful. Speak to them of Christian books and they will answer scornfully that such works are unworthy of attention. Supreme grief! The Christians have even forgotten their language and you will hardly find one in a thousand who can write a reasonable Latin letter to a friend. But if you want to write in Arabic, you will find a number who

can express themselves in the language with every elegance and even compose verse more artistic than that of the Arabs themselves!'

Of the number of Arabic words that have passed into modern Portuguese estimates have varied between four hundred and a thousand: the most recent expert, Professor David Lopes, suggests an average. But the most significant aspect of this Arabic-derived vocabulary is the proportion of it that is devoted to aspects of organization and civilization that were transferred from the Moslem culture to the Christian. Philosophic intercourse was barred by the difference of religion, so that none of this vocabulary is abstract. Part of it relates to warfare and arms, and represents the normal exchange of words necessitated by hostilities. But the great proportion of the vocabulary refers to the house, its parts, utensils, tools, clothes, trades, agriculture, implements, plants, fruits, weights and measures, food, beverages and musical instruments. In addition the Arabic vocabulary of science occurs in Portuguese as in other European languages.

At the time of the restoration of Coimbra the exterior life of the Mozarabs appears to have differed little from that of the Saracens, thus contrasting sharply with the older-settled region about the Douro. One sign of the overlapping of the two civilizations is in the frequent combination of Moslem and Gothic names: witnesses to a document cited by Herculano are Merwan Menendiz, Martinus ibn Tomad, Pelagius Abu Nazar presbyter and Zoleiman Leovigildiz presbyter, whilst three children of Exeiza Alvane are Justa, Abdirahman and Maria: even Mozarabic priests thus used Arabic names. The will of one Bona Menendiz, undated but of the time of Sisnand, shows that this lady had settled in Christian Beira with all the servants she had brought with her from Zurita near Moslem Toledo: most of her household possessions take their Arabic names, and the document is confirmed by Petrus presbyter Zoleima and witnessed by Calaf Levita and Merwan.

¹ Herculano, vi, 316: documents of 1090 and 1096.

CHAPTER IV

THE COUNTY OF PORTUGAL

i. ALFONSO VI; THE VISIT OF DUKE EUDES, 1087. Although the history of the modern state of Portugal commences with the creation of the County under the Burgundian Henry in the last years of the eleventh century, the process of detachment from the kingdom of Leon began much earlier. Already in the time of Ordoño II the choice of Viseu as the capital of Galicia led to the rise of several powerful families between the Minho and the Mondego. In the second half of the tenth century the most prominent were those of Counts Gonçalo Moniz and Gonçalo Mendes, the latter a son of D. Mumadona Dias, the foundress of the monastery of Guimarãis. Gonçalo Mendes was one of the closest supporters of Bermudo II, who entrusted to a Count Mendo Gonçalves, perhaps a son of the former count, the education of his heir Alfonso V. When in 1014 Alfonso appeared in Guimarãis, he confirmed the monastery of Guimarãis in its possessions and married the daughter of his tutor. Thus in the early years of the eleventh century Portuguese nobles came to occupy prominent positions in the court of Leon.

However, with the implantation of the Navarrese dynasty by Fernando the Great in 1038, any tendency towards independence in Portugal was stifled, though the autonomy of the province as an administrative area was recognized.1 Fernando's will, which divided his realms between his three sons and two daughters, stimulated once more private ambitions and civil war, in the midst of which the Portuguese barons came for the first time to measure their strength against their king. When Fernando died in 1065, his eldest son Sancho inherited Castile, the second, Alfonso VI, took Leon and Asturias, and the third, García, became king of Galicia, while his two daughters Urraca and Elvira took the titles of Oueens of Zamora and Toro respectively. García, a most hapless ruler, was the victim of a snatching contest between his brothers; Sancho defeated and seized territory from Alfonso, who in his turn seized Galicia from García. García further lost the district of Coimbra with Viseu and Lamego, which was in the hands of Count Sisnand, a partisan of Alfonso VI. As royal power descended to its nadir that of the barons mounted. In January 1071 Count Nuno Mendes, lord of Oporto, rebelled. against García in a movement which was possibly for the first time

¹ Thus in the Council of Coyanza (1050): 'in Legione et in suis terminis, et in Gallaecia, et in Asturiis et in Portugalle...' with other examples in Gonzaga de Azevedo, pp. 160-5.

separatist and anti-Leonese. However, in the battle fought between Braga and the river Cávado, well beyond the territory of Nuno Mendes, García was victorious and the rebellious count killed. Donations of King García suggest that at least some barons of the Douro region remained loyal; one, Afonso Ramires, had received a large grant of property on the banks of the Douro in the year preceding the revolt.

Meanwhile the division of the kingdom had produced other violence. Sancho of Castile, in whose army was the Cid, defeated and captured Alfonso VI of Leon, confining him in a monastery from which he later fled to the protection of the Emir of Toledo. But Sancho's ambition was not satisfied, and he began to besiege his sister Urraca in her city of Zamora; here, before the walls, he met his end when the much-sung traitor Bellido—Dolfos of the romances—issued forth from the city, transfixed the king with his lance, and escaped. On Sancho's death, his host dispersed and Alfonso VI came back from Toledo to resume his interrupted reign. Soon the empire of Fernando the Great was pieced together again, García being dethroned and imprisoned for the last seventeen years of his life. Easily dismembered and reunited only laboriously and with violence, the Christian kingdom had now reached the stage from which Portugal was to break away.

Alfonso VI appears to have neglected the County of Portugal. No bishop was appointed to Portucale during his reign, and the territory north of the Douro seems to have been united to Galicia, its county lapsing till the arrival of the Burgundians. By contrast, the County of Coimbra flourished under Sisnand, and was encouraged in its development by the issue of various charters. On the capture of Coimbra all Moslems had been driven out of the territory between the Douro and the Mondego, and only five thousand were allowed to remain in Coimbra itself. To this nucleus Count Sisnand added many new settlers, largely Mozarabs from the south, who received free and hereditary possession of houses and land. At this time Coimbra was the meridian of the two civilizations, Christian and Leonese in religion and government, but Moslem, African or Mozarabic in customs, architecture and agriculture.

The resplendent and ambitious Alfonso VI, Dei Gratia Legionensis Imperii Rex et Magnificus Triunfator, as he called himself, felt the necessity of pushing forward the reconquest. Toledo, the ancient capital of the Visigoths, was the obvious objective, but Alfonso had promised to respect the emir who had given him shelter, and only when the inhabitants ejected this ruler in 1080 was he free to act. He had already reduced various Moslem rulers to the rank of tributaries, including even the Emir of Seville, and the siege of Toledo was interrupted by a quarrel

with Seville and an expedition against it. On his return, Alfonso finally captured Toledo with the help of the Mozarabs and Jews inside the city, and, in 1085, became 'lord of the two religions'.

This accomplishment and the threat to Valencia brought a reaction of the Moslems; in the words that tradition lends to the Emir of Seville: 'Better a camel-driver in Africa than a swineherd in Castile.' Several of the taifa rulers appealed for help to Africa, where the Almoravids, Berber peoples from the Sus and Senegal, had crossed the Atlas, made an empire for themselves and founded their capital, Marrakesh, in 1061. Their leader, Yusuf ibn Tashfin, already famous as a general and defender of Islam, was very ready to extend his influence to the Peninsula. In 1086 Berber and negro troops were landed at Algeciras, and joined by Peninsular forces supplied by the Emirs of Seville, Granada, Málaga and Badajoz. Alfonso VI was besieging Saragossa, but he at once gathered a force which greatly outnumbered the invaders, and gave battle near Badajoz. On the battlefield of Sacralias the Christians were completely defeated, losing the flower of their army, while Alfonso himself barely escaped with five hundred men to Coria.¹

The immediate result was to free the Moslem states from vassalage, but Alfonso was saved from worse disaster by the return of Yusuf to Africa, where his eldest son had died. Nevertheless the defeat made it necessary to reinforce Leon, and Alfonso sent to France pleading for urgent help. In May 1087 a large number of French knights entered the Peninsula, but their stay was not very long, owing to the disappearance of immediate danger with the withdrawal of Yusuf. In this expedition there came the Duke of Burgundy, Eudes, a nephew of Alfonso's wife Constanza; and when the other Frenchmen left the Peninsula, he and certain Burgundians journeyed to Leon to pay their respects to the queen.

Whether the two Burgundians who were later concerned in the creation of the County of Portugal came in this expedition is doubtful. Eudes himself was in Leon on August 9, 1087, when he confirmed a donation by his aunt. Of his brother, Henry of Burgundy, there is no mention at all, but the confirmation of their cousin, Count Raimundo, appears on a privilege conceded by Alfonso VI to the clergy of Astorga cathedral on April 25, 1087. There is no reference to the coming of either in the chronicles; the date of the privilege of Astorga suggests that Raimundo came before the main expedition, whose departure from France is ascribed to May 1087 by the French Chronicon Sancti Petri Vivi. In any case the visit of Eudes and Raimundo is sufficient to mark the commence-

 $^{^1}$ Sacralias of the Christian chronicles, or Zalaca of the Arabic, is the present Azagala, near Alburquerque.

ment or the contact with Burgundy that was so greatly to influence Portugal.

ii. COUNT RAIMUNDO. The renewed pressure against the Moslem states was soon felt after Yusuf had returned to Africa. In 1090 the Moslems again appealed to him, and he unsuccessfully attempted to reduce the important Christian outpost of Aledo between Lorca and Murcia. Yusuf found his co-religionists an easier prey than the Christians, and taking advantage of widespread dissatisfaction in the taifa states, he proclaimed himself protector of Islam, and in a few years extended his authority over most of Moslem Spain.

The Emir of Badajoz sought the protection of Alfonso VI against Yusuf, and ceded as the price of it Santarém, Lisbon and Sintra, all occupied by Christian forces between April 30 and May 8, 1093. On April 22 Alfonso, with the Burgundian Count Raimundo, passed through Coimbra, where he confirmed the privileges (fôros) of the city. Sisnand had died in 1092, and his son-in-law Martim Moniz was now governor. Over the new dominions of Santarém and Lisbon, Alfonso put Soeiro Mendes, under the authority of Count Raimundo. At the same time, the latter was given power over all the western region from the north coast to the Tagus, and various local authorities, previously directly dependent on Alfonso VI, were subordinated to him.1 According to Gonzaga de Azevedo, the marriage of Raimundo to Alfonso's legitimate daughter Urraca took place in 1090, and at about the same time he received the government of the province of Galicia. But in the confirmation of the rights of Coimbra of April 22, 1093 Raimundo appears simply as the son-in-law of the king, and the earliest document in which he calls himself Count of Galicia is of February 2, 1094.2 On February 25, he was lord of Coimbra and of all Galicia, thus having succeeded Martim Moniz, who was transferred to Arouca between April 1093 and August 1094.

Raimundo's government began not too auspiciously. The cession of the three towns by the Emir of Badajoz was ill-received by many of his subjects, who called upon Yusuf to intervene. When an Almoravid general descended on Badajoz early in 1094, the emir and his sons were murdered before Raimundo could lift a hand to help them. For whatever reason. Raimundo soon ceased to exercise power outside Galicia: a document of August 9, 1095 still carries the title 'Lord of Galicia and

¹ D. Peres, Como nasceu Portugal, 2nd edition, Coimbra, 1942, p. 54.

² The need for a trustworthy governor in Galicia is suggested by the arrest of the Bishop of Iria and Santiago, Diogo Pais, on a charge of high treason in 1088. According to the Historia Compostellana, II, 2: Quem episcopum praedictus Rex Alfonsus expulit ab Eccleia B. Jacobi et diu tenuit captum in compeditous, imposito ei nomine proditoris. Quidam enim epis sinimici invoidiae zelo dixeruni quod Gallacciae Regnum prodere Regi Anglorum et Normannorum et auferre Regi Hispanorum satageret. It would be interesting to know whether William I or II ever entertained the idea of promoting a kingdom of Galicia.

Santarém', but this is the last document that suggests authority in Portugal. It appears that Lisbon and even Sintra and Santarém were lost and Raimundo defeated, only with great difficulty retreating into Christian territory, and according to Herculano this defeat caused Alfonso to reduce Raimundo's power. The date of the engagement is uncertain, but a document of November 18, 1094 shows that the count had collected in Coimbra on that date the Bishops of Santiago and Lugo, together with a great number of Galician knights.

To replace Count Raimundo in authority over Portugal, there now appeared a new figure, his kinsman, Count Henry, the progenitor of the first royal line of Portugal.

iii. 'COUNT HENRY OF PORTUGAL. The earliest document that attests the presence of the brother of Duke Eudes in the Peninsula is dated. December 18, 1095, and refers to him as Count of Coimbra. Two documents of the following year mention his authority in Braga and in Constantim de Panóias, proving that it extended into Trás-os-Montes. In April 1097 his territory stretched from the Minho to the Tagus, and in a donation of November 27, 1097 occur the phrases Henricus comes portucalensis and Quia in nostro dominio et diccioni constitit omnis Portucalensis provincia. The foundations of the county were thus complete.¹

Count Henry, like his cousin Raimundo, married a daughter of Alfonso VI; his wife, by name Tarasia or Teresa, seems to have been a bastard, the child of one Ximena Nunes. The document by which Portugal was given to the count and countess has disappeared, and there is therefore no direct evidence of the nature of the grant. Much discussion has taken place about the extent of the count's jurisdiction, whether it was hereditary, and whether it was sovereign in the sense of giving him the right to secede from the empire of Alfonso VI. Of the hereditary nature of the county there is no reason to doubt, in view of a document which expressly states it, though there is still no proof that Portugal was the dowry of Teresa.² As to the absoluteness of the grant —upon which those who wish to prove that Portugal obtained her independence legally, and not by revolution, have based their arguments —there seems to be little evidence to support it. The hereditary nature of the county clearly implies no such thing; and the existence of con-

¹ Herculano believed that Henry had arrived late in 1094 or early in 1095, and had been made Count of Braga under the authority of Count Raimundo. Professor Damião Peres has shown that there is no reason to suppose that Henry was ever subordinated to his cousin (Como nasceu Portugal, p. 57).

⁽Como nasceu Portugal, p. 57).

A donation of the year 1097 was made in tempore Adefonsi Imperatoris regnante in civitas Toleti, suo nomine gener verum suus comes Anrichus sedente cum filiam ipsius Imperatori nomine Tarasie et tenente de illo terra de Portugal pro sua hereditas (ibid. p. 62). If the donation were a dowry, it would seem strange that the first reference to the whole of it (from the Minho to the Tagus) is at the very least two years after the wedding.

firmations by Alfonso VI subscribed to donations made by Count Henry, although not numerous, are sufficient to indicate the conditional nature of the count's authority. Moreover, Henry frequently appears as a confirmatory of the acts of Alfonso VI among the members of the Curia Regis of Leon.

Nevertheless, the connection between the emperor and Portugal had become indirect and dependent on the person of the count, so that it may be argued that the situation was very different from that obtaining in Galicia, where Alfonso appears to have continued regularly to confirm the acts of Raimundo.

There is no doubt that Henry was a man of considerable ambitionone of the few clear pictures we have of him is his raging departure from the Court of Leon on finding his aspirations to share in the legacy of the dving emperor thwarted. His political ambitions were possibly reflected in the struggle of the diocese of Braga to impose its authority on the Portuguese bishoprics, and to contest that of Santiago by obtaining supremacy over the sees of Galicia. The aims of Count Henry and those of his fellow-countryman Bishop Gerald were complementary. Gerald, a Cluniac from St Pierre de Moissac, came to the Peninsula with the Metropolitan of Toledo, and was made archbishop and metropolitan of all the province of Galicia early in 1096. Although Braga had been the first of the five pre-Moslem metropolitan churches to be restored in 1071, its primacy had not been recognized; indeed owing to the part taken in its restoration by the Bishop of Lugo, it had been under the influence of this diocese, and only on the death of the Bishop of Lugo did Braga attempt to obtain papal recognition of its archbishopric and of its claim to metropolitan authority over Galicia and Portugal, in 1088. But in the same year Toledo was restored, and its archbishop acquired the title of primate, dashing the ambitions of Bishop Pedro of Braga as far as Urban II was concerned, and driving him to obtain recognition from the anti-Pope Clement III, for which he was deposed. Meanwhile, the see of Santiago, fearing the future ascendancy of Braga, obtained a declaration of its own independence.

St Gerald, by himself going to Rome in 1103, succeeded where his predecessor had failed. In 1101 the bishoprics of Galicia, with the exception of Santiago, but with the addition of Oporto, had been made suffragan to him, and two years later, Coimbra, Viseu and Lamego were added, while the pope, in a letter to Count Raimundo, recommended every assistance for St Gerald. Nevertheless the turbulent Bishop Diego Gelmírez of Santiago, dissatisfied with the considerable increase in Gerald's powers, secured confirmation of the exemption of his own diocese and began the struggle with Braga for administrative supremacy.

Of Count Henry's early government very little is known. In 1096 he gave charters to Guimarãis and Constantim de Panóias. In the former he had his own dwelling, and put aside a street or ward for foreigners, who had without doubt increased greatly in number since the arrival of the Burgundian counts. In the following years he appointed Portuguese barons to the highest dignities in his court and plentifully endowed them with estates, after which, in the winter of 1097 to 1098, he departed with his wife and court on a pilgrimage to Santiago. In 1102 he proposed to join in the crusade of the Emperor Henry IV, and even left Portugal in the following year, but as the crusade was not realized, he returned to the Peninsula in 1104. The coincidence of his absence with that of St Gerald suggests that he may have gone to Rome, and perhaps added his influence to the bishop's suit. The very fact that he should have contemplated leaving the country on a crusade, an activity usually discouraged among rulers of the Peninsula, implies that there was no pressing danger on the Moslem frontier. The Almoravids had captured Consuegra in 1099; and the Cid, just before his death in the same year, was defeated near Játiva. A reaction to the first of these reverses came in 1100 when Count Henry led an expedition in the service of Alfonso VI, and was worsted at Malagón, near Ciudad Real.

iv. COUNT HENRY; THE PACT OF SUCCESSION; HIS DEATH. Count Henry's political ambitions are illustrated by an undated pact of succession made with his cousin Count Raimundo, and with the intervention of one Dalmatius Gevet, representing Abbot Hugo of Cluny. In it Raimundo's right to the throne on the death of his father-in-law Alfonso VI was recognized by Henry, who promised military aid against any man or woman who might dispute the claim. Henry also undertook that if he received Toledo from Raimundo he would give him two-thirds of its treasure and keep one-third. Raimundo promised to give Henry Toledo, or if he could not, Galicia.

Much has been written about the significance and date of this contract; and as the question is still open it is necessary to mention two possible explanations. If the document is of 1093, it was provoked by a declaration of Alfonso VI, made on the death of his wife Queen Constanza, that Count Raimundo, as the husband of his legitimate daughter, should accede to his estates. In this case the ambitious Count Henry, annoyed at seeing his cousin inherit an empire whilst he remained with only his county, expressed his discontent, and the Abbot of Cluny, anxious to avoid a conflict, sponsored the agreement which has been preserved.¹ The second explanation, more in keeping with the aggressive wording

¹ This view is favoured by the presence of a Dalmatius, a monk of Cluny, in Spain in 1094, elected Bishop of Iria and Santiago in 1095.

of the agreement, would require a date some time before the death of Raimundo in the autumn of 1107.1 After the death of Queen Constanza, Alfonso VI had married or taken as his mistress a Moor, Zaida, daughter of the Emir of Seville, by whom he had a son, Sancho, born possibly in 1097. Alfonso's intention of leaving the throne to this son, expressed in 1106, would thus provide a motive for the pact.2

The intervention of Cluny in affairs of state is in any case interesting; Abbot Hugo was related to Raimundo and Henry, and to Alfonso VI through Queen Constanza. His interest in protecting the claims of the two counts is therefore easily perceptible. As far as Count Henry is concerned, if the latter date were established, it would suggest that his personal ambition was greater than his desire to secure the independence of Portugal, since he was ready to do homage to Raimundo in return for Toledo or Galicia.

The death of Count Raimundo in the autumn of 1107 threw out of gear the calculations of the pact. The young prince Sancho died in the battle of Uclés in 1108, leaving Raimundo's widow Urraca indisputably heiress to the throne. On July 1, 1109, Alfonso VI himself died. A few years—between three and five—before, a son had been born to Raimundo and Urraca, and was known as Alfonso Raimúndez. Guido, Archbishop of Vienna, a brother of Raimundo, came to Spain to protect the interests of his nephew, and Alfonso VI swore at a council held in Leon that he would recognize the child's right to Galicia, should Urraca marry again, and ordered all Galicians to serve and defend his grandson, even against himself if necessary. At this moment Sancho was still living and Alfonso presumably hoped that he would inherit the throne, so that Galicia was merely a second prize for his grandson.

Obviously the only sufferer from these events was Count Henry, who left the court a few days before the death of Alfonso VI. Non se por que, entrebeniente discordia e sanna, se partio ayrado del rrei, says the Chronicle of Sahagún. He left in a rage, after scenes of discord and wrathprovoked, it is not too much to suppose, by his failure to obtain the promise of a satisfactory legacy from the dying king.3

A few months later, in September or October 1109, Urraca married Alfonso I el Batallador, King of Aragon; and Count Pedro Froilaz of

3 Henry's share in the responsibility for the disaster of Uclés, in which the Infante Sancho met his death a year before, may possibly have cast a cloud over his fortunes.

¹ A. Herculano, História de Portugal, 1, 206.

² The second explanation, with the date 1107, seems to require two Cluniacs answering to the name of Dalmatius, one who became a bishop in 1095, another who was simply Dalmatius Gevet in 1107. If Sancho was born as early as 1098, there would be no reason for not adopting this date, a single Dalmatius, and the second explanation of the motive for the pact, though there is of course no other evidence that Count Henry had arrived in the Peninsula so early.

Trava, the guardian of Alfonso Raimúndez, proclaimed his ward King of Galicia, clearly exceeding the very wide powers that Alfonso VI had granted to his grandson at Leon. Urraca later, apparently in order to secure Galician support in a war against her second husband, declared that this had been the last wish of her father, but the Chronicler of Sahagún, who was at the death-bed, makes no reference to any such intention. The acclamation of Alfonso Raimúndez in Galicia infuriated Alfonso of Aragon, who launched a fierce attack on the forces of the boy-king, so fierce as to widen the breach that was already appearing between himself and D. Urraca.

Meanwhile Count Henry had retired to Portugal. A revolt of the Moors of Sintra in July 1109 was quickly suppressed, and the count occupied himself first and foremost with the internal affairs of his domains. Whether there were ulterior motives in his generous bequests to the Church, especially Braga (where Maurice had succeeded St Gerald), Coimbra and the important monasteries, it is only possible to guess; perhaps with the idea of independence already in his head, he sought to benefit by the ecclesiastical disapproval which Urraca and Alfonso of Aragon had earned by their uncanonical marriage. The interference of Alfonso of Aragon, Emperor and King, as he called himself, and lord of all the Christian Peninsula except Galicia and Portugal, must have made Count Henry uneasy from the first, and the attack on Galicia, with the fall of Lugo and various castles, was a warning to him. He had failed to appear at Leon when Urraca, before her second marriage, received the homage of her nobles, though the Metropolitan of Braga had attended.

Henry was faced with the choice of reaffirming his loyalty to Urraca and becoming a vassal of Alfonso of Aragon, or of raising troops abroad to protect himself. Choosing the latter alternative, he slipped across Spain and into France, where he was arrested, and eventually returned without having obtained any result in 1110. However, the threat to his estate was lifted with the retirement of Alfonso of Aragon from Galicia. In spite of the fury and destruction of his onslaught, Count Pedro Froilaz successfully held him off. Urraca, after quarrelling with Alfonso, sent for her son with the intention of having him proclaimed King of Leon; but the news that husband and wife were reconciled arrived before the emissaries reached Galicia, so they turned aside to take council with Count Henry, who recommended the continuance of resistance on behalf of Alfonso Raimúndez, his nephew.

From this time Count Henry was closely involved in the quarrels of Urraca and Alfonso of Aragon: these broke out afresh when the Archbishop of Toledo pronounced the marriage incestuous and Urraca accepted the decision. Alfonso, less malleable, tried to force her to go to Aragon, where he would have her in his power, but she freed herself and civil war began. Alfonso sought the assistance of Count Henry, who found it politic to acquiesce and joined with him in the invasion of Castile; the Castilian barons who supported Urraca came out to meet them, but were crushed in the battle of Candespina on October 26, 1110. In order to weaken her husband's forces, Urraca now sought to detach Count Henry through the agency of the Galician barons; and by means of promises, including the leadership of the army and administrative advantages, persuaded him to change sides. In November and December 1110 Count Henry joined Urraca in besieging Alfonso at Peñafiel, and later came to Coimbra.

But on his return Count Henry was apparently reprehended for his confidence in these promises by his wife, who held that he should have demanded an immediate division of the kingdom from her half-sister. Urraca, made aware of this, began secret negotiations with her husband, while pretending to agree to partition her possessions with Count Henry at Palencia in January or February 1111.

On Urraca's reconciliation with Alfonso of Aragon, her allies were disconcerted and some of them, including Pedro Froilaz, acclaimed her son Alfonso Raimúndez. Count Henry, for his part, joined with Froilaz and others, and besieged Urraca and Alfonso at Carrión, whilst the Galicians who had adhered to Urraca and Alfonso besieged Alfonso Raimúndez in Galicia. The siege of Carrión was ineffective and Count Henry was forced by events in Portugal to abandon it.

The prolonged civil strife seems to have produced widespread unrest in the Peninsula. 'In these days', says the anonymous monk of Sahagún, 'all the rustics, labourers and lesser folk collected and conspired against their lords, that no one should render them their due service. These conspiracies were called brotherhoods. They went about the marketplaces and the towns and cried abroad: "Know all that at such a place on such a day the brotherhood will assemble: if anyone be missing, his house shall be pulled down." Then like wild beasts, they rose up in tumults against their lords, their stewards and servants; they pursued them and chased them through the streets; they broke down and destroyed the palaces of kings, houses of nobles, churches of bishops, barns and properties of abbots; destroyed and consumed all supplies; killed whatever Jews appeared; refused tolls and tributes to their lords; and if any noble gave them his hand, they demanded him for king and lord.'1 The spread of this movement to Henry's own territory would give ample reason for raising the siege of Carrión. In May 1111, he 1 R. Escalona. Historia de Sahagim, Madrid, 1782, p. 305; Gonzaga de Azevedo, III, 92.

was in Portugal and granted charters to Sátão and to Coimbra, a natural means of remedying such disturbances. The charter of Coimbra, which begins by thanking the inhabitants for their welcome in spite of 'what you have hitherto done against me', promises to remove certain persons from the city and certain obligations from the inhabitants. On the same day as this charter was granted the Moors completed the capture of Lisbon, Sintra and Santarém; and in order to protect Coimbra from a possible invasion Count Henry founded Soure, some eighteen miles south of the city, attracting settlers by the concession of a charter.

Meanwhile Urraca and Alfonso of Aragon had again fallen out. In November 1111 Urraca was definitely separated from her husband and joined the party of her son Alfonso Raimúndez, who was acclaimed in the Cathedral of Santiago. Alfonso of Aragon now required Count Henry's assistance, and obtained it by granting him Zamora and Astorga, which passed into his possession by December 1111. The Galician supporters of Alfonso Raimúndez advanced to Viadangos, between Astorga and Leon, where Alfonso of Aragon surrounded them overnight and captured the young king's tutor, Pedro Froilaz. Urraca, nothing daunted, succeeded in detaching Count Henry together with his new possessions of Astorga and Zamora from her husband. In the spring of 1112 she passed into Galicia with her son, Count Henry and Countess Teresa, and called the Galician nobles to a council in Santiago de Compostela.

Count Henry and Countess Teresa soon left Galicia for Portugal, concerned about the defence of Coimbra from the Moslems. After a short stay the Count passed to Astorga where, in April 1112, he died.¹

v. COUNTESS TERESA. Countess Teresa was still in Portugal when she heard of the death of her husband at Astorga: she was apparently able to take over the government of the county without opposition.

Nevertheless, Teresa was no less ambitious than her husband, and she can hardly have been pleased with the loss of Astorga and Zamora—within a month of Count Henry's death Astorga received her sister Urraca, and shortly afterwards Alfonso of Aragon appeared there and tried to besiege his wife; he was repelled, and she in turn sought to besiege him in Carrión, where the quarrelsome pair were once more reconciled, repairing to Astorga in early summer. Countess Teresa also travelled to Astorga, and violent discussions took place; finally Teresa warned the king that her sister was anxious to poison him. Whether this piece of slander was prompted by ambition or spite is unknown; its result

¹ A. Herculano accepted 1114 as the date of Count Henry's death; Gonzaga de Azevedo in a long appendix to vol. III (pp. 180–212) argues convincingly in favour of April 30 (?), 1112. João Pedro Ribeiro had proposed May 1, 1112; Dr T. de Souza Soares (*História da Expánsão portuguesa no Mundo*, Introd., p. 68 n.) adds that, having examined the documents of many Spanish archives, he finds none later than 1112 bearing Count Henry's name,

was certainly to embroil husband and wife once more, but the countess seems to have gained nothing by it.

Urraca, repudiated by Alfonso, retired to Galicia, where she obtained support from the powerful Bishop of Santiago, Diego Gelmírez. Teresa, for her part, was in an uncomfortable position. Her husband had been able to whittle away the bonds that subjected Portugal to Leon by allying himself now with one side, now with the other, and always being prepared to exercise his military abilities if necessary. His widow could only depend on her notable talent for intrigue, and took her place beside Urraca, whose authority she recognized at a royal council held in Oviedo early in 1115. Whereas Teresa had called herself queen in documents previous to Henry's death, her title between 1112 and 1114 became infanta. Only with an improvement in her position, due possibly to the distrust of Urraca shown by the Galicians, did she resume the title of queen in 1114 and 1115.

In 1114 Alfonso Raimúndez, in his tenth year, had gone off to Toledo with his tutor Pedro Froilaz, and two years later he wrote to the Bishop of Santiago requesting his assistance in securing possession of Galicia, as Alfonso VI had guaranteed—an indication of the great power of Gelmírez. It was not long before Alfonso Raimúndez made a triumphal return, being greeted with a lavish display of enthusiasm in Santiago. But Urraca, the mother of the young king, feared her own exclusion by Gelmirez, and occupied the city with her armed forces. This action brought her face to face with Pedro Froilaz and Countess Teresa, who attempted to overthrow her ascendancy by attacking her supporters in Galicia from Portugal. The combined hostility of these and Gelmírez was formidable, and Urraca was besieged at Suberoso for a time, but she succeeded in breaking away to Santiago, and at the same time Teresa was compelled to withdraw by the threat of the Moslems on her southern frontier. Her gains from meddling in Urraca's affairs consisted in the temporary possession of the districts of Tuy and Orense.

The Moslem attack on Coimbra had been anticipated before the death of Count Henry, but it did not take place until 1116. In this year the forces of 'Abdu'l-Malik seized the two fortresses which protected the city, Miranda da Beira and Santa Eulália, put most of the garrison of the first to the sword, and captured that of the second, including the governor, one Diogo the Chicken. The defenders of Soure, thinking resistance useless, left their outpost and took shelter in Coimbra. This onslaught, which effectively destroyed the breastworks of the capital, was followed in 1117 by a siege of Coimbra. 'Ali, the Almoravid caliph and son of Yusuf, brought an African army reinforced by Andalusians 'as many as the grains of the sand of the sea', according to the Chronicle

of the Goths. For twenty days the city was surrounded, the suburbs and possibly the interior sacked, while Countess Teresa took refuge in the castle. Many thousands of men were said to have been lost.

There followed a period of tranquillity which lasted until 1121, when Teresa again allowed herself to be drawn into the quarrels of Galicia. Urraca was still opposing the combination of Gelmírez and Count Pedro Froilaz and his family gathered about her son Alfonso Raimundez. The part of the boy-king was upheld by his uncle, that Cardinal Guido who had visited the Peninsula before the death of Alfonso VI and now ascended the papal throne as Calixtus II: Gelmírez was able to profit by this connection to strengthen the authority of his see of Santiago. Teresa's association with the Raimundez party was sealed by her union with Fernando Peres, a son of Count Pedro Froilaz, the young king's tutor. Already in 1121 Fernando Peres de Trava appears as lord of Oporto and Coimbra, and two years later he enjoyed equality with Teresa, granting with her the castle of Benviver to Paio Soares. Whether the pair were married or not is uncertain; while the countess calls herself the spouse of Fernando Peres, pious writers say that he had left his legal wife and that his relations with Teresa were adulterous. The two conflicting points of view might be reconciled by his having repudiated his first wife before marrying Teresa: a daughter of the match is referred to in a document of 1132.

Teresa's adherence to the Raimúndez party involved her in hostilities with Urraca, who invaded Portugal in 1121 and besieged the castle of Lanhoso to which she had retired. Terms seem to have been arranged between the two sisters, and they may have been favourable to Teresa; but her continued interference in the affairs of Galicia cannot be said to have brought any ultimate advantage to Portugal. Indeed, Teresa's authority in her own territories was declining: not all her barons took her side against Urraca, and in pursuing her Galician policy with excessive interest she compromised the unity of her own possessions. As the power and influence of Fernando Peres increased that of Teresa weakened: and, in the few years following, the County of Portugal began to divide between the countess and her young son Afonso, called Henriques, born between 1106 and 1111 and brought up in the district of the Douro, where a group of faithful barons formed round him. The situation in Portugal was similar in outline to that in Galicia: just as Urraca was opposed and finally overthrown by the party surrounding her young son Alfonso Raimundez, so her sister Teresa was losing her influence to her son Afonso Henriques and his supporters. In 1124 Alfonso Raimundez armed himself knight in the cathedral of Santiago: a year later, on Whitsunday of 1125, his cousin of Portugal armed himself knight in the

cathedral of Zamora. The completeness of the parallel lies in the significance of the act. Only independent princes usually took up the arms and invested themselves with their own hands. Alfonso Raimúndez followed the ceremony by declaring himself king: Afonso Henriques' action was thus a symbol of independence and served to point out his presence to all those who were discontented with the rule of the countess and the Galician Peres.

In March 1126, Urraca died, and Alfonso Raimundez signed a provisional treaty of peace with D. Teresa and Fernando Peres, in which she was confirmed in the possession of her territories and no reference was made to the subordination of the County of Portugal. If this appeared to be a success, it was illusory, for in September 1127 Alfonso VII invaded Portugal in order to compel Teresa to do him homage either for her county, or for her possessions in Galicia. The ground that had been lost in the process of the unification of Portugal during these years is best seen in the evolution of the religious situation.

vi. Loss of Religious Independence. St Gerald had obtained metropolitan rank for the see of Braga in 1103, with supremacy over the bishoprics of Astorga, Lugo, Tuy, Mondoñedo and Orense in Galicia, and in Portugal Oporto and Coimbra, with also Viseu and Lamego when they should be finally restored. By this recognition he established the ascendancy of Braga over Santiago, which, while exempt from the authority of Braga, had no suffragans. The only Peninsular authority above Gerald was thus the Archbishop of Toledo, whose supremacy he acknowledged by accepting the title of metropolitan instead of archbishop for himself.

After St Gerald, the Bishop of Coimbra, Maurice, also a Frenchman, was elected to Braga, but in the following years the diocese lost its prestige. The new Bishop of Coimbra, Gonçalo, refused to acknowledge the supremacy of Braga, and was consecrated not by Maurice but by the Archbishop of Toledo. In 1113 the situation worsened. Diego Gelmírez succeeded in arranging the election to the see of Oporto of a French satellite of his, Hugo, formerly Archdeacon of Santiago, whom he himself consecrated.

The lack of hegemony proceeded from the strong individualism of those who had brought about the reconquest and their anxiety to keep control of the lands they themselves had recovered. The interplay of baronial interests was assisted rather than impeded by the official attempt to restore and delimit the bishoprics according to the Visigothic Divisio Wambae, of doubtful authenticity, without regard to the vast change of conditions that had occurred since 710.

In \$113 Maurice refused to appear at the Council of Palencia and was

suspended by the Archbishop of Toledo. Towards the end of 1114 Maurice went to Rome and succeeded in having the suspension, which the pope had already confirmed, made null, in obtaining the exemption of Braga from the jurisdiction of Toledo, and in having the dioceses of Coimbra and Zamora made suffragan to Braga. Moreover he became archbishop. In reply to this success, Gelmírez, vigorously struggling for the supremacy of Galicia over Portugal, rallied the suffragans of Braga and, countenanced by Toledo, declared the supremacy of Santiago over Braga. Not only the bishoprics of Galicia, Tuy, Mondoñedo, Lugo and Orense gave their support, but also Oporto and later Coimbra. Gelmírez's first attempt to have Maurice's rights annulled through the despatch of Bishop Hugo to Rome, was a failure, but in 1116, working through the Archbishop of Toledo, whose interests in keeping down Braga coincided with his own, he had his way. Maurice tossed his bonnet over the windmills by crowning Henry V, and in 1118 became Anti-Pope as Gregory VIII. Thus the elevation of Braga brought no useful result. Bishop Hugo, as the result of a dispute about the boundaries of the dioceses of Braga and Oporto, obtained a decision which brought him compensation from Braga and relieved him from subordination to it. With the aid of falsified documents, he also came into possession of part of the diocese of Coimbra. In 1120 Countess Teresa laid the foundation of much future trouble by subjecting the whole of the burgh of Oporto to the authority of the bishop.

The whole question had meanwhile been placed in the hands of Cardinal Boso, the first cardinal to come to Portugal. He, after visiting Santiago and Braga, left the decision in the hands of the Council of Burgos of 1117, which upheld the connection of Coimbra with Toledo against Braga, and also settled the territorial dispute to the detriment of Braga. Gelmírez meanwhile had done his best to obtain the metropolitanate of Braga for Santiago, but only achieved supremacy over Coimbra.

The schismatic Maurice was replaced by Paio Mendes, who was consecrated in Toledo. Both he and Gelmírez sent messages to Rome to claim the disputed metropolitan rights, which were returned to Braga in 1121. Although on this occasion Calixtus II, the former Archbishop Guido of Vienna and uncle to Alfonso Raimúndez, awarded both Oporto and Coimbra to Braga, he still upheld the privileges of Oporto and Santiago—thus settling the same question in two different ways in the same document.

Paio Mendes, perhaps because he had received privileges in Portugal from Urraca, was in bad odour with Teresa, and in July 1121 took refuge with her sister in Zamora. Teresa promptly divided his diocese between those of Oporto and Coimbra: when he returned to Portugal, he was

arrested by order of the countess. This high-handedness probably contributed towards the decline of her fortunes: Calixtus II ordered the restoration of Paio Mendes under pain of excommunication and interdict, and Teresa was forced to give way.

vii. THE BATTLE OF SÃO MAMEDE, II28. Alfonso VII's invasion of Portugal in 1127 was supported by Gelmírez and the majority of the Galician barons; heavy fighting and various sieges are referred to, but the course of the campaign has not been recorded. Afonso Henriques held the castle of Guimarãis, the seat of his father, but Alfonso VII, rapidly advancing, surrounded the town. Those within the city, finding resistance impossible, agreed in the name of Afonso Henriques to do homage to the King of Leon.

The tale of the act of loyalty of Egas Moniz, whatever its historical value, deserves to be mentioned. Egas Moniz, a baron of the Upper Douro, became surety for the fulfilment of the oath of allegiance. When later Afonso Henriques forgot or chose to disregard the promise of vassalage, he alone remembered the engagement, and, taking his wife and children, presented himself, barefooted and haltered, before Alfonso VII, ready to redeem his honour at the cost of his life. According to the story, Alfonso's anger was appeased and Egas Moniz released from his bond.

The invasion lasted six weeks. Countess Teresa was forced to sue for peace and accepted the reduction of Portugal to the status of a province of Leon, losing the territory she had acquired north of the Minho. Alfonso VII, satisfied with this surrender, retired into Galicia. He had no interest in the imminent struggle between Afonso Henriques and his mother; when both accepted him as their overlord, he withdrew. The incursion, and its results, a military defeat and renewed subjection to Leon, had far-reaching effects in Portugal. The blame fell upon D. Teresa and her Galician favourite; hope for the future strengthened the party of Afonso Henriques. Many of those who had tolerated the authority of Fernando Peres began to see in him an obstacle to Portuguese independence.

Afonso Henriques, according to a Galician document, had already established a degree of separate government: a donation dated September 7, 1127, declares that Alfonso VII was King of Toledo and Leon, and adds, 'imperante portucalis adefonsus filius henrici comes'. At the end of the same year various castles on the Neiva and the Lima were being governed in his name. Alfonso VII was present in Portugal in the following spring, but neither he nor Countess Teresa seems to have taken any action against the party rising round Afonso Henriques. As late as March 31, 1128, mother and son appear as signatories of the same document. Yet at the end of the following month the quarrel which was only

to end with the retirement of Countess Teresa had already broken out. The stages of the dispute are perceptible in two documents: on April 27 Afonso Henriques confirmed without the intervention of his mother the charter of Guimarãis, thus holding territory north of the Douro, whilst her authority was relegated to that south of the river. On May 26 he confirmed a previous privilege of Paio Mendes, Archbishop of Braga, naming him chaplain and promising to cede him the city of Braga, when he should come into possession of the government of Portugal—thus making clear his intentions. Early in July he was in Braga, and the tenens of Bragança had adhered to him.

The growing power of Afonso Henriques was too plain to be ignored. On July 24 the army of his mother and Fernando Peres appeared in the district of Braga, where they were met by the forces of Afonso Henriques and defeated in the battle of São Mamede, near Guimarãis. Teresa and Fernando Peres were captured and expelled from Portugal.

It is uncertain where Alfonso VII heard of the battle of São Mamede;

It is uncertain where Alfonso VII heard of the battle of São Mamede; Gonzaga de Azevedo, interpreting the *Historia Compostellana* differently from Herculano, asserts that Galician nobles were ordered to invade Portugal, and that they actually besieged Guimarãis, where the episode of Egas Moniz would take place after July 1128. According to this version, the Galicians, who had not their hearts in the campaign, merely exacted the oath of allegiance from Egas Moniz and verified that no violence had been done to Alfonso VII's sovereignty before abandoning Portugal. Teresa survived the defeat of São Mamede a bare two years, dying in Galicia: her companion, Fernando Peres, appeared on several subsequent occasions as a general of Alfonso VII at war with the new lord of Portugal, Afonso Henriques.

CHAPTER V

THE FOUNDATION OF THE KINGDOM: AFONSO HENRIQUES

i. EXPEDITIONS INTO GALICIA. The territory which Afonso Henriques governed from 1128, stretching from the River Minho in the north to Coimbra in the south, comprised less than half the area of modern Portugal. Two possible fields of expansion existed, over the Minho into Galicia, or beyond Coimbra against the Moslems. In the latter direction, Christian authority had been carried down to the Tagus by the cession of Santarém, Lisbon and Sintra some thirty years before, but the incursions of the Almoravids had wiped out this extensive advance. To the north, Countess Teresa had succeeded in passing the Minho, and obtained temporary possession of Tuy, Orense and other places, but the consolidation of Alfonso VII's power put an end to hopes of territorial aggrandisement at his expense. In spite of the many ties between Portugal and Galicia, Afonso Henriques, after following for a time the policy of his mother, gradually renounced it in favour of a southward expansion, assisted by the continued, if interrupted, disintegration of Moslem power.

Afonso Henriques, still in his early twenties, was a ruler who seized every opportunity for action: 'the youth, though he already well knew the art of ruling, yet was full of the ardent love of glory, and borne like a fragile reed wherever the breath of the breeze carried him'. Unfortunately no contemporary description or character sketch of him survives. Tradition has endowed him with gigantic stature and Herculean strength, and has embellished his doubtless martial features with a flowing black beard. The sixteenth-century tomb built for his remains by King Manuel suggests at least that this tradition is of respectable antiquity.

In 1130 Afonso Henriques crossed the Minho on the first of his raids into Galicia. As his cousin was away at war with the King of Aragon, it was left to the barons of Galicia to collect forces to expel him, but the real or simulated illness of Gelmírez and the lack of enthusiasm of the lords of the region enabled him to withdraw into Portugal unmolested. Presumably harmony was restored by the end of 1130, or in 1131, for at this time, the date of Countess Teresa's death, Fernando Peres appears once more in Portugal by the side of Afonso Henriques. During the period of Fernando Peres' influence with D. Teresa, a brother of his, by name Bermudo Peres, was married to Afonso Henriques' sister and

¹ Book of Testaments of Santa Cruz de Coimbra: Herculano, História de Portugal, II, 143.

became governor of Viseu. This Bermudo appears to have followed the young ruler, or at least been reconciled to him, but now, at about the time of his brother's return, he became involved in a plot against the new regime. Holding the castle of Seia, in the Serra da Estrêla, he spread disaffection among various other nobles, but Afonso Henriques quickly marched to the scene of the conspiracy and expelled Bermudo from Portugal. Like his brother, Bermudo took service with Alfonso VII and appeared on the Leonese side in the encounter of Val-de-Vez.

Between 1132 and 1135 Afonso Henriques made another attempt on Galicia. The chronology of these three years is difficult to establish, but it is clear that he penetrated the Limia district and was met by Rodrigo Velaz and Fernando Peres, who forced him to return to Portugal. His next attempt was little more successful, though he built the stronghold of Celmes on Galician soil, and manned and supplied it against attack before re-entering his own territory. However, Alfonso VII soon collected forces and besieged Celmes, which fell into his hands after a few days. Many Portuguese knights and men were made captive, and Alfonso, after assuring the defences of the castle, retired from the scene. The reverse was a hard blow; the Chronicle of Alfonso VII speaks of the intolerabilis tristitia it produced in the house of the Portuguese.

In 1135 Alfonso VII assumed the title of Emperor in Leon, and the rulers of the Peninsula did him homage—Ramiro, King of Aragon; García Ramírez of Navarre; Ramón Berenguer IV of Barcelona; Alfonso Jordan, Count of Toulouse; William, Count of Montpellier; 'Abdu'l-Malik, dispossessed Prince of Saragossa. Only Afonso Henriques was missing from the glittering assemblage, a bold omission which, accompanied by his persistent absence from the Leonese court and failure to send troops to serve the emperor, sufficiently declared his intention of seeking complete separation. For two years he maintained this attitude with impunity. At the end of this time he made an alliance with the King of Navarre for a mutual attack on the territories of Alfonso VII. and fulfilled his part of the bargain by seizing Tuy and Toroño and reducing the castle of Allariz. Advancing towards the Sil, he met the forces of Fernando Peres and Rodrigo Velaz, Count of Sarria, at Cerneja and inflicted a defeat on them. News from the southern frontier prevented his carrying the campaign any farther.

After the last onslaught on Coimbra, the breastworks had lain abandoned for some time. Soure, granted to Fernando Peres in 1122, was repopulated in the following year and given to the Templars in 1128. But the order was still numerically weak in Portugal, and could not be expected to do more than hold the fortress. To supplement the defences of Coimbra, Afonso Henriques founded the castle of Leirena (Leiria).

which was begun in December 1135, and formed his southernmost outpost. When it was built, Paio Guterres, a sturdy soldier, was appointed governor of a strong garrison. But while Afonso Henriques was still in Galicia, there came the news that the Moslems were organizing a heavy attack on Leiria, and he was too late to prevent their entering the new castle and killing over two hundred and fifty knights and men. At about the same time a Portuguese raiding force was destroyed in the neighbourhood of the river Tomar (the modern Nabão).

Meanwhile Alfonso VII had been informed of the defeat of his marchers at Cerneja, and moving swiftly to Galicia with only a small force, he recaptured Tuy and ordered the Archbishop of Santiago and the barons of Galicia to raise men at once for a punitive invasion of Portugal. But before these troops could be collected, the emperor informed his vassals that their aid was no longer necessary. The news of the impending invasion had caused the Portuguese to choose the path of prudence and sue for terms. According to Herculano, Afonso Henriques, menaced by the Moslems on one side and the Leonese and Galicians on the other, was forced to beg for a truce and took the Archbishop of Braga and the Bishop of Oporto to Tuy, where the emperor awaited him with the Bishops of Segovia, Tuy and Orense. The five prelates elaborated the conditions of a treaty in which Afonso Henriques swore loval friendship to the emperor, promising to respect the security of his person, vassals and land, on behalf of himself and all the Portuguese. He agreed to assist the emperor in repelling any assaults of Christians or Moslems, and to make restitution for any infraction of the treaty by the Portuguese barons. The honras or gifts of land which he received from the emperor would be returned to Alfonso VII or his successor without fraud or hesitation whenever they might be demanded. A hundred and fifty good men of Afonso Henriques were to witness the conclusion of this pact.1

While not expressly demanding Afonso Henriques' acknowledgement of vassalage, the treaty implies his subordination in the clause referring to the tenure of *honras*. However, Afonso Henriques was not the man to resign himself to such an agreement, and after the battle of Ourique

¹ Volume IV of Gonzaga de Azevedo (1942) attempts to alter the whole interpretation of this treaty. The document, included in the *Historia Compostellana*, is reduced to a draft (1) because it is in the third person, (2) because of its unprofessional Latin, (3) because neither Alfonso nor Afonso Henriques nor the 150 witnesses confirm it, only the five prelates being signatories. From this Gonzaga de Azevedo argues that the treaty was never signed by Afonso Henriques. The Archbishop of Braga, Paio Mendes, would have gone to Tuy and accepted conditions which were rejected by Afonso Henriques (though the negotiations had gone far enough to cause the retirement of Alfonso VII). Paio Mendes is said to have been replaced in the archbishopric in July 1137, by one Pedro, a prior of Braga; he died two years later, without having returned to the country. The whole argument, which merely absolves Afonso Henriques from the charge of perjury, requires more support than its author is able to supply.

in July 1139, he again returned to Galicia. Gonzaga de Azevedo asserts that he had already seized Tuy in the October following the treaty, and held it until the succeeding February, a single act of hostility which led to no immediate repercussions because Alfonso VII was engaged in a raid in Andalusia and the siege of Coria. Later in 1139 or early in 1140, according to the usually accepted chronology, Afonso Henriques again attacked Galicia through Tuy and entered Toroño, to which Alfonso VII replied by raising an army of Galicians to invade Portugal, crossing the Minho and marching towards the Vez. Afonso Henriques held the castle of Penha da Rainha. When the enemy forces arrived, knights of both sides challenged each other and the encounter was turned into a tournament: 'without the order of the emperor, many leaders and men joined battle with the followers of the king, who came down from their camp: and many were unhorsed, brought to earth and captured on either side', says the Chronicle of Alfonso VII. The Portuguese Chronicle of the Goths declares that the advantage lav with the knights of Afonso Henriques. and mentions that the brother of the emperor and Bermudo Peres, Afonso Henriques' brother-in-law serving with the emperor's forces, as well as other prominent supporters of Alfonso VII, were captured according to the rules of tourney (buhurdicium). The Chronicle of Alfonso VII says that the request for peace came from the Portuguese. Prisoners and castles were exchanged, but the issue of Portuguese independence seems to have been avoided. Perhaps Afonso Henriques' anxiety about the security of his southern frontier shortened the negotiations, for a Moslem force commanded by Ismar had just destroyed Leiria and Trancoso, and immediately after the conference of Val-de-Vez, the Portuguese king marched off to deal with these invaders.1

ii. OURIQUE, II39. The first landmark of Afonso Henriques' campaigns against the Moslems was the victory of Ourique, won on July 25, 1139. The importance and place of the battle have been frequently discussed. The unlikelihood of its having taken place near the town of Ourique, where it is still commemorated, has been widely admitted. The

^{1.} Herculano's chronology has been assailed by C. Erdmann, De como D. Afonso Henriques assumiu o titulo de rei, Coimbra, 1940. According to Herculano, in 1137, after hostilities, the peace of Tuy was signed, and Afonso Henriques was obliged to drop the title of Princeps for that of Infans: in 1139, for unknown reasons, the war was recommenced and after the encounter of Val-de-Vez a truce was signed by which Afonso Henriques was able to break the treaty of Tuy and declare himself king. According to Erdmann, the agreements of Tuy and Val-de-Vez are one and the same: the three accounts in Historia Compostellana, the Chronicle of Alfonso VII, and the Chronicle of the Goths each give only one set of events and one agreement. The similarities of the two episodes are indeed striking: on both occasions Afonso Henriques invades Galicia: the Moors attack Leiria in his absence: Alfonso VII leaves his war with Navarre to deal with him: Alfonso goes first to Santiago: peace is concluded without a decisive battle. A few details diverge: the peace of Tuy is described as permanent, that of Val-de-Vez is non absolute sempiterne, sed per aliquot annos (Chronicle of Alfonso VII).

chronicles do not suggest that any such impressive penetration into Moslem territory took place: to them it is merely remarkable as the first of Afonso Henriques' victories over the Moslems. A plausible site is perhaps Chão de Ourique, some ten miles from Santarém.

The earliest chronicles give quite bare accounts of the engagement. The Chronicles of Lamego and of Coimbra (thirteenth century) give the name Oric and Ouric, and mention the date as the day of Santiago. The Moorish king, called Ismar, fled. The Life of St Theotonius says that on Santiago's day Afonso Henriques defeated five pagan kings with a great multitude of Moslems from both sides of the sea. Other accounts add that the battle was fought in the heart of Moslem territory and that their women fought like Amazons. Only the longer version of the Chronicle of the Goths gives more details: that Afonso Henriques met the Saracen King Ismar, who waited until he had penetrated into the heart of Moslem territory before attacking him with an infinite multitude of Moors from over the sea, together with men from the regions of Seville, Badajoz, Elvas, Évora and Beja, and from all the castles as far as Santarém, accompanied by women who fought like Amazons. The Portuguese, in much fewer numbers, were surrounded on the hill-top where they encamped. The infidel host included some notable knights whom Afonso put to the sword, and Ismar himself fled with his forces.

Neither Arabic nor Spanish chronicles, not even Rodrigo of Toledo, who has a chapter on the great battles of Afonso Henriques, throw any light on Ourique. Ismar, variously named as Ismar Abuzicri and divided into two as King Ismar and Auzecri, governor of Santarém, has been identified by Professor David Lopes as Abu Zakariya, governor of Santarém. The tradition of the magnitude of the battle seems to date from the later chroniclers who gradually inflated what was perhaps merely a large-scale raid into a grand enterprise. Any crushing defeat of the Saracens is disproved by their reaction in the following year, when the same leader Ismar returned to the attack with men from Santarém, Évora and Badajoz, and destroyed the castle of Leiria, killing some of the garrison and capturing the rest.

Nevertheless Ourique played an important part in the development of the Portuguese state: after it and, we must suppose, because of it, Afonso Henriques assumed the title of king. Until July 1139, all his documents (with one exception which has been reasonably held to be misdated) bear the titles *Infans* or *Portugalensium princeps*. One document, dated October 1, 1149, in error for 1139, bears the unusual title 'Alphonsus gloriosissimus princeps et Dei gratia Portugalensium rex'. After April 1140, the usual title becomes rex Alfonsus.

The significance of the title of king is a nice point. Its assumption

does not mean that the titles *Infans* and *Princeps* are dropped; the latter of these, used by Count Henry, seems to indicate magisterial authority. The title of *Regina* had been used intermittently and discreetly by Countess Teresa, who had dropped it on doing homage to her sister in Galicia. It is interesting to note that Urraca, the daughter of Fernando I, on inheriting the city of Zamora became 'queen'. At a later date the will of Sancho I of Portugal refers to three of his sons as kings and uses the title queen, not only of Mafalda, the repudiated wife of Alfonso IX of Leon, but also of Sancha, who was never anything but a princess. The elective tradition of the Visigothic monarchy had never been legally superseded, and it was by appending the now hereditary title of king or queen to the reigning family that the dynastic principle was indicated.

iii. THE CHURCH. Ecclesiastical unity, gained for a time under St Gerald and lost during the government of Countess Teresa, was gradually restored under Afonso Henriques. Bishop Gonçalo of Coimbra had always been strongly under the influence of Toledo, and when the time came to appoint his successor, the Archdeacon Telo, founder of the monastery of Santa Cruz in Coimbra, negotiated with Countess Teresa as a supporter of the influence of Toledo. Afonso Henriques, however, had a bishop elected and consecrated from the archdiocese of Braga—Bernard, apparently a Frenchman, who had been archdeacon at Braga. Gelmírez at once complained to the Papacy against the consecration performed by Paio Mendes, and obtained the support of Honorius II, who however died just after (1130).

In the schism which followed, Portugal, like other western countries, adhered to Innocent II. Although relations between Portugal and Rome are obscure for the following five years, Afonso Henriques' interference in the affairs of the diocese of Coimbra probably produced friction with the Holy See. Perhaps the legend of the Black Bishop, recounted by the English twelfth-century chronicler Hoveden and by a number of other writers in Portugal and Spain, is attributable to this period. The legend, in one version, shows Afonso Henriques loading his mother with chains after the battle of São Mamede: the pope intervenes on her behalf and, on his orders, the Bishop of Coimbra urges Afonso Henriques to release her. He refuses and is excommunicated, driving the bishop to flee in terror and appointing the Black Bishop, an Arab or Berber, to take his place. On hearing of this, the pope decides to send a Cardinal to catechize the king, who threatens to cut his arm off at the elbow. The Cardinal excommunicates the land of Portugal and departs at cockcrow, but Afonso Henriques pursues him, draws his sword and threatens to cut his head off, whereupon the Cardinal promises to obtain whatever Afonso wants in Rome. His demands are simple: that Portugal be not excommunicated, and that the Cardinal take no gold nor silver out of the country, and only three beasts for the journey, leaving his nephew as hostage. After this Afonso Henriques thought that he could elect bishops and archbishops as he pleased.¹

Gelmírez had renewed his protests against the consecration of Bernard to Innocent II, but Paio Mendes was not to be budged. Nevertheless, relations between Portugal and Rome appear to have become closer at this time. The Benedictine reformers, whose influence was strongly felt in Portugal, had their headquarters in Coimbra at the Monastery of Santa Cruz, whence they founded other centres such as Grijó and Refóios de Lima. So, after the example of Santa Cruz, the first monasteries 'of the protection of St Peter', subordinated to Rome as centres of influence and of receipt of revenue, were instituted. The condition attached to the extension of St Peter's mantle to Santa Cruz was the payment of two Byzantines a year in return for direct papal protection over all the properties already possessed or in future to be acquired by the order. The negotiations for this agreement were conducted in Pisa by João Peculiar, future Archbishop of Braga; Cardinal Guido, soon to play an important part in bringing the whole of Portugal under the protection of Rome, intervened in the discussions on behalf of the Papacy. The bull of the protection of St Peter was dated May 25, 1135, and on the following day the Bishop of Coimbra—although his submission to Braga was condemned—was taken under the protection of the pope, a compromise which at least deprived Gelmírez of any claim of supremacy.

The end of Gelmírez's influence in Portugal was at hand. His henchman, Bishop Hugo of Oporto, died in 1136, and Afonso Henriques placed in his room João Peculiar, who succeeded to the Archbishopric of Braga in 1138. Thus the three Portuguese dioceses were once more restored. The question of the relationship between Coimbra and Braga still caused dissension. Calixtus II had outlined the submission of Coimbra to Braga, but in terms productive of endless discord: under Innocent II a partial solution was reached, but João Peculiar's interference in the affairs of Coimbra aroused new protests. The direct interest of the Papacy and the mission of Cardinal Guido, who visited Coimbra in 1143, had a salutary interest in smoothing away this friction.

iv. Afonso Henriques and the holy see, 1143. The agreements of 1137 and 1140 (Tuy and Val-de-Vez) fell considerably short of Afonso Henriques' aspirations for complete independence, and the events that

¹ This version of the legend of Afonso Henriques' cruelty and impiety is in the *Memórias Avulsas de Santa Cruz de Coimbra*. Another version is in the Spanish *Chronicle* of Rodrigo Sánchez de Arévalo (Gonzaga de Azevedo, IV, 281).

had preceded them were a warning that any attempt to gain it by military action were unlikely to succeed. So in 1143, availing himself of the improved ecclesiastical position of Portugal and of the presence in the Peninsula of Cardinal Guido, he put his kingdom under the direct protection of the Holy See, thus avoiding vassalage to Alfonso VII. The change was recognized at a conference held at Zamora and attended by Afonso Henriques, Alfonso VII and Cardinal Guido, the acts of which are not extant. In return for papal protection of himself and his estates from all lay or ecclesiastical powers, Afonso Henriques promised to pay four ounces of gold annually and to declare himself the liegeman of the pope and of St Peter, thus gaining not an acknowledgement of sovereignty, but a separation from Leon. This seems to have been recognized in the Council of Valladolid held in the same year, when the only representative of the Portuguese clergy present was Bishop Bernard of Coimbra, still claimed as a suffragan of Santiago. The Archbishop of Braga, João Peculiar, did not figure at this or any subsequent Spanish council.

The pact of Zamora which made the transference practicable has not been preserved. Herculano conjectured that the emperor recognized the title of king, which Afonso Henriques had used since 1140, but maintained a technical sovereignty over him by confirming his tenure of the city of Astorga. The fact that no evidence exists to show that Afonso Henriques continued to hold Astorga provided no obstacle to Herculano, who offered the explanation that when Alfonso VII demanded military service from Afonso Henriques and Pope Eugene III (1145–1153) refused his pretension, the emperor deprived his cousin of Astorga.

Afonso's letter of oblation, dated December 13, 1143, exists in various copies: it states briefly that Aldefonsus Dei gratia Rex Portugaliae offers an annual tribute of four gold ounces on behalf of himself and his successors to be paid to the Blessed Peter: 'ego tamquam proprius miles beati petri et romani pontificis tam in me ipso quam in terra mea vel in hiis etiam que ad dignitatem et honorem mee terre attinent defensionem et solatium sedis apostolice habeam et nullam potestatem alicujus secularis ecclesiasticive dominii nisi tantum sedis apostolice vel a latere ejus missi unquam in terra mea recipiam. Facta oblationis hujus firmitudine Idus decembris era M.C.LXXXI. I, the aforesaid King of Portugal who ordered this letter to be made, freely confirm this with my own hand before fitting witnesses.' There follow the confirmations of the Archbishop, João Peculiar, and of the Bishops of Coimbra and Oporto.

¹ Herculano considered the conference of Zamora to have preceded the agreement with the Papacy, and to have diverted Alfonso's attention from Afonso Henriques' real motives, but Erdmann has shown by following the Cardinal's itinerary that the act of vassalage was made first and the conference held later.

The papal reply, accepting this offer of homage, was despatched by Lucius II in the following spring. It does not recognize Afonso's right to the title of king, which it avoids by the greeting Dilecto in Christo Filio A. illustri Portugalensium Duci, but after referring to Afonso Henriques' devotion, it absolves him from the duty of presenting himself in Rome on the grounds of his wars with the pagans and manifold secular occupations. In view of this, the meeting with Cardinal Guido is regarded as sufficient: the promise of the four ounces a year is acknowledged, and Lucius promises blessing and protection from the assaults of enemies visible and invisible.

If, as Herculano thought, Afonso Henriques was recognized as King of Portugal in return for the tenure of Astorga and consequent technical and personal vassalage, the dependency was only nominal. Alfonso VII in subsequent documents did not include the King of Portugal in lists of princes who did him homage—the Count of Barcelona and King of Aragon, and the Kings of Navarre, Murcia and Segura. On the other hand, in a document of 1154 confirming the division of the city of Tuy between the bishop and chapter, Alfonso VII makes the partition good with the consent of D. Afonso, King of Portugal, in whose territories lay some of the ecclesiastical possessions of Tuy. For the moment the independence of Portugal was, if not officially recognized, at least tolerated.

v. Moslems and christians. In the south of the Peninsula the yigorous military activity of the Almoravids was spent, but in the Caliphate of 'Ali there had appeared in Africa a new sect, the followers of Muḥammad ibn Tumart, who denounced the corruption of the Almoravids and defended the strict observance of Koranic law, calling themselves Almohads or unitarians. To them Almoravids and Roman Catholics were alike polytheists. Such was the eruptive force of the new sect that the Almoravids withdrew their strength from the Peninsula to meet it, thus giving rise to a new period of separatism and regional division. Of the independent rulers who governed parts of Portugal, the most prominent was ibn Qasi of Mértola: parts of modern Portugal also fell in the domains of the rulers of Badajoz and Cáceres.

The incidents of Leiria and the battle of Ourique were not the only hostilities between Moslems and Christians. If the chronicles do not mention other engagements, it is not because they did not exist, but because they had become customary. Frequently in spring the frontier leaders gathered their supporters together for a raid into enemy territory with the object of destroying tillage and bringing back cattle, loot and prisoners. These raids or *fossados*, regularly organized on both sides, took place over the wide area between Coimbra and Santarém; and their

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regularity probably accounted for the comparative depopulation of the

region.

The system of defence against Moslem raids was similarly standardized; watch-towers signalled by means of beacons the approach of the enemy and a horn-blower was despatched through the threatened district crying 'Mouros na terra! As armas!' Failure to appear at this summons with appropriate arms was punishable in the case of knights by a fine and the docking of their horses' tails, and in the case of footsoldiers by the cutting off of their beards.

In these raids the castle of Leiria played an important part. Built as an outpost half-way between Coimbra and Santarém, it occupied a position of considerable strength on an isolated outcrop that drops sharply into an almost sheer cliff on its southern side. In spite of its natural defences it was entered in the campaign of 1137 and above two hundred and fifty knights and men were killed. In 1140 it was once more sacked, and in 1144 it was rebuilt and garrisoned for the third time. Farther inland the frontier was no more southerly: the Moslem raid on Trancoso and the construction in 1142 of the new Portuguese outpost of Germanelo, near Penela, indicate that the border was only a little below the level- of Coimbra itself.

Beyond this border lay the three provinces of al-Andalus, into which Moslem territory was divided. Of these the most northerly was Balata, now Portuguese Estremadura, looked upon as a marvel of fertility because it included all the rich lands of the Tagus with the three towns of Lisbon, Santarém and Sintra. According to Idrisi, writing in 1154, 'the inhabitants of Lisbon and of most of the west say that the sown wheat only remains in the earth forty days, and may then be harvested. They add that one measure of corn yields about a hundred'. Al-Rasis, writing in the tenth century, says of the region of Santarém, 'the fields can yield two crops a year, if it is desired, so good is the nature of the land. When it fills, the Tagus overflows and covers all the countryside, and after the river has fallen the sowing is done easily and the ground is left so damp and ready that the bread quickly ripens.'

The second province, that of al-Qasr, included not only the town of Alcácer, but also Évora, Badajoz, Mérida and Alcántara. The third, named al-Qunu, which Professor David Lopes derives from the name Cuneus, the land of the ancient Conii (Cynetes), contained the towns of Santa Maria (Faro), Mértola and Silves, its capital. Of Silves, Idrisi says that it was protected by a strong wall, possessed a port and shipyard, and was 'of fine appearance, with attractive buildings and well-furnished bazaars. Its inhabitants are Yemenite Arabs and others, who speak pure Arabic, compose poetry, and are eloquent

in speech and elegant in manners, both the upper and the lower classes'.

Herculano draws a strong comparison between the poor and struggling Christian states of Afonso Henriques and the civilized and flourishing cities of the Moslems. This is certainly an exaggeration. In spite of its towns, the south was probably sparsely populated, whereas at least the Douro and Minho districts of Portugal were thickly settled. Idrisi, who saw Lisbon only a few years before Afonso Henriques conquered it, has little to say of it in spite of its undoubted importance, digressing at length on the legend of the Wanderers. By his description of Christian territory, he shows that it was not without its own wealth. 'The sea-route from Coimbra to Santiago is this: from the castle of Montemór to the mouth of the river Vouga is seventy miles. This is where the land of Portugal, as it is called, begins. Portugal is a populous land with towns, castles and many tilled fields. It has many warriors, on horse and on foot, who raid the territory of their neighbours not of the same party. The Vouga is a big river, entered by trading-vessels and galleys, for the tide goes up it many miles. From it to the mouth of the Douro is fifteen miles. The Douro is also a big river, with a rapid rushing current, full and deep. From this river to the mouth of the Minho is sixty miles; this is a very big river, broad and deep. The tide goes far up it, and vessels that go upstream to trade stop often because of the great number of villages and castles on its banks.' This was without doubt the most thickly populated part of the country.'

Of Coimbra, Afonso Henriques' capital, Idrisi says, 'it is a small city, flourishing and well-peopled, rich in vineyards and orchards of apples, cherries and plums. The fields of Coimbra are very fertile. From the west of the city almost until the city, there are many tilled fields, and the inhabitants, who are the bravest of the Christians, possess many cattle, both great and small. The Mondego moves many mills and bathes many vineyards and gardens.'

vi. THE FIRST ATTACK ON LISBON. In 1140 or 1142 the first attempt was made to capture Lisbon.² A fleet of some seventy ships of English and Norman crusaders, men of Southampton and Hastings commanded by Willelmus Vitulus and his brother Radulfus, sailed into the Douro, where Afonso Henriques represented to them the advantages of a combined attack on Lisbon. The crusaders agreed to make the attempt,

¹ As indeed it still is. Studies by Gama Barros show that sixty of the seventy-seven modern parishes in the district of Guimarãis can be identified with those mentioned in the *Inquirições* of 1220.

² The Chronicle of the Goths gives the date 1140, whilst the English crusader of the De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi says the expedition was five years before the successful attack of 1147.

investing Lisbon from the sea while Afonso Henriques brought his army to bear from the land side. The details of the campaign are unknown; but though the outskirts of the city were sacked, it was necessary to withdraw. Undoubtedly Afonso Henriques had underestimated the difficulties of the task, for his allies left in an angry frame of mind, which caused those who returned five years later to hesitate before accepting new engagements with him.

vii. IBN QASI. The principal rebel against the Almoravids in Moslem Portugal was a certain native of Silves, known as ibn Qasi. After a prodigal youth, ibn Qasi had seen the light of truth, gave away his wealth, departed on a pilgrimage and on his return built the hermitage of Arrifana near Aljezur, where his followers foregathered, 'a source of ruin to their country', according to the historian ibn al-Katib. He had met at Alicante ibn al-'Arif, the introducer of the Suffite sect into the Peninsula, whose teachings he followed, and whose position as leader of the sect he inherited. According to ibn al-Katib, 'he wished to rule and called himself mahdi, guided by God. His lies were many—that he had made the pilgrimage to Mecca in a night, that he could send his thoughts to whomsoever he wished, that he had wealth minted by God.'

In 1143 or 1144 ibn Qasi ordered one of his followers to take for him the castle of Monte Agudo, but though this was done, it was soon recaptured and his lieutenant executed. Ibn Qasi thereupon turned his attention upon the fortress of Mértola, one of the strongest in the west. His men, in a band numbering only seventy, entered it by a trick and ibn Qasi made it his headquarters, freely distributing the money which he declared he had received from God, but which nevertheless bore the emblems of the Almoravids. Soon Silves was stirred up by his friend Muhammad ibn 'Umar ibn al-Mundir; and Évora under Sidray ibn Wazir declared for him. Ibn al-Mundir, with troops from Évora, drove the Almoravids out of Beja, and by September 1144 ibn Qasi had created for himself an independent state comprising a large part of Portugal below the Tagus.

Ibn al-Mundir was joined by the inhabitants of Ossonoba, then still a town of importance, but now reduced to a group of ruins near Milreu (Faro), and crossed the Guadiana to campaign in Andalusia, where he was defeated in the district of Seville and beaten off from Cordova. In his absence, ibn Wazir had extended his authority from Beja and Évora to Badajoz, but either fell into disfavour with the Mahdi or tired of subordination to him, and refused to appear in answer to his summons. Ibn Qasi thereupon ordered ibn al-Mundir to attack him, but ibn Wazir defeated and captured his rival, and declared the prophet deposed, once more acknowledging the authority of Cordova. Ibn Qasi's fortunes now

rapidly declined; having shut himself up in Mértola, he had barely time to escape when the gates were opened to ibn Wazir. However he was able to reach Morocco to seek the assistance of the Almohad ruler, 'Abdu'l-Mu'min, who had declared himself Mahdi. According to the Arab historian, the Moroccan greeted the fallen Mahdi of the Algarve haughtily with the words, 'So you claimed to be the Mahdi?', to which ibn Qasi replied 'You know that there are two dawns, the true and the false: I was the false'.

By whatever subtlety, ibn Qasi succeeded in securing for himself the office of Alvali of the Algarve when the first Almohad army invaded the Peninsula in the summer of 1146. This force entered Mértola and took Silves; as it travelled northward ibn Wazir submitted to it with Beja and Badajoz, and having wintered in Mértola, it captured Seville in the following spring.

viii. THE CAPTURE OF SANTARÉM, 1147. The attempted capture of Lisbon in 1140 or 1142, though not in itself successful, was closely preceded or succeeded by incursions which had a sufficiently strong effect on the Moslems to make them offer Afonso Henriques homage and tribute. To judge by the entries of the Chronicle of the Goths for 1142, this advantage was not gained by any single battle, but by a series of raids and devastations which forced the Moslems to give conditional submission. During the seven years that elapsed between the reverse of Trancoso in 1140 and the capture of Santarém in 1147, Afonso Henriques was thus gaining for himself a reputation among his enemies; 'the fierce Lord of Coimbra, the perfidious Galician, the Christian King known by the name of ibn Arrik', their chroniclers call him, 'the perfidious ibn Arrik, the cursed of Allah!' The account of the conquest of Lisbon, as told by an English eye-witness, confirms that tribute had been levied on the subjects of the Emir of Évora-Rex Eburensium jampridem datis induciis cum rege portugalensium fidem refellere nequeo, ut eum scilicet vel suos bello perturbare velim.1 The very conditions in which the assault on Santarém was made show that a truce had previously existed.

Santarém, the Scallabis of Roman times, had been rechristened between the middle of the seventh century and the Moslem occupation: the new name was derived from Santa Eiria (Irena), whose body was brought there after her martyrdom in 653. The most central town of the Tagus region, its possession, just as much as that of Lisbon, was of utmost importance to the pursuit of the reconquest.

The city was strongly protected, and Afonso Henriques did not possess

¹ David, Conquest of Lisbon, pp. 138-9. Homagium ei facientes dabant ei tributum et censum de civitatibus et de castellis de Santarem et de Ulixbona et de vicinis suis, says the Chronicle of the Goths under the year 1142.

the resources or the engineers to undertake a formal siege. The attack must therefore be by surprise. A certain Mem Ramires was sent on fictitious business to spy out the best places for night-attack with scaling-ladders; his report was presumably favourable, for Afonso Henriques and a small force left Coimbra on March 10. Having been joined by a body of Templars from Soure, he sent forward one Martim Moab with two companions to announce the breaking off of the truce to the Moslem governor. On the same day, Wednesday, the messengers returned, and the force advanced to Pernes, where it camped on Friday night. It was customary to give three days notice of the breaking of a truce, and Afonso Henriques intended to interpret the rule as much in his own favour as possible by delivering his attack at daybreak on Saturday. Overnight the ladders, each with twelve men, were brought up and concealed with the assault troops in cornfields near the walls. Before dawn, Mem Ramires led the way up a path to the part of the wall he had selected. Instead of finding the wall undefended, the attackers heard two sentries talking on the parapet: it was necessary to lie down in the corn until they drowsed. Then the Portuguese approached the wall. The first ladder collapsed with a crash, and only three men had had time to reach the parapet before the guards woke, saw the banner, challenged them, and shouted for help. Nevertheless, the small band of Portuguese on the wall was able to force a way to the gate, open it and admit their companions. In a short while the whole town was sacked with great slaughter of the inhabitants.

ix. THE CONQUEST OF LISBON, II47. Whilst the capture of Santarém at once suggested an attack on Lisbon, Afonso Henriques could not afford to consider an immediate attempt; but when he granted the churches of Santarém to the Templars he promised that if perchance it should happen that at any time God gave him Lisbon, he would transfer them there. The previous unsuccessful expedition had been made with the help of numerous crusaders, and there was then nothing to suggest that this support would again be forthcoming in a few months time.

Fortunately, a very full account of the conquest of Lisbon has been preserved in the letter of an English crusader, possibly a fighting priest, to a correspondent at Bawdsey in Suffolk. It is a remarkable tale.

Lisbon was even now one of the chief cities in the Peninsula, famous for its commerce, the wealth of its inhabitants and the neighbouring vineyards, gardens and saltpans: on the south bank of the Tagus at Almada gold was found; in the centre of the city itself there were warm

¹ The manuscript of Corpus Christi College, Cambridge, excellently edited and translated as *De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi*, by C. W. David, New York, 1936. The account is addressed to (perhaps written by) one Osbert or Osbern of Bawdsey.

springs, which gave the old quarter of Alfama its name. According to the English crusader, the population was a hundred and fifty-four thousand men, not including women and children, certainly a greatly exaggerated number, even allowing for the congregation of the inhabitants of Santarém and others who took refuge from the invaders inside the walls. Perhaps the statement that there were arms in the citadel for fifteen thousand men gives a closer idea of the truth. 'The buildings of the city', says the crusader, 'were so closely packed together that, except in the merchants' quarter, hardly a street could be found which was more than eight feet wide. The cause of so great a population was that there was no prescribed form of religion among them, for everyone was a law unto himself; the most depraved elements from all parts of the world had flowed together as it were into a cesspool, and had formed a breeding ground of every lust and abomination.'

The capture of Lisbon was made possible by the arrival in the estuary of the Douro of a large fleet, about a hundred and sixty-four vessels, which had sailed from Dartmouth at the end of May 1147 on their way to the Holy Land. The crusaders, estimated at thirteen thousand in number, were in three groups. The first consisted of Englishmen, mostly simple soldiers under the command of four constables—Hervey de Glanvill, who brought men from Norfolk and Suffolk; Simon of Dover, with men of Kent; Andrew, the leader of a group of Londoners; and Saher of Archelle, who had charge of the rest. The second group consisted of Germans, led by Count Arnold of Aerschot, a nephew of Duke Godfrey I of Lower Lotharingia; and the third was of Flemings and Boulogners under Christian of Ghistelles.

The description of the journey from Dartmouth and the organization of the expedition is curious and detailed. The crusaders had a priest to each ship, which was treated as a parish, and two judges to every thousand men; strict laws of an eye for an eye were adopted for the keeping of the peace. The voyage from England to the north coast of the Peninsula took five days, and the ships were separated by a great storm, during which at intervals the Sirens were heard, 'a horrible sound, first of wailing, and then of laughter and jeering, like the clamour of insolent men in a camp'. However, the shore of Galicia was at length sighted, 'a mountainous province, very famous for the hunting of beasts and for the manifold fruits of its soil, and quite delightful were it not defiled by its inhabitants'.

Passing the Lighthouse Tower at Corunna, 'a wonderful work which was formerly built by Julius Caesar in order that it might serve as a centre through which the revenues and the interminable lawsuits of all Britain and Ireland and Spain might pass to and fro', the crusader

recounts the rivers and towns of Galicia and northern Portugal, until his ship reached the Doyra in which lay the city of Portugala. In the bar of the Douro, there were sands in which the sick were enveloped until the rising tide washed them off and healed them; the preceding bishop had thus been cured of a black and blue spot like leprosy.

It was some days before the scattered fleet was collected, and when Afonso Henriques, who was away campaigning against the Moors, heard of their arrival he conveyed to them through the Bishop of Oporto, Pedro Pitões, the suggestion that they should join with him in an assault on Lisbon. The message was delivered by the bishop in a Latin oration pronounced in the Cathedral cemetery, since the numbers were so great that the church itself would not hold them. After the bishop's speech, his words were translated into the various tongues of his audience. His exhortation included a reference to a raid of the Moors on Oporto several years previously, in the course of which the vestments and vessels of the church were carried off and the clergy killed or captured all the way up to Santiago. Afonso Henriques, he said, had already departed ten days ago with all his forces on an expedition against Lisbon. 'Knowing in advance of your coming, he ordered us to remain here to await you, in order that we might speak to you in his place. If perchance God should put it into your hearts that you with all your fleet should go with him and remain with him until by God's will and your help the city of Lisbon be taken, we will promise money to your forces so far as the resources of the royal treasury will permit. And as hostages for the fulfilment of the promise, you may keep us with you, and anyone else vou desire.'

It was agreed to wait for the arrival of Christian, the leader of the Flemings, together with the Count of Aerschot and others before taking a decision, and to send for the Archbishop João Peculiar. With him and the Bishop of Oporto the fleet sailed to Lisbon, to make a bargain with Afonso Henriques. At the entry of the Lisbon river, after a heavy squall, a wondrous portent was beheld in the shape of great white clouds that seemed to do battle in the air with other clouds bespattered with blackness, coming from the mainland: this, with the victory of a great cloud coming from the sea, was taken to be a favourable omen. On June 28 they arrived off Lisbon, and after lunch some crusaders landed and skirmished with the Moors, but only two tents with thirty-nine men, of whom the English historian was one, spent the night ashore, 'not without fear'. On the following day Afonso Henriques arrived with his army, and a great meeting was held at which the conditions of agreement were discussed. 'As the king approached we almost all went out to meet him, rich and poor mixed up together as usually happens in such

a crowd.' Afonso Henriques, having asked who were the chief men, complimented them on their brave appearance, and disclaimed any intention of persuading them by the offer of rich gifts, 'for having been constantly harassed by the Moors so that sometimes not even our life has been safe, it has surely not been our fortune to amass wealth'. He relied, he said, on their piety as a stimulus. At this point, there seem to have been expressions of disapproval, for he is reported as continuing: 'But lest our discourse be disturbed by the shouting of your people, choose from among you those whom you wish, in order that we may withdraw together and quietly and in good temper mutually define the conditions of our promise.'

After a good deal of 'beating of the air', the men of Southampton and Hastings, those who with Willelmus and Radulfus Vitulus had taken part in the first attempt on Lisbon, took Afonso's words as treachery and declared in favour of sailing on and attacking Moorish shipping between Spain and Africa; they were anxious to get to Jerusalem, and did not want to be delayed by a lengthy siege. Eventually Glanvill persuaded the dissidents, some eight or ten shiploads, and all agreed to stay. After the choice of representatives the contract of association with Afonso Henriques was elaborated and confirmed. By it all the spoils of the city were conceded exclusively to the crusaders, together with the ransom of their captives and the contents of the inner city, if it should fall to them. Any crusaders who wished to remain in Portugal after the taking of Lisbon would receive lands from the king and have confirmed by him those liberties and customs which they enjoyed in their native countries, together with exemption from a commercial tax. Afonso Henriques further gave his word that he would not abandon the attack for any reason whatsoever, save mortal illness or danger to his kingdom from another quarter. To seal this oath, twenty hostages were exchanged.

Before hostilities were begun, the king sent João Peculiar, the Bishop of Oporto and certain crusaders to demand the surrender of Lisbon. They approached the wall and held speech with the military governor, magistrates and the bishop—either a Mozarab (Herculano's view) or a Moslem priest—and demanded that the 'see of this city shall be under our law; and surely, if a natural sense of justice had made any progress among you, you would go back unbidden to the land of the Moors whence you came, with your baggage, money, and goods, and your women and children, leaving to us our own.... You Moors and Moabites fraudulently seized the realm of Lusitania from your king and ours'. The reply of the Moslem spokesman rejected the various claims of the archbishop: 'I cannot wonder enough concerning you, for while a single forest or district suffices for many elephants and lions, neither the land

nor the sea is enough for you. Verily, it is not the want of possessions, but ambition of the mind that drives you on.'

The parley having failed, military operations began the following day. Afonso Henriques occupied the height of the Monte da Graça behind the city with his army; to the west were the English, who began the attack with slingers; to the east the Germans and Flemings took up their positions. During the first afternoon's fighting the Moslems who had come out to assault the slingers were driven back into the shelter of the outer walls protecting the suburb. Towards evening these defences were penetrated in such a way as to expose those of the enemy who were between the outer walls and the main fortifications of the citadel. Since it was late in the day, Afonso Henriques ordered the withdrawal of the forces that had broken through and the postponement of the general attack on the suburb until the following day. But it was too late to retire; most of the English troops were mixed up in the affray and dusk was coming on: Saher of Archelle resolved to call up the remaining forces and complete the conquest of the suburb. By nightfall Saher with three thousand men had seized the whole of it and driven the Moslems into the gates of the inner city, and they camped overnight in the Moorish cemetery, while the abandoned houses blazed around them.

Next day the defenders tried to dislodge the occupants of the suburb in a sortie, but both Portuguese and English reinforcements drove them off. They now established their camp under the walls of the inner city, 'not without a feeling of considerable envy of our good fortune on the part of all the besieging forces'. The suburb on the eastern side of the city fell without resistance to the Flemings and Germans, who reaped the advantage of the English onslaught. The capture of the suburbs laid open the system of underground storehouses tunnelled into the side of the hill: the rocky nature of the hill-crest had made it necessary to build these deposits outside the citadel, so that about a hundred thousand loads of wheat, barley, millet and pulse fell into the hands of the besiegers. The lack of supplies added to the difficulties of the defenders, crammed together in the small space of the inner walls. As to the crusaders, they had lost men, and two cemeteries were prepared, with their respective chapels, one to the east, one to the west, providing the sites of the later monastery of S. Vicente de Fóra and the church of Santa Maria dos Mártires, the site of the present National Library.

The siege of the inner city now commenced. The defenders derided the attackers from the parapets, 'taunted us with the numerous children about to be born at home in our absence', and made remarks and actions offensive to their religion. The first engines to be constructed were five mangonels, which were promptly burnt. A tower, built by the English,

got stuck in the sand and was at length burnt; the men of Cologne began five mines, but were each time repelled. After six weeks, the besiegers' spirits drooped, and there were many complaints. But one night a Moorish skiff tried to slip away from the city in the direction of Palmela; its occupants were pursued and fled, but abandoned in the boat letters addressed to Abu Muḥammad Sidray ibn Wazir, the governor of Évora, begging for immediate help. Some days later the body of another Moor was found with the reply from Évora; the governor was at peace with Afonso Henriques and could give no assistance. This episode, whether true, or, as Herculano conjectured, a piece of propaganda, had the effect of raising the spirits of the besiegers.

The plight of the Moslems was now serious: the poor were already deserting through hunger. The attackers ranged over the country on both sides of the river, and brought eighty Moorish heads from Almada which they impaled before the walls. For sport, food was left outside the walls, and the Moors netted like birds when they tried to slip out and take it. Nevertheless, the various machines and mines were not successful. Catapults pelted the city with stones; an engineer from Pisa directed the construction of a movable wooden tower on the western side, whilst the Germans and Flemings tried to lay a long mine under the walls. On October 16 the mine was fired and part of the wall breached. The Germans and Flemings rushed into the gap, but were driven out. Many of the English who had heard of the breach tried to take advantage of it, but were resisted by the Germans, who sought to beat them off. The breach proved useless. Three days later the English tower was ready. Brought up against the wall at the river-front, it was attacked and defended with energy. Overnight it was surrounded by water and the Moslems did their best to fire it. At last it was near enough for a draw-bridge to be dropped on the parapet. When the besieged saw that the wall was about to be assailed, they laid down their arms and asked for a truce till the morrow.

Fernando Cativo, Afonso Henriques' general, and Hervey de Glanvill went to meet the Moorish leaders. Fighting was suspended; the besieged handed over hostages and were given the night in which to decide whether to surrender. The hostages were delivered to Afonso Henriques. This aroused the suspicions of the crusaders, who flocked towards the royal enclosure, fearing lest they should lose the promised booty. Negotiations were interrupted by disturbances. A rascally priest of Bristol, of the worst morals, for he was later arrested amongst thieves, stirred up an uproar against the leaders, and an attempt was made to lynch Hervey de Glanvill. A crowd of crusaders protested against the negotiations and demanded the resumption of the attack next day. The

Germans and Flemings left their quarters in order to wrest the hostages from the Portuguese: the English warned Afonso Henriques of this, and he was preparing to resist the mutineers by force, when their leaders came to declare that tranquillity had been restored. Afonso threatened to abandon the siege if there were further disorders.

Next day, the leaders of the allies renewed their oaths to the king and the arrangements for entry into the city were made—a hundred and forty English men-at-arms to lead, with a hundred and sixty Germans and Flemings to follow as far as the keep, where the Moors were to hand over their possessions. If anything were concealed, its owner should suffer death, but after the sack the Moors should freely depart. In spite of the careful diplomacy of Afonso Henriques, the hundred and sixty Germans and Flemings entered first, joined by others who poured through the now-abandoned breach. After the English, Afonso Henriques and the leaders of the crusaders entered. Meanwhile violence and murder prevailed. When the sack and the consequent disorder and debauchery were done, the inhabitants filed through three of the city gates, a sorry procession that streamed away empty-handed from Saturday October 25 until the following Wednesday. The siege had lasted seventeen weeks.

x. SETTLEMENT; CISTERCIANS AND TEMPLARS. The conquest of Lisbon brought about the surrender of the surrounding district. Sintra, completely cut off, gave in before it was attacked, and the ancient rock-fortress of Palmela on the south side of the Tagus was abandoned by the Moslems, affording a strong outpost for a further advance.

The organization of the city was begun with the appointment of Pedro Viegas as governor. Afonso Henriques had offered to provide land for any of the crusaders who desired to settle in Portugal; and a number of them accepted. One William Lacorni or Descornes peopled Atouguia with his followers; another, Jourdan, settled in Lourinha; and a third, Allard, received Vila Verde. Although all these colonies agreed to serve Afonso Henriques and his successors, they were allowed to preserve their own customs and laws: the obligation to respect these various privileges may have had something to do with the delay in granting a charter to Lisbon. The most notable of the settlers was one Gilbert, a priest of Hastings, who was made Bishop of Lisbon, being consecrated by João Peculiar shortly after the fall of the city. The new bishop is said to have introduced the breviary and missal of Salisbury, which prevailed in the diocese until 1536. His consecration by the Archbishop of Braga originated a new contention between Braga and Compostela, which claimed to have inherited the suffraganate of Lisbon from the see of

Mérida. Some of the Moorish and Mozarabic families which had remained in the Lisbon district preserved their liberty and their own laws and customs, but others were enslaved, and a great part of the population had withdrawn after the fall of Lisbon to Alcácer, now the limit of Moslem territory.

Two religious orders played a considerable part in the early expansion of Portugal. The Templars had given Afonso Henriques valuable aid in the reconquest and were recompensed in Santarém and Lisbon: the Cistercians performed the enormous task of peopling and cultivating the newly-won territory, much of it waste or abandoned. Appearing in Portugal before 1143, the followers of St Bernard received in 1153 jurisdiction over a large area of Estremadura spreading round the monastery of Alcobaça, which developed into the largest and most opulent religious house in the country. The Cistercian dominion lay between Leiria and Óbidos and included the townships of Aljubarrota, Pedreneira and Alcobaça, with the seaport of São Martinho de Selir. Like Afonso Henriques, the white friars were of Burgundian origin; and, what was very much to the point, they kept alive the primitive Benedictine tradition of agriculture. In due time the coutos of Alcobaca came to include as many as thirteen towns and three ports; and within this area the monks entirely directed settlement, cultivation, stock-raising, commerce and communications.

The Templars were principally settled in the eastern part of the newly conquered territory and in the Tagus valley. From their first settlement at Soure in 1128, they had spread to Pombal, Ega and Redinha, then overgrown and uninhabited wilds. In 1145 they received from Afonso Henriques' sister and her husband, Fernão Mendes of Bragança, the castle of Longroiva, and two years later their Master Hugo was granted the ecclesiastical patronage of Santarém. When Lisbon fell the churches of Santarém returned to its diocese, and in an agreement with Bishop Gilbert, the Templars were compensated by Afonso Henriques with the possession of the castle of Cera, on the banks of the river Tomar. The name of the river was given by the Master of the Templars, Gualdim Pais, to the town he founded on its banks as a centre for the order. By the end of the twelfth century, the Templars possessed in addition the castles of Idanha, Almourol, Zêzere and others, and Afonso Henriques had endowed them with houses and land in Sintra.

xi. THE RECONQUEST BEYOND THE TAGUS. Soon after the fall of Lisbon Afonso Henriques had made an attempt on Alcácer, but had been driven off and was himself wounded. In 1151 he laid plans for another attack on the same town. This time Bishop Gilbert was sent to England to ask for help in an attack, according to Johan, Prior of Hexham, on

Seville.1 According to Herculano, English knights and men came out, but although the town was surrounded, it did not fall. In 1157 another unsuccessful attempt was made, in conjunction with a band of passing crusaders, perhaps under the Count of Flanders, Thierry of Alsace. When in the following year Alcácer at last fell, it was to purely Portuguese forces.

The dissension prevalent among the Moslems was still favourable to the reconquest. The Almohad army that had restored ibn Qasi to Silves and to which ibn Wazir had submitted in Beja and Badajoz had conquered Seville and retired. At once revolt flared up. Amongst numerous other insurgents, ibn Qasi declared his independence in Silves. A fresh army was sent from Africa to reduce the rebels in the Peninsula, but although ibn Wazir and others went to Sallee in 1150 to offer submission, ibn Qasi was not among them. In the following year he gave his support to a new mahdi in Mecca who was overthrown, and was compelled, according to the Arab account (which no Portuguese source confirms) to appeal to Afonso Henriques for protection. To him the Portuguese king sent a horse, a shield and a lance as presents, but the inhabitants of Silves, fearing the effects of this treaty with the traditional enemy, forced their way into the castle and emerged with ibn Qasi's head on a lance-point, crying 'Behold the mahdi of the Christians!' Ibn al-Mundir was chosen to succeed him.

In spite of the anarchy of the Moslem Peninsula, reconquest had to proceed step by step, nor was every advance permanent. In 1159 Afonso Henriques led an attack on Évora and Beja, which were temporarily added to the Christian kingdom. Beja was held for only four months and then abandoned, but Évora was kept for two years, at the end of which fresh Moslem forces recovered it. The operations which brought about the final recapture of these two places were not conducted by Afonso Henriques in person. On November 30, 1162, Beja was seized by a force of commoners (cavaleiros vilãos) under a certain Fernando Gonçalves, proceeding, according to an Arabic writer, from Santarém.

Évora was captured by Geraldo Sem-Pavor, a figure who has passed from the domain of history into that of legend. Said to have been a knight guilty of various faults who, because of them, had abandoned Afonso Henriques' court, he had formed a band of raiders (latronibus sociis eius), and seized several castles from the Moslems, giving them to the king. In September or October 1166, Évora was taken by scaling-ladders after a surprise attack, and subsequently settled by Christians

¹ Twysden, Hist. Angl. Script., p. 278, Anno 1151: Gilebertus episcopus Olisiponis, praedicans in Anglia, plurimos sollieitavit in Hispaniam proficisci, Hispalim obsessuros et expugnaturos.

with Gerald himself as governor. A few months previously he had taken Trujillo: some three months after the capture of Évora he entered Cáceres, and later in the same year seized the castles of Montanches, Serpa and Juromenha.

xii. CONFLICT WITH LEON. In 1146 Afonso Henriques married Mafalda (Matilda), a daughter of Count Amadeus III of Maurienne and Savoy. The match continued the relations established in the previous generation between Burgundy and Portugal, for Mafalda's grandmother had been a sister of Count Raimundo and of Cardinal Guido of Vienna. According to the monk of Alcobaça who recounts the capture of Santarém, Afonso's first son, christened Henrique, was born on March 5, 1147, only five days before the king set out on the expedition. This eldest son and one other did not survive infancy, and when Queen Mafalda died in December 1158, four children were alive, the heir, Sancho Martinho, born about 1154, and three daughters, Mafalda, Urraca and Teresa.

Princess Mafalda was betrothed to the heir of Count Ramón Berenguer IV of Barcelona at a meeting between Afonso and the count at Tuy in 1160, but she died before the marriage could take place. In the same year a meeting was celebrated at Celanova with Fernando II, the new King of Leon: its purpose is unknown, but the marriage of Princess Urraca to Fernando, which took place in 1165, was probably arranged on this occasion. Afonso's third daughter, Teresa, married Count Philip of Flanders, son of Thierry of Alsace, in 1184.

Since the agreement of Zamora of 1143, Alfonso VII apparently ceased to take any interest in the affairs of Portugal. In 1147 or 1148 he complained to Eugene III that his rights and dignity had been infringed by the mutual concessions of the Papacy and the King of Portugal, and protested that the Archbishop of Braga had not recognized the supremacy of Toledo, as Urban II had bidden and all his successors confirmed. Eugene III, a refugee on French soil, gave way. With regard to the papal undertakings to protect Portugal, he attempted to avoid the issue by saying that he had done as much for Alfonso VII, but in dealing with the complaint about the Archbishop of Braga, he decided entirely in the favour of Toledo and ordered that the supremacy of the latter should be recognized. In facing what was clearly an embarrassing situation, he addressed Alfonso VII in endearing terms and sent him the Golden Rose. At the same time he ordered João Peculiar to acknowledge the supremacy of the Primate of Toledo within three months, under pain of suspension. João Peculiar had not appeared at the Council of Rheims at which Alfonso's complaints were received, in spite of the visit to Braga of a papal legate. He continued to disregard Eugene's directions, and was suspended; but when Eugene was returning from France to Italy in 1148, he appeared in Lombardy and was absolved, having promised to do homage to Toledo.

From this time until the death of the emperor in 1157 the question of Portuguese independence again lapsed. The division of the Leonese empire between Alfonso's two sons Sancho and Fernando, who became Kings of Castile and Leon with Galicia respectively, gave Afonso Henriques hopes of profiting by any dissension between them. In the partition made by the late emperor no mention was made of the fate of Portugal, but the two brothers came to an agreement at Sahagún in May 1158, deciding that when it had been conquered Fernando should divide it in half and Sancho take his choice. Instead of being able to profit by their disunion, it seemed as though Afonso Henriques was to be the victim of a concerted attack.

However, the death of Sancho three months later upset the projected conquest and turned the ambitions of Fernando II towards Castile, now ruled by a boy of four, Alfonso VIII. For the moment the pact of Sahagún was forgotten, and Fernando sought to take advantage of the bitter conflicts for power between the two powerful Castilian families of Lara and Castro. The meeting between Afonso Henriques and Fernando II at Celanova in December 1160 may have resulted in some kind of alliance, sealed by the betrothal of the King of Leon and the Princess of Portugal, destined to give free rein to Fernando II's ambitions in Castile. If this was so, the meeting was not very effective, for hostilities soon broke out between Portugal and Leon.

The source of the conflict was the foundation of Ciudad Rodrigo by Fernando II in 1160. The settlers proved an unruly crew, and took advantage of their proximity to the Portuguese frontier not only to carry out raids, but also to push back the boundaries. The towns of Salamanca and Avila objected strongly to the foundation, revolted and were suppressed by Fernando in 1162. Five years later Afonso Henriques went to war with his son-in-law over the same city—the depredations caused to Portugal must have been considerable to bring about the breaking of a truce that had now lasted twenty-seven years. The expedition against Ciudad Rodrigo was led by Afonso's son, Sancho, now a boy of thirteen, and thus ripe for military experience. Advancing almost to the city, the Portuguese were met by Leonese forces at Arganal and heavily defeated. Sancho himself was obliged to flee, leaving many of his men prisoners, though they were later freed by Fernando II. If this liberation was pure

¹ Quantum vero adquisierimus de Portugal teneamus per medium; postquam vero totum adquisierimus, vos frater meus Rex Fernandus dividite eum, et ego Rex Sancius eligam contra partem meam: Escalona, Hist. Sahagún, Madrid, 1782, Appendix 174 (Gonzaga de Azevedo, IV, 113). The pact also disposed of the Moslem territory in Portugal still to be conquered.

generosity, Afonso Henriques did not accept it in the spirit in which it was offered. Putting himself on the northern frontier and preparing the way by corrupting various Galician barons, he seized the city of Tuy, violating the cathedral, and carried his advance to Toroño and the river Limia. He then surrounded the castle of Sandino, the property of the monks of Celanova, but was driven off by a great storm, attributed by the monks to the intervention of their patron Saint Rosendo, and hastily built the fortress of Cedofeita. Leaving garrisons in his new conquests, Afonso Henriques retired to Portugal. Cedofeita was soon lost. When Fernando attacked it, its main tower was struck by lightning, and on this demonstration of divine displeasure the garrison gave in. But at least some of the Galician conquests were retained until 1169.

Meanwhile Geraldo Sem-Pavor, now governor of Évora, had spread terror into the hearts of the Moslems of the Tagus and Guadiana area. Probably when Afonso Henriques was on a visit to Tuy, where he compensated the cathedral by a large grant for the violation committed two years before, he learnt that Gerald, with or without his permission, had captured the city of Badajoz. The deed was a double infringement of the rights of the King of Leon, firstly because Badajoz was tributary to him and secondly because in the partition, agreed to possibly at Celanova, its conquest had been awarded to him. While the Portuguese occupying the city were awaiting the surrender of the Almohads who had taken refuge in the keep, Fernando appeared with a new army and began to encircle the besiegers. The Portuguese found the position untenable, and attempted to make a sortie. In the confusion Afonso Henriques broke his right leg under the bar of the gate, and though he was carried to Caia, near the city, he was there captured by the Leonese.

Afonso Henriques' captivity lasted two months, and the price of his liberty was the surrender of the towns of Galicia and a considerable sum of money.¹ Never again able to ride after his accident, Afonso Henriques was borne back to Coimbra: Geraldo returned to his stronghold of Juromenha, and the Moslem governor re-entered Badajoz.

xiii. Last Years of Afonso Henriques, 1170–1185. On his release from captivity, Afonso retired convalescent to Lafões on the Vouga. One of his first acts was to secure his possessions below the Tagus by granting them to defend and develop to the Templars, in payment of which they would receive a third of all the land they could settle and acquire. It was presumably in this area that the fighting of 1170 took place, in which Gonçalo Mendes, the warrior known as o Lidador, is said to have lost

¹ According to Roger Hoveden: Qui dedit pro redemtione 25 oppida, quae ipse super eum acquisierat, et 15 summarios oneratos auro, et 20 dextrarios, et aliis Regni assistentibus, ut citus liberaretur, dedit multa.

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his life at the age of ninety, fighting two engagements on a single day.

The reverse of Badajoz had undoubtedly given encouragement to the Almohads, and Afonso Henriques' maimed condition no longer permitted him to take an active part against them. It was probably these two facts that caused Afonso Henriques to knight his son Sancho in a ceremony held at Coimbra in August 1170, and shortly after to associate him in the government. The appearance of Sancho's name as a witness to documents is not conclusive of this; but the account of the removal of the relics of St Vincent to Lisbon expressly states filioque regis eiusdem conregnante, 18 annorum adolescente mirabilis indolis (1173), and other documents declare that Sancho was ruling with Afonso at this period. The association of father and son had been a common occurrence in Visigothic times, and Afonso Henriques' measure recalls the fact that the monarchy was still theoretically elective, for Visigothic law was the only written law on the subject. As Afonso Henriques himself survived until 1185, there was thus time for the country to become accustomed to Sancho's succession, and the hereditary nature of the kingship was never questioned, although the right of the people to choose its own leader on the extinction of a dynasty became a living issue at the end of the fourteenth century.

On three occasions the Moslems, reinvigorated with the triumph of the Almohads, attempted heavy onslaughts on Portugal. The first of these attacks, that of 1171, was directed against Santarém. Abu Ya'qub, the Almohad caliph, collected a large force of 100,000 men according to Arabic tradition; and departing from the Algarve, forced his way into the interior of Portugal. Afonso Henriques himself was in Santarém, which was surrounded. At once Fernando II marched from Leon in the direction of Santarém: curiously, Afonso Henriques seems to have doubted with what intentions his son-in-law was coming, and sent out messengers to ask for peace. Whether Fernando ever reached the beleaguered city is unknown, for the messengers brought back the news that the King of Leon was bringing aid, and the Moslems made off, seizing Alcántara on the way.

A period of peace followed the retirement of the Almohad horde; Afonso Henriques made a truce with the Moslems which lasted from 1172 until 1178: 'the accursed Christian ibn Arrik shut himself up in his stronghold, and the Moslems were for some time delivered from his mischief'.¹ It seems to have been under cover of this truce that the relics of St Vincent were brought to Lisbon in 1173. The saint, a victim of the persecutions of Dacian in Valencia in 304, had been brought to Cape

¹ Al-Maggani, v. Herculano, III, 101.

St Vincent in the eighth century. Here, according to Idrisi, the church which was built over his remains and served by Mozarabic monks, gave hospitality to all comers, 'an immutable obligation'. It possessed 'vast treasures and ample revenues, mainly derived from lands with which it has been endowed in different parts of the Algarve'. Mestre Estêvão, the precentor of Lisbon Cathedral, tells how Afonso Henriques had himself vainly gone to the Cape for the purpose of bringing back the martyr to Braga or Coimbra, but that only through the arrival in Lisbon of two brothers who knew the church well was he able to find the body, 'and as by the will of God, the treaty of peace between the king and the Moors granted greater safety for the journey', ships were sent to the Cape to bring back the body of the saint, together with two of the ten ravens that never forsook the church. These ravens, perched one fore, one aft of a ship, form the crest of Lisbon; and pairs of the birds, often very tame, are a familiar sight in the streets.

The truce was eventually broken by the Portuguese in 1178. Sancho, now aged twenty-four, made a bold penetration of enemy territory and reached Seville, entering and sacking the suburb of Triana, from which great spoils were brought back to Portugal. Vengeance was not long in coming. In the following year Abu Ya'qub, who had been in Morocco at the time of Sancho's exploit, raised a fleet to attack Lisbon. The raid, which is not recorded by Christian writers, resulted in the destruction and spoliation of the suburbs.

In this year Alexander III at long last recognized Afonso Henriques' right to the title of king. The bull *Manifestis probatum* of May 23, 1179, not only confirmed him in possession of all his conquests from the Moors, but acknowledged the claims of his successors to the same title, possessions and protection. 'It has been proved by evident arguments', runs the bull, 'that in the labours of war and in military strife as an intrepid extirpator of the enemies of the Christian name, and as a diligent propagator of the Christian faith, you have performed numerous services as a good son of your holy mother church and as a Catholic prince, leaving a name worthy of memory and an example to be imitated by following generations.' These words make it clear that it was on the score of his conquests from the infidel that Afonso Henriques earned recognition from Rome. In the following sentence the monarchy of Portugal is accorded divine right: 'it is therefore just that those whom a celestial dispensation from on high chooses for the government and security of a people should be cherished with sincere affection by the Apostolic See, which should hearken and give effect to their just pleas. Therefore, considering your person, adorned with prudence and justice and fitted for the government of people, we take it under the protection of St Peter

and of ourselves, and concede Your Excellency and confirm with our apostolic authority the Kingdom of Portugal in the full royal honour and the dignity pertaining to kingship, and all those places which with divine aid you shall have seized from the hands of the Saracens and over which the neighbouring Christian princes cannot vindicate rights.' This protection is accorded to the successors to the throne, and it is noted that Afonso Henriques has contracted pro amplioris reverentie argumento to pay a tribute of two gold marks yearly to the Holy See. Finally the promise of protection is repeated more explicitly—'that no man whatsoever shall dare to disturb your person or those of your heirs or the said kingdom, or to take away its possessions or to threaten to retain what may have been taken away, or to trouble it with any vexations'. If in the future any person knowing this 'page of our constitution' shall try to infringe it, he shall on the second or third warning suffer excommunication and retaliation.

Although the concession of 1179 merely recognized a state of affairs which had long existed, its appearance was an admission of Portugal to the company of nations, and an assurance against future aggression. The non-payment of the agreed tribute was the subject of a dispute between Sancho I and the Papacy in 1199, when the latter claimed that no payment had been made during the twenty years that had elapsed since the issue of the bull.

After an unsuccessful siege of Abrantes in 1179, the Almohads returned the following year to invest Coruche and Évora, and were successful in taking and destroying the former, though it was rebuilt within two years. Évora, for its part, withstood the siege, and the enemy retired to Seville. Ibn Khaldun mentions a naval battle between the Portuguese and Sevillian fleets, resulting in a defeat of the Portuguese with the loss of twenty vessels.

The third invasion of the Almohads took place in July 1184, the year before Afonso Henriques' death. In an incursion lasting five weeks, Abu Ya'qub laid waste Estremadura and again surrounded Santarém. According to an Arabic account preserved at Copenhagen, the Almohads brought enormous forces, but failing to take Santarém, raided as far as Tôrres Vedras, and then retired. During the retirement, Abu Ya'qub died, killed during a Portuguese raid on his quarters, according to one Arabic source. This invasion, which attained considerable fame outside the Peninsula, is referred to by Dean Ralph de Diceto, in his *Imagines Historiarum*, who says that thirty-seven Moorish kings were defeated and forty-five thousand Berbers and Moors slain in two battles. According to Ralph, the Almohads crossed the Tagus and assailed Santarém for three days and three nights until the walls were breached and they entered, driving

the garrison into a tower. On the following night, Sancho and the Bishop of Oporto arrived with relief. Hearing of the arrival of Abu Ya'qub, the Archbishop of Santiago came down from Galicia to assist the Portuguese and reached Santarém at daybreak on June 26, the day after Sancho's victory. This unexpected attack caused great loss to the enemy. On July 24 news came that the King of Leon was preparing to come to challenge the Almohad Emperor to single combat, but when Abu Ya'qub tried thrice to mount his horse he fell off and died. Hereupon the Almohad army took alarm and fled. Ralph's version is thus detailed, and some of its statements may be true.

Considerable developments had taken place in the expansion of Portuguese relations with the western world. The marriage of Afonso Henriques' daughter Teresa with Count Philip of Flanders was arranged through Henry II of England, as a cousin of Philip. In spite of her large proportion of Burgundian blood, Teresa gained fame as a southern beauty: the English historian Ralph de Diceto remarks quam hilarior fama concupiscibilem forma filiabus regum australium praeferebat. After numerous requests, Afonso Henriques at length consented to the match and Teresa departed in Flemish galleys for La Rochelle, where she was received by envoys of the King of England and accompanied to Poix, near Amiens, for the wedding. Of Afonso's other children, Mafalda had died young, and Urraca, after her repudiation by Fernando II, retired to a convent. Two illegitimate sons of the king played prominent parts in the life of the nation. Fernando Afonso was general-in-chief (alferesmór) of his father's army; a position which was subsequently transferred to his brother Pedro Afonso, who later retired to a Cistercian monastery. A third bastard, Afonso, was elected Grand-Master of the Hospitallers in Palestine, but was forced to resign on account of his excessive worldliness, and returned to Portugal. The Chronicle of Malta avers that he came back with the intention of supplanting Sancho on the throne and was therefore poisoned, but there is no confirmation of this.

On December 6, 1185, after a reign of fifty-seven years, Afonso Henriques died. He was buried with D. Mafalda in Santa Cruz at Coimbra. The original tomb was replaced by a more ornate one in the sixteenth century by D. Manuel.

¹ Fernando II had repudiated Urraca in 1175. The two Spanish chroniclers Rodrigo de Toledo and Lucas de Tuy associate the repudiation with Fernando's intervention against the Saracens of 1170. Rodrigo de Toledo: Quod audiens R.F. in succursum ejus celeriter properavit et ejus adventus territus, Rex Aldefonsus timuit ne ad vindicandas injurias adveniret, sed cognita veritate egit gratias, ut debebat. Agareni autem Regis Fernandi praesentium non ferentes ab obsidione continuo recesserunt. Et Rex Fernandus ad regnum rediens dimisit Urracam uxorem... et duxit uxorem Tarasiam filiam comitis Fernandi quae fuerat uxor comitis Nunii de Castella.

CHAPTER VI

THE REIGN OF SANCHO I

i. ADMINISTRATION AND SOCIETY. Three days after the death of Afonso Henriques, Sancho arrived in Coimbra to take possession of the throne. He had already had fourteen years' experience as a ruler and a soldier, so that now in his early thirties, surrounded by the ministers who had assisted his father to establish Portuguese independence, he had every opportunity to organize and strengthen the kingdom. Two English authors, Robert du Mont and Roger Hoveden, in recording the marriage of D. Teresa, suggest that Sancho was already king in his father's lifetime. In view of Afonso's age, between seventy-four and seventy-nine at the time of his death, this may have been in practice true.

The state to which Sancho I succeeded was clearly defined on its western and northern frontiers: from the mouth of the Minho to the castle of Alva on the Douro the northern and western boundaries followed roughly the same line as those of to-day. From the Douro to the Tagus the difference was slight, falling rather to the disadvantage of Portugal in the tract below the Douro and above the Serra da Malcata. Below the Tagus there were no definite frontiers; in the northern area settlement had not progressed sufficiently for any limits to be fixed, and farther south the frontier was even more fluid. The continual fossados produced a strip of no man's land which was never settled and was regularly overrun. Of Portugal itself, the most intensively cultivated and firmly held was naturally the province between the Minho and the Douro; nevertheless Coimbra, closer to the scene of military operations, played the part of capital of the early kings, though the Portuguese court and administration remained ambulatory until a late period—even in the sixteenth century the tendency to wander persisted.

The administration of Portugal had evolved from that of Leon, with innovations introduced by the Burgundians and local variations; the general organization of the barons, as lords and chatelains, and counts, as lords of the frontiers, together with the royal council and household, was Leonese. The principal officers of the court were four; the maiordomus curiae, who was head of the administration; the signifer or military chief, who led the army in the king's absence and bore the standard in his

¹ Robert du Mont, Pist. Illust. Veter. Script. 1, 676, Rex Anglorum Henricus sapientia et divitiis suis acquisivit sororem regis portugalensis Hispaniae, ad hoc ut fieret uxor comitis Flandrensis. ...haus pater, licet grandaevus, adhuc vixit. Roger Hoveden, Annal. p. 622, duxit in uxorem sororem Sanctii regis portugalensis.

presence; the dapifer curiae, or master of the royal household; and the chancellor, or royal notary. The two offices of standard-bearer and chancellor appear for the first time in a document of D. Urraca of 1112, and were Burgundian innovations. One Mestre Alberto appears as chancellor to Afonso Henriques from 1142 until at least 1169, when he was replaced by Mestre Julião, who by his statesmanship became one of the most influential figures at court. These officers, together with whatever barons, governors and prelates were present at court, formed the royal curia, the source of the royal council and of the cortes, and appeared as confirmatories on documents issued by the king: thus in the first month of Sancho's reign, a confirmation of his father's concessions to the church of Santa Cruz at Coimbra shows the principal figures of the court to have been Count Velasco as dapifer, Sancho's half-brother Pedro Afonso and Pedro Pais as present and former standard-bearers, the four governors of Viseu, Lafões, Lisbon and Santarém, and four other nobles, together with Archbishop Godinho and the Bishops of Oporto, Lamego, Coimbra and Viseu, and Bishops-elect of Évora and Lisbon.

These personages, together with other barons, the masters of the orders of knighthood and certain abbots, formed the first rank of nobility, the ricos-homens, who possessed wide estates and enjoyed a high degree of sovereignty over them. The rico-homen was a 'lord of banner and cook-pot' (senhor de pendão e caldeira): he enlisted men under his banner and fed them from his cook-pot. In the south of the country the large areas governed by ricos-homens were controlled from the largest towns, but elsewhere a distinction was made between ricos-homens, whose authority was largely rural, and nobres-homens or governors of the towns.¹ According to the Ancient Book of Lineages (Livro Velho das Linhagens), the early Portuguese nobility derived from thirty Leonese established in the north of Portugal in the time of Alfonso VI of Leon. The lesser nobility, who were without private civil or military authority, constituted the class of infanções; knights and squires rarely held lands from the crown.

Below the nobility the highest class of free commoners was that of the cavaleiros-vilãos (villein-knights), who were able to maintain a war-horse and arms of their own, which they must put at the king's service. The general burden of the ignoble, the payment of taxation, fell most lightly upon them: sometimes by special privilege their position was not inferior to that of the infanções. As warriors they played an important part in the reconquest, and were independently responsible for the capture of Beja in 1162.

Unfree classes, living in hereditary glebal serfdom, existed wherever the king, nobility or clergy had estates: lapses into serfdom through capture, debt, crime or personal preference were common. Emancipation

¹ Herculano, vii, 197.

might be accompanied by onerous conditions approximating to serfdom itself. Slaves, not attached, but saleable, were usually captive Saracens: slavery long outlived serfdom in Portugal. Intermediate unfree classes comprised juniores, of obscure position, but at least in part (juniores de capite) without freedom of movement. Clients (malados) were freemen who had accepted the shelter of a baron to whom they paid taxes or offered services: in Portugal or Galicia this maladia might entail the assignment to the overlord, either baron or ecclesiastic, of as much as half of the subject's property in return for protection.

ii. DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCELHOS. The first four years of Sancho I's reign were peaceful: the king, known as the Settler or the Peopler (o Povoador), devoted himself to the intensification of his father's work of development. The northern frontier was fixed, now that the Galician policy had been definitely abandoned, by the construction of castles-Lapela and Melgaço founded by Afonso Henriques, and Contrasta by Sancho I. Within his frontiers Sancho was faced with the problem of large areas of half-abandoned territory with ruined towns and villages and untilled fields. Only the north was thickly settled: the immediate area of Coimbra was adequately populated, but there remained areas within a short distance of the capital which were still unrestored. The eastern tracts of Beira, all of Estremadura from Leiria to Lisbon, and especially the heaths across the Tagus east of Santarém carried only a fraction of the population necessary for their proper development and defence. In a proportion of this area the land itself compared unfavourably with that of the populated region of the north. Settlers could thus only be attracted to the centre of the kingdom and to the new frontiers by the offer of considerable privileges: these usually took the shape of the foundation of a municipality or concelho, whose rights were guaranteed by the issue of a charter embodying the local privileges and obligations.

The history of the concelho, which forms the basis of the regional reorganization of reconquest, was for long traced through Visigothic and Moslem times to the Roman municipium. This view has now been generally abandoned in favour of one which attributes the origin of the concelho to the economic necessities of rural communities at the time of the reconquest, and finds its earliest manifestations in the organization necessary to exploit and break in land, and to collectivize various aspects of rural life. The early charter of Castro Xeriz, granted in 974 by the Count of Castile, shows the beginning of authorized municipal practice based on the doctrine of traditional bye-laws. At the Cortes of Leon of

¹ The document is called a charter of liberty and *ingenuitas*: it prescribes legal enquiry, punishes perjury with the extraction of one-fifth of the offender's teeth by the *concelho* and orders that, if an inquiry be impossible, the contention be settled according to the *fueros* (bye-laws) of Castro Xeriz: Herculano, vII, 73.

1020 the local legislation of the city of Leon is included at the end of the articles of the assembly and shows the concelho as having jurisdiction over the citizens, even over the royal officers, and regulating the economy of the city by its deliberations. In various other localities the manner of electing the magistrates, and their privileges and obligations, are prescribed according to ancient custom. The charters which confirm the organization of municipalities bear the name forais in Portuguese, or fueros in Castilian.¹ Already before the independence of the County of Portugal, these had been issued in Portuguese territory, though the number of localities that enjoyed their benefits was small compared with the areas in the possession of the nobility and clergy, where a seigniorial regime was in vigour. The earliest Portuguese concelhos date from the second half of the eleventh century, but their forais, and all others issued until the middle of the reign of Afonso Henriques mainly in the province of Beira, lack any reference to municipal organization. Only in the later years of Afonso I do there occur charters which confer municipal privileges.

The monarch was not the only source of *forais*. Although it was in general he who was most concerned in the attraction of settlers and defenders to certain districts, others, lords, the monastic orders and the Church, also issued *forais* for similar purposes. In numerous cases the *concelho* formed itself without the initiative of the *foral*, which then consecrated an already existing state of affairs. There seems to have existed no agreed stage of development at which municipal status was granted, for the *forais* themselves betray every degree of growth from the rudimentary to the complete.

For defence the concelhos had the advantage of providing unpaid military service. The cavaleiros-vilãos, the highest class of citizens in the concelho, were obliged to provide horse and arms for a varying period of time annually when the king or his representative required: in return for this duty they received considerable alleviations of taxation. Their social inferiors, the peões, incapable of providing a horse, were obliged to offer military service on varying conditions. In some cases, only the defence of the concelho itself was exacted: in others, attendance on the annual fossado (raid) was demanded. To draw settlers to the new centres, Christian captives or serfs usually received a guarantee of freedom either on their arrival, or after a year's residence. Similarly Afonso Henriques granted the free or enfranchised Moors (mouros forros) of Lisbon, Almada, Palmela and Alcácer, a foral in 1170, and permitted certain

¹ Foro is defined by Herculano (vi, 84) as traditional law, the immunity and privileges that belong to a class or to a corporation: foral is the charter of settlement, the document regulating the collective rights and duties of cities, towns or villages.

families to live in liberty, preserving their own laws under his dominion. The *forais* of various districts contain clauses protecting the Moslem merchant and traveller.

Sancho's first restoration was Covilhã, on the eastern frontier, where settlement had been slowest, followed by the foundation of Guarda, and the almost complete reconstruction of Idanha-a-Velha from the remains of the ancient Egitania. The foral of Covilhã contains the guarantee of liberty and freedom to all Christian captives after a year's residence, and the concession of the privileges usually enjoyed by the lesser nobility (infanções) to all the cavaleiros-vilãos who should settle there. Simultaneously with Covilhã, Gouveia received its foral, and in the following years, 1187 and 1188, Folgosinho and Valelhas, concelhos on the eastern side of the Serra da Estrêla. In 1187 Sancho issued forais to Bragança and Viseu, the latter consisting of the same conditions as his father had granted. These two documents were confirmed in the names of Sancho, Queen Dulce and their four children in spite of the fact that the youngest was not yet a year old.

iii. The capture of silves and the almohad invasions, 1189–1191. After the fall of Jerusalem in 1187, Sancho I, at least according to the Chronicle of Rui de Pina, contemplated joining the Third Crusade, in spite of the custom by which the kings of the Peninsula confined their activities to the infidels on their own frontiers. Perhaps a will drawn up by Sancho in the prime of life in 1188, in which he uses the words 'whenever I may come to die or, which Heaven forfend, to suffer whatever misfortune', is capable of bearing this construction, as Herculano believed. Whatever Sancho's intentions, the return of the new Almohad caliph, Abu Yusuf Ya'qub, in 1189, was certainly enough to detain him in the Peninsula. Although Christian writers are silent about this campaign, Arabic historians describe an advance as far as Santarém and Lisbon, and the carrying off of thousands of captives: there is no proof that any Christian outpost fell, and the fact that Ya'qub retired to Africa within five months of his departure from it suggests that the campaign was not very devastating. In the very same year the arrival of two new bands of crusaders gave Sancho I the opportunity to make an attack on the Saracen capital of the Algarve.

The people of north-western Europe who were engaged in the Third Crusade collected in English and French ports and, like their predecessors, put in at those of Galicia and the Douro after the long crossing of the Bay of Biscay. The first expedition that was to assist Sancho in the attack on the Algarve consisted of Danes and Frisians to the number of twelve thousand, in a hundred and sixty ships. They had landed in Galicia to visit the shrine of Santiago, but the inhabitants, alarmed by the rumour

that the crusaders intended to steal the head of the saint, refused to admit them and, taking up arms, drove them back to their ships. On their arrival in the Tagus, Sancho made a bargain with them, and after a few days the fleet of crusaders, together with a Portuguese naval force, sailed round Cape St Vincent and, entering the bay of Lagos, stormed the stronghold of Alvôr. On its fall and reduction to a heap of ruins with the massacre of six thousand of those who had taken refuge within, the northerners continued on their way to Palestine, enriched with plunder.

A little later, in July 1189, a new force of three and a half thousand English, Flemings and Germans put in at Lisbon, and this time, although the auxiliaries were in smaller numbers, Sancho resolved to deliver an assault on Silves itself. The city, with a population of perhaps twenty or thirty thousand, had been the capital of an independent state under the Banu'l Muzaiyin family at the end of the Umaiyad dynasty, being later rejoined to the Sevillian government. Some forty years before the present attack it had been the scene of the exploits of ibn Qasi. In commerce and in culture, its inhabitants, pure Yemenites, according to Idrisi, formed the most influential and prosperous agglomeration of al-Qunu. The crusaders, led by the German Landgrave Ludwig of Thuringia and two Flemish counts, Bar and Braine, had collected at Sandwich and part of their fleet had called at Dartmouth to embark a number of Londoners. On July 15 the ships, with a Portuguese fleet of about equal numbers, left the Tagus and after four days' sailing arrived off Portimão. Portuguese land forces had already encamped near Silves.

On the following day the fleet sailed up the river Arade as far as the depth of water permitted, and faced the gleaming city whose minarets and flat roofs stood out above groves of almonds and oranges-much stronger and ten times more remarkable for the opulence and sumptuousness of its buildings than Lisbon, asserts Herculano. Apart from its strong keep and double girdle of walls, its two cisterns could hold enough water to last the modern town a year. As at Lisbon, a heavy attack at the opening of hostilities carried the outer city, the walls being scaled and the defenders driven to take shelter in the citadel. As at Lisbon. too. the quick success was followed by a long siege, during which numerous assaults were made with machines and mines. New reinforcements arrived under Sancho himself, together with supplies. The murder of three Christian captives on the tower in full view of the army aroused a spirit of vengeance in the attackers: on the following Sunday, a German battering-machine, called the Hedgehog, was brought up to the wall, and although part of it was burnt with blazing tow, a section of a tower was brought down. A mine under the same tower completed the breach,

and on being attacked the Saracens, although they might have held the weak point with their superior numbers, took refuge in the keep. Even now the defence continued, but the huge cistern was no longer accessible to the besieged.

Deserters were beginning to find their way out of the city, where the lack of fresh water was already telling on the defence. A general assault was attempted on August 18, but driven off with heavy loss. Its failure discouraged the Christians, who began to talk of abandoning the siege. Even Sancho apparently hesitated, but in the following days new mines were begun, farther back from the walls. Again the Saracens made a sortie, though on this occasion the keep was almost entered as they retired, closely pursued to the very gate. Once more the siege was all but raised. Sancho resolved to strike camp, either because he had run out of supplies, or because he feared the arrival of Moslem reinforcements. At length it was decided to remain for four days more. Rapidly a new mine was begun: the Saracens, opening a counter-mine from the underground vaults, came face to face with the Christians and fought underground until the tunnel was filled with smoke and they were obliged to withdraw. By now the besieged were living on figs alone and sucked clay to moisten their mouths: the Christian captives, numbering at first four hundred, were obliged to fight their own men or die of thirst. On September 1, Moslems called from the walls to some Portuguese knights and offered to surrender if they were allowed to retain their movable possessions: Sancho was willing to accept, but the crusaders, whose only interest was in the booty they expected, refused to agree. Although the king offered as much as twenty thousand morabitinos in place of the plunder, his allies demurred because of the time that it would take to fetch the treasure from Coimbra or Évora. But the defenders were in no case to resist. On September 3 the gates were opened and they came out, bringing only a garment apiece. Only the governor was allowed to ride out on his horse; the rest tramped eastward to find shelter as far afield as Seville. Overnight the gates were shut so that none of the inhabitants might leave unseen, and in the morning the rest of them took their departure.

The Portuguese and their allies had been promised shares in the supplies of food still in the city, but the crusaders, who had spent the night in the keep, came out in the morning and attempted to sell food to Portuguese soldiers. Sancho protested; some of the crusaders ran amok and sacked the city. According to the anonymous German author who describes the siege, Sancho was accused of standing by and not contributing to the work, and of defrauding the crusaders of their rights.¹

¹ De Itinere Navali, 37, 41.

After the scenes of disorder in the city, Sancho occupied it and drove the crusaders to the ships, where they divided the plunder in their own way.

Having assured the defence of Silves, Sancho was obliged to return north, perhaps because much of his army was required to serve only a certain number of weeks a year, or because Beja had just surrendered to the Christians. Although a Flemish bishop, one Nicholas, was appointed to Silves, his companions could not be persuaded to stay and continue the conquest of the Algarve. Several of the nearest castles had fallen with Silves, but the next objective, Santa Maria de Harune (Faro), could not be attacked without the continued help of the crusaders.

The news of the fall of Silves, combined with that of Alfonso VIII's advance to Seville, aroused the African Almohads. In the spring of 1190. Ya'qub crossed the Straits and marched straight upon Silves. Leaving an army of besiegers to attack the city, he moved with the main body of his troops against Santarém. Silves, indeed, had received unexpected reinforcements in the shape of a shipload of a hundred men-at-arms from London who were on their way to Syria, but agreed to the request of Bishop Nicholas to stay and help against the siege. This ship seems to have been the first of Richard Cœur-de-Lion's fleet; having sailed with nine others from Dartmouth and been separated from them by a great storm, this one vessel was blown southwards and came in at Silves, while the rest of the fleet congregated in the Tagus. The ship itself was ceded to the defenders to be broken up and used in the defence, and was later replaced by order of Sancho I. Meanwhile, the rest of Richard's French and English forces, under Richard de Camwill, Robert de Sabloil, William de Forz and the Bishops of Auch and Bayeux, began to arrive in the Tagus. Ya'qub, crossing the Tagus above Santarém, attacked Tôrres Novas, which surrendered after ten days' resistance, its inhabitants being killed or captured. The Saracen force now turned upon Tomar, the headquarters of the Portuguese Templars, and one of the strongest castles in the country: here the knights under Gualdim Pais held up the attack, and the invaders were only able to ravage the town outside the walls. Some of the Almohads had gone northwards and, again destroying Leiria, reached the walls of Coimbra. Sancho himself, expecting that Ya'qub intended to besiege Santarém where his father had met his death, had collected forces for the defence of the city, but the rapid movement of the Saracens had now almost cut him off from the north of the country, from which reinforcements might be expected. At this time the Anglo-French fleet began to appear in the Tagus, and Sancho appealed to its commanders for help; in response a force of five hundred men was detached to defend Santarém. But either because of the fevers of central Portugal or because of the considerable forces arriving in the Tagus, Yaʻqub made a proposal to retire and conclude a truce for seven years if Silves were exchanged for Tôrres Novas. Sancho refused, and Yaʻqub despatched new envoys threatening the immediate assault of Santarém: everything was prepared for the defence when scouts reported that the siege of Tomar had been raised and that the enemy was again crossing the Tagus in the direction of Seville. The invasion passed as suddenly as it had appeared.

The accumulation of crusaders in Lisbon, though it may have contributed to Ya'qub's departure, proved a very mixed blessing. Men of the roughest sort overran Lisbon, plundering and insulting the Jews and Moslems, burning their quarters and devastating the fields so that not a grape was left. The king, arriving from Santarém, obtained an oath from their leaders to obey the regulations of the expedition, but after three days they were again allowed on shore and the disorders were renewed. As a free fight was raging in the streets of Lisbon, the king ordered the gates of the city to be closed, and with his own soldiers arrested the seven hundred crusaders who were inside. A new agreement was made between Sancho and Camwill and Sabloil; a few days later William de Forz's thirty vessels appeared off the bar and the whole fleet proceeded on its way to Palestine.

With the end of the invasion, Sancho ordered the restoration of Tôrres Novas in 1190 and apparently that of Leiria in 1195. Silves was held for only three years, during which Sancho entitled himself King of Silves and of the Algarve. In 1191 Ya'qub returned and, besieging Silves with a larger force, succeeded in taking it: it seems unlikely, as the Arabic historian ibn Khaldun says, that the siege of Silves was continuous until the return of Ya'qub: at least Hoveden, who describes the voyage of the crusaders along the south coast of Portugal, makes no reference to it.

The great Almohad invasion of 1191 not only carried away Silves, but swept away with irresistible impetus most of Afonso Henriques' conquests below the Tagus. Alcácer, Palmela, even Almada, a bare bowshot from Lisbon, all fell, and of all the important towns that the Portuguese had captured in the province of Alcácer the only one that could be held was Évora.

iv. THE MILITARY ORDERS. Four military orders took part in the settlement and defence of Portugal. Obliged by their vows to give permanent military service, while most of the king's subjects were legally compelled to give only a limited number of weeks, and more easily mobilized because of their monastic organization, the orders formed a reliable pioneer force.

Of these orders, that of the Templars was by far the most powerful in Portugal, and in addition to the widespread dominions it had acquired from Afonso I, Sancho endowed it with the town of Idanha in 1197, an extensive territory on the north bank of the Tagus and another on the south.

The Order of Santiago, founded by Fernando II of Leon in about 1170 and introduced into Portugal two years later, received a handsome donation—or perhaps the confirmation of it—in the first year of Sancho's reign; the castles of Alcácer, Palmela, Almada and Arruda. When these were lost in the Saracen onslaught of 1191, the knights were recompensed with the grant of the keep and palace of Santarém and Santos-o-Velho outside Lisbon, which they held until the recovery of Alcácer.

Already in 1166 members of the Order of Calatrava, founded by Sancho III of Castile, had settled at Évora, then newly recovered. Afonso Henriques gave them the castle of Mafra, to which Sancho made various additions, including the promise of Juromenha when it should be recovered. Taken under the protection of the Papacy in 1201, they then held eleven properties; to these Afonso II added Avis, whence their later title, the Order of Avis.

The Hospitallers, much less prominent than the Templars in Portugal, apparently received concessions in 1186; perhaps their first house was that at Leça near Oporto. Their priory was later established at the castle of Belver, and they received the territory of Guidintesta by the Tagus on condition that they should build a castle there.

v. RELATIONS WITH LEON, II90—I200. Although Fernando II had repudiated Urraca of Portugal on grounds of consanguinity, their son Alfonso acceded to the throne of Leon on his father's death in 1188 without any effective opposition. At one time Fernando's third wife had wished to place her own son on the throne, and Alfonso had approached his uncle Sancho of Portugal with a view to obtaining an alliance, but no intervention seems to have been necessary when shortly afterwards he was acclaimed as Alfonso IX. The new King of Leon was only seventeen years of age, and barely half a year after his accession he visited his cousin Alfonso VIII of Castile at Carrión, received the order of knighthood from him, and very imprudently kissed his hand. This humiliation of Leon before Castile was soon regretted by the young king, and relations between the two countries became strained.

Towards the end of 1190 or early in 1191, Alfonso IX married D. Teresa, eldest daughter of King Sancho of Portugal, at Guimarãis. The motive for this match given by Lucas de Tuy was the necessity for the military support of Portugal against Castile: the marriage was concluded *in odium Regis Castellae*. Although the political moods of the

three kings are difficult to follow, it is possible to trace the vacillations of Alfonso IX through the lines of Zurita, who declares that in 1188 Sancho had refused to conclude a treaty with the King of Aragon because the latter insisted on the inclusion of Alfonso IX, but that three years later, or just at the time of the wedding, the treaty was agreed to between the three states of Portugal, Leon and Aragon.¹ Thus after Alfonso IX had come dangerously under Castilian influence, he now detached himself and adhered to Portugal. Yet the marriage and the treaty produced no better results than did the match of Fernando and Urraca, ending in divorce and hostilities.

The relationship between Alfonso IX and Teresa, who were first cousins, quickly brought down the condemnation of Celestine III, who ordered them to separate. Disobeyed, the pope put the kingdom of Leon under an interdict and excommunicated Alfonso IX and Sancho I. This continued for five years, when at length the Queen of Leon was repudiated for political reasons. According to Hoveden, Alfonso VIII of Castile compelled Alfonso IX to relinquish his wife and gave him his own daughter, but the responsibility of the King of Castile is not certain, since the papal order for separation was obeyed in 1196, and the marriage of Alfonso IX and Berengaria of Castile took place only at the end of 1197.

The political motives that led to the realignment of the Christian powers proceeded from the battle of Alarcos. In 1193 the Castilians had resolved on a new campaign against the Saracens, and had penetrated so far south that Ya'qub ordered the preaching of the holy war and collected large forces for the invasion of Castile. Alfonso VIII appealed to his neighbours, and Leon and Navarre promised their adhesion. Either their forces were not ready in time, or Alfonso would not wait, or the promises were false, for when the Castilians met the Almohads and suffered the great defeat of Alarcos on July 19, 1195, their only allies were a band of Portuguese led by Gonçalo Viegas, Portuguese Master of the Order of Calatrava, and Rodrigo Sanches, formerly governor of Silves, who were both killed: the vanquished King of Castile retired to his territories, and Ya'qub returned to Seville. The defeat sharpened the divergencies between the Christian princes. The Kings of Leon and Navarre penetrated into Castile, and the King of Castile, with the support of Aragon, seized part of Leon. Alfonso IX, thus menaced, made an alliance with the Saracens, who joined him in attacking Castile in 1196 and 1197. The alliance with the Saracens was brought to the notice of the pope, presumably by the Castilians, and on October 31, 1196 Celestine III ordered Alfonso of Leon to be excommunicated once more and freed all Leonese from the duty of fidelity to him so long as he

¹ Zurita, Anales de Aragón, 11, 44.

continued to rely on Moslem aid and beset Castile. Already Sancho of Portugal, who can scarcely have been pleased by the repudiation of his daughter, had joined Aragon and Castile against Leon, Navarre and the Moors, induced apparently by the visit to Coimbra in February 1196 of the King of Aragon, who came according to the Chronicon of Coimbra 'to make peace between the Christian princes'. In August 1196 Sancho was already at war with Leon, but only in the following year did hostilities come to a head. Sancho had asked for certain privileges from the Papacy, and in April came the bull Cum autores et factores which offered the indulgence usually conceded to those who defended Christianity to the present adversaries of Leon: any land that his enemies could seize during Alfonso IX's period of aberration should never be returned to him. Sancho again left Coimbra and invaded Galicia: Tuy was surrounded and surrendered, and other places, perhaps as far as Pontevedra, passed into his possession; certain Galician barons probably obeyed the papal order and joined Sancho.¹

Meanwhile, Castile had been invaded by the Saracens, and Alfonso VIII had pacted with them. Leon, deprived of its ally, was outnumbered, and Alfonso IX proposed peace, offering to marry Berengaria of Castile. The proposal was at length accepted, the marriage celebrated in Valladolid at the end of 1197, and the Castilian seizures returned to Leon. Portugal was apparently not included in the agreement, for a letter from the new Pope Innocent III to his legate in the Peninsula, after dealing with the uncanonical marriage of the cousins Alfonso IX and Berengaria, recommended the establishment of peace between Leon and Castile and Portugal. The recommencement of war between the new father and son-in-law was only avoided by the influence of the nobility just after the pacification; and in the middle of 1198 Portugal seems to have been on the verge of war with Castile. Possibly Alfonso VIII had undertaken to assist in making Sancho return the parts of Galicia he had seizeda letter from the pope to his legate ordered him to warn the kings of Portugal and Castile and Leon and their people to keep the peace, since certain evil-living men were trying to sow hatred between them. Although Sancho could claim the promises of the last pope as a justification for keeping what he had won in Galicia, the King of Leon did not intend to be despoiled without resistance. In 1199 he invaded Portugal and besieged Bragança, but Sancho succeeded in driving him off. Further fighting took place later in the year on the eastern frontier. In 1200 the war had stopped, and Leon and Castile joined forces against Navarre. The date of the loss of Tuy to the Leonese is unknown; Herculano supposes it to have been in August or September 1199.

¹ Herculano, 111, 228.

If these wars brought no territorial or other advantage, they at least proved that Portugal was capable of holding her own with the now declining monarchy of Leon, which with Aragon was facing the rise of the more dynamic power of Castile. In the century that had elapsed between the foundation of the County of Portugal and the wars with Leon, vast changes had taken place: new frontiers had been deeply engraved in the west; a new power had risen from an offshoot of Leon to become her military and territorial equal.

vi. CONTENTIONS WITH ROME. After the capture of Silves in 1190, Sancho I sought papal confirmation of his kingship. The bull of May 7, 1190, issued by Clement III, begins with the same words as, and repeats the substance of, the bull of Alexander III in which recognition of kingship was accorded to Afonso Henriques. In view of his services in fighting the infidel, Sancho is confirmed in his possessions, and the protection of the Papacy is extended to the kingdom of Portugal and the places newly wrested from the Saracens. Clement adds that no other prince of Spain shall have any rights over these dominions, and adjures Sancho to continue to widen the bounds of the faith, and to pay through the Archbishop of Braga the annual tribute of two marks of gold. The similarity of the bulls of 1179 and 1190 gives no hint that the annuities were in arrears: only the correspondence of Innocent III preserves any trace of the contention that had arisen over the payment of the tribute.

Already in the Papacy of Clement III, a certain Master Miguel had been sent to Portugal to warn the king personally that the tribute must be paid or the penalties prescribed by apostolic authority might be invoked. Sancho replied that his father had paid ten years' tribute at once by sending a thousand gold coins to Alexander III. Clement III had not been able to carry the matter any further, and no tribute had thus been paid for twenty years when the vigorous Innocent III took up the matter in 1198, at the same time as he ordered his legate Rainerius to bring about a peaceful settlement among the kings of Portugal, Leon and Castile. In the bull Serenitatem regiam, he rehearsed the circumstances of the contract and refuted the argument that Sancho had used upon Master Miguel: the contention that Afonso Henriques had paid ten years tribute in advance was untrue; the money to which Sancho referred had been a free gift, a testimony of piety. The king was therefore recommended to pay the arrears to Rainerius, who had powers of compulsion. Only a month and a half after this, Innocent admonished the King of Castile not to join Leon in hostilities against Portugal, a favour which Herculano interprets as suggesting that negotiations for the payment of the tribute were proceeding favourably.

Sancho, though obliged to recognize the debt, still attempted evasion. Accepting his father's promise of tribute made in 1143, he despatched to Rome through the Master of the Hospitallers the sum of 504 morabitinos, representing the debt from 1179 until 1198, based on the original agreement of half a mark, or four ounces of gold a year. As to the free gift of a thousand morabitinos (forty marks), he did not profess to know the truth, but left the matter to the pope's conscience, perhaps hoping that the papal accountancy was sufficiently defective to get him the benefit of the doubt. However the device did not succeed. Innocent III sent back a copy of Afonso Henriques' letter in which the rate of the tribute had been raised from half a mark to two marks on the concession of the royal title, and firmly demanded the payment of what was still owing; at the same time, December 1198, he addressed a separate bull to Sancho in which he declared him to be his very beloved son and ruler of a kingdom tributary to Rome, offering once more protection to all the kingdoms he possessed or might justly come to possess. No more correspondence exists, but the payment made by Afonso II in 1213 covering twenty-eight years implies that the tribute again lapsed.

vii. THE QUARREL WITH THE BISHOPS. After the Leonese war, there followed a period of general peace: probably owing to lack of resources, no attempt was made to compensate for the losses suffered during the Almohad campaign of 1191, and Lisbon and Évora still marked the limit of southern expansion. Even before the war, underpopulation presented Sancho with a grave problem: there remained areas of central Portugal to settle, and Tôrres Novas and Leiria, destroyed in 1191, had had to be rebuilt and restocked, while the repopulation of Beira was still proceeding. New settlers were canvassed abroad to colonize the region of the Tagus; the former Bishop of Silves, Nicholas, or his dean, William, also a Fleming, went to Flanders to find inhabitants for Alenquer and Pontével.

Portugal was indeed already beginning to turn her eyes beyond the Peninsula. In 1199 King John had acceded to the throne of England, and after his war with the barons of France who supported Arthur, a treaty was signed involving the marriage of Blanca of Castile, a daughter of Alfonso VIII and niece of John, to Louis, heir to the French throne. Not only Alfonso VIII but also the King of Portugal had sent ambassadors to John on his accession; their messages are unknown. John deputed three persons of confidence to deal with the Castilian envoys, and wrote to all the authorities of the kingdom warning them of the arrival of the Portuguese and ordering their reception everywhere with every demonstration of respect and the provision of all their requirements (June 1199). According to Ralph de Diceto, John had despatched from Rouen at the time of his treaty with Philippe-Auguste of France various

emissaries, including the Bishop of Lisieux, William d'Estaing, Ralph d'Ardennes and Robert Burch, to ask for the hand of one of the daughters of Sancho I. Apparently while the mission was still away, he changed his mind and married Isabel of Angoulême. 'In view of these facts,' remarks Herculano, 'what we must conjecture seems to be that either Alfonso VIII, whose political talents and capacity were indisputable, or what is less likely, John Lackland himself, had conceived the design of uniting all the princes of central and southern Europe in a family alliance, which was to be the instrument of a political alliance of the respective monarchies, torn by incessant wars. From these facts we may also deduce that, in spite of his ambitions and his hatreds, the king of Portugal associated himself with the plan.'1

The co-operation with Castile advanced a stage in 1208 with the marriage of Sancho's eldest son Afonso with Urraca, a daughter of Alfonso VIII and aunt of St Louis of France. This match involved the king in a lengthy quarrel with the Bishop of Oporto. The present bishop, Martinho Rodrigues, consecrated in 1191, found the diocese still enjoying the position of prominence which it had been granted by Countess Teresa, having full dominion over the burgh of Oporto. Conscious of his privileges, Bishop Martinho denounced the marriage of Afonso and Urraca as falling within the forbidden degrees and avoided receiving them when they passed through his city.

they passed through his city.

Martinho Rodrigues had already caused a conflagration within his diocese by his despotism. His predecessor had granted certain liberties to the chapter, of which he on his elevation deprived them in his own favour. The canons protested, and the Archbishop of Braga arranged an appeasement, though the chapter soon found new accusations against the bishop, which resulted in the concordat of October 1200, when Martinho, though forced to pay the chapter nine Byzantines, established that in the event of any further contentions the chapter should not appeal to the king, unless they had previously appealed in vain to Braga. But on the next conflict, which occurred before 1208, the king intervened with some violence; the bishop fled, while his brother was arrested and his property, furniture and horses were seized by the royal officers. Martinho despatched his complaints to Rome, and Sancho, unwilling to lose his title of beloved son of the church, permitted Martinho to return to Oporto, restored his property, promised not to interfere with ecclesiastical affairs again, and offered an indemnity for any damage to the bishop's goods.

When therefore the marriage of 1208 roused the bishop's displeasure, there were old differences to rekindle. The question of consanguinity

¹ Herculano, III, 246.

had become largely a political one: the kings of the Peninsula were all cousins, and the strict observance of the degrees proved an intolerable hindrance to the system of marriage alliances. The action of the Bishop of Oporto was simply an affront to the king. Not only the king, but the burghers of Oporto took action. Riots occurred in the city; the bishop was hooted in the streets; the royal officers seized the houses of some of his adherents. The bishop's interdict descended on the city. Popular anger flared up and churches were broken into. A number of the clergy ignored the interdict, while Martinho remained penned up in his palace for five months. Sancho had at once appealed to Rome, and obtained a bull in September 1209 which deprived anyone of the right to excommunicate the king or the country without a special order from Rome. The bishop, aware that the settlement would be in his disfavour, slipped away with one or two companions and made for Rome himself. Meanwhile the Bishop of Coimbra had also denounced the king, bidding him not to interfere in religious matters and to cease certain impious practices, including the keeping of a witch in the palace. The king had seized buildings and beasts belonging to the Church; and the Bishop of Coimbra laid his interdict on the capital city, appealing at once to Rome, lest the new Archbishop of Braga, a friend of the king, should intervene. Sancho ordered the interdict to be ignored, and the bishop replaced. The archbishop's orders in this sense were obeyed by only part of the clergy; and the king, filled with indignation, ordered the recalcitrants to be forced to say mass. The bishop gave in and raised the interdict, but before he could flee to Italy he was arrested by Sancho's order.

Meanwhile the Bishop of Oporto had reached Rome and reported the witchcraft of the king and all the events leading to the arrest of the Bishop of Coimbra. The pope learnt of the king's disregard for the clergy, his interference with the Church, his appointments and depositions, his seizures of the Church's income, beasts, birds, dogs and horses, his orders that clergymen should do military service, his friendship for enemies of the Church, usurers and the excommunicate. The pope sent Sancho a warning, which, together with the king's reply, has disappeared. But one of Innocent's later bulls shows that Sancho had defended himself in 'letters full of gall, indiscretion, immodesty' by saying that the best way of dealing with those who shammed religion was to 'cut off the excess of temporal wealth that had been lavished on them by himself and his father to the grave detriment of the kingdom and his successorswealth that would be better expended on the infantes his children and the defenders of the country, who suffered great necessities, than in the hands of enemies of his house'. These terms, whilst indicating Sancho's interest in the repopulation of the country—obviously the 'defenders who suffer great necessities'—and illustrating his fiery temper, are perhaps too ingenious and well-reasoned to proceed from the unlettered king: it is possible to detect the hand of Mestre Julião the chancellor, who had built up a strong influence over him.

Meanwhile Bishop Martinho received full support from Innocent III. In May 1210 the pope ordered the Bishop of Zamora and two other ecclesiastics to make Sancho give full satisfaction to Martinho and to punish the royal officers, clergy who had disobeyed the bishop's interdict, and especially two burghers who had apparently led the popular movement against the bishop. One of these was one Pedro, called Feudo-tirou (break-feud), presumably the leader of a party opposing the century-old vassalage of the rapidly developing burgh to its bishop.

The king, meanwhile, was suffering from a slow illness, and foresaw the approach of his own death. In his will, dated October 1210, he displayed every desire to conciliate the Church by leaving handsome bequests to the Portuguese dioceses and the monastic orders. The high dignitaries of the Church gathered round him; the Bishop of Coimbra was reconciled, and he himself recommended the king to give way to the Bishop of Oporto. In reply Sancho submitted completely, assuring Martinho of safe conduct if he would come to court and be publicly reconciled.

Not unnaturally the citizens of Oporto were the victims of this reconciliation: if Martinho had treated the burghers in the same way as the chapter, their motives for refusing to recognize his overlordship can be understood. When he was reinstated in December 1210, he was able confidently to put the matter before the king, and obtain Sancho's confirmation of his authority in Oporto. Even the royal tax-gatherers were obliged to notify the bishop if they had any case to bring against his vassals.

Although his reconciliation with Sancho had already taken place, the Bishop of Coimbra's appeal to the Papacy was not withdrawn: the bull Si diligente attenderes must have reached Portugal when Sancho was already dead. This document, answering Sancho's 'letters full of gall, indiscretion, immodesty', rebuked this arrogance, never before used to a pope save by heretics and tyrants: the intention of cutting off the temporal goods of the clergy savoured more of a heretic king than of a loyal son of the Church. Yet the king was merely ordered to restore the Bishop of Coimbra and his church, and in future to assist him. On the same day Innocent III despatched a letter to the Archbishop of Santiago, bidding him to see to the settlement of the matter. A second letter to the same archbishop throws a curious sidelight. The pope had learnt that Mestre Julião often took the place of the king in business with the

Papacy, and therefore warned the archbishop to have his orders delivered to Sancho himself and have them read to him, thus avoiding the trickery of the chancellor, 'misconstruing or omitting by his customary ill-faith' what might displease the king.

With the collapse of resistance on the part of the king, the pope gave his confirmation to the royal will: two months after the king's death, the news of it had not reached Rome, for Innocent says 'sick doubtless in body, but hale in mind, you have drawn up and we accept this legal testament'. The will itself disposed of a fortune of nearly a million morabitinos, almost all in minted gold, vastly more than is mentioned in the will elaborated in 1188. While, as Sancho himself pointed out to the pope, the defenders of the realm were in great need, the monarchy and the nobility enriched themselves on the proceeds of an extortionate tributary system, which worked in direct opposition to the policy of settlement and repopulation.¹

The pieces of evidence which can be collected about Sancho's character suggest a figure with all the characteristics of his times. Ignorant and credulous, irascible and violent, declares Herculano, he appears to have been inclined to gallantry and the chase—one of the complaints formulated by Innocent III was that he compelled the clergy to support his dogs and hawks. His most important work, that of repopulation and settlement, was handicapped by circumstances and the commonly accepted ideas of administration.

¹ Herculano, III, 303: a law of Afonso II refers to 'evil old customs' by which the king and all his tenants and governors took one-third of the sale-price of all food.

CHAPTER VII

CHURCH AND STATE

i. AFONSO II; THE ASCENDANCY OF THE CHURCH. Sancho's will, apart from the million morabitinos of gold, mentions horses, cloths, hangings, jewels, furniture, arms and plate, stored at Coimbra, Guimarãis and Évora, and with the Templars at Tomar. By his wife, Dulce of Aragon, who had died in 1198, Sancho had three sons and five daughters surviving: these, with three grandchildren, received the greater part of his wealth. Afonso, the heir, took 200,000 morabitinos stored at Coimbra, 6,000 stored at Évora, the royal cloths of Guimarãis, all his arms, two rings that had belonged to Afonso Henriques, and five of his best horses. The remaining legitimate children, including D. Teresa, ex-Queen of Leon, and two grandchildren, received each 40,000, together with quantities of silver varying between 250 and 150 marks. To his two illegitimate families, one consisting of two sons, the other of Maria Pais and her five children, he bequeathed sums of seven or eight thousand apiece, together with the tenancies of various castles and towns. The religious bequests were numerous and varied-a thousand morabitinos to the cathedrals of Lisbon, Viseu, Lamego, Guarda and Oporto; two thousand to Braga; three to Tuy; five hundred to each of five monasteries; two thousand between ten churches: ten thousand to the Abbot of Alcobaça for a leper-hospital; and ten thousand for the building of a Cistercian house; ten thousand, a gold cup and a hundred marks of silver to Santa Cruz in Coimbra; a hundred of gold for the pope so that he might with all his authority enforce the fulfilment of the will.

These dispositions, sealed with the invocation to the pope, were further confirmed by an oath exacted from the heir, and included in the testament—'And I, King Afonso, son of the aforesaid King Sancho and of Queen Dulce, promise faithfully by the faith of Jesus Christ to fulfil and see to all these things, if I survive my father, and that I will not prevent, nor consent in the prevention of the least of them. And for this I have done homage in the hands of my father, and I will likewise swear in the hands of the Bishop of Braga, of the Bishop of Coimbra and of the Abbot of Alcobaça that I will fulfil and hold in especial care all these things.' The precaution taken in securing this oath seems to have been rendered necessary by the character of Afonso II. The new king, deeply attached to the inviolability of royal power, was to fight desperately to maintain his patrimony intact. Probably aware of this, his brother, sisters

and half-brothers, and the Church suspected that he would do his best to baulk the execution of the will, and for this reason a number of notables signed the document as guarantors 'under pain of being held traitors and caitiffs', and first the clergy, then the royal family sought Innocent's confirmation of their legacies.

Afonso II, known as the Fat, had been a weakly child, and had survived only 'by a miracle' a serious illness during the period of adolescence; now, at the age of twenty-five, he was incapable of the exertions of a military life. He came under the influence of Mestre Julião, whose views probably coincided with his own about the collapse of his father's resistance to Bishop Martinho: at the end of the first year of his reign two donations to the chancellor's son, made in recognition of Mestre Julião's services to his grandfather and father, testify to the continuance of this influence.

Already in the first year of his reign Afonso summoned a council at Coimbra, a full meeting of the curia regis or cortes, at which the ricoshomens and other nobles, together with regular and secular prelates. approved measures regulating the administration of justice, and gave the concessions made by Sancho I to the clergy the form of law. Of the general measures adopted, the most important dealt with personal freedom, property, the curbing of oppressive taxation and the protection of the taxed classes from impositions of the clergy and nobility. Thus every free man might choose his own master, unless he resided on another's land, in which case the owner was necessarily his lord; every free man might sell his property, though his brother or relative should have preference as the purchaser; the old custom of the cession of one-third on all sales of foodstuffs to the king or lord was abolished; the king might constrain no one to marry without the freewill of both parties; royal judges must be appointed to decide suits; appellants whose claims were disallowed must pay a fine; royal sentence of death or mutilation might only be carried out twenty days after being passed, so that decisions given in spasms of anger might not take effect; the heirs of those condemned for high treason might inherit the property of the traitor, and confiscation should only take place when murder of the king or royal family or overlord had been premeditated.

The clergy, taking full advantage of its powerful position, obtained the recognition of those regulations that Sancho I had assented to. Ecclesiastical law was to be considered inviolable; all legislation contrary to the Church was considered automatically void. All governors, judges and public officers must protect monasteries and churches against secular individuals and institutions. In cases of violence, assault or defiance, ecclesiastics were to appear before their bishops: only in cases con-

cerning property or goods were secular courts to intervene. The method of election of incumbents to livings under royal patronage was established. The clergy were exempted from the payment of colheita, the entertainment of the king, from the anúduva, a service or tax for the maintenance of fortifications, and from participation in general taxation in those districts where municipalities had compounded with the king for a lump sum to represent the various royal tributes.

The victory of the clergy was complete: the only compensation obtained by the king consisted in the restriction of the vast amount of land passing into the hands of the Church. The problem of the large areas of the country which had gone out of taxation was growing acute. The first measure taken by Afonso II was to forbid the purchase of new land by the Church. The step did not obviate the accumulation of legacies, through which the Church obtained most of its possessions, and was therefore destined to fail of its object. Perhaps for this reason, the clergy offered no opposition—moreover any ecclesiastic as a private person could buy or sell land at will. After this very tentative measure the problem of alienation was shelved.

The policy adopted towards the Church was thus one of appeasement: the ecclesiastics retired sated, and Afonso was free to deal with the members of his own family who had acquired large shares in his inheritance, strengthened for the conflict by the recognition of his own piety. In April 1212, Innocent III confirmed him in the possession of the kingdom and all his privileges, not forgetting to remind him to pay the annual tribute of two gold marks, which indeed he had spontaneously offered.

ii. THE THREE PRINCESSES. Having yielded to the Church, Afonso attempted to restrict or annul the extensive privileges granted in his father's will to his three sisters. At first he demanded that they should acknowledge his overlordship by paying the customary tributes on crown property and by accepting his nominees as governors of their townships. But the three sisters obtained from the pope fresh confirmation of their right to the legacies, specifying Teresa's authority over the towns of Montemór and Esgueira, and Sancha's over Alenquer. Mafalda, holding the three convents of Bouças, Arouca and Tuias, together with the estate of Seia, obtained a papal order in her favour: the Archbishop of Santiago and the Bishops of Guarda and Lisbon were bidden to see that she was not molested in her possession, and the Bishops of Zamora and Astorga and the Archbishop of Santiago given powers to punish anyone who might interfere with her sisters.

Afonso's brothers Pedro and Fernando left the kingdom soon after his accession. Fernando went to Paris and joined his aunt Matilda (Mafalda), the widowed Countess of Alsace: he married Joan, heiress to the county of Flanders, and was one of the prisoners of Philippe-Auguste in the battle of Bouvines. Pedro retired to Leon, where he interested Alfonso IX in the internal quarrels of Portugal.

Afonso founded his defence of the integrity of his possessions on the bull of Alexander III which, in conferring the title of king on Afonso I and his successors, had ordered the territorial integrity of the new state to be respected. In contesting the heritage of his sisters, a distinction. was made between the case of Mafalda and that of the others. Mafalda possessed only the patronage of certain religious houses and, having decided to adopt a conventual life, she granted her monasteries to the Hospitallers, retaining only the usufruct for herself. Mafalda's allies established themselves in the monastery of Bouças, to the anger of the king, who had them expelled by force. The Hospitallers put the question before the pope, and Afonso despatched one Silvestre, possibly the future Archbishop of Braga, to argue his cause. In the present case Afonso insisted that Mafalda had no right to dispose of possessions of which she was only entitled to the usufruct; and, perhaps to pave the way for broader claims in case of success, asserted that his father had been of unsound mind when the legacy was made. Finally, he held that kings of Portugal were not allowed to alienate their possessions to the detriment of their heirs, and that the present endowment in favour of the Hospitallers implied a loss of seven thousand morabitinos a year. Although Innocent III appointed the Bishops of Astorga, Burgos and Segovia to settle the case in July 1212, apparently neither the infanta nor the order succeeded in keeping the disputed property. Afonso, in spite of his father's will, which expressly used the terms 'by hereditary right', was able to get his way.

The parallel contention with the ex-Queen Teresa and Sancha was more serious. Afonso, represented in Rome by the Bishop of Lisbon, Sueiro, and his dean, Mestre Vicente, explained to the pope that, in view of his having to give help to the King of Castile against the Saracens, he had requested his sisters to cede him their towns of Alenquer and Montemór-o-Velho; this had been refused, and he now asked for the annulment of the legacy, advancing the same reasons that he had used in the case of Mafalda—the integrity of his estates and the insanity of his father. Meanwhile, since his sisters had fortified themselves in their towns, he had collected what troops he could and besieged Montemór. He proposed that Teresa should hand the castle over to a rico-homen in whom they could both confide, who should be paid by the crown and do homage to the king while Teresa enjoyed the revenue from the town. This too was refused. Both sisters granted forais to their towns, assuring

themselves of popular support by concessions, and proclaimed their allegiance to the King of Leon in the midst of Portuguese territory. Teresa, as ex-Queen of Leon, could count on important sympathizers; thus while Afonso II contributed many forces who distinguished themselves in the great battle of Las Navas in response to the appeal of the King of Castile, Alfonso IX of Leon stood aloof from the enterprise which was to deal the greatest blow at Saracen power in Spain, and took advantage of the emergency to invade Portugal on the pretext of assisting his former wife.

When Alfonso IX crossed the frontier, he was accompanied by Prince Fernando, his and Teresa's son, and Pedro, Afonso II's brother, as well as a number of Portuguese barons who had either left the court or had been dismissed from it by the king. Afonso II appeared in Guimarãis in June 1212 with only Mestre Julião and his mordomo-mór: probably the rest of the court was on campaign. Meanwhile the fringe of castles that guarded the northern frontier of Trás-os-Montes had fallen, and the corresponding districts had been ravaged: a reverse was suffered at Val-de-Vez, and the district of Sortelha in Beira was entered. However, Alfonso IX's treachery did not go long unpunished. The battle of Las Navas was fought on July 16, 1212; in it the Portuguese, mostly infantry, 'a number of warriors from the parts of Portugal, a copious multitude of foot-soldiers of wonderful agility, easily sustained the labours of the expedition and attacked with an audacious onset', says Rodrigo de Toledo; and Lucas de Tuy adds 'the Portuguese rushed into battle as if to a feast'. After the great victory over the Moslems, the troops returned to the defence of Portugal. Alfonso VIII himself had an account to settle with the King of Leon, who not only repeated his conduct of Alarcos, but had seized ten Castilian castles during the campaign. With Castilian prestige so recently enhanced, the Leonese was glad enough to accept terms, which included the evacuation of Portugal.

When Afonso II surrounded Montemór, the apostolic legates, the Archbishop of Santiago and Bishop of Zamora, at once excommunicated him and laid the kingdom under an interdict, as they had been bidden. The king protested, and a new bull now arrived appointing new legates, who at length absolved the king and kingdom in exchange for a promise of obedience. But the king and his sisters did not reach any agreement.

Another question cut across the dispute now that the Papacy had been called upon. The tribute had again lapsed since 1198, and Innocent III took advantage of the situation to demand it. After some demur Afonso paid: a paper dated December 12, 1213, acknowledges the receipt of fifty-six gold marks, representing arrears of twenty-eight years. In the following January the two Abbots of Espina and Osseira absolved the

king from the interdict. Proceeding with the case between the king and his sisters, they condemned him to pay them an indemnity of a hundred and fifty thousand morabitinos, which Afonso refused. Again excommunicated, he appealed to the pope, procuring a notable Milanese advocate to state his case. The bull Cum olim charissimus of April 7, 1216 settled the affair in Afonso's favour—the rights of sovereignty must be respected since there was nothing in his father's will to exempt the said castles from the royal jurisdiction. As to the princesses, they should continue to reside in them and receive their revenue, but hand them over to the Templars to guard. But the question was not settled. In 1217 the succeeding Pope Honorius III ordered the Archbishop of Braga and the Dean of Santiago to see to the strict fulfilment of the conditions, and to oblige the Templars to take charge of the castles of Montemór and Alenquer. Only in 1223, after the death of Afonso II, was the agreement finally carried out in favour of the king, and in more or less the same terms as had been prescribed by Innocent III.

iii. RECAPTURE OF ALCÁCER DO SAL, 1217. The violent alteration of the southern frontier in 1191 had still been only slightly rectified: before the death of Sancho I Palmela had been reoccupied by the Templars, and in 1212 the Knights of Calatrava, known in Portugal as Knights of Évora, were granted Avis, where they were to build a castle and settle the district; soon the name Knights of Avis became the usual name for the order. Meanwhile the Templars had been granted a vast property on the eastern frontier, contracting the obligation to complete the modern town of Castelo Branco. Once more Alcácer was the northernmost outpost on the Saracen side of the border.

Since the battle of Las Navas, the Moslem empire had remained weak; a recurrence of famine in the Peninsula led to the conclusion of a truce from 1213. Alfonso VIII had arranged a meeting with Afonso II at Palencia to discuss military operations against Gascony; but his sudden death on the way to the appointment and the succession of a ten-year-old boy to the throne of Castile delayed the progress of the reconquest. In Portugal, however, the opportunity for a new advance was given by the arrival of a fleet sailing from Vlaardingen to Palestine on the fifth crusade. This time the crusaders were largely Rhinelanders from Cologne, led by Count George of Wied and Count William of Holland: a party of Flemings and Hainaulters was commanded by Walter of Avesnes, of the House of Brabant, and the whole expedition filled over two hundred

¹ Henry I of Castile, the only son of Alfonso VIII and Berengaria of England, was married to Mafalda, the cloistered sister of Afonso II of Portugal; but the marriage was dissolved on grounds of consanguinity, and Henry himself died in 1217. Mafalda returned to Portugal and became a nun at Arouca. Both she and her sisters, Teresa and Sancha, were later beatified, Herculano, IV, 62; História de Portugal, ed. Peres, II, 184.

ships. On this occasion the enlistment of the crusaders' help and the conduct of the campaign against Alcácer was due to the action of Bishop Sueiro of Lisbon, with the support of the Bishop of Évora and the Templars and Hospitallers. Not all the crusaders could be persuaded to take part in the enterprise, but many were convinced that the season was too late to reach Palestine, and a hundred shiploads anchored in the estuary of the Sado on July 30. For five weeks the siege proceeded, scarcely differing except in its details from previous attempts, though naturally following the crusading tradition of siege by assault, with mines, towers and engines, rather than the Portuguese method of surprise attack with scaling-ladders. But in September a considerable army of Saracen reinforcements appeared, furnished by the governors of Seville, Jaén, Badajoz and Jerez and numbering, it was said, fifteen thousand horse and forty thousand foot. Some of the crusaders began to remember their vows to go to Palestine, but the timely arrival of reinforcements, including some thirty ships and Templars from Leon, enabled the Christians to fight a pitched battle near Alcácer on September 11, and drive off the Saracen army with heavy loss.

At length on October 18 the gates of Alcácer were opened, and the castle, returning to Christian possession, was handed back to the Templars.

Soon after, the Bishops of Lisbon and Évora applied to the pope for permission to retain the crusaders for another year in Portugal in order to carry on the reconquest, but Honorius III refused this request, and after wintering in Lisbon, the crusaders pursued their journey in the following spring.

During these operations Afonso II did not approach the scene of battle: leaving Lisbon in May he had travelled north to Guimarãis and only returned to Santarém at the end of 1217. Herculano points out that at least one eye-witness of the fall of Alcácer, Oliverius, author of the Historia Damiatana, seems to have been quite vague about the ruler of Portugal, referring to the army as troops of the Queen of Portugal. Certain other castles fell, possibly in Afonso's reign, notably Borba, Vila-Viçosa and Moura. The last is said to owe its name to a Moor, Salukia, the daughter of one Buarcon, a lord of the Alentejo, who gave her the city on her betrothal to the lord of Arouche. The bridegroom, on his way to celebrate the engagement, was ambushed with his party by some Christians, who, assuming their victims' clothing, entered the town in disguise and with little difficulty seized the fortress; Salukia flung herself from the tower to avoid capture. The truth of this story can hardly be ascertained. The south-eastern border of Portugal remained elastic until the following reign.

iv. Afonso's reforms: conflict with the church. If Afonso II did not shine on the field of battle, his reign was none the less a series of struggles: 'never did so unwarlike a king fight so much'.¹ The duel with his sisters formed only the prelude to a much wider action in defence of the royal patrimony, an action which brought him into conflict with the all-powerful Church—whose fortification he had himself permitted at the outset of his reign—and his successor to a miserable deposition.

Between the years 1216 and 1221 large numbers of letters of confirmation were issued. As a protection for the property of the crown, many of the grants made in favour of the nobility. Church and concelhos by his predecessors were confirmed, implying the transitory nature of such concessions and the right of the king to revise them if he wished. From 1220 the process was carried a stage further by the inquirições, an extensive enquiry begun north of the Douro by a royal commission which investigated the nature of the various properties, seigniorial rights and patronage of churches and monasteries. By this means much land that had been illegally taken from the crown might be recovered. In the succeeding enquiries set up in other provinces the lands of the Archbishop of Braga seem to have been singled out for special attention. The method followed consisted of the convocation of the oldest or most experienced men in each parish who must declare under oath the local traditions about the origin, possession and conditions of tenure of all holdings: in general, the lords were not called upon to give evidence, and presumably both the nature of the findings and the opportunity that was given to vent malice contributed to arouse their antagonism. Among the principal misdeeds and evasions revealed by the commission were fraudulent extensions of boundaries by barons, members of the military orders and churchmen, sometimes procured by compounding with villeins and undercutting the king's tributes, sometimes by the simple erection of crosses, which sufficed to protect religious possessions from royal officers: a house where even the bastard baby of a nobleman had been nursed might thereby acquire exemption from taxation.

The effect of these enquiries was to stimulate the hostility of the barons towards the throne; Afonso hastened the crisis by provoking the Church, thus challenging two rivals whose combined strength proved too great for the crown. After the first year of his reign, in which he had made such sweeping concessions to the Church, his enthusiasm cooled and he retracted some of the endowments and grants he had made, obliging religious institutions to pay the colheita or supply of victuals to the king wherever he should pass. However, in 1218 Honorius III confirmed him in possession of the crown, reiterating the bull Manifestis probatum,

and on April 13 of the same year Afonso granted a tithe on all his property to the bishops of the kingdom. Hitherto only the Bishop of Évora, whose diocese remained impoverished and imperilled, had enjoyed this concession: its extension to the rest of the country was a munificent gesture, possibly due to the influence of Mestre Vicente, the Dean of Lisbon and future successor to Mestre Julião as chancellor of the kingdom. This Mestre Vicente had had charge of the see of Lisbon whilst Bishop Sueiro was on the campaign of Alcácer, and his reforms, apparently exceeding his authority, led to a quarrel on the return of his superior, as a result of which he was dismissed—though his influence with the king enabled him to retain his revenues. The bishop appealed to Rome for support and three ecclesiastics were appointed to settle the case, but Afonso II used his influence to have Mestre Vicente reinstated and he was again dean by 1220: the methods employed by Mestre Vicente included the attempted murder of his successor and of a certain witness against him.

Around the king there collected a party of those who opposed the power of the bishops, and found the discomfiture of Sueiro of Lisbon very much to their taste: this included the king's secretary, Gonçalo Mendes, a disciple of Julião, and the mordomo-mór, Pedro Anes. On the other hand the Archbishop of Braga, Estêvão Soares da Silva, had powerful connexions and had displayed his own forcefulness by going to Rome to dispute the primacy of Toledo with the archbishop of that see, Rodrigo Ximénez, the chronicler, and obtaining an unlimited suspension of the question. In 1219 after a visit to Santiago, dictated surely by some policy as well as piety, Afonso II returned to revoke certain concessions to the Church, which called forth an outburst from the archbishop. The king was attacked for causing ecclesiastics to be tried in civil courts and to contribute to the anúduva, or labour on the watch-towers of the frontier, and for his own adulterous habits. Threats did not silence the archbishop: the king and his close supporters were excommunicated and the kingdom generally laid under an interdict. In revenge royal officers pulled down houses and destroyed property of the archbishop: the burghers of Guimarãis marched to Braga and seized the archiepiscopal granaries, vineyards and orchards, in punishment of which they were excommunicated. After these scenes of spiritual and temporal violence, the archbishop fled the country. The king had already been under the ban a year and more when at the end of 1220 Honorius III intervened and despatched three bulls depriving Afonso of his patronage of the churches of Portugal, ordering the clergy to provide suitable support for the exiled archbishop, confirming his sentence of excommunication against the king, and absolving the Portuguese from their oath of fealty to him. A fourth epistle warned the Bishop of Coimbra to detach himself from Afonso's following. The Roman chancery, having delivered five bulls in three days, rested. Afonso was reproved with comminations drawn from the prophets. As to his counsellors, or deceivers, whose policy was responsible for the terrible state of affairs, they were frogs lurking in the royal penetralia where they involved the king in evildoing: such pestilential creatures must be expelled, declared the pope in a sixth communication, a bare fortnight later.

Still Afonso II disobeyed. The ban continued, unheeded apparently, for the king did not begin negotiations with Rome. Afonso's will, dated November 1221, gives no hint that the excommunication caused him any inconvenience: although numerous bequests were made in favour of the clergy and priors of the military orders, the bishoprics were pointedly omitted, with the exception of the new see of Guarda, and the Galician sees of Santiago and Tuy.

In the meanwhile a half-brother of Afonso II, Martim Sanches, had left the kingdom and taken service with Alfonso IX of Leon, who had appointed him a governor on the Galician frontier with charge of the districts of Limia and Toroño: in about 1222 Portuguese knights of the frontier invaded Martim Sanches' tenancy, perhaps because the Archbishop of Braga had estates there, and in return Martim Sanches invaded Portugal. According to tradition Martim Sanches hesitated to attack the king and asked him to remove the royal banner to a distance of a league, which he did. Herculano suggests that the tradition is a patriotic apology for the unwarlike Afonso's retreat. In any case in a battle fought near Barcelos the Portuguese were worsted, and after other fights near Braga and Guimarãis the Leonese retired to Galicia with their spoils. Alfonso IX at the same time seized Chaves and held it until the following reign. The court of Castile also seems to have been on the verge of intervening in Portugal, since Afonso circularized his justices ordering them to keep the truce with Castile.

Another incident of 1221 or 1222 shows Afonso resisting the influence of the Franciscans, who had appeared in Portugal in 1216 and acquired the power not only of preaching, but of punishing, from the Bishop of Coimbra. Sueiro Gomes, who had founded the first Franciscan monastery in Portugal near Alenquer, went so far as to issue his own laws—their tenor is unknown, but they certainly irritated the king, who threatened to punish their publication with fines of a thousand morabitinos, loss of office, corporal punishment and confiscation of goods. The laws which the Franciscans attempted to publish possibly had reference to heretics: Herculano supposes them to have been the decrees of Frederick II of 1220, which Honorius III made extensive to all Christendom.

Towards the end of 1221 Afonso settled at Santarém: in November he made his will. Three papal epistles dated June 16, 1222 made a final and successful effort to reduce him to obedience before he died. The Archbishop of Braga was bidden to absolve him that he might the more easily return to the fold. Afonso himself was exhorted to make peace with the archbishop. Thirdly, powers were given to various prelates to secure the obedience of the king, by excommunication if necessary. Afonso, though only thirty-seven years of age, was now in the last stages of leprosy: six doctors were present at Santarém, but their attentions were in vain. In view of his impending death, his counsellors found it wise to temporize—the heir, born after 1208 and therefore under twelve years of age, would not be capable of giving them much support against the clergy. The Archbishop of Braga, armed with his bull, was on the way back from Rome: the court had already made peace with Bishop Sueiro, and Mestre Vicente succeeded in coming to terms with the archbishop. A few months later, in March 1223, Afonso died.

v. sancho ii: the religious settlement and the reconquest. By his will Afonso II established the order of succession of his four children; the eldest, Sancho, could not have been above twelve years of age: the rest, Afonso, future Count of Boulogne and King of Portugal, Fernando known as the Infante of Serpa, and Leonor future Queen of Denmark, were born between 1209 and 1220, the date of Queen Urraca's death. In the above order the four children were constituted heirs 'to have the kingdom integrally and in peace'. As Sancho was at least two years short of his political majority, a council of regency must have been appointed, but no members of the royal family seem to have merited Afonso II's confidence. His three sisters and his half-brother Rodrigo Sanches were ignored, and members of the curia regis continued to exercise power, performing among themselves the functions of regency. This disappearance of the central authority during Sancho's minority aroused innumerable ambitions and plunged the country into baronial wars. When the time came for the unfortunate Sancho to rule, the sceptre had lost its authority by passing through many hands.

Afonso II had died excommunicate, and Estêvão Soares refused to grant him an ecclesiastical burial until an agreement had been made between Church and State. The king's tutors and ministers had to clear themselves from censure before they could govern, and a concordat was signed at Coimbra in June 1223 which delivered the king completely into the hands of the Church. Firstly, three ecclesiastics, probably selected by the archbishop himself, were appointed to assess the damage done to churches and monasteries; the king and barons binding themselves to accept their decisions. A sum of six thousand morabitinos was to be paid to

the archbishop in compensation for the personal wrongs he had suffered. and the crown undertook to restore his buildings; thirty thousand morabitinos, and a reserve of twenty thousand more, were to be lodged at Santa Cruz in Coimbra, from which all replacements of property, monies and cattle might be paid: at the same time certain specified individuals must be punished by the royal counsellors. In return for this, as soon as the various sums of money had been deposited, the archbishop would raise the general interdict, absolve Afonso II, bury him canonically and pardon all the offences he had received. Those who had disobeved the interdicts and buried the excommunicate were ordered to exhume the dead, obtain a document of absolution, then rebury them according to the law. Apart from these particular stipulations which gave the Church reparation, general dispositions were laid down to protect it in the future: the king would continue to receive colheita from cathedrals and churches but without violence or abuse on his part; no vassal of his should sell or hire a church; in episcopal cities and Church lands, cases dealing with property should be dealt with by a prelate, with no appeal to the king except after judgement had been given; the king would defend all churches and clerics at once on the demand of a prelate; the king would take no revenue belonging to bishoprics, even whilst they were vacant, nor oblige churches or monasteries to maintain his officers, dogs, hawks and horses; he would not intervene in ecclesiastical cases except in respect to civil law; he would amend the inquirições made by his father in so far as they concerned churches on royal land; he would prevent any baron or officer from harming or using force against any churches, clerics or the Church's serfs.


The long-standing quarrel between the king and the princesses was settled shortly after. Teresa and Sancha were confirmed in life-possession of their castles and assured of an income of four thousand morabitinos derived from the revenues of Tôrres Vedras. The king promised to respect the forais which had been given to Alenquer and Montemór in order to secure the loyalty of the inhabitants in the fight against Afonso II. These and other dispositions were confirmed by the oath of the king and six Portuguese barons on the one hand and that of five Leonese barons on the other: in the event of the breaking of the agreement the barons confirmatory to the perjured party were bound to present themselves for imprisonment by the other party, under pain of being held perjurers, traitors and caitiffs.

The quarrel of the Church and monarchy was not over: the Church had taken possession of the vacated battlefield, but a strengthening of the royal power must bring a reaction against the state of submission to which it had been reduced. For the moment, however, it was a mere bone of contention. Unfortunately, the early years of Sancho II's reign

are completely unchronicled, and only the evidence of documents and brief references give clues to the course of events. In the first three years the frequent changing of the officials of the court suggests a feud between two or more factions: the principal office, that of mordomo-mór, changed hands at least five times between the middle of 1223 and the middle of 1225. Occasionally documents are passed with only one baron as witness, while others have no witnesses, but merely the words 'by my order'. Two documents of the following reign contain the words 'at the time of the robbery of King Sancho' and 'in the time of King Sancho, his brother, when he was stolen', suggesting that at least for a time the king was kidnapped, possibly by the powerful family of Mendes de Sousa. Similarly there are traces of conflicts between the barons, references to murders, reconciliations, revenges and restitutions made to churches for violations.

When in 1226 Sancho took Elvas from the Saracens, the Mendes de Sousa were probably still in power. Of the attack on Elvas nothing is known: merely a donation to one Afonso Mendes Sarracines made at Elvas in July 1226 is 'pro multo bono servicio quod mihi fecisti et maxime in Elvas ubi intrasti in cavas exponendo corpus tuum morti pro me'. Having had his first experience of warfare with the Moslems. Sancho retired. Elvas was granted a foral in 1229, but apparently lost again, to be finally recaptured in 1230. After the attack on Elvas, the government seems gradually to have regained stability: by 1229 the Mendes de Sousa disappear from the court, and Sancho's officers are Mestre Vicente—now apparently reconciled with his one-time enemy the Archbishop of Braga -João Fernandes the mordomo-mór, and Martim Anes, Afonso II's former standard-bearer. The latter had been associated with the Mendes de Sousa, but survived the connexion. The appointment of Mestre Vicente as chancellor was perhaps the signal for the resumption of Afonso II's policy of resistance to the encroachments of the Church. Whether because the general position of the clergy was assailed, or because secular clergy challenged the wealth of the monasteries, new complaints were delivered to Rome, not without the intervention of the pugnacious Bishop Martinho of Oporto. It was to deal with this situation that a legate, Cardinal Jean d'Abbeville, was sent to assist at a council held in Coimbra in 1228.

One result of the cardinal's visit was the restoration of Idanha-a-Velha, which had been destroyed some time after Sancho I had granted it to the Templars. With this restoration of the diocese Mestre Vicente was appointed bishop: at the same time the court visited the eastern frontier and delivered *forais* to Idanha, Salvaterra and Elvas. In 1230 Elvas was finally recaptured, and the Guadiana was reached with the taking of Juromenha.



In the same year Alfonso IX of Leon died, and the crowns of Leon and Castile were united in Fernando III, Sancho's cousin, who was thus master of by far the greater part of the Peninsula. An interview between Fernando and Sancho, held at Sabugal at the end of 1230 or beginning of 1231, resulted in the return of Chaves to Portugal. The town had been retained by Alfonso IX of Leon as a guarantee of D. Teresa's enjoyment of her property in Portugal: Fernando's advantage in making this return is not clear unless he wished to prevent a combination between Sancho and the Leonese barons, many of whom viewed his accession with disfavour.

Sancho, a better soldier than statesman, interested himself chiefly in the resumption of the reconquest. A donation of March 1232 resulted in the foundation of Crato by the Hospitallers: Mestre Vicente issued a foral for the repopulation of Alter in his diocese. Probably in the same year Serpa and Moura were recaptured, thus re-establishing Portugal's claim to territory on the eastern bank of the Guadiana. Afonso Peres Farinha, who had taken part in numerous baronial wars in the troublous times of Sancho II's youth and joined the Hospitallers on the pacification of the kingdom, distinguished himself as prior of his order and fought the Saracens for twenty years on the Guadiana frontier. The Knights of Santiago, now established in Alcácer, advanced to Aljustrel; the break through into the Moslem Algarve was consolidated by the capture of the stronghold of Mértola in 1238, thus opening the way down the course of the Guadiana to the sea at Ayamonte. In the following year Tavira and Cacela fell. By the end of Sancho's reign the Saracens had been reduced to a wedge of land in the south-west; the frontier began somewhere south of Alcácer and stretched to a point on the south coast just west of Tavira. The final reduction of this wedge, of which Silves was the centre, was accomplished by Afonso III.

vi. DEPOSITION OF SANCHO II, 1248. Whilst Sancho was pursuing the reconquest, the kingdom gradually lapsed into anarchy. Although in 1227 a certain degree of stability had been reached with the appointment of Pedro Anes and Mestre Vicente to high office, the evil habits of the previous four years had taken too deep root to be easily eradicated. Baronial anarchy was not confined to lay lords: the great prelates, closely attached to the nobility by bonds of kinship and cupidity, had battened on the lands of the crown, protected by the revision of Afonso II's inquirições which they had been able to exact in 1223. Possibly the increase in royal power following Sancho's coming of age turned their attention to the property of the monastic orders, which provided rich pickings. As an example of the extraordinary abuses which could be perpetrated, those of Bishop Sueiro of Lisbon deserve mention. This

enterprising priest ordered that a considerable proportion, up to onethird, of the property of those who died should be handed to the Church, which might refuse canonical burial and the administration of sacraments to those who would not comply. This was the subject of a complaint to Honorius III in 1222, and the Franciscans were ordered to deal with the case. The situation of the monastic clergy is depicted in a bull of Honorius III, dated December 1226. The monks could rarely find a protector who would dare to face their oppressors. At Alcobaça they were made to pay unjust tithes, deprived of bequests, and subjected to interdicts—the latter a vexation which could only have been suffered at the hands of the regular clergy. The misuse of the power of interdiction as a threat, combined with the comings and goings of warring barons, explains the existence of eight or ten bulls of special and general protection obtained by the monks of São Vicente and Alcobaça.1 Notable among the executors and victims of such violences were the royal officers. A specimen list of such incidents shows one Estêvão Peres of Carcavelos arresting and hanging a royal mordomo who entered his property to collect tribute; another lord killing two officers; others killing two more; one Mem Afonso tying an officer to a horse's tail and dragging him round his estate; other nobles and monasteries seizing villages belonging to the king; the lord of Bragança demanding pieces of land from the royal settlers as the price of doing them no harm. Settlers in the zones of influence of the military orders fought among each other now that they were brought into close contact in the conquest and repopulation of the upper Tagus valley.

Bishop Martinho, in voicing his complaints, appealed not to the archbishop, who was now on good terms with his former adversary Mestre Vicente, but directly to the Papacy. The complaints differed only in detail from those made against Afonso II: the king extorted money from the citizens of Oporto under threat of arrest; forced them to serve in the army 'as if they were his own men'; gave vacant benefices to his followers without consulting the bishop or put them in charge of laymen; and other similar charges. Honorius III warned the king to leave the Church alone and to return the tithes he had confiscated, and recommended the Bishop and Dean of Zamora to prevent the king from exercising any jurisdiction in Oporto, in view of the donation of the burgh to the Church made by Countess Teresa. This donation was confirmed by the new Pope Gregory IX, who despatched several bulls warning Sancho II and at length decided to send Jean d'Abbeville as a special envoy. Some kind of settlement was reached at the cortes held in Coimbra in 1228, and the cardinal left the country.

¹ Herculano, IV, 194.

At about the same time the Bishop of Lisbon, the extortioner Sueiro, abandoned his diocese and joined the barons north of the Douro; sometime before 1231 he carried his complaints in person to Rome. The gist of these appears from a bull sent to the Bishops of Astorga and Lugo in October of the same year: royal officers entered the houses of ecclesiastics at night in search of concubines and extorted money either for keeping silence or by threats of slander; the king took the opportunity of reinstating any priest who appealed from the condemnation of the ecclesiastical courts; he seized the Church's property, consorted with and gloried in the company of infidels and the excommunicate, giving Jews high public office; he forced churchmen to do military service and keep his hunting-dogs and hawks. Among the measures prescribed by the pope was the appointment of a Christian to supervise tax-collection, which was farmed out not only to Jews, but to Saracens. Apparently Sancho did not obey: there is no evidence that he displayed any interest in such matters.

On the death of the old Bishop of Oporto, his successor reiterated the same complaints; and when Estêvão Soares was followed by Silvestre Godinho as archbishop, similar protests were made with regard to the diocese of Braga. But whilst the party of the bishops was gathering strength, Rome hesitated to intervene; presumably Sancho's successful campaigns against the Moslems of the Algarve stood him in the good grace of the Papacy—so much so that a bull of 1234 extended to all those who fought the Saracens in Portugal the same privileges as were granted to crusaders in Palestine. Gregory IX had even supported Sancho against the bishops, who were accused of exempting from military service their lay supporters and even tonsuring many for the purpose; similarly if any of their friends was accused of a crime in the civil courts he was smuggled into holy orders and his case transferred to the security of an ecclesiastical court. As a remedy to this Gregory ordered all the prelates of Portugal to admit no one to holy orders without the king's command. At this time Sancho received general support; in 1232 the popehad even ordered that no canonical penalties should be laid on him whilst he was at war with the Saracens. Sancho in return seems to have shown his piety by adopting a Franciscan cowl—like his cousin Louis IX of France—whence his nickname Capêlo. As a final proof of the benevolence with which the pope regarded him at this time, he was absolved in 1233 on his own request from the responsibility of rough-handling certain clerics in the line of battle—'cum ipse in exercitu, vel alibi constitutus, non suadente diabolo, sed ordinandi aciem vel declinandae pressurae necessitate cogente, virga interdum impulserit quosdam clericos sive manu' 1

¹ An epistle of Gregory IX to Br. Jacob, Sancho's confessor, Herculano, IV, 244.

It was thus no deep-seated hatred of Sancho's person that brought the Papacy to depose him: at least as long as he continued to crusade against the infidel he was in good odour, and the protests of the bishops went unheeded or, if satisfied, were averted from his person. The conduct of his two brothers, the one an adroit and calculating opportunist, the other a dangerous and disorderly bandit, contributed considerably to Sancho's fall. The first of these, Afonso (later III), had left Portugal and established himself at the French court, where his aunt the Queen-Mother Blanche of Castile ruled during the minority of his cousin St Louis. Here he married in 1235 Matilda, daughter of Count Rainald de Dammartin, through which match he acquired the county of Boulogne. The youngest brother, Fernando, known as the Infante de Serpa, had remained in Portugal and fought against the Moslems; apparently much favoured by the king, he was presented with the seigneury of Serpa, where he set up a lawless petty tyranny. Mestre Vicente, who had retired from the court to care for his diocese, complained of Fernando's extortions and murders of priests, and obtained his excommunication in 1237. About this time the bishopric of Lisbon fell vacant, and of two candidates one was supported by the king, and the other, the dean, supported by the chapter and eventually by Rome: one of Fernando's exploits was to raid the dean's houses, destroy them and violate the sanctuary of a church in which his supporters had taken refuge. The responsibility for these actions was attributed to the king and an interdict laid upon him. Fernando for his part repented, went to Rome, was absolved and promised to go unshaven and without washing his head through the following Lent, to walk barefoot on Good Friday through all the churches wherever he should chance to be, and to be flagellated in Santarém, the scene of his murders.

Sancho II did not escape so easily. In 1237 the new Bishop of Oporto, Pedro Salvadores, invited the Dominicans to establish a monastery in Oporto, and took advantage of the occasion to deliver a picture of the state of Portugal—a real political pamphlet, in the words of Herculano. Only the coming of the Dominicans, he declared, could remedy the present evils—bandits were countless; monasteries and churches were made into barracks and stables; property was sacked; churches burned; priests slain before the altars; children speared at their mothers' breasts, crushed or drowned if their fathers would not ransom them; maidens scarcely marriageable were raped in churches by herds of lewd brutes, scarcely human. The friars came to Oporto. But their preaching was only too successful; the charity of the pious found its way into their hands, and no longer into the bishop's. Soon after, the terrible crimes must have vanished, for the Dominicans were forbidden to exercise their

priestly functions and all those who favoured them with benefices were threatened with excommunication. It was this Pedro Salvadores who accused the royal officers of violating the immunities of his diocese, and played a leading part in the campaign against Sancho II. His voice, added to that of the archbishop, moved the pope to take action, and a crisis in the king's affairs occurred in the middle of 1238, just after the outrage in which Fernando had been concerned. In May 1238 the Bishop of Oporto obtained compensation for damage done in his diocese by the king's uncle, Rodrigo Sanches, governor of the province between the Douro and the Lima, who seems to have played a similar part in respect to the diocese of Oporto as Fernando to Lisbon. Meanwhile the Bishop of Salamanca and others had been appointed by the pope to investigate the religious situation, and had used their power of interdict to menace the king: this sentence was now upheld in Rome by the encyclical of January 1238; the Bishop of Orense was bidden to see that the king held no communication with any priest on religious matters. Toledo was ordered to see that all persecuted priests found shelter in Leon or Castile, and two bulls addressed to Sancho himself severely reprehended his general conduct and his treatment of the Bishop of Lisbon, now a refugee in Rome.

These threats cowed the king, who gave an abject undertaking of complete obedience to the Archbishop of Braga, in which not even the law restricting the amortization of property was adhered to: rather to emphasize his surrender, Sancho made handsome donations of land to the archbishop. At the end of 1238, the storm seemed to have passed; only the burghers of Oporto carried on some sort of struggle against their bishop until a composition was reached in 1240. However the Bishop of Lisbon was still in Rome, where on the occasion of the Council called by Gregory IX to deal with the problem of Frederick II they were joined by the Archbishop, Silvestre Godinho, and the Bishop of Oporto, Pedro Salvadores. The Council was convoked for 1241, but Frederick II destroyed the fleet which carried many French and Spanish delegates, thus preventing it from taking place. The Portuguese delegates, however, arrived in Rome and assisted at the prolonged intrigues which resulted in the election of Innocent IV, who, though a former friend of Frederick II, found it safer to take refuge in Lyons close to the domains of St Louis: here he called another Council in 1245, to which the Portuguese prelates proceeded from Italy, with the exception of the Archbishop of Braga, who had died in Rome. It was on this occasion that the conspiracy which was to remove Sancho from the throne was first elaborated: in France the bishops had the opportunity of making contact with Sancho's brother Afonso, still the legitimate heir to the throne

(since Sancho had no children) and, having distinguished himself against Henry III of England in the battle of Saintes, a person of consequence in France.

Meanwhile in Portugal the clergy were without their champions, and lost the ground that had been gained by the agreements of 1238. The nobility, seeing the ease with which the royal power had been reduced by the Church, had broken loose; many of its members probably left the court and retired to their own estates, leaving the king's familiars to scramble for prominence. While discontent was spreading, Sancho himself took a step which greatly contributed to the dissolution of his power by marrying D. Mencia (Mécia) López, daughter of the Lord of Biscay, Lopo Díaz de Haro, and widow of the Count of Urgel. The marriage must have taken place after 1240, but the year is unrecorded. Since Sancho was a great-grandson and his wife a great-great-granddaughter of Afonso Henriques, it fell—for those who were interested in disputing the throne with Sancho—within the forbidden degrees: at the same time the birth of an heir would be a serious menace to the Count of Boulogne's claim to the throne. Accordingly the Portuguese who were at Lyons persuaded the Papacy of the illegitimacy of the match, and Innocent IV ordered the marriage to be dissolved if, as 'our beloved son and noble gentleman the Count of Boulogne' had declared, it should be proved to be within the fourth degree (February 1245). The only evidence of the internal state of Portugal during this extremely obscure period is provided by the epistle of the same pope despatched the following month to urge Sancho to mend his reprehensible conduct. According to this document, which must be regarded as extremely suspect, since it formed the political justification for Sancho's dethronement, the king was given up to violences, tolerating all sorts of crimes and not controlling his vassals; thieves, bandits, incendiaries, sacrileges and murderers swarmed everywhere; ecclesiastics and laymen were robbed and murdered without distinction and with impunity; the churches were despoiled; close relatives married: the excommunicate attended mass and received sacraments; heretics disputed doctrine, citing the Old Testament and the New: monasteries became stables: Sancho allowed the destruction of castles and towns, robberies, rape of nuns, extortion of all and sundry, violation of temples and churchyards, and finally the occupation by Saracens of the Christian frontiers of Portugal. At least the last accusation was an undeserved calumny: of the rest it is impossible to judge.

In January 1245 the pope had sent the Count of Boulogne an epistle which advised and requested him to depart in succour of the Holy Land. Since no similar documents were issued to anyone else and the mention of the Holy Land is accompanied only by a vague reference to its

deplorable state, it seems reasonable to conclude that the bull was a tacit permission for Afonso to raise troops to take to Portugal. When in the following months the prospect of a campaign in the Holy Land did present itself, a new bull was received by the count, praising him for his anxiety to combat Islam in Spain, whither he had resolved to go, and, since Innocent desired that everyone should assist him, particularly the inhabitants of the Peninsula, conceding all Portuguese soldiers who should fight for him the benefits usually accorded to crusaders in Palestine. This was the thinnest of disguises for an invasion of Portugal.

The Bishops of Oporto and Coimbra were charged with the task of

bringing the king to heel and ordered to report on the measure of their success at the coming Council, to begin on June 24. As the bull, dated March 20, could only have reached Portugal late in April, the bishops could have spent at most a month in Portugal: during this time Pedro Salvadores did not scruple to obtain the gift of the castle of Marachique for his diocese and that of Odemira for the Knights of Santiago. The following month at Lyons he presented a lamentable picture of crime and deceit in the government of Portugal: even before setting out he and his companion wrote to inform Innocent IV that their efforts to make Sancho see the folly of his ways had been in vain. At the Council they were joined by the Archbishop of Braga, João Egas, who added his testimony to theirs. A week after the end of the Council a bull was despatched to the nobles, communities and concelhos and all knights and persons of Portugal pointing out the urgency of confiding the kingdom to some more trustworthy ruler. The catalogue of errors was repeated—weakness before the barons, crimes, heresy, immorality, loss of frontiers, obstinacy, 'to the imminent risk of destroying and ruining the monarchy'. The most suitable person to remedy this state of affairs was the Count of Boulogne. Sancho's brother and next legitimate heir to the throne, virtuous, religious and prudent. Therefore on his arrival in Portugal he should be received in all cities, towns and castles, all oaths of loyalty to Sancho being automatically dissolved and his orders resisted, though his person and those of his legitimate children, should he have any, must be respected. All tributes and revenues must be handed to Afonso, and the archbishop and the Bishop of Coimbra, after due warning, should have power to compel with the penalties of the Church and without appeal, 'since there was in these dispositions no intention to deprive King Sancho or his legitimate son, should he have one, of their rights to the crown, but simply to save the king, the kingdom and themselves, the inhabitants, from immediate ruin, through the solicitude and prudence of the Count of Boulogne'. This very modern-sounding document was dated July 24, 1245.

In possession of this bull of deposition, the archbishop and the Bishop of Coimbra went to Paris to settle the conditions on which the Count of Boulogne should get, in spite of the disclaimer in the bull, the Portuguese throne. The necessary clauses were drawn up by a group of Portuguese nobles and clergy under the chairmanship of the Dean of Chartres, representing the pope. Afonso undertook to maintain the good old customs of the realm and to do away with the bad new ones set up by his father and brother, to appoint or see elected honest judges without oppression or bribery and to punish homicide exemplarily, especially that of clerics. The promise was undertaken, by whatever title he, Count Afonso, might attain the kingdom of Portugal-whether he began as regent or at once seized the throne. The majority of the clauses protected the Church and the rights of the Papacy, a natural consequence of the circumstances in which the conspiracy came about: in spite of the numerous complaints against Sancho's administration, Afonso did not swear to reform it except in vague terms, though he very definitely swore to 'consult loyally the advice of the prelates' and to be 'ever obedient to the Roman Church, his mother, as befitted a Catholic prince, no doubt nor deceit being admissible in this promise'. Similarly he swore to shelter and keep the churches, monasteries, clergy and religious persons, their goods and chattels, recompensing them for all wrongs done, on the valuation of the Archbishop of Braga, the Bishop of Coimbra and honest men: to raze all buildings erected on church lands or to the detriment of churchmen without fear or favour; to settle in conjunction with the prelates the punishments due to those who had harmed the Church; not to demand colheita in cash, nor greater than in the time of Afonso Henriques, nor more than once a year, nor for long; and to observe and maintain the bulls of Gregory IX in favour of the Church. In return he should not be interfered with by the Church in the appointment of governors or disposal of concessions and public revenues; this latter as a favour—et hoc concedunt eidem! To complete the picture this oath was taken to the archbishop and other churchmen: only the phrase 'saving his right and that of the kingdom of Portugal' appeared in the agreement to justify any future evasion of these impositions. Herculano rightly expresses doubt whether to wonder more at the insolence of the two prelates, or at the abjection of the ambitious prince.

Leaving the county of Boulogne to the care of his wife, Afonso arrived in Lisbon by sea at the end of 1245 or beginning of 1246. Already a number of partisans had been canvassed for him; the bull of deposition refers to a number of letters from ecclesiastics, concelhos, barons and soldiers brought by the Bishop of Oporto after his rapid visit of May 1245. The reception in Lisbon had been well prepared: the 'Procurator

of the Kingdom' or 'Defender and Visitor of the Kingdom for the Supreme Pontiff' found the Order of Santiago ready to back him, and the concelho of Lisbon had its written and unwritten charters and foros confirmed in return for subjection and obedience. Whilst the south of the country adhered to Afonso from the first, forces of resistance collected in the north and centre. There exists no record of the ensuing war, but in spite of the censures of the Church and the enmity of part of the nobility, Sancho retained much of the popular sentiment which probably derived from his military feats against the Saracens. Coimbra, the seat of the court, held out longest for Sancho. Óbidos was closely besieged, as were Guimarãis and the castle of Faria; corruption brought about the fall of other castles, such as Lanhoso. The backbone of the resistance was probably Martim Gil, a son of Gil Vasques de Soverosa and Sancho I's mistress Maria Aires: according to his enemies, Sancho's subordination to Martim Gil produced many of the misfortunes of the kingdom. In 1245, whilst the revolution was still brewing, there had been fought at Gaia the engagement known as the lide do Pôrto, in which the king's uncle Rodrigo Sanches and other ricos-homens met their death at the hands of Martim Gil in what may have been the last of the baronial wars that characterized Sancho's reign. The name of the battle is legendary; but its motives and significance are lost—unless we look for a motive in the Count of Boulogne's gift to the monastery of Grijó for the soul of Rodrigo Sanches, buried there after his death at the hands of Sancho's favourite.

One of Afonso's supporters was his uncle Pedro, brother to Afonso II, who had gone to the court of Leon, where he became mordomo-mor, leading an adventurous life in the wars against the Saracens. After rebelling against his brother in support of the three princesses, he had gone to Africa and taken service with the Emperor of Morocco, returned with the remains of the five Franciscan 'martyrs of Morocco', who were buried at Coimbra, and joining the court of Leon, married the Countess of Urgel, Aurembiax, who had been repudiated by the Count in favour of D. Mencia López, the present Queen of Portugal. Offered the islands of Majorca and Minorca by Jaime I of Aragon, he became King of the Baleares, and in 1236 went east to fight for the Latin Empire of Constantinople. On his return he exchanged his island kingdom for some castles in Valencia. As Pedro was the only possible rival to the Count of Boulogne, the supporters of Afonso had obtained from the pope a bull urging him to support and fight for the claimant. His experience in war may have greatly benefited the cause and prestige of Afonso.

Meanwhile the struggle went on, gradually centring round Coimbra.

Here the chapter and clergy were persecuted by Martim Gil's men on suspicion of dealing with the enemy prelates, and a baron, Gomes Anes de Portocarreiro, jestingly called himself Bishop of Coimbra. Yet Sancho's supporters gradually diminished; Teresa, the former Queen of Leon, welcomed his rival from her town of Montemor, dangerously close to the capital. Perhaps the bitterest blow of all was the capture of the queen, carried off from the palace of Coimbra by a band of barons led by a brother of the Archbishop of Braga, Raimundo Viegas de Portocarreiro, who took her to the castle of Ourém. Sancho marched against the castle but failed to recover his wife, and retired to Coimbra. A suspicion that D. Mencia herself connived in this, that the abduction was in reality a flight, is based on the existence of documents freely issued by her and given at Ourém in September 1246, on the presence there of other Basques including the military governor and on the complete omission of her name from Sancho's will. It is only possible to divine how deeply the robbery or desertion of the woman for whom he had defied public and religious opinion may have affected Sancho. As to Afonso, now that the king and queen were separated, he feared no one: no legitimate child could be born to the king, and he was the nearest heir: with patience all would be his.

At last and too late, Sancho thought of obtaining foreign help against his brother. His deposition, as far as the Papacy was concerned, merely constituted an attempt to show the power of the Church in face of the effrontery of Frederick II. Frederick saw it in the same light and in a letter to Fernando III of Castile pointed out the arrogance of Innocent IV —adfectionem vestram rogamus attente quatenus diligentius advertentes, qualiter summus pontifex suis viribus, qui nihil habere debet, cum gladio non contentus, in alienam messem falcem presumptuosus immittit et ut non longe a nobis petatur exemplum, qualiter in regno Portugalliae honoris sibi usurpaverit dignitatem, curas vestras et animos excitetis.1 Fernando III had wrested Jaén from the Moslems in April 1246 with the aid of his son, the future Alfonso X el Sabio: in the spring of 1247 he began the siege of Seville, which finally capitulated late in 1248. Apparently after the capture of Jaén, Sancho II approached him through the Infante Alfonso to whom he made or had already made liberal donations of castles and land. The young prince undertook to write to the pope and point out how the Count of Boulogne was assaulting Portuguese cities and castles and practising a thousand wrongs, not even respecting the castles and lands that had been granted by Sancho to him, the Prince of Castile. In reply the pope dilated upon the motives for the deposition of Sancho, declaring that he had no intention of depriving him of the throne—non tamen est

¹ Petr. de Vineis, Epistolar. l. 1, c. 15; Herculano, v, 65, n.

intentionis nostrae nec extitit, ut per hoc juri vel honori praedicti regis, seu legitimi filii, si quem eum habere contigerit, in aliquo derogetur, si ad eum statum ipsum devenire claruerit ut per suam diligentiam et industriam possit praedictum regnum utiliter et salubriter gubernari¹—the story of Sancho's insanity apparently accepted by the pope was later used to invalidate donations made by him, as in an inquirição of 1307 in which the Templars are deprived of their rights to Idanha and Salvaterra 'because they were given them by one who had not power to give anything in the realm, for he had lost his wits'. The Templars probably adhered to Sancho for some time: their master, Martim Martins, was a childhood friend of the king, but in the middle of 1246 he either abandoned him or was superseded.

Early in 1247 Castilian troops under Alfonso and D. Mencia's brother, Diego López de Haro, entered Portugal: by now Sancho probably only possessed Coimbra and part of the province of Beira. Promptly excommunicated, the Castilian troops continued to march towards Coimbra. Alfonso of Castile protested anew to the pope against the outrages upon Sancho's authority and the excommunication pronounced against himself. In his reply of May 1247 Innocent ordered that no censure of the Church should fall upon the heir of Castile, and promised to send one Desiderius to report to him and advise Alfonso, but he had clearly no intention of preventing the usurpation of the Portuguese throne. The Castilian expeditionary forces, not perhaps very numerous, seem to have stayed on to defend Coimbra even after Sancho had retired to Castile: early in 1248 they were worsted in a fight near Leiria, or, in Rui de Pina's version, Sancho himself left the kingdom and returned with Castilian troops—on the way back the royal forces passed the castle of Trancoso where a number of their adversaries were immured: a certain Fernão Garcia de Sousa came forth with only a squire and challenged Martim Gil as the author of all the present ills, offering to renew their allegiance to the king if he would dismiss the public enemy. Sancho disallowed the combat, and, according to Pina, Martim Gil attempted to kill the challenger by treachery.

Finding resistance to be impossible, Alfonso of Castile and Sancho left Portugal. The king retired to Toledo, Fernando III's capital, where he died soon after, early in 1248. His will, dated January 3, shows that few of his allies followed him into exile; his chancellor appears in it, but not Martim Gil, nor is there any reference to Mencia López. His possessions were bequeathed to those few who had remained faithful to him, but his request to have his ashes buried at Alcobaça was never fulfilled. A legend which has become history, or an incident that has

¹ Herculano, v, 67, n.

become a legend, is told of Martim Freitas, the governor of Coimbra. This last loyal supporter of Sancho II held out in the capital until after his master's death in Toledo: summoned to surrender on the news of this, he refused, until by means of a safe-conduct he had made the journey to Toledo himself and seen the body of his master with his own eyes.

The evidence is too slight to justify any attempt to assess Sancho's rights and wrongs: his name as a soldier is bound up with the reconquest of the Algarve—as an administrator there must remain grave doubts of his ability, though the incontestable unscrupulousness of his enemies shakes any confidence in their charges, including that of his madness.

CHAPTER VIII

THE COMPLETION OF THE RECONQUEST

i. AFONSO III; THE END OF MOSLEM DOMINION IN THE ALGARVE, 1249: THE TREATY OF BADAJOZ, 1267. Whatever the justification for the campaign against Sancho II, his death legitimized Afonso's possession of the throne and deprived the party of opposition of any legal grounds for existence. Without abandoning his title to the county of Boulogne, Afonso became King of Portugal, unchallenged except possibly by some of the nobility of the north. He was soon able to gather the strength of the country round him, beginning with the clergy, who naturally were his strongest supporters, and the municipalities. Immediately on his arrival in Lisbon he had confirmed the privileges of the burghers, and in the war with his brother he availed himself of troops supplied by the concelhos, which also were to form the spearhead of his action against the Moslems. The faithful service of the commoners was to be rewarded by their admission for the first time to the deliberations of the council, thus forming the first cortes of the three estates. Whilst the clergy and commoners rallied firmly round the throne, a certain displacement seems to have taken place among the nobility: very few of the highest rank were present in Paris when Afonso made his pact with the prelates, and now the lower degree of the nobility, the infanções, took his favour and were appointed as governors or tenentes in preference to those of higher rank.

For the first few years of his reign Afonso, an experienced, bold and careful opportunist, travelled the length of his realms acquiring support, granting privileges, warily feeling his way. From Lisbon he moved to Guimarãis, the capital of Count Henry; in July 1248 he was in Coimbra, the capital of the last three kings, whence he moved back to Lisbon. The latter city, perhaps because of its immediate welcome, pleased him best, and it was there that he made his court; who shall say what influence the choice of a port rather than an inland town such as Coimbra or Guimarãis played on the destinies of Portugal?

In 1249 Afonso moved through Estremadura: he had already decided to embark upon a final campaign against the Algarve, either because the wars against the Saracens were popular with the Church, to which he was so deeply indebted, or because a military enterprise was the best way of harnessing an army that should be loyal to him. He raised men from the concelhos and extracted, even in Oporto, a scutage from those who did not wish to fight. The time for the campaign could not have

been more opportune: Fernando III of Castile had captured Valencia and Cordova, received the submission of Seville late in 1248, and making the latter city his capital, menaced town upon town in Andalusia. Two experienced leaders who had seen service before Seville were now in the train of Afonso III—one his uncle D. Pedro, formerly ruler of the Balearic Islands, the other Gonçalo Peres, comendador-môr of the Portuguese Knights of Santiago. Though the military orders gave Afonso full support, there is no evidence that the barons or high clergy assisted in the campaign. In March 1249 Santa Maria de Faro was taken, and the Saracen triangle in the south-west of the Algarve began to dissolve; other towns, probably including Silves itself, fell at the same time. In the following year the king visited the scene of his conquests and divided them among the military orders and his supporters.

The kingdom of Portugal thus reached the natural limits set by the southern coastline. It had already absorbed Ayamonte on the eastern bank of the Guadiana, apparently uncontested; now in completing a conquest which had been marked out since Sancho reached the sea at Tavira, it aroused the jealousies of Castile, and the two countries came to the brink of war. During the reigns of Afonso Henriques and Fernando II, an agreement had been made about the future conquests of Leon and Portugal: although its terms are unknown, the course of the Guadiana seems the obvious line of demarcation. But the circumstances in which it was made had been modified by the absorption of Leon into Castile and the decay of the Almohad empire. It was the action of the Portuguese master of the Knights of Santiago, Paio Peres Correia, that now precipitated a dispute. Santiago had been richly endowed by Sancho II, and had developed its extensive possessions in its own way, retaining the Saracen population to labour and pay tribute. In order to establish their right the knights obtained bulls from Innocent IV confirming their ownership of Sesimbra, Tavira, Alcácer, Palmela, Mértola, Cacela and other places, but when Paio Peres had been present at the siege of Seville he had also applied to Fernando III for confirmation of these possessions, and obtained it some days after the death of Sancho II: the reasons for this procedure are unknown. Meanwhile a Saracen who had given his support to the Castilians, Muhammad ibn Mahfut, Lord of Niebla, governed by treaty with Castile the territory of Niebla and Huelva, including Faro and Silves. On Afonso III's seizure of the Algarve, the Lord of Niebla ceded his territorial rights to the Infante Alfonso of Castile—Afonso III's former enemy. In spite of the King of Portugal's protest to Fernando III, the justice of which was admitted, the prince of Castile, acting independently of his father, launched a campaign against Portugal at the end of 1250. The place and events of the campaign are

not known, but presumably the fortunes of war ran against Afonso III, who seems to have recognized the cession of the Lord of Niebla's rights to the Infante of Castile. A truce was concluded between the adversaries for forty years: in fact it lasted less than two. On the death of Fernando III in May 1252 and the accession of the Infante as Alfonso X of Castile, the truce was broken and another campaign, as obscure as the former, was fought. In January 1253 Innocent IV intervened, desirous that Alfonso X should carry out his father's intention of fighting the Moslems in Africa, and proposed himself as mediator, promising to attend to the interests of both parties. The result of the pope's intervention was a marriage pact. Afonso III, now a man of forty, should marry the bastard infant daughter of Alfonso X, retaining the sovereignty of the Algarve and the eastern bank of the Guadiana, but granting their usufruct to his future father-in-law until such time as the eldest son of the match should reach the age of seven, whereupon the disputed territories would be reincorporated in the Kingdom of Portugal. Not the least curious feature of the solution was the official morality which, having declared illegal Sancho II's marriage with his great-grandfather's great-great-granddaughter, now positively encouraged Afonso III to commit bigamy. In spite of the protests of the Countess of Boulogne, and the order of separation made by Alexander IV some years later, the bargain was carried through and after an interview at Chaves between the two kings the child Beatriz was brought to Portugal and treated as a queen. When in 1258 the order of separation was made, the marriage was still unconsummated. Afonso's resistance to the order brought down a papal interdict: shortly afterwards Countess Matilda died and a daughter was born of the new union in 1259. In the face of Alexander IV's protests and accusations of bigamy and incest, the prelates of Portugal made a united plea for the king in 1260, and three years later, owing to the intervention of France and Navarre, the matter was settled in his favour, the interdict raised. and the legitimacy of the children already born recognized by Urban IV.

The political arrangement, whilst it implied the immediate recognition of the superior force of the King of Castile, who had managed to acquire temporary rights over land to which his ancestors had never made any claim, nevertheless favoured Portugal in the future, since not only the possession of the Algarve was guaranteed but also that of the towns on the east bank of the Guadiana such as Moura and Serpa, which, though conquered by the Portuguese, had probably not been conceded to Afonso Henriques in the original agreement made with Fernando II. However, the agreement was of a nature to produce friction. Alfonso X took it upon himself to restore the diocese of Silves and appoint his own bishop, to whom he granted in perpetual gift various properties and a tithe on

the royal revenue. The bishop had already been consecrated in Seville when he applied to Afonso III for his confirmation: at a meeting in Lisbon cathedral Afonso registered his protest—as the King of Castile had only the usufruct of the Algarve he could not presume to dispose of any part of it in perpetuity.

Hostilities probably did not completely stop: in 1263 Alfonso X sent a commission to Portugal to sign peace and agree to the demarcation of frontiers—possibly because the extensive rebellions of Saracens in already conquered or tributary territory had extended to the Guadiana or Algarve. The prince whose seventh birthday was to bring these possessions back to Portugal had been born in October 1261. Alfonso X could afford to be magnanimous, since he was to lose the Algarve in any case by the end of 1268: consequently the agreement made on this occasion restored Portuguese sovereignty in all the disputed territory in return for the promise of 'fifty lances', the aid of fifty knights whenever Alfonso X might require them. Even this last condition was waived when the heir to the Portuguese throne, Denis, was sent to visit Alfonso X in Seville (1266). The motive for the journey was Alfonso X's war with the Saracens of Granada and Murcia, which he was allowed to turn into a crusade on the grounds of the intervention of a Moroccan army. In answer to his appeal, Portuguese land and sea forces were sent under the nominal command of the Infante Denis, Afonso III having overcome the considerable reluctance of the concelhos to pay for the expedition. In return for this aid 'rendered us in our war by land and sea', the little prince of Portugal was knighted by his grandfather, and obtained from him the renunciation of the right to fifty Portuguese lances, and the return to Portugal of two castles in the Algarve which had been retained as a pledge. At the same time Alfonso X dropped the title of King of the Algarve; in an agreement resulting from a meeting of the two kings at Badajoz in February 1267, he desisted from all territorial rights in the Algarve whilst Afonso gave up claims to territory east of the Guadiana the towns of Serpa and Moura were only restored to Portugal in the reign of Denis. Except for this latter region and the smaller Riba-Côa district, the provisions of the treaty of Badajoz define the Portuguese frontiers of to-day: the invasions and alarms of six and three-quarter centuries have modified this by no means natural frontier by a bare league or two of land, an astonishing proof of Portuguese resistance in view of the disparity of strength of the two neighbours.

ii. CORTES OF LEIRIA, 1254. Afonso III could not have reigned long in Portugal before feeling the same difficulties as his brother, father and grandfather with regard to the Church: when he made the sweeping promises of the treaty of Paris he had had no experience of the problems

caused by the autonomy, even supremacy, of the Portuguese clergy. It is true that some of the promises he had made tended to check the excesses of the barons and to protect the villeins, but how far he had been able to impose order on the country during these first years is difficult to say. Probably the cortes called at Leiria in 1254 constituted the first attempt to deal with his difficulties in a general way: here for the first time in Portugal the deliberations of the two privileged classes were attended by representatives of the commoners.

According to Visigothic tradition, the king relied for advice on a curia regis or royal council, which he might consult at his own pleasure on such varied questions as concessions, administration of the royal household and crown property, financial measures, appeals by private persons, or quarrels between Church and State, and the elaboration of laws: those who attended comprised all nobles or prelates who happened to be at court, together with members of the royal family, but their advice was, theoretically at least, in no way binding on the king. The regular meetings of the curia to advise or confirm matters of incidental importance formed the antecedents of the royal council; extraordinary meetings, to which numbers of dignitaries were specially called and which dealt with more general and permanent questions, slowly evolved into the institution of the cortes, which in its complete form consisted of the representatives of three classes, the nobility, the clergy, and the municipal hierarchy of the towns-the latter including commoners. Before the time of Afonso III, three gatherings classifiable as cortes are recorded.1 The first, held in Guimarais in the time of Count Henry, is referred to in the Life of St Gerald as a meeting of omnes process portugalenses. In 1211 the assembly which heard Afonso II's undertaking to respect the rights of the Church as law comprised prelates and barons, with clearly a strongly ecclesiastical tinge; the third assembly, that of 1228, in which Jean d'Abbeville had intervened, had been to reach an accord between Church and State; at it the repopulation of recent conquests was resolved, but the pacification proved short-lived. Afonso III himself had already called a solemn assembly of ricos-homens and other nobles, without churchmen, in January 1251, and passed certain measures tending to re-establish order in the kingdom. The prevalence of feuds—the source of anarchy, since their spread involved whole districts in hostilities at the service of their lords—was discouraged, though hardly prevented, by the application of fines and imprisonment. Fines for the robbery of stock were tabulated; the thief of a cow or ox paid the king six maravedis

¹ The Cortes of Lamego, said to have been celebrated by Afonso Henriques in 1143, appear to have been a pure invention, though their acts were regarded as law in the seventeenth century; see p. 324.

and the owner four; the fines for a hen, capon, kid, goose or sucking-pig were established at a maravedi for the king and five soldos for the owner; similar payments covered the theft of clothing. Anyone who, having killed his enemy, stole any of his possessions might have to pay as much as three hundred maravedis. The lower orders of labourers, all those who did not use a lance and fight for their lords, were protected from death or harm at the hands of others by the threat of a fine of three hundred maravedis, an attempt to put an end to indiscriminate marauding. These measures tended to abolish not so much the right to execute private revenge on one's enemy as the disorder and banditry which were its accompaniment. The assembly of 1251 also established the right of all travellers to claim food at prices to be assessed locally by two good men: if provisions were refused, the traveller might—if he dared—take them. This protection probably envisaged Moors and Jews, travelling vendors who were very often at the mercy of their customers.

The cortes of Leiria of 1254 assembled at the end of February and dispersed at the beginning of April. The subjects discussed included the satisfaction of complaints from certain concelhos and confirmation of the privileges of others, and confirmations and reparations in favour of monasteries. Perhaps more important than the subject-matter of the cortes was the fact of their existence; deputies of the towns had appeared in the Leonese cortes as early as 1188, perhaps the earliest representation of the commoners in Europe; and Portugal was thus brought into line with the political development of the other states of the Peninsula.

One of the questions discussed at Leiria was the status of Oporto. The possession of the burgh by the bishop, accorded by Countess Teresa, was the cause of incessant complaints: the royal burgh of Gaia had been founded on the opposite bank, and the two towns disputed the right to receive toll on and to disembark merchandise coming down the river. Afonso's first intervention had been unsuccessful; the bishop had opposed the royal officers by force, leading to popular riots which the king punished by the imposition of a heavy fine. Occupying the city, Afonso had demanded the surrender of the keys of the castle, which the bishop's governor at first refused; he at length deposited them on the high altar of the cathedral as a sign that he would not break his allegiance to the bishop. On this occasion the other bishops did not move in support of Oporto, and the king was able to put the question before the assembly at Leiria in a dispassionate and equitable manner: a third of the ships descending the Douro and half the ships from abroad should discharge at Gaia, the rest at Oporto. Unfortunately the bishop refused to accept this composition and appealed to the pope, who confirmed the agreement made in the time of Sancho II. None the less

Afonso retorted by founding the new concelho of Vila Nova in 1255 and granting its treasury officer half the dues and tolls received in Oporto itself in return for half those received in Gaia.

iii. MUNICIPAL DEVELOPMENT AND MONETARY PROBLEMS. The cortes of Leiria, attended by representatives of the towns, and settling the municipal problems of Oporto and Santarém, were a manifestation of Afonso III's policy of assistance to the concelhos from which he had derived support on his first arrival in Portugal. In 1252 he granted a foral to Beja, restoring its fortifications and buildings; he repeopled Odemira, motus inspiratione divina, according to its foral, and granted a foral to Estremós in 1258. Melgaço received the privilege of choosing its own governor; Valença do Minho rose from the ruins of the fort of Contrasta; the fishing port of Viana sprang up at the mouth of the Lima. Monção was founded, and Vila Viçosa granted its foral. The cortes of Leiria resulted in the creation of Vila-Nova de Gaia.

This municipal activity was accompanied by the fostering of commerce: already the sea-ports of Portugal had begun to make contacts abroad. The marriage of D. Teresa, the daughter of Afonso Henriques, to Philip of Alsace either led to or followed the arrival of Portuguese merchants at Bruges. In the very first years of the thirteenth century Portuguese merchants appeared in England, being authorized to come and go freely by King John in 1203. This trade developed rapidly, for in 1226 Henry III sold over a hundred safe-conducts against pirates to Portuguese traders: these documents insured the person of the merchant and his property, provided that he always accompanied it. By the time of Afonso III a considerable import of cloths and luxury wares was counterbalanced by the export of wine, salt, dried fruits, oil and other goods. In the towns Afonso III encouraged the development of trade by hiring out buildings as shops, markets and factories. To facilitate the work of travelling merchants and to foster local trade, fairs and markets were fixed by royal charter not only in crown but also in seigniorial possessions. Usually charters for fairs guaranteed safe conduct on the roads, as for instance, at the fair of St Mary held for a fortnight every August at Covilhã, where no fairgoer could be arrested for any past crime from a week before the fair until thirty days after. Sedentary merchants also appeared in the time of Afonso III.

The expansion of trade brought new economic problems. Already Alfonso X of Castile had been troubled by the shortage of coin and encountered resistance in attempting to extract subsidies from the clergy: his coining of new money, the *burgaleses*, heavily debased, sent up prices, and he sought to take advantage of this by imposing a general purchase-tax, which only increased his subjects' and his own embarrassment. The

scarcity of coin was felt in all the Peninsular states, particularly with the increase of trade; periodical debasement, a source of wealth for the monarch and of discontent among his people, had been a recognized remedy in Castile since at least 1202, though the date of its adoption in Portugal is not known. In usual practice the money was 'broken' septennially, silver being called in, debased and reissued with the same face-value. Frequently the subjects paid a heavy compensation to avoid the debasement. The interchange of currencies among the Peninsular states speeded the communication of monetary problems from one country to another: in Portugal a large part of the currency consisted of gold Byzantines, Leonese soldos, Moorish doubloons and French écus.

At the end of 1253 it was rumoured that Afonso III intended to break the Portuguese coinage, and prices began to rise. The king, after consulting 'the wisest ricos-homens, his counsellors, prelates, knights, merchants, citizens and good men of the concelhos', imposed a price-tax to operate between the Minho and the Douro, the wealthiest part of the country. Meanwhile he was besought to renounce the right in return for a cash payment or monetágio, which he accepted. In spite of the agreement many people complained that the monetágio was more onerous than the debasement, and Afonso promised not to demand a greater sum than his predecessors. After the lapse of seven years the project of breaking the coin was advanced again. To meet the need for new money, Afonso proposed to raise the value of the existing units and debase the coinage by one-quarter simultaneously. The general uproar caused by this proposal resulted in the calling of cortes at Coimbra in 1261, where it was resolved that both old and new coinages should circulate, but that no more of the new should be minted for four years, the number of furnaces used being restricted to twenty, whilst the relative values of the two coinages were stipulated. Afonso also bound himself not to break the coinage for the rest of his reign, giving the undertaking that his successors likewise should perform the operation only once in each reign. In return for this he levied half a libra on those who possessed between ten and twenty; one on those with from twenty to a hundred; two from a hundred to a thousand, and three above a thousand, however great the fortune might be—a schedule which illustrates clearly contemporary ideas on the incidence of taxation. Needless to say the privileged classes obtained extensive exemptions—religious persons, sword-bearing knights and their children, noble ladies unless married to 'rustics', canons and the clergy of cathedral churches. Although the lion's share of the burden was deposited on the third estate, the cortes of 1261 succeeded in extracting from the king an oath which should be binding on his successors; it was established that the nation granted to the monarchy the

right to break the coinage—et placuit eis concedere mihi, ran the royal report of the acts of the cortes. It is from this time that the claim of the representatives of the nation to be consulted on matters affecting taxation was laid.

By agreement money was now standardized, and the standards guarded in the monasteries of Santa Cruz at Coimbra and Alcobaça. The morabitino or maravedi ceased to be the standard money, and the French system of livres (libras), sous (soldos) and deniers (dinheiros) was adopted. Of these libras and soldos were used merely for reckoning: only dinheiros were actually minted. Fractions of a dinheiro were obtained by chopping in two at the mint, or simply by snipping between the teeth. The values of the old morabitinos were fixed in soldos; thus Afonso Henriques' morabitino was worth thirty, and Afonso III's twenty-two. The agreement that the coinage should be debased only once in each reign was observed by his descendants. King Denis increased Afonso III's twelve libras to the mark to fourteen; and Afonso IV made the mark produce eighteen libras fourteen soldos. Catastrophic changes in the currency only occurred in the latter half of the fourteenth and early fifteenth century, when the right of devaluation was exploited to the full.

iv. Afonso III's INQUIRIÇÕES; THE CLIMAX OF THE STRUGGLE WITH ROME. Two of the principal reforms of Afonso III were the conversion of tribute from kind into money and the renewal of the inquiries begun by Afonso II into the titles by which individuals or the Church held lands from the crown.¹

In the early days of the monarchy the extreme rarity of coin, the general practice of barter, and calculation of values in measures of wheat or cloth, necessarily resulted in the registration of tribute in terms of produce; this, when collected, was used for the payment of royal officers and soldiers. The collection of goods in kind was excessively onerous, and the system of registration complicated, whilst the cupidity of minor officials was stimulated by the irregularities of local practice and openings for extortion. In the new *forais* issued by Afonso III clauses relating to tribute often refer to a payment of money: Afonso's anxiety to have an assured income in gold or silver caused him to offer privileges and liberties to those who would contract to pay him money rather than perishable goods, and in this way the *concelhos* obtained such advantages as the choice of their own governor, subject to the king's approval, the prohibition of the local magnate's entry into the village or town except in the case of foreign war, or his obligation to pay in money for any goods he should take from his neighbours.

¹ Inquirições carried out in the reign of Sancho II were not systematic, but dealt only with individual cases; Herculano, v, 154.

The inquirições, which Afonso III launched in 1258, began to operate in the region north of the Douro, where tenure was oldest and abuses deepest rooted. The same method was followed as that employed by Afonso II: the despatch of royal commissions empowered to swear in and take depositions from the magistrate, priest and good men of each district with a view to obtaining true testimony of the king's rights. In the course of the inquiry numerous abuses came to light—usurpation of the tributary rights of the crown, robberies by the shifting of bounds, exactions and tyranny practised by barons and officers. Considerable relief was afforded to the majority of commoners by the subsequent promulgation of restrictive legislation—the respect of the individual, punishment of extortion, limitation of redundant officials and finally the reintegration of the royal patrimony. The last-mentioned order told very heavily against various interests, especially those of the Church: strict orders were given to lords and magistrates to see that all crown property sold, endowed or bequeathed by its holders to any privileged bodies or individuals should be returned: similarly all land was to be confiscated when the original concessionaries had abandoned it to live on the property of barons or the Church, leaving subtenants from whom they collected tribute. These measures were probably put into force in 1265, for a document of April of that year, directed to the baron, magistrate and notary of Viseu and ordering them to take over all property that had been alienated from the crown, has the characteristics of a circular.

The prelates, deeply aggrieved by the measure, complained to the king and reminded him of the oath he had taken in Paris-in vain. Afonso was not to be deterred by threats of ecclesiastical censure. The clergy, which had given Afonso all its support in legitimizing his marriage and children only a few years before, quickly rose up in protest and rekindled the ancient quarrel between the Portuguese throne and Rome. Of the nine sees of Portugal, seven were in revolt, while the Bishop of Silves lived in the court of Castile; only one, Bishop Mateus of Lisbon, adhered to the king. At the end of 1266 three of the bishops left Portugal for Ciudad Rodrigo, and at the beginning of the following year the Archbishop of Braga, and the four Bishops of Coimbra, Oporto, Guarda and Viseu left their dioceses under an interdict and departed for Rome, accompanied by representatives of the Bishops of Évora and Lamego. The accusations they presented to Clement IV included most of those which had been successful against Afonso III's ancestors, with slight additions: the seizure of ecclesiastical land to build houses and make markets, the confiscation of episcopal dues to build walls and pay menat-arms, refusal to pay tithes, incitement of the concelhos to imitate him in this, compulsion of widows to marry rude persons when their husbands

were barely cold, demands of loans from merchants enforced by threats and imprisonment—and a catalogue of other offences under forty-three headings. Afonso forestalled papal action by a letter in which he declared that he bore no grudge against the bishops and was prepared to have them return to their sees: he subsequently informed the pope of his intention to take the cross and accompany St Louis to Palestine, a subterfuge which brought letters from Clement IV to facilitate his preparations-including the suspension for six months of the Archbishop of Braga's interdict. Meanwhile the king produced a testimonial to his just government from the concelhos and presented it in Rome as a warrant of good conduct; the bishops, for their part, declared that it was extorted. Whether Afonso had the slightest intention of departing on the crusade remains very doubtful. If Clement IV was deluded for the moment, the Portuguese bishops continued to press for satisfaction, and the pope agreed to send his chaplain to Portugal, meanwhile admonishing Afonso to mend his ways. But Afonso, far from retreating, proceeded to give grounds for these admonitions by seizing the revenues and property of churches in the dioceses of Braga, Coimbra, Viseu and Lamego: he appointed a governor to the ecclesiastical city of Braga and distributed the lands of the see of Guarda among his friends and family.

His policy of procrastination with Rome was assisted by the death of Clement IV, whose successor Gregory X only took up the cudgels in May 1273, ordering the King of Portugal to send faithful and wise men to Rome to conclude a concordat with the bishops, and warning him that the prior of the Dominicans and others had been bidden to report what steps he took within three months. The bull was discussed at the cortes of Santarém, convoked in December 1273, and Afonso, having promised to obey, agreed to appoint a committee to undo all his recent wrongful acts and to abide by all their decisions. As, however, the members of this committee were largely faithful supporters of the king, few faults were found worthy of correction—tamen quasi nihil per ipsum aut eos actum extitit, declared the bull De regno Portugaliae. The report of the papal commissioners was far from satisfactory; they alleged that Afonso had delayed seeing them as long as possible on the pretext of illness or pressure of other business, and that the cortes of Santarém were a simulation. Even Afonso's reply to the pope consisted only of a memorandum without the authenticating seal. This was probably delivered to Gregory X before the Council of Lyons, which interrupted the Portuguese case until September 1275. In this month another strongly worded bull was delivered, summarizing the half-century-long struggle between the Portuguese throne and the Church, depicting the pitiful state of the kingdom, narrating the fall of Sancho II and the circumstances of the

present king's accession, his oaths and his ingratitude, and the flight of the bishops from his tyranny. Compassion for the misery of the Portuguese made it necessary to take severe measures: in view of the 'hereditary depravity' of the Portuguese sovereigns, Afonso must himself take, and bind his successors to take, a new oath of obedience similar to that made in Paris. The king, his sons and the officers of the realm must at once swear. In addition every magistrate or official appointed by the king must swear on taking office never to aid the king or his advisers in any act prejudicial to the Church or contrary to the royal oath of obedience to the Church. This must be agreed to within three months under pain of a series of penalties whose severity was graded according to the length of the monarch's resistance. Thus in four months' time a local interdict would accompany Afonso in his movements; in five months, excommunication; in six, a general interdict over the kingdom; in seven, deposition, with the release of all his subjects from their allegiance and the removal of all churches from his patronage.

Afonso did not give way. A Spanish Franciscan, entrusted with the task of pronouncing the penalties, gave him every opportunity of procrastinating, wasting time with 'fairy-stories and futile discussions': meanwhile in 1276 Gregory X was succeeded by Innocent V, Adrian V and John XXI. The last, formerly Pedro Julião, or Petrus Hispanus, was a native of Lisbon who had distinguished himself in the University of Paris as a doctor and logician. Bishop Mateus of Lisbon, who was now in Rome, at once wrote to Afonso III, advising him to take advantage of the election of a Portuguese Pope to negotiate an understanding. Afonso wrote to the new Pope, who replied with cautious amiability, urging him to defend the privileges of the Church. Nevertheless the order to pronounce the penalties threatened by Gregory X had been given, and Afonso made no offer of obedience: in March 1277 the legate read before Lisbon cathedral the penalties which the king had incurred and, having affixed them to the doors, departed to repeat the ceremony in the chief cities of the kingdom. No hindrance was offered to the announcement. In May 1277 the news of the sudden death of John XXI caused Afonso to despatch messengers urging the legate to return to Lisbon to discuss important matters; though he came in July, he was only received on October 5. Afonso asked the legate whether the bans could be lifted if he gave an oath to obey the Pope's orders. On being told that the penalties could only be removed when these orders had been executed, Afonso closed the interview and the legate departed to proclaim the penalties in Évora. When he returned to Lisbon, he again saw Afonso before issuing the final anathema. Afonso declared that he had had a promise that John XXI would destroy 'the diabolical ordination'; the legate asked him to produce any document to that effect, if he had it, and Afonso broke off the interview, remarking that it was too late to waste time in arguing. There is no further record of the legate's activities: presumably the final penalty of deposition was uttered in October 1277, after which date Afonso's vassals were to be freed from their oath to him. Civil war broke out in that year, for there are records of a battle fought at Gouveia; possibly the same conflicts that had rent the kingdom thirty years before on the deposition of Sancho II raged once more, the retaliation of fate for Afonso's part in his brother's fall.

Afonso was a sick man. Since 1264, according to a declaration of D. Denis, he had been bed-ridden; his illness, though severe enough to make it impossible for him to see papal commissaries, had not prevented his frequent movements about the country. However, in January 1279, he called to his bedside the only prelate who remained at court, the Bishop of Évora, and declared that, having long intended to swear to obey the papal commands saving his rights as king, he was now prepared to give an unconditional oath, which was promptly taken on the gospel and followed by a similar undertaking from D. Denis. Afonso was absolved, and died three weeks later.

v. Local administration. At the time of the creation of the county of Portugal, Leonese traditions of life had been implanted for generations in the district north of the Douro, where a comparatively dense rural population tilled the estates of the oldest and most powerful families. The Coimbra of Count Sisnand was, on the other hand, largely Mozarabic in composition and outlook. Most of the areas subsequently reconquered from the Moors, and especially the region south of the Tagus, consisted of urban centres separated by considerable tracts of almost deserted heath.

These three examples alone illustrate the range of regional organization of which the Portuguese state was composed, and they serve to explain the variety of policy followed in creating local administration. This variety, complicated even further by the lack of definition of powers, and the confusion of military, magisterial and fiscal functions, reached such lengths that 'there was perhaps no institution, no principle, that was applied universally and without exception' (Herculano). Ample evidence of this variety is presented by the *forais*, of which numbers have been preserved.

In general the *forais* are broadly divisible into two classes—those which have reference to rural organization, and those applied to settlements of an urban nature. Rural *forais* resulted broadly speaking from the necessity to develop the land, especially from the time of Sancho I:

this was 'perhaps the predominant preoccupation of our monarchs'.¹ North of the Douro and in the province of Beira Alta these forais were frequently issued to very small entities, divisions of a parish not mustering a score of inhabitants, and would confer some privilege while regularizing the payment of taxes or the obligation to render services. On occasions the groups of individuals thus recognized had collected spontaneously and exercised a degree of autonomy which was approved in the foral: especially in Beira free men developed their own settlements and way of life. Thus whilst the rural foral may deal only with the question of taxation, it may involve the appointment of a magistrate or royal officer (mordomo).

As the largest farmer in the country, none felt more than the king the inconvenience of holding widely scattered estates which had to be entrusted to incompetent or dishonest overseers who might connive with powerful neighbours to defraud him. By the issue of *forais*, he could count upon a fixed revenue and depend upon his free subjects to complain of any infringement of their rights. Thus the rural *foral* worked to the advantage of the king and at the same time contributed to the extinction of serfdom.

Forais referring to urban units are divisible into six groups, showing considerable variation in the privileges and status accorded to the inhabitants and in the magisterial organization involved. The first group relates to mercantile centres common to the predominantly rural districts of northern Portugal and Galicia, where the township or burgh was a settlement round the walls of the castle of a lord or of the king. The typical case is that of Guimarãis, which received a foral from Afonso Henriques in 1128. The privileges of Guimarãis included the freedom of all those who dwelt there, including any serfs claiming asylum, the choice of a judge by the concelho itself, and certain guarantees such as inviolability of domicile: obligations included an annual tribute of twelve dinheiros in recognition of vassalage, and services and fines fixed in the municipal statute. Two characteristics divide this northern group of forais from that which is found below the Douro: the application of the foral to a nucleus of population, not to a district, and the lack of reference to any civic military organization. In the territory south of the Douro, there was still underdevelopment of rural areas and the threat of danger from the Saracens, so that the second group of forais, those issued in Beira, applies to districts, not simply settlements, and provides for their defence in time of war. Examples are those conceded to Coimbra and Sátão in 1111, Miranda da Beira and Seia in 1186, Penela in 1189, Viseu in 1123 and 1189 and Tomar in 1174, and are marked by the presence

¹ Dr T. de Souza Soares, Introduction, História da Expansão Portuguesa, ch. 11, p. 78.

of the cavaleiro-vilão, the plebeian knight who is obliged to furnish his own horse and arms to fight the Moslems and in return is exempt from the jugada, a tribute of cereals based on every yoke of oxen possessed. Plebeians (peões) went to war on foot, but if their possessions indicated a certain level of affluence they fell within the category of knights—in Penela, 'all those that dwell here and have two yoke of oxen and ten sheep and two cows and a bed of cloth, he that has more, let him get also a horse', runs the foral. In view of this obligation to defend the district against the enemy, the privileges granted in these cases are far-reaching—although the magistrates are named by the king or lord, the condition is usually attached that they must be natives; sometimes the municipal territory can only be conceded to a lord who is acceptable to the inhabitants, and, as in Coimbra, no infanções may acquire a house or vineyards in the community without rendering the same services as the townsmen. The dignitaries in these cases consisted of a military governor (alcaide) and a judge, mordomos or fiscal officers, and others, including the almotacés, of Moslem origin and probably introduced into the organization by Count Sisnand, with the duty of supervising the markets, prices, weights and measures. A considerable degree of municipal development is attested in cases where fines imposed by the judge are approved by 'four or five good men drawn from the council'.

Two other types of cartas de foral are derived directly from those of Salamanca and Avila. The former, that of Salamanca, appears because of the incorporation of the Riba-Côa district in Portugal by the treaty of Alcañices of 1297. The five communities of Castelo-Bom, Castelo-Melhor, Castel-Rodrigo, Castelo-Mendes and Alfaiates possessed an advanced organization and their cavaleiros-vilãos were counted as infanções, and their peões as cavaleiros-vilãos. The statute of Avila, introduced into Évora, Castelo Branco and other towns in the upper Tagus region, had a military character suited to the district in which it was implanted: of the twenty-odd forais of this type granted before the end of Afonso III's reign, none refers to any previous customs of the place, implying therefore the presence of an uprooted population collected probably from various sources and newly settled in the territories of the reconquest. Further evidence of the military nature of this group is given by the representation of royal authority not by a judge but by a pretor, who from his castle controlled administration and justice, as well as military organization.

The last two types of cartas de foral are reorganizations made necessary by the progress of time. The first, issued with variations to Coimbra, Santarém and Lisbon in May 1179, originated in Coimbra, then the

capital of the kingdom. Once more a considerable development of local wealth is suggested by the elevation of classes (peões to rank as cavaleirosvilãos, and cavaleiros-vilãos as infanções); judicial organization has been separated from municipal, except in so far as the person of the governor is concerned, and is therefore scarcely mentioned in the statute. The municipal officers and their duties together with the privileges, customs and punishments of the citizens are dealt with at length. This type of organization was delivered to a large number of townships in Estremadura; the version of Santarém was granted to Beja in 1254 and spread through the Alentejo; that of Lisbon, after its application to Silves in 1266, was established through the Algarve. Finally, in the reign of Afonso III, it was found with the reorganization of the tribute system that municipalization was long overdue. The repeated issue of rural statutes or cartas de povoação covering small settlements had produced innumerable small and different units—the example given by Dr T. de Souza Soares is that of Terra de Panóias, where twenty-six such statutes are known to have existed in thirty-two parishes: in this case Afonso III organized Vila Real in 1272 and granted it all the royal rights and revenue in Panóias, thus bringing together all the rural communities and making them dependent on the new municipality, whose statute allowing the concelho to elect two judges and to present for royal confirmation their own governor or pretor was extended subsequently to various places in Trás-os-Montes.

vi. DECLINE OF SERFDOM. In the times of the county and early monarchy of Portugal serfdom was the general regime under which baronial and ecclesiastical land was tilled. Numerous documents bear witness to the widespread attachment of labourers to the land: Count Henry and Countess Teresa endowed the see of Braga with a monastery, its men and their sons; Afonso Henriques followed their example; D. Urraca claimed that three brothers, canons of Santiago Cathedral, were hereditary serfs of hers, but in deference to the repeated requests of Diego Gelmírez, granted them freedom for the honour of the cathedral. Land was normally sold or exchanged with its serfs. But even in the twelfth century numerous factors were beginning to break up the system of hereditary serfdom, and these steadily gained force until in the reign of Afonso III practically all rural labour was remunerated, and houseserfdom had been replaced by a domestic service, performed by a new class which, at least in the case of the royal household, enjoyed immunity from military service and other burdens.

To a certain extent the custom of manumission, for religious purposes, contributed to put an end to serfdom, though the advantage of being freed was not always very great—for example land was sold with its

free labourers attached just as with its serfs; in this case the serfs were probably Moslems who were manumitted on embracing Christianity. A greater influence in bringing about the end of serfdom was exercised by the increase in cartas de foral, which transformed serfs into settlers, technically free to move, but still encumbered with obligations that for the moment made the change of doubtful advantage. Yet the rapid growth of the number of chartered towns and villages gave the opportunity to obtain freedom under much more favourable conditions to all serfs: frequently criminals were promised security and freedom if they should settle in a concelho, and though certain crimes might be made the subject of exceptions, that of flight from servitude was not among them -indeed often serfs were incited to obtain liberty by settlement in the concelho. In face of this the retention of labourers on the land by violence, though legalized, was no longer effective, and the barons and Church found it more advantageous to offer the same terms as the concelhos in order to keep their workers.

In general the Church could always find reasons for conciliating its conscience with regard to servitude; the presence of serfs and slaves gave the pious the opportunity to perform the soul-healing act of manumission. But on occasion the repugnance of slavery to the Christian religion was translated into action. An instance is given in the Life of St Theotonius, when Afonso Henriques had made an incursion into Moslem territory. 'Apart from rich spoils his warriors had brought and held captive a certain number of the people commonly called Mozarabs, who live under the pagan voke, though following the law of Christ. Knowing this, the man of God was very grieved and he, who had never crossed the outer door of the cloister, blazing with zeal, went to meet the king and the army and said: "Oh king, and you barons, sons of the Holy Church, wherefore do you reduce your brothers thus to serfdom? You have sinned against the Lord your God." After he had spoken to them for a while in this manner, and threatened them with the wrath of heaven if they did not free the people, the king and his warriors released all the Mozarab captives and let them go in the presence of the saint.'

Obviously from the foregoing the servitude of Christian captives was a commonplace at this time: only later was it generally held shameful for Christians to be equalled with Moslem slaves. One of Afonso II's laws of 1211 already shows a considerable change: 'We establish firmly that any free man in all our kingdom may take whom he pleases as his lord, except those who dwell on the estates of others, who ought to acknowledge no lords but those of such estates.... This we establish to assure liberty so that a free man may dispose of himself as he will: and if any noble should go against this, let him be fined 500 soldos, and if on the

third fine he do not mend his ways, let his property be confiscated and himself expelled from the land.' Here, whilst the existence of serfs is specifically recognized, those who have gained their freedom are protected with stringent regulations, and moreover those who have not, merely ought to acknowledge the lords under whom they live: the lacuna in the text may establish a penalty for the infringement of this.

The term homem de criação, which had been used in the twelfth century of serfs bound to the land, is applied by Sancho I to a soldier who, after doing him good service as an archer, bequeathes two pieces of land, a horse, arms and a tent to the Templars. In 1265 Afonso III granted his homens de criação or servitors immunities which put them in a more favourable position than the villein-knights: other documents, relating to servitors both of the king and of the nobles, show that they were treated with special favour, so much so that other persons must be entertained 'as if they were homens de criação'.

CHAPTER IX

THE AGRARIAN MONARCHY

i. DENIS THE FARMER, 1279-1325. Afonso III was the first ruler since Count Henry who had any acquaintance with life outside Portugal. Hitherto contact with the rest of the world had been limited to transactions with Rome, intermarriages with Spanish houses, and commercial intercourse with the western ports of France, England and the Low Countries. Broadly speaking Portugal had been isolated from the main European currents, and education, in particular, remained restricted. Bishop Paternus had founded a school in Coimbra, which was later moved into the monastery at Santa Cruz; the abbey of Alcobaça gave instruction in grammar, logic and theology. But there was nothing that resembled a university, and the few administrative positions that demanded some instruction were usually filled by graduates of Bologna. In Afonso III's own life the influence of his stay in France is only perceptible, but his son Denis received the most complete education yet given to a Portuguese king. His tutors were a Frenchman, Aymeric d'Ebrard, and a Portuguese, Domingos Anes Jardo, who founded a college in Lisbon which probably formed the nucleus of the university. The effect of this was soon extensive to the whole court. With the end of the reconquest and the pacification of the kingdom the nobles must find other occupations as well as warfare, and accordingly D. Denis and his circle turned to versification. Following his grandfather, the learned Alfonso X, who had already adopted the Galaico-Portuguese speech as that most suited to express the themes of Provençal poetry, Denis wrote many poems in the language of the Cantigas, though their content is amorous rather than pious. Not only in verse but also in prose, Portuguese developed towards linguistic maturity, for now for the first time documents began to be drawn up in the vernacular instead of in Latin. and Denis ordered his grandfather's Siete Partidas to be translated into Portuguese. In 1288 various ecclesiastics represented the desirability of the establishment of a 'General Study' in the kingdom, and eighteen months later the University was founded in Lisbon, its existence being confirmed by a bull of Nicholas IV dated August 9, 1290. The clergy took the responsibility of finding the salaries of the professors. Twenty years after the proposal for its creation, the university, now equipped for the study of canon and civil law, dialectics, grammar and medicine, was shifted to Coimbra, receiving various privileges. However, it later

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returned to Lisbon and was only finally established in Coimbra by John III in 1537.

But it is as the protector of agriculture that D. Denis is especially remembered and has the epithet o Lavrador, the Farmer, linked to his name. Since the chief wealth of Portugal lay in agriculture, he sought to distract the nobility from its military pastimes and to ennoble rural occupations by declaring that no baron should lose caste by dedicating himself to the soil. In order to assist development, he arranged for the distribution of uncultivated land to smallholders who should pay a rent to the crown. Other land was distributed to settlers on condition that it was brought into production within four years. To further the policy of settlement he encouraged Brother Martinho, a monk of Alcobaça, to drain the marsh of Ulmar. For the provision of wood for ship- and house-building he had the great pine-forest of Leiria planted, which not only supplied timber but held off the tracts of coastal sand that were previously driven by the elements on to tilled fields.

ii. LAND POLICY; TREATY OF ALCANICES, 1297. On his accession D. Denis was eighteen years of age. He himself and his kingdom were excommunicate, but he displayed no haste in coming to terms with Rome. An assembly at Guarda attended by six bishops and many barons and knights threshed out the question, and apparently committed D. Denis to the acceptance of Gregory X's demands with certain reservations, for their recommendations, delivered to the king at Évora as he returned from an excursion in the Algarve, and resulting in his letter to Martin IV of April 23, 1282, were turned down by Rome as captious. The Papacy refused anything short of complete surrender. The offer was amended and returned to the Bishop of Leon and other non-Portuguese ecclesiastics, who were to see the king take oath before full cortes to observe the amended version and beg the approval of Rome. However, not until a year later, in 1285, when the excommunication had lasted eight years, were cortes summoned to Lisbon to discuss the religious situation. Like his father, D. Denis used every pretext for procrastination. When cortes met, he availed himself of the death of Martin IV to reject the credentials of the legates as no longer valid, boldly refuting the bishops with the argument that if he gave way 'when all the other Christian kings and princes remained free, the crown of Portugal would be so subjugated that he would not be able to pass an hour without scruples of conscience'. Only by the Concordat of 1289, forty articles agreed between Nicholas IV, the Portuguese archbishop and three bishops and the king's representatives in Rome, was agreement reached.

It was inevitable that D. Denis' land policy should bring him face to face with the Church. In spite of attempts at preventive legislation, land

continued to accumulate in mortmain and frequently to go out of cultivation. Afonso II's law, passed at a time when the Church's authority was invincible, contained obvious loopholes even in its limited scope; in the reign of Denis for the first time the crown was able to wrestle with the Church on equal terms. The weapon of excommunication had been used; but once used, and abused, it lost its effect as a threat. Thus in 1286 Denis ordered all land acquired by the Church or clergy since his accession to be sold to private persons within a year. In 1291 the law was extended so as to prevent those who took the habit of any religious community from bringing their property with them into the hands of the Church. Endowments could be made only by the sale of up to one-third of the owner's property, exclusively to laymen, and the donation of the proceeds to a church or community. Above all, these dispositions were enforced.

At the same time steps were taken to curtail abuses of the nobility by means of new *inquirições*. These had been requested at the cortes of Lisbon and Guimarãis of 1285 and 1288, and took place in the latter year and in 1301, 1303 and 1307. Their principal purpose was to investigate the titles by which *honras*, or lands exempt from taxation, were held. The practice of making an *honra* of a house where a lord had had a baby suckled was checked by a law of 1290; in 1307 all *honras* created since the enactment of the former law were abolished.

Much of D. Denis' action was the logical and necessary result of his father's policy. This is especially true of his attitude towards the Church and the nobility, and of his transactions with Castile. The two triangles of Portuguese territory which remained in the hands of Alfonso X were recovered in 1297 by the treaty of Alcañices. Two years before, Denis had taken advantage of the confused situation of Castile during the minority of Fernando IV to support the young king's uncle D. Juan, who declared himself King of Seville, made an alliance with the Emperor of Morocco and demanded for himself the kingdoms of Leon and Galicia, on the grounds that they could not legally be incorporated in Castile. After an interview at Guarda Denis agreed to give his daughter Constança, not to the young Fernando as he had promised, but to the pretender Juan, and furthermore to declare war on Castile. This was done on August 1, 1295, and brought Fernando's uncle and tutor to Guarda, where in an interview with D. Denis he promised to surrender Serpa and Moura to Portugal provided that no assistance was given to the claims of D. Juan. Two months after the declaration of war the towns were handed over, but as his neighbours delayed giving a solution to the old problem of marking out the frontiers, D. Denis found it convenient to join Jaime I of Aragon and the pretenders of Leon and Castile in a

league aiming at the partition of Fernando IV's possessions. In 1296 the central monarchy was attacked from east and west, and D. Denis' forces advanced beyond Salamanca. They soon retired, but not without occupying the Riba-Côa triangle including Sabugal and Almeida. In the following year a second incursion was threatened, but the Castilian regent offered peace, which was concluded in September 1297, and finally settled the frontier question in Portugal's favour. To complete the agreement Fernando IV and his sister Beatriz were to marry Denis' two children Constança and Afonso. Both brides and both bridegrooms were between the ages of three and eleven years.

In the following spring the Castilian cortes sent a mission to D. Denis to request immediate assistance against his former allies. A Portuguese army entered Castile, and D. Denis dabbled a little longer in Castilian politics, but without adding anything to his territorial gains and the strong diplomatic position established by the Treaty of Alcañices.

iii. Denis and the templars; foundation of the order of christ, 1319. By the reign of Denis most of the restrictions on Portuguese national independence had disappeared—the papal tribute was long forgotten, and the prolonged and ineffective excommunication of Afonso III and Denis marked a new period in relations with Rome. One condition of dependence however remained; the military orders had their grandmasters resident outside the country, and accordingly suffered from neglect, bad organization and misuse of their revenues. Only the knights of Calatrava had since their inception been separated from their Spanish fellows as knights of Avis. In 1288 Denis obtained a regional organization for those of Santiago, by securing permission for them to elect their own provincial master.

Similarly twenty years later the suppression of the Templars was turned to national account. The conflict between Philip the Fair and the Order reached its climax in 1307. In the following year Clement V, the first pope of Avignon, instructed the Bishop of Lisbon to organize an enquiry into the activities of the Portuguese Templars, and informed Denis of the nature of the crimes for which they might be arraigned. Without the violence of the French king, but with gentle acquisitiveness, Denis ordered a case to be formulated against the knights, whilst giving them time and opportunity to leave the country. His officers at once entered into possession of their castles and towns on the pretext of their having been wrongfully sundered from the crown. In 1309 and 1310 these seizures received legal sanction from a court of judges. When, however, monastic orders laid claims to them, the king closed the case on grounds of the absence of the defendants, but made provision for retaining the confiscated estates himself in a pact with Fernando IV-of

Castile, dated January 1310, by which each signatory undertook to aid the other to this end, if the Order should come to be extinguished. A few months later an ecclesiastical council held at Salamanca and attended by the dignitaries of Portugal, Castile and Leon with one voice found the Templars innocent. The temporal league on its side was strengthened by the adhesion of the King of Aragon, and their solidarity stood them in good stead, for when Clement V finally suppressed the Order in 1312, his decree that the Hospitallers should take over its possessions contained an exception in the case of the Peninsular states, permitting the respective kings to hold the lands and revenues of the extinguished Order until further instructions. In this way the crown regained the possession of Pombal, Soure, Ega, Redinha, Idanha, Rosmaninhal and Salvaterra. To avoid the passage of their remaining estates to the Hospitallers, Denis proposed the creation of a new Order with headquarters at Castro Marim, a castle in the Algarve. Authorization was granted by John XXII in 1319, and the Military Order of Christ took possession of Castelo Branco, Longroiva, Tomar, Almourol and all the other lands that had belonged to the Templars. In this way a purely national order came into being.

iv. THE FAMILY WARS. In King Denis' reign the tradition of baronial and ecclesiastical troubles died out, but these were replaced by a series of intermittent dynastic disorders which characterize the fourteenth century. Denis himself displayed an immediate desire to rule on his father's death; he soon quarrelled with his mother, Queen Beatriz, who at first governed in conjunction with him. Alfonso X offered his mediation, but after departing for a conference on the frontier, Denis did not go beyond Elvas, and his grandfather returned to Seville, without their having met. Finally Queen Beatriz left Portugal.

It was not long before a conflict broke out between the king and his brother Afonso. Although Urban IV had regularized their father's bigamous marriage in 1263, the Infante Afonso claimed to be the true heir to the throne as the first son born after the bull appeared, and therefore the first legitimate fruit of the marriage. The claim found little support, but when D. Afonso, who was lord of Portalegre and Marvão, sought to build walls round the open town of Vide, the king appeared there with his troops in the spring of 1281 and his brother took refuge in Seville.

Whilst at Vide, D. Denis settled his marriage with Isabel of Aragon, a granddaughter of Jaime I, who for her piety and charity was canonized as St Isabel of Portugal: of her, as of St Elizabeth of Hungary, the agreeable legend of the lapful of bread turned into roses is recounted. On various occasions her strong and salutary influence arrested the quarrels of her more worldly family.

Meanwhile Denis' brother married a niece of Sancho IV of Castile, and, in agreement with Alvaro Núñez de Lara, planned to gather an army of Portuguese and Castilians to execute raids on the neighbouring country from his Alentejo estates. The first objections of Sancho IV were unheeded, but in 1287 both kings sent armies against Afonso at Arronches. To prevent bloodshed, the two Queens of Portugal and Castile, Queen Beatriz, and Denis' sister the Abbess of Las Huelgas, intervened. As the infante slipped away to Badajoz, a settlement was soon reached. Some twelve years later the situation was repeated. When Denis adroitly changed sides in the question of the Castilian succession, Afonso continued to support the pretender, and openly rebelled against his brother in 1299. Denis besieged Portalegre for five months, at the end of which Queens Isabel and Beatriz and the Abbess D. Branca again successfully intervened.

The last and bitterest of these family wars cast a shadow over the last years of the reign. Of Denis' two legitimate children, the elder, Constança, married Fernando IV of Castile and died in 1313; the younger. born in 1291, succeeded to the throne of Portugal as Afonso IV. Out of wedlock Denis had several children. Two of these, both older than the heir, held positions of prominence in the state. The first, Afonso Sanches, occupied the important office of mordomo-mór, whilst the second. D. Pedro Afonso, was made Count of Barcelos in 1314, the result apparently of a quarrel between the sons. The heir, envious of his father's affection for his half-brothers, circulated the rumour that Denis had sought to exclude him from the succession by legitimizing Afonso Sanches, a story which was the easier of belief both because of Denis' own legitimization and because the bastard's influence increased as the king approached his sixtieth year. In 1320 Afonso, disobeying his father, met the queen-mother of Castile at Ciudad Rodrigo and persuaded her to write to Denis to suggest that the government should be handed over to him. Denis refused, and published a declaration of the honours he had granted his son and a reprimand. The prince's reaction was to depart for the north of the country and raise an army. Marching on Coimbra, he seized his mother's castle of Leiria, but when royal forces appeared he made for Santarém, partly to avoid a conflict, and partly perhaps in the hope of a declaration from Lisbon. Denis, convinced that his wife had connived at the capture of Leiria, had her confined and took the town from her. Afonso, though avoiding his father's forces by withdrawing from Santarém, continued to spread disorder. His supporters murdered the Bishop of Évora, who had received papal consent to excommunicate them: they must have been numerous, for Afonso was able to seize Coimbra and Oporto and invest Guimarãis. In the midst of the siege, Oueen Isabel arrived to plead in vain for his submission. Coimbra was

threatened by D. Denis, and Afonso left Guimarãis to relieve it. The queen, determined to prevent war, arrived at Coimbra as the two armies faced one another, failed to convince the king that no good could come of the conflict, whatever the result, but succeeded at last in persuading her son to sue for peace. Pedro of Barcelos, who had sided with Afonso, returned with her to the king. Although hostilities had begun, Denis relented and agreed to offer very mild terms. The two armies dispersed, the king's to Leiria, the prince's to Pombal. By treaty Afonso became Lord of Coimbra, Montemór, Oporto and Gaia, the towns he had seized, but did homage for them to his father and promised obedience. Only after the agreement had been sworn in separate places could the queen persuade her son to meet his father.

The agreement made in May 1322 lasted a bare year. Afonso Sanches had left Portugal, but on returning he was again received at court. At once the heir collected arms and men and marched on Lisbon. Undeterred by Denis' threats, Afonso continued to advance. Once again Queen Isabel intervened. A year later, Afonso rebelled in Santarém, but submitted when the city was attacked. A few months later, on January 7, 1325, the civil war ended with the death of King Denis.

v. Afonso IV, 1325–1357; RENEWAL OF THE FAMILY WARS; THE BATTLE OF THE SALADO, 1340. The family divergencies that had overcast the end of the last reign did not die out with the accession of Afonso IV; on the contrary, they spread beyond the frontier and gradually involved Portugal in foreign war. Although Afonso Sanches had left Portugal before the death of Denis, and become the son-in-law of Juan Alfonso de Meneses, Lord of Alburquerque, with whom he took up residence, the new king of Portugal bore a deep grudge against him, and declaring that, amongst other crimes, he had tried to poison him, sentenced him to banishment for life and confiscation of his possessions. In vain Afonso Sanches appealed for justice: at length he collected an armed band and invaded Trás-os-Montes in combination with his father-in-law, defeating the Master of the Order of Avis, but accepting the mediation of Queen Isabel when Afonso appeared with his army.

This was the last occasion on which St Isabel intervened in the affairs of the world. In the year of her husband's death, she had retired to the convent of Santa Clara at Coimbra where she passed the last twelve years of her life. With her death in 1336 there disappeared a strong influence for good in the family quarrels of the reigning house, and in the same year active hostilities broke out between Portugal and Castile. Alfonso XI of Castile had contracted to marry for political reasons the young daughter of the Infante Juan Manuel, but having freed himself from a dangerous tutelage by an adroit assassination, he found himself

strong enough to do without Juan Manuel's aid and sent proposals to Portugal for a marriage with Afonso IV's daughter Maria. The match was made, but the King of Castile openly maltreated and scandalized the queen. When Afonso IV betrothed his heir Pedro, aged fifteen in 1336, to the repudiated Constanza, the daughter of Juan Manuel, who had taken refuge in Aragon, he tried to oppose her crossing his territories to Portugal. As a result Afonso IV joined with his father-in-law and the King of Aragon in an alliance against Castile.

War began with a threefold onslaught by the Portuguese: one army under Pedro of Barcelos attacked Galicia, another under the king moved against Badajoz, and a fleet of twenty galleys unsuccessfully raided the Guadiana region. The invasion of Galicia was answered by a Castilian incursion that penetrated as far as Oporto, whilst the siege of Badajoz had to be raised. The King of Castile proved himself a fortunate warrior, and the Infante Juan Manuel came to terms, leaving the war with Portugal to protract itself in minor campaigns until peace was signed in Seville in July 1340. At last, Alfonso XI agreed to allow D. Constanza to cross Castile to Portugal and to respect the person of his wife.

Almost at once the Castilians turned their military activities against the Moslems, who had attacked Tarifa with large forces from Africa. Benedict XII granted the indulgences for a crusade, and Afonso IV provided a fleet and military help, consisting of a thousand lances and a number of the dignitaries of the kingdom under his own command. This force joined the Castilians in Seville in October 1340, and proceeded towards Tarifa, where, on the banks of the river Salado, the Moorish forces were broken and dispersed in a pitched battle. The Portuguese troops faced those of Granada and bore themselves with valour. According to the chroniclers, Afonso IV refused to enrich himself with spoils, bringing back only one Moorish chief and some swords and banners as trophies.

vi. INÊS DE CASTRO. Afonso's heir, D. Pedro, was born at Coimbra in 1320 and betrothed at the age of eight to the Infanta Blanca of Castile, but in view of the bride's illness and weakness of mind, the marriage was later dissolved, and at the age of sixteen Pedro married his second wife, D. Constanza. The marriage was by proxy, and Constanza was only able to reach Portugal four years later, after the conclusion of peace with Castile. Some time after the repetition of the marriage ceremony in Lisbon, in August 1340, Constanza took as one of her ladies a Galician girl related to her, by name Inês Pires de Castro, and known for her elegance as Colo de Garça, or Heron's-neck. With her Pedro fell in love. Constanza attempted to put an obstacle in the way of the attachment by choosing Inês de Castro as godmother for her son Luis, but Pedro with his violent and stubborn character ignored the relationship and at length

scandalized the austere Afonso IV by his behaviour. Inês de Castro was exiled to Alburquerque, where however D. Pedro continued to keep in touch with her. Constanza died in 1345, in giving birth to the eventual heir, D. Fernando, and Inês de Castro soon after returned to Portugal to take her place. In the course of the following ten years, four children were born to Pedro and Inês, thus producing another bastard line, fertile in future trouble.

Afonso IV urged his son to contract another marriage, but D. Pedro alleged his attachment to his late wife to avoid it, while Inês de Castro was said to have declared that she never was, nor could be, his wife. In spite of this, he came under the political influence of her two brothers, who intervened in both Portuguese and Castilian politics, and in 1354 claimed the throne of Castile, to which Pedro the Cruel had acceded four vears before. According to López de Ayala, the King of Portugal prevented the scheme from going any further, but the threat of an entanglement with Castile combined with fear of an attempt to instal one of the sons of Inês de Castro on the throne, in place of the direct line, caused the royal counsellors to urge Afonso to take action. Thus a background of intrigue developed behind the idyllic interlude of the Quinta das Lágrimas, the estate adjoining Santa Clara at Coimbra to which Pedro and Inês repaired. The three protagonists of this movement against the Castros were Pedro Coelho, Diogo Lopes Pacheco and the Chief Justice Alvaro Gonçalves. These men brought Afonso IV to the point of action on January 7, 1355, when, the court being at Montemór, they persuaded him to ride the few miles to Coimbra and put Inês to death. According to Rui de Pina, who reproduces the ensuing scene, the king's heart was softened by the sight of his grandchildren imploring him to spare their mother, and he left the palace still in doubt. Only on the way back did the three courtiers return to their arguments, and wrested from him permission to do what they would. Riding back to Coimbra, they burst into the palace and murdered Inês de Castro. The deed drove Pedro into open rebellion. The brothers of Inês brought down an army from Galicia and overran northern Portugal. Pedro himself besieged Oporto, but raised the siege when his father marched upon Guimarãis. The chronicler Acenheiro declares that the short civil war was productive of great bloodshed and disorder, until Queen Beatriz, following the example of St Isabel. intervened to bring about a reconciliation, and peace was restored on August 15. In the general pardon, Pedro promised to forgive the three counsellors, and in return received vice-regal powers as chief justice.

Afonso IV died soon after the civil war, and Pedro acceded to the throne in May 1357. He at once proceeded to take vengeance on Inês' murderers. Two of them had been signatories to the peace of 1355, but

later escaped into Castile. Already in July 1358 a treaty with Castile was under consideration, and in 1360 it was followed by an agreement to extradite certain refugees in both kingdoms. As a result Álvaro Gonçalves and Pedro Coelho were handed over to Pedro and executed at Santarém, their hearts being drawn, one through the chest, the other through the back. The third murderer made good his escape.

The episode was crowned by Pedro's last step in announcing that he had been secretly married to Inês years before, and in attempting to force recognition of the marriage on his vassals by the observance of pompous funeral celebrations. This, the theme of D. Pedro's constancy, has seized the imagination of many writers; on it are founded Ferreira's Castro, the earliest Portuguese tragedy, a famous passage of the Lusiads, Calderón's Reina después de morir, and innumerable lesser works, whilst Portuguese poetry has found and finds in it a never-exhausted source of inspiration.

Whatever the motives of D. Pedro's declaration—probably the legitimization of Inês de Castro's children, since D. Fernando was his only lawful heir—the alleged marriage was widely rejected in Pedro's own time. The better to emphasize it, he ordered the manufacture of the two beautiful tombs which stand in the Abbey of Alcobaça, recording in intricate tracery the life-story of Inês de Castro and concluding with a scene of the Day of Judgement, in which Inês and himself are seen approaching Christ in the company of the blessed to witness from the casements of paradise the agony of Pedro Coelho and Álvaro Gonçalves, engulfed in the jaws of hell.

vii. PEDRO I, THE JUSTICER, 1357—1367. The short reign of Pedro I is the first of which a full account by the great chronicler Fernão Lopes is still extant, and consequently the picture of this king is more vivid than that of any of his predecessors. Much has been written about the presumed corruption of Fernão Lopes' earlier chronicles by Rui de Pina, whose version of the reigns of the first kings is the only one to have survived, but inexact and deficient as it is, its author must have used whatever material Fernão Lopes may have furnished. If his account of Pedro I is a full one, this is because it was written a bare fifty years after the king's death.

In the pact made with his father in 1355, Pedro was appointed chief justice of the realm. For the rest of his life he dedicated himself to the administration of justice, or, more exactly, to the execution of its penalties, allowing no crime to be tried save in his presence and keeping the reins of justice in his own hands by nominating judges who should have been elective—against which the cortes of Elvas protested in 1361. His predecessors had wandered from town to town to oversee the gathering of taxes: Pedro's life was that of a supreme judge on a never-ending circuit. He rarely completed a month in one place, says Fernão Lopes;

often his movements were dictated simply by the opportunity of delivering spectacular verdicts. These might be pronounced with a torrent of stammering abuse, or in an emotional crisis through a flood of tears. The punishment, if corporal, he would mete out with his own hands. tossing off his robes the better to wield the scourge. At the same time, Fernão Lopes points out that he improved and expedited the administration of justice, refusing to admit the existence of advocates, disgracing corrupt magistrates and severely curbing his own officers. Various incidents are narrated by the chronicler. On one occasion two of Pedro's squires were accused of the robbery and murder of a Jew. Arrested and brought before the king, they were questioned by him, but denied their guilt. Pedro ordered them to confess 'or perforce of cruel whips he would make them tell the truth'. They confessed; then Pedro, striding up and down the room, rebuked them for a long while. Those present, understanding that he intended to put them to death, began to plead for them, but the king insisted that 'what they had learnt upon Jews, they would practise on Christians', and ordered their execution.1

With impunity too he exercised his justice on churchmen. When the Bishop of Oporto adulterously took a citizen's wife, D. Pedro descended on the city, and having dined, ordered the bishop to appear and everyone else to leave the chamber. Alone with the bishop, he brandished a great whip, and himself stripped to a scarlet shirt, tore off the bishop's robes, demanding a full confession. Outside the doors, the bishop's followers gathered in trepidation; the only man who dared contravene Pedro's orders and interrupt the interrogation was the private secretary. Goncalo Vasques de Góis, who pretended to bring urgent letters to him and thus introduced certain nobles who at length appeased the king's anger and released the bishop. In spite of the considerable moral latitude he allowed himself, he visited the most trivial moral offences with extreme penalties. In Braga a squire was beheaded for smashing a poor man's wine-vat, and a clerk of the treasury hanged for a fraud of eleven and a half libras. 'and on that day with these two, eleven were killed by justice, both thieves and malefactors'.2 Lançarote Pessanha, the son and successor of the Genoese admiral contracted by D. Denis, incurred the death penalty for availing himself of the services of a bawd, but fled, and in spite of an appeal from Genoa, only obtained pardon after a lapse of time.

When he was not giving justice, D. Pedro spent his time in hunting, dancing and feasting, 'in which he took such great pleasure as is nowadays hard to credit. And these dances were to the sound of some long trumpets they then used, without caring for any other instruments there might be, and if at any time they wanted to play stringed instruments, he soon grew irritated and told them to give them to the Devil and call

¹ Fernão Lopes, Crónica de El-Rei D. Pedro I, ch. vi.

the trumpeters....Day and night he went dancing for a great space, and see if it was not a pleasurable sport. The king used to come by boat from Almada to Lisbon, and the citizens of all the crafts came out to receive him with dances and merrymaking as was the custom of the day, and he landed from the boats and joined the dance with them, and thus to the palace. Consider if this was not good sport. One night when the king was lying in bed in Lisbon, and sleep refused to come to him, he roused the youths and all those who were sleeping in the palace, and called João Mateus and Lourenço Palos to bring the silver trumpets, and had torches lit, and passed through the town dancing with the rest. Those who slept came to the windows to see what the holiday was, and wherefore, and when they saw the king thus they were glad to see him so merry. And the king went on for a great part of the night, and returned to the palace dancing and asked for wine and fruit, and threw himself down to sleep.'1 Small wonder that in spite of the tempestuous, irascible character of the king, his rough justice and fits of sullenness, Fernão Lopes could conclude his chronicle with the words: 'And folk said that ten such years there never were in Portugal as those when D. Pedro was king.'2

viii. INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL POLICY OF D. PEDRO. Little consistency of policy was perhaps to be expected from such a man as Pedro. In 1358 Pedro I of Castile sent ambassadors to Portugal, proposing a military alliance, which was sealed by three betrothals, that of the heir of Portugal Fernando to the King of Castile's daughter Beatriz, whilst the two sons of Inês de Castro, João and Denis, would also marry Castilian princesses. Although D. Pedro supplied his namesake of Castile with a fleet of galleys under his admiral Pessanha, he began secret negotiations with the common enemy, the King of Aragon, who, with the Red King of Granada, supported the pretender to the throne of Castile, Henry of Trastamara. In 1360, after the battle of Nájera, Pedro of Portugal and the King of Castile came to peace with Aragon, and two years later Castile gathered round her Portugal, Granada and Navarre as enemies of Pedro IV of Aragon, who still sheltered Henry of Trastamara. After a brief peace in 1363, the war broke out once more, but Portugal now stood aside. With the entry of the White Companies and Du Guesclin, Henry's star began to ascend, and he was acclaimed king of Castile in the spring of 1366. Pedro of Castile, after attempting to raise help in Portugal, first sent his daughter Beatriz, betrothed to Prince Fernando, then followed himself to Portugal. On his arrival at Coruche, Pedro of Portugal refused to give him help and he retired to Galicia and then Bordeaux. Recognizing Henry as king of Castile, Portugal concluded treaties of peace with Castile and Aragon in the last months of Pedro's reign.

CHAPTER X

THE END OF THE BURGUNDIAN DYNASTY

i. FERNANDO, 1367-1383. 'After the death of King Pedro, there reigned the Infante D. Fernando, his first-born son, being then aged twenty-two years and seven months and eighteen days: a bold, merry and lusty youth, fond of women and an accoster of them. He had a wellformed body of good height, handsome in appearance and conspicuous. so that, being in the midst of many men, though he were unknown, he would at once be taken for king by the others.' Fernão Lopes goes on to extol his love of justice, his prowess as a huntsman, his liberality and his anxiety to govern well, adding: 'All this disappeared when the war began, and a new world was born very contrary to the old, and the easy years of his father's time were gone; and afterwards there came redoubled woes, so that many wept their ill-starred misery: if he had been content to live in peace, well-furnished with his revenues, with great and many treasures that his ancestors left him, no one in the world would have lived more merry, nor spent his days in such ease; but perhaps it was not so ordered from above.'1 At the beginning of his reign, says the chronicler, Fernando was the richest king yet to rule in Portugal, with treasure in the tower of Lisbon alone amounting to 800,000 pieces of gold and 400,000 silver marks, apart from other coin in Lisbon and general treasure elsewhere. The sum is impressive when it is recalled that Pedro I of Castile once declared at dice that his whole wealth of 20,000 dobras was on the board. According to Lopes, the royal revenue was 200,000 dobras, without the lucrative customs of Lisbon and Oporto and certain tithes—and the customs of Lisbon alone were estimated at 35,000 or 40,000 dobras a year just before Fernando began to reign. 'And be not surprised at this and more, for the kings in those days had such a way with the people, for their service and their profit, that all perforce were rich, and the Kings had great revenues; for they lent money on security to all who would borrow, and had tithes twice a year for their interest, and since everyone paid a tenth of what he earned against his debt, this was gradually discharged and they were still rich, while the King came by his own.'2

The chronicler also describes the great commercial activity of the port of Lisbon, and the numbers of foreign colonies, 'Genoese, Piacentines, Lombards, Catalans of Aragon and of Majorca, and those of Milan,

¹ Fernão Lopes, Crónica de D. Fernando, Preface.

called Milanese, and Cahorsins and Biscayans, and of other nations'. In a given year 12,000 tuns of wine went out, and often 450 trading-ships would lie in the Tagus. Nevertheless the economic position of the country was not sound. The population had increased, but productivity had not followed it; on the contrary, soil still tended to go out of cultivation, and Fernando had to legislate in favour of agriculture. In the far south, it was necessary to import wheat, and even in years of plenty distribution remained bad. The decline of rural Portugal was sharply accentuated by the three Spanish invasions made between 1369 and 1382, which brought widespread devastation and depopulation. The trading classes, especially those of Lisbon, saw their new prosperity undermined by the monetary policy of Fernando I; but it was they who reacted strongly and increased their influence, so as to raise John I to the throne in the face of Castilian absorption.

ii. THE CASTILIAN WARS, 1369-1382. Fernando's first action was to ratify the treaty of peace with Castile and Aragon. When Pedro the Cruel defeated Henry of Trastamara at Nájera a few months later, Fernando renewed his treaty of peace and friendship with the former king and maintained it until Pedro's assassination two years later. Certain Castilian towns that had always supported Pedro now preferred to offer allegiance to the King of Portugal rather than recognize Henry II, with the result that Fernando agreed to become a claimant to the neighbouring throne, basing his candidature on his descent from Sancho III and his marriage with the daughter of the late Pedro I. Fernando joyfully received the homage of Tuy, Corunna, Santiago, Orense, Lugo and a number of other places in Galicia, as well as Zamora, Ciudad Rodrigo, Alcántara, Valencia de Alcántara and Carmona on his eastern frontier. Prominent among Fernando's Galician adherents were the family of Inês de Castro. They and their companions persuaded him that 'it was small wonder to be king of Castile, or of the greater part of it'.

Once having decided to oppose Henry of Trastamara, Fernando looked about him for allies. The first was the Moslem King of Granada, formerly allied to Pedro of Castile, with whom he made a military alliance for forty years. The second was Pedro IV of Aragon, who had been the ally of the present King of Castile. The latter now entered Galicia, receiving Corunna through the agency of João Fernandes Andeiro, a Galician noble who was to play a prominent part in the affairs of Portugal. On learning of the Portuguese intervention, Henry II led his army to Galicia, but Fernando, who was unprepared for war, retired by sea to Oporto, and thence to Coimbra to collect troops. Henry, accompanied by Du Guesclin, at once entered Portugal, seized Braga, which was ill-defended and ill-armed, and burning it, moved against Guimarãis, where

he arrived on September 1, 1369. However, the news that the King of Granada had destroyed Algeciras caused Henry to retire at once from Portugal, only pausing to take and man Bragança and Miranda on his way.

Whilst the enemy diverted his attention to the Moors of Granada. Fernando concluded an alliance with the Aragonese. In it, he was recognized as King of Castile, in return for the cession of Murcia to Aragon, and contracted to marry the Infanta Leonor, the daughter of Pedro IV. In addition the Aragonese promised to make war on Castile for two years, also providing Fernando with fifteen hundred lances at his own expense. For this purpose some four thousand gold marks were despatched to Barcelona, and Count João Afonso Telo went to bring back the princess. But although the treaty was ratified in June 1370, Pedro IV refused to allow her to depart until a papal dispensation was obtained, and Telo came back bringing the crown, jewels and robes that Fernando had sent for Leonor. In July a new treaty was made raising the number of Aragonese auxiliaries to three thousand, but already the Papacy was attempting to bring about a settlement. Two legates sent by Gregory XI arranged the peace of Alcoutim in March 1371, and Fernando agreed to be the faithful friend of the Kings of Castile and of France, undertaking to marry Henry II's daughter, also named Leonor. Prisoners and conquests were exchanged, and Pedro of Aragon salved the slight inflicted on his daughter by appropriating the gold that Fernando had lodged in Barcelona.

The treaty of Alcoutim had barely been ratified in the following August, when Fernando fell in love with, and declared his intention of marrying, a third Leonor, a Portuguese lady named Leonor Teles, a niece to the Count of Barcelos, João Afonso Telo, and already the wife of one João Lourenço da Cunha. The husband, unwilling to connive at a divorce on grounds of consanguinity, 'which is easy to find among the nobles',¹ fled for his life to Castile, while Fernando made the necessary explanations to Henry II, who, after displaying 'melancholy', accepted the situation and assured Fernando that his daughter could make as good a match elsewhere.

Fernando's velleities aggravated the discontent of the Portuguese people. In the first place the claim to the throne of Castile and the ensuing invasion had been unpopular. Secondly the export of such a quantity of gold to Aragon, and its entire loss—the chronicler says that 2,024 gold marks and some silver were seized in Aragon—drained the kingdom of a great part of the treasure Fernando had inherited, while, to complete the damage, the stores of silver disappeared in the purchase of war-material and payment of troops. To remedy this loss, recourse was had to a drastic monetary reform, which was certainly more acutely

¹ Fernão Lopes, Crónica de D. Fernando, ch. LVII.

felt now that the use of coin was generalized and commerce beginning to flourish. Already in the reigns of Afonso III, Denis and Afonso IV, the number of libras to the mark had increased from twelve to fourteen, and thence to eighteen and fourteen soldos, but the quantity of precious metal had always been decreased without any increase in the base. Fernando was responsible for a vast and profitable operation involving both processes. His new barbuda, composed like the libra of twenty soldos, was made of three parts silver and nine alloy, instead of the former eleven and one. Since the king offered to pay a mark of twenty-seven libras of his new money for nineteen libras of the old, everyone rushed to make the exchange, merchants, nobles, and ministers alike. Every mark that the king bought up at twenty-seven libras, he converted into one hundred and ninety-five; the handsome profit of over 600 per cent was squandered on the wars, and the way prepared for the ruinous financial regime of John I. The inevitable rise in prices and the inability of simple people to distinguish the old and good coinage from the new and bad fomented discontent. The fact that the king promised to restore the coinage when the war was over and officially equated the various currencies did little to help matters. Prices were fixed in the various districts of the kingdom, and hoarding prohibited—those who possessed corn must sell it, without exception of 'any count, nor noble, nor archbishops, nor abbots, nor any other person'. Whilst the existence of such legislation bears witness to the turmoil that had been caused, there is little evidence that relief was obtained by it.

The people thus had ample motive for discontent. Their sudden explosion of indignation against Fernando's marriage nevertheless comes as a surprise. The rumour that he had stolen Leonor Teles soon spread, 'not only to the grandees and fidalgos, who loved his service and honour, but even to the common people, who felt great resentment'. The council, after vainly attempting to reason with him, ceased to refer to the subject, but the people criticized his favourites and advisers for their inaction, and those of Lisbon decided to make their complaint to him in person. Choosing a tailor, Fernão Vasques, as their 'captain and proposer', some three thousand people of diverse trades and soldiers went armed to the palace. 'The king, when he knew that these people were there and why they came, sent a favourite of his to ask what they wanted and the reason for their coming, and Fernão Vasques replied in the name of them all.' The tailor, a version of whose speech is given by the chronicler, urged Fernando not to take Leonor Teles, but to marry some king's daughter, or even some noble woman by whom he might have legitimate issue, 'and not take the wife of another, a thing to which they would not consent, nor was there any reason why he should take this amiss, for they did not want to lose so good a king as he for the sake of a woman who had bewitched him'. Fernando sent back his answer thanking them for their good intention as prizers of his honour, and assuring them 'that she was not his received wife, nor would God permit it'; he offered to meet them the next day at São Domingos and give further assurances. The promise was accepted by Fernão Vasques, and the crowd dispersed, declaring themselves satisfied, but adding that if the king refused they themselves would wrest her from him in such a way that he should never see her again. Next day the crowd assembled in the appointed place, but Fernando, seeing their numbers and humour, feared a riot and departed secretly with Leonor Teles for the north. A few days later they were married in the presence of a number of lords and priests. Only D. Denis, one of the sons of Inês de Castro, refused to acknowledge Leonor Teles, saying bluntly that he would not kiss her hand but she might kiss his. Whilst D. Denis was merely ostracized, the tailor of Lisbon and a number of his followers were later tortured and executed through the influence of the new queen. The Teles family and its adherents at once came into prominence, and the queen's brother received charge of the castle of Lisbon, from which the city could easily be dominated.1

The necessary changes in the treaty with Castile were negotiated in April 1372 at Tuy, but already the Hundred Years War was casting its shadow over the Peninsula, and in the following July Fernando concluded an alliance in England. Henry II had depended on France for help in his wars against Pedro I, whose daughters Constanza and Isabel had married John of Gaunt and the Earl of Cambridge, thus bringing to England the responsibility of keeping alive the traditionalist claim against the illegitimate Trastamaras. Lancaster sent two envoys, Sir Roger Hoor and the Galician João Fernandes Andeiro, to treat with Fernando, who recognized his claim to the crown of Castile and agreed to join in war against Henry. Both would invade Castile and Aragon, Lancaster receiving all castles and towns conquered in Castile, and Fernando whatever else he himself captured. Fernando provoked war by seizing some Castilian ships, but Henry, willing to avoid a conflict, sent to Portugal the escaped assassin of Inês de Castro, Diogo Lopes Pacheco, to ask him to fulfil his treaties. Finding him intent on war, Henry took up the challenge and at the end of 1372 left Zamora and seized Almeida, Pinhel, Linhares, Celorico and Viseu. At first Fernando resolved to meet the Castilians near Coimbra, but later decided to fall back on Santarém in the hope that the enemy would be disorganized as they advanced farther from their base. On the contrary, Henry quickly reached Coimbra, and continued to Tôrres Novas, where he awaited an attack. Fernando,

¹ Fernão Lopes, Crónica de D. Fernando, chs. LX-LXIII.

however, did not stir, even when the enemy approached Santarém. Convinced of his inability to fight, the Castilians moved upon Lisbon and began a siege in February 1373. At once the inhabitants took shelter behind the inner walls, abandoning the wealthiest part of the city, including the Jewry and Rua Nova, which were burnt. Reinforcements were brought downstream from Santarém, but the Portuguese cause did not prosper. Their fleet was crippled by a Castilian naval force, whilst an army entered from Galicia and brushed away resistance as far as the castle of Faria.

Although Lisbon did not fall, the pope sent a legate, Cardinal Guido of Bologna, to arrange peace, and the terms which Fernando was forced to accept implied a defeat. He renounced his alliance with John of Gaunt, and promised to maintain friendly terms with Castile and France, treating Englishmen in his kingdom as enemies and forbidding their ships to enter his ports. For the space of three years he must even contribute two armed galleys whenever the King of Castile should find it necessary to raise six galleys against the English. He must expel Castilian malcontents whom he had sheltered, and admit, pardoned, Portuguese exiles who had taken refuge with Henry II. The treaty was sworn in boats on the Tagus at Santarém, and Henry II lavished fine words on Fernando, whose remark 'How am I Henrified!' gave rise to the nickname henricados applied to the supporters of the rapprochement with Castile.

The conditions of the peace were intended to guarantee its permanence. Thus various castles, Viseu, Miranda and others, and certain persons, including the Admiral Lancarote Pessanha and the queen's brother João Afonso Teles, were handed over as hostages. The shattered state of Portugal at the end of the second Castilian invasion was an even surer guarantee of a spell of peace, though the humiliating conditions to which he had submitted made D. Fernando begin immediately to prepare for future vengeance. As soon as peace had been signed, he gave orders from Evora for the military training of all able-bodied youths, and curtailed the abuses of those nobles who used to impress or contract their neighbours, instead of supplying their contingent from their own estates. In the Peninsula the weight of chivalry was still decisive in the open field. In the case of siege the economic resources of a district were sorely tried. It was therefore necessary not only to increase the number of trained men, but also to stimulate a flagging agriculture and strengthen the towns upon which resistance depended. Lisbon and Oporto, the repositories of the chief wealth of the country, were defended with new walls; those of Lisbon rose between the autumn of 1373 and 1376. Similar defensive measures were taken in other cities. In Guarda, for

example, the cathedral was destroyed, as being too near the walls for security, and replaced by the present simple and handsome building. For the reorganization of agriculture the leis das sesmarias, published in 1375, made ownership of land conditional on tillage; two good men in every village were to ensure that every acre was fully utilized; inventories of untilled land were made with a view to its seizure, and those persons who avoided work as vagabonds or by passing themselves as priests or monks were sought out and compelled to labour. Similarly all those who had formerly tilled the soil, with their sons and grandsons, must return to it, and town-dwellers exercising less useful occupations below a certain rate of remuneration were also ordered to the country. These and similar measures were designed to remedy the 'great lack of wheat and barley, and other supplies with which before all the lands of the earth, this used to be the best replenished; and these few supplies that are found here, have reached such a dearth that those who have to maintain wealth or estate cannot obtain them without great diminution of what they have: and seeing and regarding that before all reasons why this dearth comes, the most special is the decline of tilth, which men abandon and forsake, launching themselves into other occupations that are not so profitable to the common wealth, so that lands that are fit to bear fruit become bare commons and barren heaths'.1 The word 'constrain' occurs no less than eighteen times in the act.

At the same time Fernando sought to reinforce Portuguese shipping. Not only were builders of new ships encouraged by the exemption of all duties on the cargo of the first voyage, but also those who proposed to build ships of over 100 tons burden were permitted to cut free of charge whatever wood they needed in the royal forests, receiving extensive remission of tribute. Ships were insured by a 'ship company', which collected funds by means of a tax on all ships and reimbursed the owners of those lost by storm or wreck; for this purpose complete inventories of the contents of ships were drawn up.

During this period of reconstruction, peace was maintained with Castile. The treaty had been sworn to in April 1373, but in spite of its prohibition of dealings with England, an agreement was signed by Fernando and Edward III, by which he agreed not to come to terms with the enemies of the English. Pursuing a purely opportunist policy, Fernando nevertheless allied himself with Henry II a year later in the hope of revenging himself on Aragon. But the King of Castile soon made peace with Aragon without securing the return of Fernando's gold, though he agreed to marry his bastard son Fradique to Fernando's only child, Beatriz. In the following year (1377) Fernando, still looking for

¹ Fernão Lopes, Crónica de D. Fernando, ch. LXXXIX.

his revenge on Aragon, made a treaty with the Duke of Anjou, but did not succeed in bringing about a war.

Of the sons of Inês de Castro, the younger, Denis, had already taken refuge in Castile, and in 1379 the elder, João, followed him. Leonor Teles had a sister Maria, a young widow with whom João fell violently in love and made a secret marriage—to the alarm of the queen, who knew that the Infante was popular and feared a plot to oust her only daughter from the throne, in the event of her husband's death. Leonor Teles, masterful and jealous, could not abide the prospect of Maria's replacing her on the throne. To eliminate any such possibility, she pointed out to the Infante that if he had not been so rash as to marry her sister, he might have wedded her daughter and thus come to the throne. João's ambitions were aroused. Hastening to Coimbra, he burst into his wife's palace, traditionally the old house called Paço de Sub-Ripas, and murdered her in cold blood. The reward of the crime never came. Leonor Teles had not intended to fulfil her promise; all she did was to arrange a pardon for the murderer, who, threatened with the persecution of more scrupulous members of his wife's family, fled to Castile.

In the same year Henry II of Castile died. Good relations between the two kingdoms did not long survive the accession of his son Juan I, in spite of a new alliance negotiated in the first year of the reign, by which the Portuguese heiress, Princess Beatriz, should marry Juan I's eldest son and not his half-brother. Instead of the foreshadowed union of the two crowns, other alliances pulled the countries apart. Castile, long allied to France, sent ships to take part in the Hundred Years' War, attacking the English coast and entering the Thames estuary. So far Portugal kept on good terms with France, and in the Great Schism acknowledged Clement VII with France, and not Urban VI, to whom England adhered. But in 1380 Portugal drew away from the Castilian alliance towards the English. The declaration of the resumption of the English alliance was made on July 15, 1380; João Fernandes Andeiro, now Count of Ourém and the queen's lover, had been sent to conduct secret negotiations in England, and having been received by Richard II, brought back an undertaking of military aid from the Earl of Cambridge (later Duke of York). A bare two months earlier a treaty had been signed confirming the marriage of the Portuguese heiress and Castilian heir. As the story is told by Fernão Lopes the desire for war came from Fernando 'to avenge himself for the injuries and great advantages that King Henry had won over him, both in burning Lisbon as in other things...and yet he always continued his intercourse with the English, as secretly as he might, supposing that at some time their aid would be needful'. Assembling his council he recalled the wars with Henry II; 'it seemed to me that this man rather by fortune and constellations than by advantage of chivalry was born in a planet to honour himself at the expense of his neighbours...though his son inherits the kingdom by his death, haply he has not inherited the good events of his father, for often of a fortunate father comes forth an unlucky son'.¹ The council apparently disliked the idea of this treachery, but Andeiro none the less was sent to England, and returning clandestinely, had secret conferences with Fernando and Leonor at Estremós, 'and by such conversations and frequent sojourns with her, João Fernandes [Andeiro] had such affection with her that many who learnt of it, had a good suspicion of them'.

Later in 1380 the commanders of the frontiers were nominated, and in May 1381 war was declared. At first Juan's constellation seemed as good as his father's, for a fleet of twenty Portuguese galleys under the queen's brother was reduced to one in a defeat off Saltes. Moreover it had been hoped to win the support of Juan's half-brother, but the two were suddenly reconciled. However, on July 19, within a month of the defeat of Saltes, the Earl of Cambridge, accompanied by his wife and son, arrived in the Tagus with 3,000 men, 'handsome people and wellprepared'. The son, Edward, was at once betrothed to the much-married child, Princess Beatriz, the two being put into a large bed and prayed over in the English fashion. In order to pay for the assistance Fernando seized plate from churches and houses, and to emphasize his change of policy transferred his religious adhesion from Clement VII to Urban VI. His allies unfortunately acted 'like destroyers rather than defenders'. At the end of the year the armies went forward to Santarém, and in the following spring the Castilians, taking advantage of the undefended state of Lisbon, sent a fleet to land troops on its outskirts; Sintra and Palmela were plundered, but the champion D. Nun'Alvares Pereira, who had been appointed marcher on the Alentejo front, returned to protect the city. This hero, one of the thirty-two sons of the Prior of the Hospitallers, had had his first experience as a soldier at the age of thirteen in the invasion of 1373. It is said that the queen had wished to have him knighted on this occasion, and that the only suit of armour found to fit him was an old harness of D. João, the Master of Avis, a bastard son of King Pedro. If the story is apocryphal, it nevertheless symbolizes the intimate association of the two men who were to secure Portugal's independence.

In spite of the preparations for war, neither side displayed any haste in coming to grips. Fernando was prematurely decrepit in his late thirties. Leonor Teles' intimacy with the Count of Ourém was a public

¹ Fernão Lopes, Crónica de D. Fernando, ch. CXIII.

shame to him, whilst illness and care depressed him. At this time the queen gave birth to a son at Elvas. Fernando was delighted, in spite of the general rumour that Ourém was the father, but after four days the infant died. Peace negotiations, at first concealed so that the English should not know, resulted in a treaty of August 1382 between Fernando and Juan. By it Princess Beatriz was betrothed to the second son of Juan I, who agreed to restore his captives, and supply ships for Cambridge to return to England. Not unnaturally Fernando's allies took umbrage at his conduct, 'throwing their basinets to earth and beating them with their axes'. Nevertheless Cambridge took leave of Fernando on September 1, and Portugal manifested her return to the Franco-Spanish fold by again recognizing Clement VII—against the counsel of Dr João das Regras, the future adviser of John I.

The possibility of Castilian domination in Portugal appeared not to trouble Fernando, who now freely allowed Leonor Teles to pursue a vigorously pro-Spanish policy in order to ensure the succession to her daughter. Thus when Juan I became a widower, the Count of Ourém went to suggest his marriage with Princess Beatriz instead of his son's. This arrangement, calculated to ensure the accession of the princess at the price of Portuguese independence, was naturally accepted. Beatriz thus became a bride for the fifth time before her twelfth birthday. An elaborate marriage pact met various contingencies such as the inheritance of Portugal by any legitimate male or female heir who should be born to Fernando, unlikely in view of his failing health. The dominating probability, that of Fernando's death without further issue, would lead straight to Juan's accession in Portugal, and it was agreed furthermore that if Beatriz and Fernando should die with no further legal issue, the crown should also go to Juan. In the unlikely event of the earlier death of both Juan and Beatriz, it was agreed that Fernando should succeed to Castile. The probable union of the two crowns was envisaged in clauses that assured the continued separate existence of the Portuguese government. Theoretically, the eldest child of Juan would succeed to Portugal, but as certain lords of Castile merrily remarked 'they would rather castrate their king so that he should remain childless, and rule Castile and Portugal combined, than that he should have a child who would make it an independent kingdom'. Princess Beatriz was duly handed over to her bridegroom, and married at Badajoz. The assent of the cortes of the two countries was obtained in August and September. Only on his deathbed did Fernando fully realize the perilous situation he was bequeathing to his country: after receiving the sacraments, he declared weeping, 'all this I believe as a true Christian, and I believe too that God gave me these realms to maintain with peace and justice, and I for

my sins have acted in such wise that I shall give Him very ill account of them'.¹ On October 22, 1383, Fernando died without making any further dispositions for the future of Portugal.

The first effect of his death was the flight of the queen's lover, Ourém. Leonor did not attend her husband's funeral, which took place with conspicuous lack of ceremony at Santarém: her neglect told against her cause. Her liaison with Ourém, to whom as a Galician her Castilian leanings were attributed, had caused her to be suspected by some of her subjects, but she compensated for this by passing such popular measures as a prohibition of Moors and Jews from holding office, and the representation of the country on the royal council by two men drawn from each province. She might have exercised the regency conceded to her in her daughter's marriage treaty but for Juan I's ambitions. The King of Castile, on hearing of the death of his father-in-law, wrote to Leonor Teles to ask for the public proclamation of Beatriz and himself as Queen and King of Portugal. This was done, though wherever the heralds appeared they were hissed and manhandled. In some towns there were riots. Fearing this expression of popular disapproval, the queen ordered solemn exequies to be celebrated for her husband on the thirtieth day from his death, but as she had already permitted Ourém to return, the hypocrisy was patent. At the ceremony the necessity of getting rid of the favourite was first vented by Nun'Álvares Pereira. After discoursing with his uncle and other nobles, he approached D. João, the Master of Avis, and managed to persuade him to give his support. But John was cautious and decided to delay the murder. Only the arguments of Álvaro Pais, an influential burgher of Lisbon, induced him to act. At that moment, John was appointed to guard the Guadiana frontier, and would have departed to his post without despatching Ourém. However he was persuaded to turn back, and finding the favourite in the palace, stabbed him. The sequel of the deed had been planned. Alvaro Pais aroused the Lisbon populace, saying that John's life was in danger and bringing crowds to surge round the palace and demand to see him safe. When he appeared, there were acclamations and the church-bells rang. Only the cathedral was silent. It did not take the crowd long to associate this silence with the bishop, a Castilian by origin, who was shortly found and put to death. When the crowd had thus stained its hands in blood, it was at one with John of Avis.

¹ Fernão Lopes, Crónica de D. Fernando, ch. clxxii.

CHAPTER XI

AVIS

i. JOHN OF AVIS AND THE NATIONAL REVOLUTION. Already at the time of the third Castilian war. John of Avis had been arrested and threatened with death through the intrigues of Leonor Teles. In her desire to have him out of the way, she had forged letters ordering his execution and purporting to issue from the king. Although these letters were brought before Fernando, who only thus learnt of his kinsman's arrest, the queen's plot seems to have owed its failure to popular indignation, or possibly to the intervention of the Earl of Cambridge, rather than to any action on the part of the king. Even when John had been released, Leonor Teles maintained that he was guilty of contemplating flight to Castile: had he not recently sold a herd of seventeen cattle to raise funds? It is probable that John's connexion with the English dates from this time, for he then joined in an inroad against the Castilians which had been planned by some of the English leaders, including a bastard son of the King of England, and displayed his military prowess in the capture of the castles of Lobón and Cortijo.

To reconcile the murders of Ourém and the Bishop of Lisbon with authority, if not with legality, Álvaro Pais proposed the marriage of John of Avis with Leonor Teles. The queen had fled from the capital to Alenquer, where Pais sought her out. She, however, rejected this scheme, which might have ensured the solidarity of the Portuguese against the menace of Castile. Meanwhile John received an offer of full support from the city of Lisbon. He accepted the title of Defender and Governor of the Kingdom from the populace, but was confirmed in it by the dignitaries of the city only as a result of popular pressure, voiced by a cooper, Afonso Penedo. In spite of the coolness of the aristocracy, it was plain that John's only course was now to go forward with the appointment of a government. Accordingly he chose the experienced and devoted jurist João das Regras as chancellor, and took into his council the Archbishop of Braga and Nun'Alvares Pereira-the former was probably the only prelate, and the latter one of the few nobles, who adhered to him throughout. As treasurer, John had an English merchant, Micer Percival. In order to take full advantage of the assistance of the populace of Lisbon, he created a new body, the House of Twenty-four (Casa dos Vinte e Quatro), a corporation elected annually on St Thomas's Day by twelve guilds, each of which appointed two good-men. The

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corporation appointed a Judge of the People (juiz do povo), his clerk, and four Deputies of the Guilds (procuradores dos mesteres), who must be present at all council-meetings in which the welfare of the people was concerned. The judge had the right to present to the king complaints or requirements of the people, and was regarded as the leader of the citizens.

The nobility and clergy meanwhile supported the regency of Leonor Teles, or, in lesser numbers, declared for the eldest son of Inês de Castro or the King of Castile; the last-named received the adherence of the Bishops of Coimbra and Guarda. The attitude of many of the nobility to the revolution was expressed by the queen's brother—'such a folly as two cobblers and two tailors have got up'. Yet Fernão Lopes describes how single-minded and unbounded was the enthusiasm of the people: 'It was wonderful to see how God gave them such strength and the others such cowardice that the castles which the old kings beleaguered for long enough with force of arms, yet could not take, the small folk, ill-armed and uncaptained, with their bellies in the sun, seized one by one before mid-day.'

Nevertheless the state of Portugal was precarious. John of Avis and Nun'Álvares began the siege of Alenquer, but Leonor escaped and met Juan, who invaded Portugal, taking Guarda and crossing Beira to Santarém in the first days of January 1384. At Santarém, the King of Castile persuaded Leonor to renounce her rights to the regency, but it was not long before she repented of the increasing dependency on her son-in-law in which this involved her, and, having attempted to conspire against him, was enclosed in a Spanish convent for life. John of Avis and Nun'Álvares Pereira left Alenquer and decided to fortify Lisbon with all haste. At the beginning of February Castilian forces moved down from Santarém to Lumiar, a few miles north of the capital, and a month later Juan himself left Santarém for the scene of operations.

The first engagement of the war was fought by Nun'Alvares, who, despatched to reinforce the supporters of Avis in the Alentejo, met a superior Castilian force on April 6 at Atoleiros near Estremós, and defeated it, according to tradition without loss. Here for the first time the masses of Castilian chivalry were allowed to charge a complete square of dismounted Portuguese whose lances and slings turned the enemy back in confusion. Nevertheless, Lisbon was surrounded on the land side, while an enemy fleet sailed into the Tagus to complete the blockade. John of Avis had sent to England for help, part of which had arrived, but the sieges of Lisbon and Oporto and the devastation of the north and of the Tagus valley made the likelihood of defeat loom large, although as yet Portugal had suffered no reverse in the field. Fortunately for the

I. THE BATTLE OF ALJUBARROTA



II. JOHN I OF PORTUGAL ENTERTAINS JOHN OF GAUNT

future of Avis pestilence broke out in the Spanish lines, and soon reached such intensity that Juan first attempted to negotiate a capitulation and then decided to abandon Lisbon until the following year, when he hoped to finish the campaign without difficulty.

On the departure of the enemy, John and Nun'Alvares reduced Portel and Alenquer, and John would have besieged Tôrres Novas but for the urgent assembly of the cortes at Coimbra, held in March 1385 to discuss the future of the Portuguese crown. At the outset, opinions remained very divided. Leonor Teles had disappeared from the list of candidates, but apart from the straight choice between the Castilian and a Portuguese. there were many who hesitated between the claims of the elder son of Inês de Castro, also called John, and of John of Avis. Seniority and the reputed marriage of Pedro and Inês told strongly in favour of the former. but the advocate of John of Avis, João das Regras, began a critical examination of the cases of all his rivals, so that that of his client should stand out the clearer. After making little of the Castilian claims, on the grounds that Princess Beatriz could not be proved legitimate in view of her mother's conduct, and that the Castilians were heretics as followers of Clement VII, he dealt with the supposed legitimacy of the sons of Inês de Castro. The evidence in its favour, he said, was negligible. For him the explanation of Pedro's conduct was that he had failed to get a papal legitimization and had chosen the declaration of marriage as an alternative. Pedro himself had said he had married Inês de Castro 'about seven years ago'—though he had forgotten the day and month. Pedro had not published the fact before for fear of offending his father: but yet he had not hestitated to offend his father by making war on him, and furthermore four years had elapsed after Afonso IV's death before any reference to the marriage was made. In any case, both the sons of Inês de Castro had forfeited their rights by taking service with Castile. João das Regras concluded with only a brief reference to John of Avis. His argument had failed to convince the whole assembly, and for some days opposition continued. Nun'Alvares, the impetuous, suggested the murder of the chief adversary, but John of Avis, the cautious, forbade any further violence. It was left to João das Regras to provide proof of the illegitimacy of the Castros. Drawing forth some yellowed parchments, he read Pedro's request for the legitimization and the refusal of Rome to grant it. He had not, he said, produced these documents before because he had wished to spare the feelings of the sons of Inês de Castro.

The assembly, staggered, heard him boldly advocate the case of the Master of Avis, who on April 6, 1385, was acclaimed king.

ii. ALJUBARROTA, 1385. In the brief space that elapsed before Juan returned to the attack—the fifth Castilian invasion in sixteen years—

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John of Avis appointed Nun'Álvares Constable of Portugal and confirmed all the privileges of the inhabitants of Lisbon. This done, king and constable set off to reduce as much as possible of Portugal to order. Nun'Álvares took Braga and Viana do Castelo whilst John seized Guimarãis. Here it was learnt that an invasion was being prepared, and supposing that it would be delivered from the Alentejo, John raised fresh forces in Oporto and marched south through Coimbra and Tomar to ford the Tagus at Golegã. Only here, at the end of June 1385, did he learn that the enemy had concentrated at Ciudad Rodrigo for an attack through Beira, and accordingly moved back to the north bank of the Tagus and resolved to collect all his forces at Abrantes, an operation that still progressed while Juan marched rapidly on Coimbra, which he did not take, and proceeded by Pombal to Leiria.

Some of the Portuguese leaders proposed a counter-attack into Andalusia to divert the Castilians from Portugal, but Nun'Alvares refused to hear of such a scheme. It was useless to 'go to Seville to fell a couple of rotten olive-trees'. In his view, Lisbon lost, Portugal lost. As King John would not decide, the headstrong constable began next day to march to Tomar, and though the king twice called him to a new conference, he only replied that his intention was to fight the enemy, and if the king wanted to do the same, he had better come too. Next day John took the road for Tomar: in doing so he committed himself to one of the most decisive battles in the history of Portugal.

On the morning of August 14, the two armies came face to face near Aljubarrota, south of Leiria, where the Portuguese intended to block the road to Lisbon. Taking their stand early in a good position, they waited some hours until the Castilians approached. These began a détour as though they had been ordered to proceed to Lisbon without giving battle. When it became clear that their intention was to attack from the south on easier ground and in the rear, the Portuguese turned about, and prepared to receive the first onslaught. At the impact the Castilians forced back the front rank of the Portuguese and their standard was approaching John of Avis' banner when it suddenly faltered and fell.1 Its disappearance disconcerted the Castilians, and at once the Portuguese began a general attack. Panic seized their adversaries, who rapidly dispersed. The same day Juan took ship near Lisbon for Seville, whilst John of Avis, according to the custom after pitched battles, spent three days encamped on the field. A force of 2,000 lances, 4,000 foot, 800 crossbowmen and some English archers had defeated 20,000 cavalry and

¹ Lt. Col. Costa Veiga has pointed out that English archers were posted on the flank of the Portuguese array, so that as the Portuguese centre fell back they were able to fire broadside into the Castilian host.

10,000 foot. From Aljubarrota is dated the decline of cavalry in the Peninsula.

The independence of Portugal was for the moment assured from Castile; perhaps even more important, numerous castles and towns at once acknowledged John of Avis. Only a number of noblemen still refused to break the oath of allegiance they had taken to Princess Beatriz in 1370. Travelling northward to Oporto, John attacked Chaves and Bragança, which capitulated in the spring of 1386. Although the war was not over, it was now put on a very different basis. The spirit of nationality had been successfully aroused at a critical moment and brought to play on behalf of the Master of Avis, who availed himself of the opportunity to remould the nation. In thanksgiving for his success John began the construction of the magnificent church of Santa Maria da Vitória, at Batalha, some two miles from the battlefield of Aljubarrota.

iii. TREATY OF WINDSOR, 1386; PEACE OF 14II. English archers had contributed to the victory of Aljubarrota. Less than a year later John I signed a treaty of perpetual peace and friendship with England. The Treaty of Windsor of May 9, 1386, the basis of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, laid down 'that there shall be between the two above-mentioned kings now reigning, their heirs and successors, and between the subjects of both kingdoms an inviolable, eternal, solid, perpetual and true league of friendship, alliance and union, not only between each other, their heirs and successors but also between and in favour of their kingdoms, lands, dominions and subjects, vassals, allies and friends, wherever they may be, so that each of them shall have the obligation to assist and give aid to the other against all people now born or who shall come to be born and who shall seek to violate the peace of others or in any way make bold to offend their states'. On the same day Portugal agreed to assist England with ten galleys.

In the following July, John of Gaunt, reviving the claims of his family to the kingship of Castile, landed in Corunna with 5,000 men, and marched through Galicia. By the treaty of November 1386, he granted John of Avis a considerable part of Castile, when he should make good his claims, in return for military aid. His daughter Philippa would marry the King of Portugal, and the concession of the Castilian territories would take the form of a dowry. In February 1387, the marriage was celebrated in Oporto, and shortly afterwards Lancaster forwent any rights he might have over Portugal as future King of Castile. Although the two allies invaded Castile, an arrangement was reached in September by which John of Gaunt yielded up all his rights to Juan, married his daughter Constance to the heir of Castile, the future Henry III, and took ship for Bayonne. The truce between his two relatives by marriage did

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not last long, for Juan harried the Guadiana area whilst John of Avis recovered Melgaco and took Salvatierra and later Tuy from his neighbour. In September 1389, a six-year truce was reached with an exchange of all conquests, but a bare year later Juan of Castile died and was succeeded by his son Henry III, still a boy. In view of the Castilian regency, a new agreement was reached in 1393, by which the truce was to extend for fifteen years and the towns of Miranda and Sabugal were returned to Portugal. However, only three years later, on the pretext that the Castilians had ignored their obligations, Nun'Alvares took Badajoz. Two years later John himself entered Galicia and took Tuy and Salvatierra once more. Nevertheless, hostilities died down. After an attempted invasion by the younger son of Inês de Castro in 1398, peace was restored by the agreement of Segovia of 1400. This ten-year truce proved final, for on the death of Henry III in 1406, and the accession of another minor. Juan II. it was again in the interest of Castile to have stable relations with Portugal. A treaty was eventually concluded in October 1411. Perpetual peace was once more the theme. A general restitution of conquests and confiscations took place, and in a commercial codicil Portuguese merchants were allowed to trade in Castile on the same conditions as Castilians, excepting only that, as always, the export of gold, silver, coin and horses remained forbidden.

iv. CHIVALRY AND THE COURT. The Portuguese knights took their chivalry very literally. Nun'Alvares, says the Chronicle of the Constable, used to read the tale of Galahad 'that contains the sum of the Round Table, and he greatly desired to appear in some measure like him'. Another writer adds that 'in the time of King John of good memory we know that his vassals called him King Arthur, and from his court he sent thirteen knights to London, to challenge in the lists as many Englishmen, both noble and bold, for respect of the ladies of the Duke of Lancaster'.1 This preoccupation with the Arthurian tradition is vouched for by Fernão Lopes, who tells how at the siege of Coria the king, displeased by the conduct of certain knights, remarked that there was great lack of the good knights of the Round Table, and that if they were present Coria would surely be taken. Thereupon one present answered: 'Sire, you have no lack of the knights of the Round Table, for here is Martim Vasques da Cunha that is as good as Dom Galaaz, and Gonçalo Vasques Coutinho, that is as good as Dom Tristão, and here is João Fernandes

¹ Jorge Ferreira de Vasconcelos, Memorial dos Cavaleiros da Segunda Távola Redonda. The apocryphal episode of the Twelve of England (Lusiads, Canto 6) tells how various ladies of the English court were offended by the remarks of some English knights derogatory to their beauty and honour. The ladies in question arranged through John of Gaunt for their defence by twelve Portuguese champions who arrived in England in Holy Week 1396 (?) and defeated the ungallant English in the lists.

Pacheco that is as good as Lancarote...so there is no lack of the knights you mention, but what we lack is good King Arthur, fleur-de-lys lord of them all, who knew good servitors and gave them good gifts for their desire to serve him well.' The knights of John of Avis were no longer the old feudal lords who had accompanied the rise and decline of the house of Burgundy. The rakish, unorganized feudal court gave place to a respectable, orderly centre of the new middle-class nobility. The old autocracy had lost its prestige and often its property to those who had supported the new dynasty with their strength and abilities and risked their wealth in its favour—'another new world and a new generation of people', in the words of Lopes. Significant of the change is the creation of the office of King of Arms to record the issue of patents, devices and changes of name. The most prominent figure of the new order was that of Nun'Alvares Pereira, who, rising to the position of Constable of the kingdom with the title of Count of Ourém, held the first place in the new state on account of his influence and wealth. His daughter married the king's bastard son Afonso, and thus gave rise to the line of Bragança, so powerful as to menace the throne two generations later. Nun'Alvares himself, the pattern of the new chivalry, retired to a Lisbon monastery, the Carmo, and devoted himself to good works, dying in 1431 as plain Brother Nuno de Santa Maria.

At the same time the personal power of the king was legally recognized. His authority increased to the detriment of the nobility and clergy; feudal and private jurisdiction were replaced by the royal power, whose representatives extended their activities to the whole length of the kingdom. John's conception of his own position is plainly expressed in an edict of April 1385 in which he refers to his own 'authority, liberty, free-will and absolute power' to be able to 'give, approve, grant and confirm all the privileges, liberties, good usages, charters and customs of the city of Lisbon': elsewhere he uses the phrase 'our certain knowledge and absolute power'.

The discipline of the court was severe. To some extent the alteration in outlook was due to the English Queen Philippa, austere, bounteous and pious. John himself, neither surpassingly great by his understanding or by his power of decision, yet possessed ample good sense and followed the influences of his time expressed in the personalities of Nun'Alvares, Alvaro Pais and João das Regras. The maxim 'Fear to misrule' put before Prince Duarte and his brothers was a new precept in the education of princes. Sumptuary laws, enforced by the financial situation, accompanied the new austerity: the cortes of Évora of 1391 forbade all save doctors and prelates to wear gold or gilt brass and velvet on the person or mount, except on three high days.

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V. THE MONETARY CRISIS. The financial chaos of the first half of the fifteenth century was a legacy from the reign of Fernando I. All attempts to halt the rise in prices produced by the spate of over-valued money proved useless. The barbuda was lowered from twenty to fourteen, and later to two and a third soldos, but without noticeable effect on prices, which had multiplied by at least four. In view of this failure taxation was decreed on sundry articles, which promptly disappeared from the market. Such was the distress that all wheat was seized for distribution. and Fernando's reign ended in an atmosphere of mistrust and confusion, which the disturbed early years of John I did nothing to remedy. The chronicles tell how the libra was steadily debased until one of Fernando's was exchanged for 1,173 of John I's, so that the silver mark, which made 25 libras in Fernando's time, now made 29,000. At the cortes of Coimbra of 1398 it was decided that all tribute or debts must be paid in the currency contemporary with the contract or in current coinage at its real value, so that a libra owed in 1386 must be paid with five of the modern coins. In succeeding years the ratio increased to one for ten and one for fifteen. By 1422 debts dating from before 1386 had to be paid fivehundredfold and tribute based on assessments made before that date seven-hundredfold.

Apart from the confusion produced by this continued debasement, considerable social changes came of it. In general the old nobility that lived on its rents saw its wealth greatly reduced to the advantage of those who had the usufruct of the estates. Confidence was completely lost in the national currency and in some contracts appeared the phrase 'to be paid in the good old money'. This stipulation was forbidden in 1402, but none the less in two marriages of the Barcelos branch of the royal family appears the condition that the dowry be paid in Spanish dobras cruzadas of good gold and fair weight.

vi. THE GUILDS. Naturally the money-changers' or minters' corporation thrived on the numerous changes in the coinage. Both Fernando and John I confirmed their numerous privileges, including exemption from military service and immunity from arrest except by order of the magistrate who presided over their corporation. The ceremony of admittance was not dissimilar from that of initiation into knighthood, for the candidate wore his arms, knelt before the magistrate and was tapped twice on the helmet. To preserve the moral standards of this class, fraud was made punishable by cutting off the hands and feet, and later by burning.

In general the Portuguese guilds had been slow in developing, possibly owing to the shortage of skilled labour. In the time of Denis there existed a cofradia in Évora, a brotherhood of merchants and good

men with the aim of attending the sick or impoverished and arbitrating in disputes. In 1285 the masters of various trades appear at a council in Lisbon—tailors, furriers, fishermen, smiths, and others. The guilds, unlike those in Spain, enjoyed popular support: whilst Alfonso X of Spain had been warned that they became monopolies in the hands of certain families who refused to admit outsiders and forced up prices, the first cortes of John of Avis pressed for compulsory examinations for masters and the compulsory inheritance of callings: a century later, in 1481, these claims were unsuccessfully urged again.

The political influence of the guilds is felt quite suddenly with the action of the tailor Fernão Vasques. Twelve years later the cooper Penedo influenced the people of Lisbon to declare for John of Avis, who in return founded the Casa dos Vinte e Quatro. Evidence of the power of the guilds is given by a document of Montemór-o-Novo dated 1384, in which local taxation is approved by the judge and leaders of the shoemakers, tailors and masons.

Even in the royal council the citizens had their representatives, both directly and through the rising class of clerks. In 1385 the cortes of Coimbra declared Portugal to consist of clergy, nobles, clerks (*letrados*) and citizens. When the people asked John of Avis to take as advisers a council of fourteen drawn from these four classes, he selected from the list of names presented one churchman, two nobles, three clerks and four citizens.

vii. CEUTA, 1415; DEATH OF JOHN I, 1433. After the conclusion of the peace of 1411, most of the older generation who had lived through twenty-three years of insecurity were glad enough to see the national existence firmly established, but there were still some who had enriched themselves by border raiding and who now found this industry prohibited. The three elder sons of John I and Philippa equally regretted having been born too late to prove their knightliness on the field under Nun'Alvares Pereira and the great figures of the struggles for independence. Their father offered to hold a tourney for them, but nothing less than conquest would satisfy them, and after some reluctance on the part of King John, it was decided to attack the North African port of Ceuta.

John I himself accompanied the fleet to Africa. His second son, Pedro, the great traveller and future regent, was given charge of the troops from the southern half of the kingdom, which were to be concentrated in Lisbon, whilst the third son, Henrique, Prince Henry the Navigator, was charged to raise troops in Beira and take ship at Oporto. Their half-brother Afonso, Count of Barcelos, was also given a prominent part in the expedition. Ships were freighted in Galicia, Biscay and England. A letter of Henry V dated September 26, 1414 permitted João Vaz de

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Almada to take four hundred lances to Portugal, and another authorization of January 26, 1415 provided another three hundred and fifty lances and some men at arms. To conceal the purpose of the armament, ambassadors were sent to declare a false war on the Duke of Holland, whilst explaining to him the real purpose of the campaign.

When the expedition was on the verge of departure Queen Philippa sickened of plague. On her deathbed she armed and advised her sons; six days after her death the fleet left the Tagus, on July 25, 1415. The expedition was completely successful. Ceuta fell in a day, was garrisoned and formed the first Portuguese possession in Africa. For their part in the victory the two Princes Pedro and Henrique were given the titles of Duke of Coimbra and Duke of Viseu respectively, the first duchies to be created in Portugal: they and their elder brother Duarte were knighted by their father in the captured mosque of Ceuta.

The remainder of the reign of John of Avis was uneventful. As if foreseeing that the victory of Ceuta would divert the attention of Portugàl out of the Peninsula, he attempted to turn the provisional peace treaty of 1411 into a permanent agreement. Negotiations were begun in 1418 and resulted in another impermanent agreement in 1423. Only in 1431 was complete agreement reached at Medina del Campo, and ratified in the following year by John I at Almeirim. The day after its signature Brother Nuno de Santa Maria, once the Holy Constable, died. João das Regras, the other great figure of the war of independence, had already died in 1404. John of Avis himself did not long survive: on August 14, 1433, the forty-eighth anniversary of the battle of Aljubarrota, he succumbed to a long illness during which Prince Duarte had borne the brunt of the government.

CHAPTER XII

THE DISCOVERIES: AFRICA

i. THE MIDDLE AGES AND THE ORIENT; PORTUGUESE ACTIVITY BEFORE PRINCE HENRY. Although Asia had been known to Europe at least since the time of Alexander the Great, contact with it had died out in Roman times, and from the days of Caracalla until the rise of Islam, the Orient remained only as a fantastic memory to the Occident. From the twelfth century the idea of Prester John, a Christian monarch, king of kings in a shadowy realm situated either in Central Africa or Central Asia, disturbed the imagination of the western world. Held to be the author of a letter directed to the Emperor Manuel Comnenus of Byzantium, he was addressed by Pope Alexander III as 'my dearest son John, illustrious and magnificent King of the Indies'. The rumour of his greatness grew: he had seventy-two subject kings, his wealth was beyond reckoning, milk and honey ran from his soil. Various geographers gave highly coloured accounts of his territory, which included both the Earthly Paradise and the land of pepper-trees.

The crusades served to bring the two worlds into closer touch, and diffused a taste for oriental luxuries in the West. The rise and enrichment of commercial centres provided the backing necessary for long-distance trading, which was canalized through the ports of Morocco, especially Tunis and Tripoli, and those of the Levant. To the former of these two points of contact the merchants of Europe brought cloth and metalwork and took away gold, thus preserving a balance of exchange. Through the latter highly priced spices, sugar and precious stones were introduced into Europe usually against payment in gold and at enormous profit to the Moslem middlemen, who alone controlled all contacts between Europe and the Orient. The discovery of a sea-route to the sources of production waited on improvements in the arts of navigation and mapmaking, including the invention of the mariners' compass. Perhaps an even stronger obstacle was the simple habit of journeying east to get to the East. Only a nation which had not its gaze fixed on the conventional trade-routes of the Mediterranean could foresee that the nearest seaway to the East lay due south.

Simultaneously with the development of commercial travel there came into existence the spiritual traveller, the missionary. The great Franciscans, Bacon, Llull and Ockham, opened the ancient geographers, discussed nature and the features of the globe, and proposed schemes for

the conquest of the world of Islam. Early in the fourteenth century there were already writers such as Marino Sanuto who amalgamated the spiritual and commercial, urging the Papacy to break the Moslem monopoly by promoting the cultivation of sugar and cotton in Europe. At this period the prices of all oriental wares rose steeply in Europe because of the increased perils to commerce from Turks and corsairs.

Portugal was much more favoured by her situation than by her commercial development to be the forerunner to the East; perhaps the prosperous banking and mercantile centres of Italy or the North would not have displayed the patience of the Portuguese explorers, whose earlier voyages promised little reward. On the other hand the Peninsular states had had close experience of Moslem civilization, and absorbed the scientific teaching of the Arabs through the medium of Toledo. The Portuguese, closer to the vast and mysterious Atlantic, perhaps lacked the fears and inhibitions that handicapped those who were used to the comparative security of the Mediterranean.

Since the early days of the monarchy, contact of Portugal with the outside world had been largely by sea. The importance of the pilgrim route to Palestine profoundly affected the Reconquest, and the first Portuguese ships were probably developed on the models of crusading vessels. Already in the time of Afonso Henriques, D. Fuas Roupinho is said to have commanded a fleet of galleys against the Moors; 1 somewhat later Sancho I beleaguered Silves by sea. Afonso III ordered the construction of numerous vessels in Lisbon; his son Denis brought the Genoese admiral Pessanha to Portugal and took such measures as the plantation of the pine-forests of Leiria, which supplied timber for ship-building. Thus in the reign of his successor the earliest voyages of discovery took place from Portugal. Just before 1336 an early expedition reached the Canaries and in 1341 another, of which there exists an account, introduced horses to the islands and returned with a few natives and some goatskins, fish-oil, woods and dyes. The earliest Catalan voyage to the same islands dates from 1342. Henceforth the Madeiran and Azorean islands appear on maps, though no attempt was made to colonize them for some eighty years.

ii. PRINCE HENRY THE NAVIGATOR. The third son of John I and Philippa of Lancaster was born on March 4, 1394 at Oporto. Before his death in 1460, though he himself never travelled farther than Ceuta and Tangier, he had planned and seen the execution of the discovery of the West African coast probably as far as 8° latitude north—and, as he had declared, 'not only did he desire to have knowledge of that land, but also of the Indies and the land of Prester John, if such might be'.

¹ Cf. Capt. Faria de Morais, História da marinha portuguesa, 1, Lisbon, 1940, pp. 135-6.

A scientific nature and a monastic and evangelical vocation attracted him to the task to which he devoted his life. Already at the siege of Ceuta he had distinguished himself by fighting for five hours under an African sun, and on later occasions he displayed the physical and mental austerity which were the mainsprings of the voyages of discovery in long travel without rest and sleepless nights of study. The firmness with which he refused to yield up Ceuta in exchange for his youngest brother, and his failure to protect D. Pedro from the schemes of the Bragança branch suggest a certain harshness of principle and a lack of humanity, but the chronicler Azurara testifies to his natural kindliness towards his companions. His passion for discovery and for religion was not incompatible with a phlegmatic temperament, detachment and a certain subjugation of human values to his aims. His interest in learning is testified by his regard for the welfare of Lisbon University, 'desiring the wellbeing and increase of these realms, and especially in wisdom, whence all good springs'. It was in this spirit that he laboured himself, and gathered round, him collaborators of many races, not only Jews, Italians and northerners, but also Moors and negroes, who brought him descriptions of their countries or those they had seen. His navigators included among many others António da Nola, of Genoa, and the Venetian Cadamosto. One of the most important figures of his retinue was that of his cartographer Jaime de Mayorca, identified with Jaffudo Cresques, son of Abraham, the author of the Atlas of c. 1375, by whom the knowledge of the early Catalan explorers seems to have been put at Prince Henry's disposal.

The motives which guided the Navigator are given by the chronicler Azurara under five heads: first, to explore the African coast beyond the Canaries and a cape called Bojador 'because at that time it was not known definitely what sort of land lay beyond that cape, either by writing or by the memory of man'; secondly, to find whether or no there were Christian peoples in Africa with whom it might be possible to do trade; thirdly, to find how far the territories of the Moors extended, 'since every sensible man out of natural prudence wishes to know the power of his enemy'; fourthly, to see if it was possible to find a Christian kingdom, that for love of Our Lord Jesus Christ would help in that war; and fifthly, to extend the Holy Faith of Jesus Christ, and bring into it all souls that wished to find salvation.

There is no reason to reject any of these five motives, though much has been done in the way of interpreting them. The first aim, as stated by Azurara, seems to be purely scientific, the second is economic, the third military, the fourth political, and the fifth religious. It is probable that all these were in Prince Henry's mind. Recently there has been a

tendency to emphasize the economic principle: but it seems doubtful whether Prince Henry himself, though he participated in the African trade, intended to do more than make his explorations contribute to pay for themselves. If we must choose a dominant theme in Prince Henry's plans, it was probably the destruction of Islam in Africa. The conquest of Ceuta seemed to open the way to a great enterprise which should reverse the Moslem invasion of the Peninsula in 711: the discoveries, as they were first conceived, were designed to forward this aim, though they were not limited to it.

iii. FIRST DISCOVERIES: THE CANARIES, MADEIRA, THE AZORES AND AFRICAN COAST TO CAPE BRANCO, TO 1441. The date of the earliest expeditions of Prince Henry is not precisely known. Whilst Azurara declares that Gil Eanes reached the Canaries after twelve years of the infante's work in 1433, the less reliable Diogo Gomes states that as early as 1415 'a certain noble of the kingdom of Portugal, D. João de Castro...captain of the fleet made by D. Henrique...which infante ever sought to reward illustrious and noble men and to send at his own expense to discover unknown regions...navigating in the Atlantic Sea, discovered an island called Grand Canary'. Meeting with strong currents between this island and another 'beyond Cape Non', he reported the discovery to the prince, who sent out in the following year of 1416 'a noble knight by name Gonçalo Velho' to discover the cause of these currents. Gonçalo Velho passed beyond the Canaries and reached a place 'now called Terra Alta' (near Cape Bojador). Before accepting this account, it is necessary to recall that the expedition of D. Fernando de Castro to the Grand Canary did not take place until 1424, and it seems possible that Diogo Gomes, writing in 1482, should have been guilty of a confusion. Nevertheless João de Barros refers to the first expeditions as before the capture of Ceuta in 1415.

The first undertaking of which there is definite record is that organized by Prince Henry and performed by João Gonçalves Zarco and Tristão Vaz Teixeira in 1418: on this occasion the island of Porto Santo was visited, and in the following year Madeira. The date of the colonization of these islands by Bartolomeu Perestrelo and others is given by Azurara as 1420 and in Prince Henry's will as 1425.

According to the contemporary account of Azurara, the exploration of the West Coast was attempted from 1421, when the Majorcan cartographer Cresques arrived in Portugal. No appreciable success was gained in the enterprise until 1434. In the meantime, however, progress had been made in the settlement of the Canaries, whither the infante sent an expedition with 2,500 infantry and 120 horsemen in 1424, though because the people were many and the land without forage D. Fernando

de Castro spent little time on this conquest, for also it was very costly to the country, and the passage of the men alone, as we see from the account-books of the kingdom, amounted to 39,000 dobras' (João de Barros). A little later, in 1427 or 1431, the Azores were reached by Portuguese sailors. The islands had been sighted much earlier and are marked on Catalan and Genoese maps of 1351 and 1375. Yet only with the first Portuguese visit by Diogo de Sevilha (Senil) or Gonçalo Velho was the colonization of the archipelago begun in 1445.

In 1434, the year after John I's death, a real beginning was made in the exploration of the west coast of Africa. The terrors of the unknown sea, terrors based on the religious, professional and physical experience of seamen of that and past ages, were somewhat diminished by the achievements of the Azores and the Canaries, but the low African coasts, their frequent storms and gales, towering waves, alternating reefs and dunes and treeless unfriendly shores, offered a formidable obstacle. The limit of southward voyages had been Cape Non, whose very name was a forbidding negative. When this was passed the fifty-three leagues between it and Cape Bojador were no more inviting. In 1433 Gil Eanes tried to pass the bulge of Cape Bojador in vain, but in the following year he doubled it, and the stretch of never-ending coastline opened out again. Fifty leagues more, as far as Angra dos Ruivos, were covered in 1436 reached Angra dos Cavalos, where two lads who had gone ashore were chased by natives armed with spears, and proceeded to Rio de Ouro, which he named so from the belief that he had reached the mouth of the Gold River, the Senegal. On this occasion a beetling rock like a ship's prow, called the Galley Stone, was the limit of the voyage—the last undertaking for an interval of four years during which Prince Henry was engaged in the expedition to Tangier and internal affairs consequent on the death of King Duarte.

When the explorations were resumed in 1440, a new type of vessel of Portuguese contrivance was put into use. The older ships, the varinel, combining oars and sails and therefore low and heavily manned, and the barca, slow and difficult to handle, were replaced by the caravel, light, long and high. The necessity of coasting was now eliminated, and full advantage of prevailing winds was gained by returning over the open sea. Two captains, Nuno Tristão and Antão Gonçalves, set out in 1441, and while the former reached Cape Branco, the latter brought back the first captives. An Azenegue or Moorish chief, Adahur, gave the infante much valuable information about the caravan routes and commerce of the West Coast, and in the following year Gonçalves returned and exchanged a number of Moorish captives for negroes and gold dust.

The first-fruits of the enterprise were rewarded by Eugene IV, who conceded plenary indulgence to all those who should die in Africa, and by the Regent D. Pedro, who in 1443 gave his brother first a monopoly of commerce with the lands discovered under his auspices, and secondly permission to build for himself a town 'on the other cape that is before the Cape of Sagres to those who go from west to east'—in other words on Cape St Vincent. The Vila do Infante, of which there is now no trace, does not seem to have been built at once: meanwhile the infante resided at Raposeira near Sagres, 'being remote from the tumult of people and propitious for the contemplation of study'.

iv. voyages of discovery from 1443 to 1469; death of prince HENRY, 1460. Prince Henry's base was the bay of Lagos, which developed into a commercial port, an experimental station, and a slave-exchange. From 1443, when the ships under the infante's fiscal officer Lançarote sailed as far as Arguim and brought back 275 captives, negroes entered Portugal in sufficient numbers to relieve the perpetual handicap of lack of agricultural labour. Not only were they welcomed by the civil authorities, but the Church, having taken the line that only Christians were admissible to salvation, logically preferred to have them redeemed as converted serfs than damned as free savages. Nuno Tristão reached the Isle of Arguim in 1443 and the Senegambia in 1444. At the same time Denis Dias passed Cape Verde, and a certain squire of Prince Henry's, João Fernandes, a linguist, was landed among the Azenegues, where he spent seven months getting information about the district, people and possibilities of trade. In the following two years Álvaro Fernandes, a nephew of Gonçalves Zarco, sailed 110 leagues south of Cape Verde, a performance which was rewarded with gifts of a hundred dobras each from Prince Henry and the regent.

In the first years of the forties Portuguese-African goods appeared on the European market: parrots, monkeys and lion-cubs could be obtained from Portuguese merchants at Bruges and became fashionable luxuries. The establishment of trading-posts on the African coast dates from 1448 or 1449, when the infante gave orders for a fort to be made on the island of Arguim. The Venetian Cadamosto, who saw the station some six years later, describes its activities. It had been let to private persons on a ten-year lease; many caravels came out every year and took back 700 or 800 slaves and gold, which were paid for in corn, cloth and horses. Diogo Gomes adds that the natives brought cotton and silk to barter.

In 1448 Azurara's account comes to an end, and apart from the documented voyages of Cadamosto, there is only piece-meal evidence of the last twelve years of Prince Henry's work. Commerce with the West Coast was well under way, and brought in wealth not only to the infante

but also to the crown, which despatched its own caravels. Nevertheless vast sums continued to be expended on the work of discovery: in 1454 Prince Henry received from the state a provision of sixteen contos—more than ten times as much as the queen herself—yet at the time of his death he was deeply involved in debts to the monastery of Alcobaça, Jews, the Count of Arraiolos and the crown. Whilst a great part of this wealth was possibly swallowed up by the cost of expeditions to the Canaries at the time of the dispute over their possession with Castile (1450–1454), it seems likely that, in pursuit of his dream of reaching India, he had sent his caravels as far as the Gulf of Guinea—'all the land of Barbary, Nubia and so into the land of Guinea well 300 leagues', as he wrote in 1458. On September 18, 1460, a bare two months before his death, he granted the spiritual dominion of the five newly discovered Cape Verde Islands to the Order of Christ, and the temporal to the crown.

In the decade that followed the death-of-the infante, his work was continued by his nephew D. Fernando. Pedro de Sintra reached Sierra Leone and only turned back at the Wood of St Mary beyond Cape Mesurado, and in 1469 Afonso V leased the trading monopoly to the Guinea gulf to a rich Lisbon merchant, Fernão Gomes, with the condition that a hundred leagues of coast be opened up every year: in this way the Portuguese reached Mina, the island of Fernão do Pó, named after its discoverer, and having already crossed the equator (Lopo Gonçalves), the islands of São Tomé and Príncipe.

v. COLONIZATION OF THE ATLANTIC ISLANDS. The first attempt at settlement took place either on Madeira or the Canaries. According to Diogo Gomes the attempt on Grand Canary took place as early as 1415, but the expedition of Fernando de Castro of 1424 is the first of which there is a confirmed record. After Gil Eanes had brought captives from the Canaries, the Castilian crown claimed sovereignty of the islands: although in 1446 the regent still guaranteed to Prince Henry the monopoly and protection of the Canaries, the group was at length adjudicated to Castile by the treaty of 1479.

Porto Santo and Madeira, found in 1418 and 1419, were settled between 1420 and 1425. When Azurara wrote his chronicle there were already 150 heads of families there, and Cadamosto found four settlements, one of 800 persons, in 1445. Madeira early began the export of wood, wax, honey and sugar. The sugar-cane, introduced from Sicily, developed rapidly and brought in a considerable income to the Order of Christ: its production brought down the price of sugar in Europe by perhaps a half in the latter part of the fifteenth century. In 1493 there were 80 factory-managers on the island, and because of the slump it was

necessary to limit production to 120,000 arrobas a year, of which 40,000 were for the Flanders market. Nevertheless, the price again fell: some fifty years before an arroba of Sicilian sugar had cost 1,080 reis, now the same quantity of Madeira sugar sold at only 300.

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The Azores, Cape Verdes, São Tomé and later Brazil adopted the same system of sugar-cultivation. The former group, which Afonso V authorized Prince Henry to people in 1439, were eventually settled with not only Portuguese, but groups of Flemings, Germans, convicts and Moors. According to Diogo Gomes cattle and sheep multiplied so rapidly that large quantities were soon reimported into Portugal. The first of the Cape Verde archipelago to be settled was Santiago. São Tomé was settled by slaves and Jewish children separated from their parents at the time of the expulsion (1493).

CHAPTER XIII

THE FORTUNES OF THE NEW ORDER

i. DUARTE, THE PHILOSOPHER-KING, 1433—1438. The five brothers in whose hands the future of Portugal lay on the death of John of Avis, presented a great and varied array of talents. Any one of them, it seemed, would have sufficed to make an able king, but by a strange combination of circumstances their great talents, with one tremendous exception, did not bear fruit.

Duarte, the heir, was now a man of forty-two, well cultured in the classics and in the fathers of the church, sensitive and conscientious to the point of morbidity. Not only his 'melancholic humour' but his passionate attachment to his wife and brothers put him at the mercy of his own virtues. When his father died, he was so overcome with grief that long persuasion by his brother Pedro was necessary before he would appear to assume his duties. In spite of his experience—he had shared in the government for many years-Duarte's faculty for action was paralysed by his hypersensitive conscience. It is as a man of letters, the author of the Loyal Counsellor, rather than as a king, that he is remembered. Pedro, famous as a traveller to the 'seven parts of the earth', was perhaps best adapted for the task of government. As king he might have ruled with distinction; as regent, he was the target of his enemies' hatred, and for him was reserved a dark fate. The third brother, Prince Henry, early displayed the scientific detachment that carried him away to dwell at the end of Europe to devise fresh discoveries. His temperament was that of a mediator, cool and disinterested, and after he had tried in vain to serve in this capacity he lost interest in the affairs of the court and followed his own specialized calling. Probably his ill-fated expedition to Tangier, in which his youngest brother Fernando was captured and perished, followed by the prolonged wrangling on which Fernando's life depended, deepened his detachment. Of Prince John, the fifth brother, little is heard except as a private individual. To complete the 'inclita geração' there was a princess, Isabel, who married Philip the Good, Duke of Burgundy, in Bruges in 1429.1

Duarte was shriven and confessed to prepare for his accession on

¹ John I had altogether ten children. Of those by Philippa of Lancaster two died in infancy, and the rest were Duarte (born in 1391), Pedro (1392), Henrique (1394), Isabel (1397), João (1400), Fernando (1402). Before his marriage John had had two natural children, Afonso and Beatriz. Of these the first married Brites Pereira, daughter of Nun' Alvares, and was created Count of Barcelos; and the second married Thomas Fitzalan, Earl of Arundel, in 1405.

August 15, 1433. A little before the ceremony, while he was donning his robes of state, his Jewish physician and astrologer, Mestre Guedalha, besought him to defer the proclamation, since the day was of 'very sad constellation, with Jupiter retrograde and the sun in decline'. Duarte refused to postpone the occasion, and the astrologer foretold a short reign 'of many adversities'.

Duarte's first adviser was his brother Pedro, whose experience made him realize the dangerous indecision of the new king's character. 'Because, Sire,' he enjoined him, 'they will make you many very discordant requests and petitions, and will give you counsels in many things and in many ways, it is necessary to consider with great discretion; and the things that do not clearly appear good and reasoned, neither grant nor decide them at once; and those that certainly do not appear bad and unreasoned, do not deny, but put them off so as later, with more repose and less fatigue, to determine them as you ought.'

At the beginning of the reign cortes were called at Santarém, at which King Duarte ordered the revision of the laws, under the supervision of the jurisconsult João Mendes. The two compilations due to King Duarte, the Ordenações de D. Duarte and Livro das leis e posturas, prepared the way for the important work of his son's reign, the Ordenações Afonsinas. Of the laws of King Duarte, the most important is the Lei Mental, so called because it was supposed to have been in King John's mind at the time of his death, although not published by him. It was intended to solve the problem caused by the too generous provision the founder of the house of Avis had made for his supporters. The new landed class formed of his early followers had been created at the expense of the royal possessions and of the annual revenue of the country, which was much impaired by the loss of taxation on John's donations. To remedy this it was declared that John had never intended to make these gifts absolute, but that all grants made by the crown must be inalienable and indivisible, and revert to it in default of a legitimate male heir. The Mental Law governed the system of morgados, or royal grants, until its abolition in 1832.

ii. THE DISASTER OF TANGIER, 1437. The campaign of Tangier was the result of the desire for religious and imperial expansion nursed by Prince Henry. By this time a considerable part of his life-work of exploration was done: already the Azores and Madeira groups were colonized, and Gil Eanes had passed Cape Bojador. There was still no sign of the hoped-for Christian prince who might assist in the war against the infidel, and there were those in Portugal who believed that the cost of holding Ceuta was excessive, and that any further commitments in North Africa would be disastrous. Henry himself seems to

¹ Crónica de El-Rei D. Duarte, ch. 1.

have held that the defence of Ceuta was costly because the conquest had never been extended: in any case, his crusading ardour was undiminished. His brother, Prince Fernando, the youngest of the sons of John and Philippa—he was now thirty-four, and Prince Henry forty-two—was deeply conscious of his youthfulness, which had prevented his taking part in the expedition against Ceuta. Naturally religious, earnest and brave, though physically frail, it was he who proposed to King Duarte an attack on Morocco. The chronicler, Rui de Pina, translates his spirit well in the words 'I am a youth who has as yet done nothing for himself wherefore he should dare to call himself the son of such a father or the brother of such brothers:...in that undertaking [of Ceuta] you earned and received the honour of knighthood that you have; whereas I alone. older than you were then, have it not and see no hope of it.' King Duarte hesitated to give his consent, but Prince Henry enlisted the aid of the queen, and early in 1436 the king gave way and agreed to put before the cortes held that year at Évora a request for financial support for the enterprise. It was granted, not apparently with great good-will. There followed a council-meeting at Leiria, in which two of the princes argued against the expedition: Prince John with circumspection and impartiality, and Pedro with clear emphasis on the risks involved. The king was driven back on the indecision of his character so far as to write to Rome for advice about the legitimacy of the war and of the taxation necessary for it. Before the reply came, the queen had again persuaded him, and preparations were completed for departure in August 1437. The disaster was short and sharp: a strong force of Saracens cut off the Portuguese from their ships, and Prince Fernando was captured with a large part of his men.

Negotiations were at once begun. The Moslems made it clear that they would only exchange the captured prince for the town of Ceuta, an offer which Henry accepted. When the news reached Portugal, Duarte's impulse was to agree, but it was necessary to refer to cortes. Pedro, John and others opposed the territorial concession. Others, including the Archbishop of Braga, held that Ceuta could not be given up without the pope's assent. More were in favour of a new war in North Africa; many others were undecided. At length the majority held that Ceuta could not be ceded. The meeting broke up, and the court travelled to Évora. Prince Henry returned from Africa: his view was now that they should try to obtain Fernando's release by an offer of money and captives, or by sending a new expedition to Africa; but that Ceuta should not be surrendered. The hope of recovering the prince by means of a new expedition was much reduced by his removal to the city of Fez.

Meanwhile, plague broke out in Évora and the court separated, Duarte and his family moving to Tomar. Here on September 9, 1438, the king died, a victim of the infection, and of grief that he had been able to find no remedy to the disaster of Tangier.

Still unransomed, Fernando, the *Infante Santo*, died after innumerable sufferings in Fez in June 1443.

iii. THE REGENCIES OF QUEEN LEONOR AND D. PEDRO, 1438–1448; ALFARROBEIRA, 1449. Ill-fortune had indeed descended upon the sons of John I. The eldest was dead after a reign of five years; the youngest experienced a living death, for which Prince Henry bore the responsibility. Now, about the person of the six-year-old Afonso V, a triple struggle began between the queen-mother, D. Pedro, and the ambitious illegitimate line of Barcelos, fought to a bitter end at Alfarrobeira. Afonso V, the first heir to the Portuguese throne to be called prince after the English fashion established by Edward I, was crowned in accordance with the English coronation rite, the copy of which still exists at Évora. This time the acclamation was favoured by the stars, for Mestre Guedalha 'regulated according to the influences and courses of the planets the best hour and point'.¹

By the late king's will, Queen Leonor was entrusted with the sole regency of the kingdom, including the tutelage of the royal family, with an injunction to ransom or recover Fernando and his fellow-captives. D. Pedro had hitherto been the member of the family in closest contact with the king, and many hoped that he would have been associated in the regency, mistrusting Queen Leonor as a woman, an Aragonese and an enemy of his. It was pointed out to her that the country would prefer to see one or more of the three remaining princes in power, and she had apparently reached the point of assenting to a voluntary resignation when counsel was delivered by friends of the Barcelos faction against allowing D. Pedro to govern, powerful and popular as he was.

Inexperience of affairs, however, drove the queen to seek the princes' help. At this time there arrived an embassy from Castile to discuss various points and demand an indemnity for the seizure of some ships by Portuguese. The distant prospect of hostilities brought the queen, D. Pedro and Prince Henry amicably together. D. Pedro's suggestion that the second son of D. Duarte should be recognized as heir apparent was a precaution that so pleased the queen-mother that she spontaneously informed D. Pedro of her readiness to comply with a last wish of the late king—that Afonso V should marry D. Pedro's daughter Isabel. The hatred and envy of D. Pedro's enemies at once flared up, especially that of Afonso, Count of Barcelos, whose ambition it was to see his own

¹ Rui de Pina, Crónica de El-Rei D. Afonso V, ch. 11.

granddaughter, the daughter of Prince John, married to the young king. Aware of this jealousy, D. Pedro took the precaution of asking the queen to put in writing the marriage she had proposed, which, says the chronicler, she willingly did. After the burial of D. Duarte at Alcobaca in the last days of October, cortes assembled in the town of Tôrres Novas, where the enemies of D. Pedro collected and swore to see the conditions of Duarte's will fulfilled to the letter, pretending to stand for the interests of Queen Leonor against the king's uncle, who they said had only the backing of a band of plebeians. Their claim to represent the nation deceived the queen-mother, though she at least tried to secure a composition through the good offices of Prince Henry, offering D. Pedro the title of Defender of the Realm and judicial authority, while retaining herself the control of finances and of the education of the princes. But by the following day Queen Leonor's mind had already been changed for her. The Barcelos party emphasized the perils of the offer, and she withdrew it. The cortes were divided. As on the death of Fernando, legality seemed to conflict with expediency, and the oaths of barons, whatever their individual worth, were hard to break in public assembly. It was Prince Henry who tried to elaborate a working compromise. After a fortnight's discussion he divided the administration into six branches: tutelage of the king and royal family; treasury; royal council; justice; defence, and the problem of Ceuta and the captives in Africa. To the queen he assigned the care of the children and the appointment of officers at court. Defence would be in the hands of D. Pedro, and justice in those of the son of Barcelos, the Count of Arraiolos. For the rest he devised a council of nine members, six appointed and three, one of each estate, elected annually by cortes. All business would pass through the hands of these nine, and their decisions would be signed by both the queen and the Duke of Coimbra. A small form of cortes, composed of selected dignitaries and citizens, would meet annually.

The arrangement was a remarkable application of the Navigator's methodical mind, but his contemporaries did not possess his own detachment. Leonor, urged by her supporters, would now have no dealings with Pedro. His followers, notably the procurators of the towns, offered him full obedience and urged him openly to take power. The tumultuous state of the people and their decided opposition to herself alarmed Leonor to the extent of ordering Prince Henry's composition to be brought, and formally signing it. The representatives of the kingdom, with the exception of the Archbishop of Lisbon, Barcelos' brother-in-law, swore to observe it. But Barcelos himself was not the man to let a check deter him. There remained the question of the king's marriage, and he persuaded Leonor to ask D. Pedro for the return of the written undertaking.

Barcelos himself went to D. Pedro to ask for the document, which the prince tore across and handed over to his enemy.

The tense situation continued until August 1439. In March the queen gave birth to a daughter, the future Queen Joana, wife of Henry IV of Castile. The birth of this child and the death of her eldest sister of plague caused great delays and confusion in the despatch of official business. As Defender of the Realm D. Pedro was impotent to intervene, and chafed. He resolved to give up his 'little office' and retire to his estates. His counsellors and his brother John recommended him to take the regency: if he did not, they must. The turmoil of Lisbon demanded a response.

Queen Leonor herself gave two further pretexts for discontent by dismissing two of her ladies and refusing to take another on grounds that their families were supporters of her brother-in-law, and by rewarding the king's tutor in a decree which she failed to have countersigned by D. Pedro. Queen Leonor, alarmed at the resentment and unrest of Lisbon, asked the advice of the Count of Arraiolos, who proposed assembling the populace before the monastery of São Domingos and regaling them with a sermon by a good preacher on the duty of obedience. The moral lesson was ill-received. Such was the indignation of the audience that the good preacher was obliged to descend from the pulpit in the full flight of his exhortation and take refuge in the church. The crowd demanded the expulsion of the unlucky monk and threatened to fire the building, but the Duke of Coimbra intervened and urged the people to keep their complaints for the cortes.

Messengers were now sent secretly by the queen, bidding the nobles present themselves armed at the following cortes. Pedro, learning of this, expressed his indignation to the Count of Arraiolos who, well aware that the queen had miscalculated, urged her to revoke the order. She promised, but did not fulfil. Prince John again pressed Pedro to take power, but he refused until the support of the cortes should be given. As Defender, he agreed to warn the cities and towns of the queen's instructions to the nobility, after which he retired to Coimbra, taking his leave of the little king and warning the queen that 'hitherto she had had him as she would, but henceforth she should take him as she found him'.1

The Lisboners selected Álvaro Vaz de Almada, Pedro's close friend and counsellor, as their captain, making clear the side they supported. At a meeting in São Domingos, they acknowledged Pedro's regency and not only bound their representatives to demand his election at the coming cortes but appointed Prince Henry and Prince John as his successors. Prince Henry, a model of caution, blamed them for having decided before cortes had met. The queen at Alenquer, aware of the probable result of

¹ Rui de Pina, Crónica de El-Rei D. Afonso V, ch. xxx.

this popular movement, warned her followers to absent themselves from the cortes. Numbers of nobles and churchmen obeyed. The Archbishop of Lisbon, having aroused the wrath of the inhabitants by apparently warlike preparations, fled to Castile. When the queen's followers began to amass arms in Lisbon, the municipality appealed to Prince John, who demanded the keys of the castle as a pledge of non-violence, and Leonor, refusing, offered him the regency and the marriage of the young king to one of his own daughters—the original desire of the Barcelos party. John did not consent, and the queen next applied to Prince Henry for an alliance, but Pedro had forestalled her. The two brothers met at Coimbra, where they were joined by Barcelos, perhaps already playing a double game. He, at any rate, was sent to Alenquer to persuade the queen to attend cortes, to which she agreed provided that the unauthorized declaration in favour of D. Pedro be annulled. Pedro refused to take any responsibility for this action, in which the towns had not consulted him. Barcelos at once departed for the north, where he met the queen's partisans, including the Archbishop of Braga, who agreed not to appear at cortes, leaving him to represent them. The result of the cortes was clearly foreseen. Pedro was chosen as sole regent: all those present but the Count of Arraiolos, Barcelos' second son, recognized the selection. Prince Henry—but only after two months—succeeded in persuading Queen Leonor to allow the king to confirm the decision.

But a complete break with Leonor was not far away. At the end of the cortes it was suggested that the two princes be handed over to the regent for their education, lest their mother should bring them up womanishly or prejudice them against him. D. Pedro, according to the chronicler, was reluctant to agree to this, but the measure was forcibly insisted on, and he at last suggested that the queen and he should 'go about the realm together'. This indeed seemed a necessary precaution; the court was still nomadic, and it would be safer to have the persuasible queen with the government than at the mercy of her followers' counsel. She herself strongly opposed this. She would take the education of the children and the treasury, or nothing. Left with the second alternative, she retired to the palace of Sintra.

Dispossessed of power, the queen was reduced to conspiracy, and sought to make contact with political allies in Castile. To lull suspicions, she feigned an understanding with the regent. D. Pedro ordered general rejoicings for the composition of past differences to the good of the kingdom, with the result that numbers of nobles of the queen's party were deceived into thinking the peace a sincere one and prepared to come to terms. Barcelos recommended Leonor to go to his estates in Beira whilst he provoked a rising. But 'at that time though the nobles

were strong, yet they were not strong enough to oppose the will of the sons and grandsons of King John'.

But Leonor's intrigues had one effect. In October 1440 an embassy arrived from Castile with a number of provocative demands—the return of ships alleged to have been seized, the reappointment of the queen as regent, with authority from the king for her to go to Castile until all was quiet in Portugal, and finally the surprising request that the Castilian ambassadors be allowed to go to all the chief cities and towns of Portugal to explain publicly the queen's rights. The embassy professed itself dissatisfied with the Portuguese offer to send a mission with the replies, and produced a fresh sheaf of instructions only two days after the refusal. This abnormal rapidity aroused D. Pedro's suspicion that the letters had not come from Castile, a suspicion that he was later able to verify. Juan had not sent the letters: their authoress was Queen Leonor, who now departed clandestinely for Crato, where she found some of her supporters. Hastily the princes manned the frontiers and cut off supplies from Crato. On December 29, 1440 the queen crossed into Castile.

Again a settlement appeared to have been reached in internal affairs. When the prospect of civil war approached, Barcelos at once submitted, embraced the Regent and received pardon. It seemed then that the only danger was from Castile, where Leonor's brothers-in-law demanded indemnity and the threat of war was used (1442). The reverse was the case: in Castile the influence of Leonor's relatives was waning, and she herself applied to return to Portugal in 1444 as the 'younger sister' of the Regent, but she died in the following year at Toledo. Nevertheless in Portugal the settlement was a mere illusion.

D. Pedro availed himself of the opportunity of arranging the marriage between his daughter Isabel and the king. An oral dispensation from Pope Eugene IV was brought to him just before Queen Leonor's flight from Crato—delivered in secrecy to avoid offending Castile, which had been requested to impede its execution by Leonor. The popularity of D. Pedro was doubtless strengthened by the attempted interference of the Castilian embassy, which tried to rehabilitate Queen Leonor under threat of war in 1442. The firm answer of the cortes of Évora reduced the Castilian demand to one of indemnity, the discussion of which D. Pedro indefinitely delayed. So far in fact from war with Castile, D. Pedro was able to take advantage of circumstances by despatching his fifteen-year-old son the Constable Pedro with military aid to help Juan II against the rebellious infantes of Castile. Although young Pedro arrived too late for the battle of Olmedo, he was well received by Juan II and probably contracted friendships that stood him in good stead in the time of his exile.

The elevation of the Regent's son to the post of Constable was one of the causes of the recommencement of internal strife. The Count of Ourém, Barcelos' son, had claimed that it was hereditary in his family from Nun'Álvares Pereira, and though he was given the Mastership of Santiago on the death of Prince John in 1442, he remained dissatisfied. In vain D. Pedro pointed out that he had made Ourém's father Duke of Bragança, on whose death he would be duke and thrice a count: the enmity of Ourém was 'the principal cause of the death and destruction of the Infante D. Pedro'.

In January 1446 the king reached his legal majority at fourteen, and formally assented to his marriage with his cousin Isabel. He asked his uncle to retain administrative power until he himself should feel more prepared to use it. The Bragança opposition found the youthful king a good subject for their influence: he had inherited his father's indecision and his mother's susceptibility to the pressure of others. The struggles over the regency perhaps left their mark on him, for his one desire was to please; the plaything of every present influence, his love of distributing favours and rewards contrasted with the close regard for the royal patrimony that had been exercised by D. Pedro.

The first step was to persuade Afonso to dispense with the services of the Duke of Coimbra. The suggestion was made by the Barcelos party, and Afonso, touched on his pride, told his uncle that he wanted to rule. Without further ado D. Pedro resigned. In 1447 the marriage between the king and Pedro's daughter took place. Already the old Duke of Bragança had moved round the northern provinces, dismissing and insulting Pedro's officers. The next step was to persuade the king to remove his uncle from the court, by force of arms if need be. D. Pedro expressed readiness to retire to his estates at Coimbra. When he had left the court, all his men were soon dismissed. He himself was accused of having poisoned Queen Leonor and his brothers, King Duarte and Prince John, and of having intended to remove the present king and his brother to clear the way to the throne.

One of the Barcelos family, the second son of Arraiolos, stood out for Pedro, but the rest, including the once-banished Archbishop of Lisbon, lent themselves ardently to the work of slander. Pedro's intimate friend, Álvaro Vaz de Almada, the pattern of knighthood of this generation as Nun'Álvares had been in the last, proclaimed Pedro's innocence everywhere, and his position gave him some influence with the young king. Álvaro Vaz had accompanied Pedro on his wanderings, had fought at Agincourt and been made Count of Avranches and Knight of the Garter by Henry V. He was now warned to stay away from meetings of the council. In defiance, he attended and launched a defence of the former

regent, offering to meet any of his detractors in single combat. The meeting was evasive, Afonso deprecating, and no detractor forthcoming: when the court moved to Sintra, Álvaro Vaz was left behind.

With Prince Henry he visited D. Pedro at Coimbra. Afonso had just issued letters to forbid all nobles to visit his uncle, who was now degraded and confined to his estates. Álvaro Vaz was deposed from the governorship of Lisbon castle: Pedro the Constable was relieved of his title. All D. Pedro's arms were demanded: he refused to yield them. His reluctance was soon translated into rebellion. In October 1448 Afonso returned from Sintra to Lisbon. The Count of Ourém persuaded the king to call the Duke of Bragança to court. Pedro was warned of a plot afoot. Álvaro Vaz was for armed resistance, and at length Pedro took up arms and went to Penela. The court, now at Santarém, envisaged civil war; those few of Pedro's friends who had not already been dismissed left to join him. Pedro sent urgently for Prince Henry, who left at once for Santarém. Reason of state was strong with Prince Henry: he had sacrificed his brother Fernando at Tangier, and would have sacrificed himself at the same time. Whatever his attitude, conciliatory presumably, it was not such as to change the course of events.

The Duke of Bragança was travelling southward with his men. Pedro sent a messenger to meet him and welcome him if he brought peace. The answer was evasive: the duke had been ordered by the king to go to Lisbon and would do no harm by the way. But Pedro dared not trust the duke, who was accompanied by an army of sixteen hundred horse, apart from infantry. To learn his enemy's real intentions he arrested a royal messenger. The king at once gave orders to notify D. Pedro that he was deprived of all his estates and must interpose no obstacle to the Duke of Bragança's progress. The messenger, on his return, brought a perverted version of Pedro's words—that he had declared himself to be no vassal of Portugal, but of Castile; that he had got rid of Afonso's mother and would of her brood. Afonso, easily influenced by these forgeries, ordered his uncle to return to Coimbra. He offered to do so, provided the Duke of Bragança did the same. The armies were now a few miles apart, the one at Lousã, the other at Serpins.

On Good Friday 1449 the combat seemed inevitable. Suddenly Bragança's forces retired, crossing the Serra da Estrêla to Covilhã in such cold that the old duke nearly perished and many of his beasts were left in the drifted snow. In Pedro's camp there was rejoicing and disappointment. Pedro, satisfied, dismissed many of his men and withdrew to Coimbra. Bragança's men were fêted in Santarém. The duke and his friends sought to convince the king that the monarchy had been outraged. Prince Henry spoke out plainly, but the intrigue only redoubled. The

little sisters of the king were prompted to scream out for vengeance on 'D. Pedro who murdered their mamma'. Afonso ordered war to be made on D. Pedro.

At Coimbra various plans were considered. Álvaro Vaz proposed to fight, and his counsel was followed. Queen Isabel implored Afonso to spare her father: he consented if D. Pedro would beg his pardon. D. Pedro agreed: he would beg the king's pardon for her sake. The Bragança faction could lead the king by the nose: 'for her sake' they pretended to be an outrageous insult.

D. Pedro marched south to within six leagues of Santarém and spent three days there unopposed. His friends sought to persuade him that he could with honour return, but he was unwilling to do this or to move against the king, and he therefore moved off in the direction of Lisbon. Hostile men appeared. Several prisoners were taken and put to death, an irremediable step which caused some of his followers to desert. On May 20 the royal troops surrounded the wandering force. The king's heralds warned Pedro's followers of the dangers of their allegiance.

The battle began accidentally. Some royal crossbowmen shot into Pedro's camp. He ordered the bombards to be trained against the archers. A missile fell near the royal tent, and the king's army threw itself on D. Pedro's lines. His men were disordered. Pedro, fighting on foot, was shot through the heart by an arrow. Álvaro Vaz de Almada had sworn not to survive him and met his death a little later. The battle of Alfarrobeira ended the civil conflict. It brought the bastard line into virtual control of the kingdom; not until the time of John II did the royal house re-establish itself.¹

The successful conspirators attempted to separate the king and queen, by bribing the royal physicians to declare her influence harmful to him and by throwing disgrace upon her. But there was a limit to Afonso's weakness; he refused to heed those consellors who wished him to seek divorce. Materially, however, the conspirators reaped a rich reward. Bragança was given the city of Guimarãis and would have had Oporto if the inhabitants had not protested. This excessive power of the house of Bragança produced the troubles of the following reign.

iv. Afonso v, 1438–1481. Of the sons of John I only Prince Henry the Navigator now survived. There had been a pause in the progress of the discoveries since 1446, and no further attempt had been made in Morocco

¹ The family of the dead Regent did not escape persecution. His eldest son Pedro the Constable became a wandering exile in Castile. The author of several poetical works of a moral and philosophical character, he was allowed to return to Portugal in 1461. Two years later he was offered the kingdom of Catalonia, which he accepted. The claim was contested and he died of consumption in the midst of strife in 1466. Of his brothers, Jaime took refuge with his aunt in Burgundy and eventually became a cardinal, and João became King of Cyprus through his marriage to Charlotte de Lusignan.

after the disaster of Tangier in 1437. It is unlikely that the Navigator lost any of his crusading zeal during these years, but his influence must have been considerably impaired: while Fernando languished in Fez, the question of responsibilities in the capitulation before Tangier was a living issue, and one which sufficed to confuse Portugal's whole policy in North Africa.

The impulse for a new attempt in Morocco came from outside. After the fall of Constantinople Rome endeavoured to promote a general crusade against Islam, and Afonso V promised his support. Preparations had already been begun when it became clear that the Papacy could not unite the necessary forces; and, with or without the intervention of Prince Henry, Afonso was persuaded to make a descent on the coast of Africa. In 1458 the crossing was made with about twenty-five thousand men, and Alcácer-Seghir was captured and garrisoned: under its governor Duarte de Meneses it withstood two prolonged sieges by the King of Fez. Afonso V, whose ambition was to outshine the feat of his grandfather before Ceuta, was a little mortified to find how much smaller was Alcácer.

He himself took little part in the discoveries; nevertheless Prince Henry was given official support for the continuance of the voyages in the shape of a payment to the Order of Christ of five per cent (vintena) on all merchandise or slaves coming from below Cape Non. The Navigator did not long survive this measure of assistance. Still working in his own town, the Vila do Infante by the promontory of Sagres, he died in 1460.

Afonso V introduced two new titles into Portugal, those of baron and marquis, the latter as an honour for the eldest son of the Duke of Bragança. The Bragança family indeed took full advantage of the victory of Alfarrobeira, extracting plentiful titles as well as lands from the monarchy. An even more scandalous case was that of D. Jorge da Costa, Cardinal of Alpedrinha, who succeeded in amalgamating in his own person the three archbishoprics of Braga, Lisbon and Évorá, the bishopric of Coimbra, the priories of Crato and Guimarãis, the abbacy of São João de Tarouca, and finally in ousting the Abbot of Alcobaça and assuming full rights over the greatest monastery in the kingdom.

Afonso's munificence was the cause of complaints at the cortes of Lisbon in 1460, where he was requested 'to have a firmer hand in the affairs of the crown with which he should sustain his estate as his predecessors had done, and not give them away with such freedom and so unnecessarily'. A lump sum was voted to him on condition he swore to decrease his extravagance, an oath which was taken, but not kept. Soon

¹ Rui de Pina, Crónica de El-Rei D. Afonso V, ch. CXLIII.



III. PART OF THE TRIPTYCHS OF NUNO GONÇALVES: The Portuguese royal family adoring St Vincent: the kneeling figure with a large round-brimmed hat is Prince Henry the Navigator

CESTA HE AFIGYRA DOCONDE ESTABRE, AO NATVR AL QUANDOESTAVA EMRELIGI AM, NOCARMODELIXBOA, ONDEIAZ



ERTA-HIVIA AD BEN'S TAWALNA,

ILLE COMEST-ABLES BENGANTI, ROMBINS AUTHOR

HINNIUS A PIEST DIX RANNAIUS HIC, MONACIUS GI, ERCATUS


GIA REGNUM, ASSEUTI VIUENS, SORTIBUS IN CERUM

CERLUM CUIM, SUPBRIT, NAR, POST NUMERORA, PROFUGA,

BEIGGT POMPAS, HUMILSO, EX PRINCIPE PACTUS,

HOC TERMALMA POSTIT, COLUTT, CENSUM 41, DECUTT

IVa. NUN' ÁLVARES PEREIRA The Holy Constable



Gernettzu Mumbergbegelhame Wazel Zerrichneden.

IVb. KING JOHN III

after, Afonso wished to make a new attempt on Tangier, but unable to ask openly for the heavy additional expenditure, declared first that his brother was going on a minor expedition and gradually increased the scale of preparations until the announcement that he himself intended to share in it exacted no opposition. Although he spent from November 1463 until Easter of the following year in Africa, his three attempts against Tangier proved unavailing, and the campaign culminated in a profitless excursion into the mountains. Afonso seemed to have little fortune in North Africa: Ceuta and Alcácer were held only by dint of endless fighting, and no progress appeared to have been made towards dealing a blow at the heart of Islam.

Only in 1471 did the situation change. The confusion surrounding the end of the Merinid dynasty in Fez provided a favourable occasion for a new attempt. Afonso V gathered together the largest expedition yet taken to Africa—30,000 men according to Rui de Pina—and was able to reduce the town of Arzila: to his surprise, Tangier was at once evacuated by its Moslem inhabitants, and Portugal was left with a firm foothold on the North African coast. By agreement with the much weakened power of Fez Portugal's possession was recognized down to the river Lukkus, where an unsuccessful attempt was made to establish the fortress of Graciosa in the following reign. Afonso V took the title of 'King of Portugal and of the Algarves on this side and beyond the sea in Africa': to the chroniclers he became 'Afonso the African'.

v. THE CASTILIAN SUCCESSION; AFONSO IN FRANCE. Soon after the fall of D. Pedro, Afonso V had arranged the marriages of his two sisters, the one with Frederick III of Germany, and the other, Joana, with Henry IV of Castile. This second union was the first step in a series of movements towards Peninsular unification that culminated in the disastrous events of 1580.

Princess Joana and her ladies showed, in the eyes at least of the rather partisan Castilian chronicler, an unprecedented immodesty in their shameless dress and manners, constant conversations with gallants, paints and perfumes, and go-betweens with coarse notes. It was widely believed that her husband was impotent. His first wife, Blanca of Navarre, had asserted it when she was repudiated on his allegation of barrenness. His enemies had not failed to spread this accusation, and added others of incompetence and sodomy. His friends defended him as easy-going and unfortunate. At length when Princess Joana gave birth to an heiress, Juana, Princess of Asturias, in 1462, many refused to believe that the king was the father, attributing the paternity to Beltrán de la Cueva, one of his friends, and labelling the unfortunate princess la Beltraneja.

There grew up a section of the nobility that demanded Henry's deposition. It was so strong that he now sought an alliance with Afonso V. The agreement would be based on a double marriage, that of Afonso with Princess Isabel—later Queen Isabella the Catholic—and of Prince John, heir to the crown of Portugal, with the so-called Juana la Beltraneja. The contract was signed at Gibraltar. Almost at once the movement against Henry IV came to a head. Certain nobles entered the palace to seize his person. He weakened and promised to declare the Infante D. Alfonso, a son of Juan II by his second marriage, his heir in place of his disputed daughter, and also to dismiss the favourite Beltrán de la Cueva from the Mastership of Santiago. No sooner had the barons taken their departure than the king recompensed the fallen favourite with the title of Duke of Alburquerque, an act that excited the nobles to declare Henry thenceforth deposed and proclaim the Infante Alfonso. Queen Joana appealed for help to her brother of Portugal, but the Portuguese cortes, meeting at Guarda, voted against taking any action, contrary to the wishes of the king.

Civil war broke out in Castile. The Infante Alfonso died in 1468, and the rebels offered the crown to Isabella. She herself refused it, but Henry, wavering, reached the stage of promising to make her his heiress. Soon afterwards he again promised the double marriage with Portugal. In 1469 Isabella secretly married Ferdinand, the heir to Aragon, and Henry IV in angry reaction changed his mind once more, decided that his daughter was legitimate, and proposed that Afonso V should marry her and succeed him to the throne of Castile. Although the negotiations got as far as a meeting of the two kings at the frontier, Afonso did not commit himself to an alliance with a broken reed. Only when Henry IV died in December 1474, did he decide to intervene, convinced of the possibility of obtaining sufficient support and relying on making an alliance with Louis XI of France, who had recently lost Roussillon to the Aragonese and hinted at mutual advantages. This time Afonso secured the assent of the royal council, and after a useless exchange of embassies with Isabella and Ferdinand had recourse to arms.

The Portuguese crossed the Castilian frontier. Afonso, now a widower of forty, married Juana and declared himself King of Castile and Leon. He was received in the city of Zamora, but he had to meet formidable opponents. Ferdinand and Isabella moved quickly, raised an army and faced Afonso near Toro. Ferdinand himself challenged Afonso to single combat; the Portuguese accepted, provided that an exchange of hostages guaranteed fair play. The conditions led to a squabble, and Ferdinand for lack of supplies had to retire on Tordesillas. Yet Afonso's position was insecure: elements of Castilian support on which he had counted did not

arrive; the whole war was unpopular in Portugal. Afonso himself would have come to terms if his wife were recognized as ruler of the 'Kingdom' of Zamora, Toro and Galicia, and Ferdinand, as an Aragonese, would probably have compounded in this; but Isabella refused to cede a stone of Castile.

By an unexpected stroke Ferdinand's men seized the bridge at Zamora and forced Afonso to retire to Toro. Afonso now challenged Ferdinand to a pitched combat, which was at first refused. Pressure from his wife and Cardinal Mendoza made Ferdinand alter his mind, and he in turn issued a challenge to Afonso, who in his turn refused. By the next year, 1476, although Afonso's son, Prince John, brought reinforcements to Toro, his Castilian support had almost completely disappeared. The loss of Zamora had been a deadly blow to his prestige and his only hope was now to recover it. The two armies camped near each other and outside the town. Cardinal Mendoza arranged for a meeting of ambassadors on an island in the Douro, but no conclusion was reached. After a fortnight Afonso's men retired to Toro for fear of being cut off or of losing Toro to a surprise attack. In pursuit marched the Castilians, and the two forces met in battle about a league from Toro, at Castro Queimado, where the Portuguese were worsted. For Afonso the reverse was sufficiently definite to put an end to his hopes; indeed only a clear victory could have redeemed his fortunes in Castile. Yet he himself did not abandon hope. He continued to hold not only Toro, but a group of fortresses, Cantalapiedra, Castronuno, Cubillos, Siete Iglesias, Villalfonso, Portillo, Villalva and Mayorga. Furthermore he cherished hopes that the alliance with Louis XI might yet come to something.

At length news came from France. Álvaro de Ataide, Afonso's ambassador, brought promises of alliance and support, recommending that he should pay a visit to Louis XI; Damião de Gois remarks sourly: 'Kings and Princes should look well what men they send as ambassadors, for if these who came hither to make an alliance had been more acute they would have found out more about French affairs, and not advised their lord to undertake a journey from which resulted so much harm, grief and travail.' Leaving the Castilian towns in charge of his officers, he returned with his unofficial queen to Portugal. Her he left at Guarda, and the following August he sent a messenger from Oporto to announce his forthcoming visit to his cousin of France.

Only the rashest of kings would have left his kingdom on the wild-goose chase of an alliance with Louis XI. Fortunately Prince John had already proved himself a capable governor; since his twentieth year he had done the work of Portugal, while his father skirmished with the Castilians at Zamora and Toro. Hardy and energetic, to him had fallen the task of raising troops for the unpopular war.

The fleet that was to dazzle France, some twenty ships and two and a half thousand warriors, was prepared in Lisbon, sailed in September 1476 and, touching at Lagos and Ceuta, landed Afonso at Collioure, whence it returned, leaving him to proceed to Perpignan and meet Louis XI at Tours. The festal reception accorded to him on the journey induced him to hope great things of the coming interview. When he arrived at Tours, Louis XI disappeared for five days, during which time lavish entertainment was provided for the visitor. At length Louis, with an iron-hilted sword, a short tunic of poor cloth and white trunks patched with various colours, embraced his visitor and piously thanked the Virgin and St Martin for permitting a poor fellow like himself to receive such a great king, whom he had always wanted to meet.

He offered Afonso to approach the pope to obtain the legitimization of the marriage with Princess Juana, to finance the purchase of certain Spanish towns which he knew very well could easily be obtained by corruption, and even sent him the sum of fifty thousand escudos with which 'to entreat some gentle dame, as was the custom and courtesy of his court'. Afonso agreed to visit his second cousin Charles the Bold of Burgundy, either to ask for men or to dissuade him from attacking Louis XI while he was engaged in the hypothetical war on Castile. Only as he was preparing to leave for Burgundy did Afonso learn that Louis dared not give him all the help he would have wished because he needed his men to guard his own frontier: however, Charles the Bold, the possessor of 'singular artillery', would probably be of service.

Near Nancy Afonso was received by his relative, who soon disillusioned him about the King of France, but promised, rather boastfully, to see that Louis was as good as his word. Just after. Charles was killed by the Lorrainers, and Louis set off to recover some of the lands that the Burgundians had seized from him, leaving a message for Afonso that they might meet later in Paris. In May, the reply from the Papacy about the legitimization of Afonso's marriage was received: it made the granting of a dispensation dependent on Louis XI's decision whether or not to fight Castile. After a last futile interview at Arras, Afonso resolved to return to Portugal. He spent the summer at Rouen, and reached Honfleur in September, a year after his arrival in France. It was necessary to await the preparation of the ships: the prospect of the return emptyhanded apparently demoralized him. On September 24, with four men and a chaplain, he took horse at Honfleur and disappeared. When he had gone, he sent back one of his men with a case of letters, to Louis XI, to Prince John in Portugal, to his subjects and to his servants in Honfleur. In them he avowed the failure of his journey and declared his intention of becoming a monk.

A messenger from the prince found the missing king in the village of Robinet-le-Bel, and brought his followers to beg him to change his mind. Inconstant to the last, Afonso let himself be persuaded and returned to Portugal. Four days before he landed at Oeiras Prince John had declared himself king. This was in accordance with the previous wishes of Afonso, who however now resumed the throne. In his absence the Castilian problem had almost solved itself with the loss of Cantalapiedra and Toro. John had ruled with a firmness that was lacking in his father; and it was probably with pleasure that the nobility welcomed back the granter of titles and favours. In effect, however, it was John who continued to rule. The Castilian crown was a will-o'-the-wisp to Afonso V; his mind turned back to the possibilities of new campaigns and renewed alliances. To his son, who was without interest or confidence in this venture, fell the task of ruling Portugal. John, brought up under the lavish carelessness of his father, had reacted strongly; his method of government would be very different—authority, statecraft, Machiavellianism, were to replace the easy-going, yet uneasy, openhandedness of Afonso V.

Afonso V still hoped to carry the war into Castile, but lack of resources was beginning to paralyse the military effort. The Bishop of Évora was defeated near Mérida and was himself captured in February 1479. Next month Queen Isabella of Castile met the Infanta Beatriz, Duchess of Viseu, at Alcántara and paved the way for two treaties, that of Alcáçovas and that of the tercarias of Moura. By the first, peace was restored, Afonso agreed to drop the title of King of Leon and Castile, and his unfortunate wife, the source of the whole conflict, was deprived even of the title of infanta. The second agreement embodied plans for a future marriage alliance. As all the protagonists in the proposed scheme were still small children, three of the four were to be lodged at the Portuguese frontier town of Moura under the care of the Duchess of Viseu as pledges. The children selected for this arrangement were Afonso, the eldest son of Prince John of Portugal, who would marry the eldest daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, also Isabella. The second union would be between Juana, until now the second wife of Afonso V, and the year-old Prince Juan of Castile, the son of Ferdinand and Isabella. In case the latter prince should not wish to marry the Beltraneja, she would have 100,000 gold doubloons in Castile, or, if she preferred, a convent cell in Portugal.

Disconcerted perhaps by the change from a bridegroom of almost fifty to one of a year old, Juana chose the convent, where the loss of her queenly title might be less conspicuous. Though indeed she was always referred to by the title of *Excelente Senhora*, her only protest, indeed her only part in the whole proceedings, was to sign herself *Yo*, la Reina. She

died in Lisbon in 1530. Afonso V, for his part, had resigned himself to embitterment; he would have no share in the treaty; he would not abandon the chimera to which he had devoted the past six years. 'In the execution of these things,' says the chronicler, 'because the necessity of many others required it so, the sole and principal minister was the prince; for King Afonso, his father, long shamed by them, excused himself from them all and left them entirely to the disposition and ordering of his son, to whose will the king at that time showed himself very inclined and subject.'

If the agreement of Moura was the end of Afonso's aspirations to the throne of Castile, it was the beginning of Ferdinand and Isabella's imperial policy in the Peninsula. Their intention of securing Portugal to Castile was only fully revealed by the marriages of the next generation, when for a brief time the baby Prince Miguel was heir apparent to both crowns.

Afonso V 'was never again merry, and always went withdrawn, imaginative and thoughtful, more like a man that abhorred the things of the world, than a king that esteemed them'. He had resolved to abdicate in 1481, but died before cortes assembled to approve his intention. His figure and character are described by Rui de Pina, who knew him. He had fattened and became bald. His round face was edged by a thick black beard. Affable the chronicler found him, too much so, 'which in a king was not greatly to be praised; for with the great familiarity that he, against his gravity and royal estate, showed to many, apart from their often not keeping for him the reverence and regard they ought, they also took courage to ask him, and he was ashamed not to grant, many and greater things than their deserts or honesty, or the increase of the royal patrimony, required'. He was the first king to appear commonly in public and was always embarrassed at having to do justice before his lords.

CHAPTER XIV

THE RENASCENCE MONARCHY

i. JOHN II; THE REPRESSION OF THE BRAGANÇAS, 1484. John II had seen the effects of his father's prodigality and felt keenly the need to assert the authority of the monarchy. He took a severely Machiavellian view of his duties and powers; and if he returned to the cortes-legality of D. Pedro the Regent, it was as policy rather than on principle. His appearance, and to some extent his character, recall those of Henry VIII of England—the same thickset, bulky frame, and dog-like expression of the beard-fringed features, the same conception of personal headship of the state, fondness for show tempered by regard for wealth, love of fine dress and majesty, addiction to hunting, hawking, riding, dancing and swimming. Broad-shouldered and red-faced, his hair was slightly rufous, and when he was angry his eyes became bloodshot, which the chronicler found very terrifying. Extremely devout in an emotional way, and absorbed by his affection for his two sons, he knew how to harness his passions to the state. For his motto he adopted the words Por tua lei e por tua grei (by thy law and for thy people).

In the last four years of Afonso V's government, titles and honours had again been lavishly distributed—some fourteen or fifteen to the Bragança family alone, including the city and duchy of Beja and the island of Madeira with all its dues and rights to the Duke of Viseu. The chronicler blames the war for the necessity of laying such a burden on the revenue of the country, but adds that Afonso was 'prodigal rather than liberal', especially in what appertained to the crown, which he had wasted 'without great deserts nor much necessity, but simply through the wiles and practices that the nobility used upon him'. John II soon revealed himself. After his proclamation he called cortes at Évora, and in doing so administered a new form of oath to his subjects, comprising a declaration of vassalage couched in the humblest style, a promise to receive the king 'at the top and at the bottom, by night and by day, and at any hour and time', a guarantee that no town or castle held from the king should be delivered to anyone unless bringing the royal seal and order 'by which you relieve me of this said homage and vassalage', and an undertaking to fulfil all the 'clauses, conditions and obligations without art, cunning, fraud, deceit or any diminution whatsoever'. This was to be signed, and then sworn, the vassal kneeling with his hands between those of the king. Both the written oath and the ceremony were found

humiliating by members of the higher nobility, who were accustomed to regard themselves as in no way inferior to the monarch himself. Furthermore, at the cortes the commoners made, and made good, various representations against abuses of the nobility and clergy, and asked that royal inspectors should supervise the private administration of justice, a petition already made in the last reign. Other petitions sought the suppression of private justice, the fulfilment of royal orders on private estates, the prevention of the offices of clerk and notary from falling into the hands of servants of nobles and prelates, the abolition of extraordinary tributes and forced loans imposed by nobles, the prohibition of the seizure of corn at arbitrary prices by magnates who had bread in their own barns, the cessation of interference by nobles in the operation of justice and in elections in the concelhos, the punishment of dissolute clerics, and others. John, declaring himself obliged to minister to the 'common advantage of these realms', suppressed the lieutenants of the divisions of the kingdom (adiantados) and replaced them by his own judges (ouvidores), who should be as far as possible letrados. His corregedores were given the right to enter the lands of all his tenants and inspect the private administration of justice.

The first to disapprove was the principal beneficiary of the extravagance of the previous reign, Bragança. The present magnate, D. Fernando, a vain and ostentatious person, was twice a duke, of Bragança and Guimarãis, Marquis of Vila Viçosa, and four times a count, of Barcelos, Ourém, Arraiolos and Neiva. He held over fifty cities, castles and towns, and could raise 3,000 horse and 10,000 foot. As brother-inlaw to John II, he expected to have his ear, as he had had Afonso V's. When the king appeared at Évora in cloth of gold and sables, he had been the first to do homage, but when the privileges and holdings of the nobility were not confirmed in the mass, as had been done before, but examined one by one, he sent home to Vila Viçosa for a list of deeds of endowments with which to make his titles clear. Before the return of the messenger, the outbreak of plague at Évora caused cortes to be shifted to Montemór-o-Novo, where John II arrived in mourning for his father, wearing a worsted jerkin, and was met by the Marquis of Montemór, Bragança's brother, mounted and caparisoned in crimson. The king reminded the marquis that he ought to be mourning for the originator of his own title, and the marquis vented his annoyance on the Archbishop of Braga, for whom one of his houses had been, wrongfully, he said, requisitioned. The marquis was packed off to Castelo Branco in disgrace, and from here he communicated his misfortune to Ferdinand and Isabella of Castile in two letters, the second of which he showed his brother—Bragança could not but disapprove of its unguarded invitation

to the Castilians to invade Portugal. About the same time information about activities of the duke himself came to light. The messenger to Vila Viçosa had enlisted the aid of the ducal treasurer, who found among his master's papers various letters to and from the court of Castile, and brought them to John II, who had them copied and returned. Their date was 1480 and their purport a secret treaty in which Bragança appeared as a Castilian agent in Portugal. All the correspondence was done in a guarded, allusive style that conveyed very little more damaging than the duke's intention to 'serve' Castile and some plans for a marriage between a bastard daughter of King Ferdinand and a boy of his line.

On this evidence John decided to bring about the revocation of the treaty of Moura so that his son might return from the tutelage of D. Beatriz so close to the frontier. For this purpose the Baron of Alvito visited Castile in 1482, advancing the insalubrity of Moura as a motive for the request. The Spaniards were inclined to be suspicious and reluctant to negotiate. Still uneasy about a future claim by or on behalf of Juana la Beltraneja, they were unwilling to see her return to Portuguese hands. The chronicler Rui de Pina, who assisted Alvito in this mission, asserts that its failure was due to a leakage of information about its purposes. The duke's brother, D. Álvaro, who had been made chancellor by Afonso V, might have been responsible for this. However, Rui de Pina was sent back to Castile to propose again the ending of the agreement, with perhaps the marriage of the heir of Portugal to the second daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, instead of the first, with the gift of the Canaries to Portugal as a dowry. But the Spaniards only agreed to the annulment of the agreement on Rui de Pina's third visit in 1483. At last about to recover his son, John II felt his feline patience had been rewarded, and could deal with the Bragança problem in a bolder manner. At Almeirim, where he received Rui de Pina on his return, he took the opportunity to see the duke in the palace chapel in the presence of only the Bishop of Viseu, urging him in view of past differences to continue to serve the crown. The duke carried away the impression that John had weakened. His brothers and Viseu met and resolved to resist the entrance of royal officers on their estates, and arranged a further meeting at Évora. Their plans were reported to the king, who, fearing an attempt to seize his son, still at Moura, withdrew the order for his men to enter Bragança's territories, to the delight of the conspirators. In mid-May the Castilian ambassadors arrived at Avis, where the court then was, and the new treaty between the two countries was signed, after which John travelled towards Évora to receive his son. Meanwhile a secret messenger had visited Bragança with the object, according to Pina, of arranging a pretext for putting John in the wrong in the case of open

war, whereupon the Braganças would refuse to give him military help. Some of this information the king learnt at Avis, when the duke's letterbearer appeared there to betray his master. Carefully considering the possibility of military action, John prepared letters ordering the surrender of the duke's various properties. Their use was not necessary. Braganca, surprised by the news of the Spanish embassy, met the royal representatives on the road to Moura, and asked their advice whether he ought to accompany Prince Afonso back to Évora or no. Having first recommended him to take this opportunity of ingratiating John, they hesitated and referred back to the king, who commended their advice. So having conducted Princess Isabel of Castile to the frontier, they returned with Prince Afonso, who was met by the duke at Portel and accompanied by him to Evora. After two days of bull-fights and dancing, the duke came to bid the king farewell; the two discoursed for some time until the king at last alluded to the duke's suspicious conduct, which, he said, he himself could not credit, being prepared to punish his calumniators. Nevertheless John suggested that they should withdraw to his tiring-chamber, where he informed the duke of the necessity of his detention.

Overnight the news reached the city. The populace abused traitors and demanded punishment. The court was called together; John announced to it and to Castile that Bragança was awaiting trial on a charge of treason. The Spanish reply, hoping that clemency would be extended to this important vassal, who of course could not be judged without a full knowledge of the case, indicated that armed interference was out of the question. The Marquis of Montemór and the Count of Faro at once fled to Castile. D. Álvaro left the country with permission. The case against the duke was prepared under twenty-two heads. When these were read to him, he could not conceal his perturbation. The trial was held before twenty-nine judges with John himself as supreme judge. Twice Bragança was called to speak. The third time he refused to appear; he was preparing for the end. John decided to proceed to the discussion of the sentence. Already he had professed hopes for the innocence of the duke, but when several had suggested a pardon, he said that he could not interfere with the course of justice. Now, weeping copiously, he heard each judge, after a trial of twenty-two days, pronounce for death. On June 29, 1484, Bragança was beheaded in the main square of Évora.

Montemór was decapitated in an effigy that bled imitation blood: he himself died soon after at Seville. His brother, Faro, also died in Andalusia. There still remained in Portugal the Duke of Viseu, John's and Bragança's brother-in-law. He, with a group of others, plotted vengeance at Santarém the following year. Warned of an attempt to

ambush him, John summoned Viseu to Alcácer. The door of the royal apartment closed behind the two; when it opened again, the duke was dead, stabbed 'without many words' by the king's own hand. Viseu's brother Manuel gave his allegiance to the king and was declared heir after Prince Afonso. Various conspirators were punished or escaped. The Count of Penamacor fled to London, where he vituperated against John, until he was thrown into the Tower on the request of the Portuguese ambassador. Isaac Abarbanel, the Jewish treasurer and father of Leon Hebreo, was condemned in his absence as an accomplice, and took refuge in Venice.

ii. John II and Rome, 1481–1487. John's policy of nationalism also brought him into conflict with the Papacy. The favoured double-archbishop of Afonso V's time, Jorge da Costa, was now a cardinal, and to his influence King John ascribed the unsatisfactory relations subsisting between Portugal and the Holy See, which had protested against new laws that were 'daily passed in Portugal contrary to papal authority and established custom'. The measure to which this referred was a request made at the cortes of Évora of 1481 that no papal letters should be published without royal consent, in compliance with a law dating from the time of Pedro I. Although at Évora John merely stated his intention of raising the question with the Papacy, he presumably took definite steps before May 25, 1483, when Sixtus IV despatched a bull accusing him of 'usurping religious liberty and the rights of the church, and trying to extinguish it completely by means of new and unheard of constitutions'.

In 1485 an embassy was sent to Rome to protest John's complete loyalty to the Papacy. In return he obtained various rights—especially the bull of the crusade for the war in Africa, promising remission of sins and indulgences to all those who put themselves or their wealth at the king's disposal or provided a soldier in their place. Even monasteries were enjoined to pay for one man for every ten inmates, and to apply all legacies and certain other monies to the African crusade. According to the chronicler, John II desisted from the right to approve ecclesiastical decisions in 1487, having made sure of the benefits offered in exchange. Though he had been brought to terms by Rome, John did not relinquish his policy of nationalism. When the customary wrongs reappeared, such as the abuse of the ecclesiastical courts, he made the execution of sentences passed by ecclesiastical judges subject to the approval of the royal justices.

iii. THE JEWISH PROBLEM; ADMISSION OF THE SPANISH JEWS. On March 31, 1492, Ferdinand and Isabella expelled the Jewish population of Spain. This anti-climax in the annus mirabilis of Spanish history came

only two months after the conquest of Granada, which had capitulated on very favourable terms with regard to religion and the retention of Moslem possessions, law and customs. Already in November 1478 the Inquisition had been set up on the request of Ferdinand and Isabella to cope with cases of judaism and heresy, but members of Jewish society held influential positions in the Spanish state and, whilst their power stimulated the envy of their gentile compatriots, it also protected them from the effects of this envy. The Middle Ages in the Peninsula had been coloured by the complete tolerance of Moslem society, and, apart from outbreaks of popular feeling against usury, were reasonably free of anti-Semitic violence. In Spain the unification of the three kingdoms of Castile, Aragon and Granada, brought about in so short a time, was accompanied by a desire for religious unification. At the cortes of Toledo in 1480 residence in Jewries was enforced, together with other annoyances, but it was only with the wide publicity given to an alleged case of human sacrifice that general anti-Jewish feeling was aroused to support the order of expulsion.

Four months was the time-limit for selling up and leaving Spain. It was not unnatural that numbers of Spanish Jews should seek the protection of Portuguese Jews, who were both numerous and powerful. Complaints had indeed been made against them on charges of exaction and oppression, but in the cortes of 1490 John II had retorted that 'Christians did worse' and confirmed his protection of them as taxgatherers and administrators. Consequently the Spanish Jews were ready to offer large sums for permission to enter Portugal. John, anxious to profit by the situation, put the question before an advisory council, which by a large majority disapproved of the entry of Spanish Jews, until he revealed his intent of extracting enough money from them to spare the Portuguese tax-payer his military expenditure in Africa. The idea of making the Jews pay for the war on the Moslems was not unacceptable. King John proposed a tax of eight cruzados a head on each foreign Jew, not including children in arms, and giving a reduction to half in the case of metal-workers and armourers provided they settled in Portugal. Customs officials were appointed to five stations on the frontier and their receipts for the stipulated entrance fee served as pass-ports inside Portugal. The refugees would be allowed eight months stay in Portugal and the king would undertake to provide transport to their next destinations, though the cost of the passages would be defrayed by them.

Under this agreement six hundred wealthy families who had made a special contract, including the right to settle in Portugal, for 60,000 cruzados, were absorbed in the larger cities. Perhaps some 60,000, or

one-third of the total number leaving Spain, entered Portugal—though Damião de Gois gives the high figure of 20,000 families. Their troubles were not over. Already at the time of their entry, an outbreak of plague was attributed to them and in no way increased the benevolence of their welcome. The king, far from providing the facilities of transport he had promised, offered passages only to Tangier and Arzila in Africa, where the Moors plundered and abused them mercilessly. Those who had no passage-money or could not take ship, were sold or given as slaves. Their children, after forcible baptism, were shipped off to the island of São Tomé with the idea that they would grow up into good Christians and useful citizens of equatorial Africa, provided they survived the rigours of the journey and the climate of the Gulf of Guinea.

iv. THE TREATY OF TORDESILLAS, 1494. Columbus' contact with the Portuguese began a few years before 1474, the year in which he established himself in Madeira and married the daughter of Bartolomeu Perestrelo, captain-major of Porto Santo. Probably in 1481 or 1482 he put before John II his project for the discovery of the Indies from the west, which was rejected either as unconvincing or because of Columbus' excessive demands. In the following years he received similar rebuffs from Ferdinand and Isabella and Henry VII, but during the course of the negotiations with Spain, John II seems to have changed his mind, for in a letter of March 28, 1484, he answered Columbus—'and with regard to your coming here certainly both because of what you point out and for other reasons, since your industry and good skill will be necessary to us, we much desire it and have great pleasure in your coming, for your affairs shall be dealt with in such a manner as should content you'. The tone of this letter suggests that John II had become convinced of the possibility of finding land beyond the Atlantic. Some support for this supposition may be given by the existence of a donation of 1486 to some Azoreans who were granted an island to be found at the end of forty days' sail.

Yet eventually Columbus came to terms with Ferdinand and Isabella and returned with what he thought to be India discovered in 1493. At once John II prepared a fleet under D. Francisco de Almeida to make a Portuguese claim. The Catholic Sovereigns were disturbed by the prospect of competition and proposed the despatch of Portuguese ambassadors to Castile to arrange for arbitration, meanwhile obtaining papal backing of their own rights in the bulls of May 3 and 4, by which Alexander VI—an Aragonese—granted them authority over all lands discovered or to be discovered lying more than a hundred leagues west or south of any of the Cape Verdes or Azores. A later bull, of September 26, virtually rescinded the rights recognized as Portuguese since the bull of Nicholas V of 1454.

John II protested in Rome and continued to negotiate in Castile, obtaining by dint of argument and bribery an important modification in the dispositions of Alexander VI—the alteration of the dividing line from 100 leagues west to 370, settled in the Treaty of Tordesillas of June 7, 1494, and resulting in the reservation of Brazil for Portugal. The only limitation to the agreement was the provision that if Columbus, now on his second venture, should discover new lands before June 20, the division would be made at 250 leagues: as Columbus made no fresh discovery before the date, this restriction was of no effect.

v. DEATH OF PRINCE AFONSO; THE SUCCESSION; DEATH OF JOHN II, 1495. Although the experience of his father's wars had taught John II the folly of seeking the hegemony of the house of Avis in the Peninsula by force of arms, he nevertheless nourished the hope of implanting it by marriage. After the breaking of the agreement of Moura, arrangements had been made for the Portuguese heir to marry the second daughter of Ferdinand and Isabella, Princess Juana, with an increased dowry to compensate for her smaller chance of inheriting the Spanish throne. Once he had settled the internal problems of Portugal by the execution of the Duke of Bragança and murder of the Duke of Viseu, John again sought a chance to open negotiations for the betrothal of the elder princess. It had indeed been agreed in 1483 that if Isabel were still unmarried when Afonso reached his fourteenth year, the marriage should be with her.

As this date, 1489, approached, both sponsors of the match did some preliminary skirmishing. Ferdinand and Isabella vented the possibility of their daughter marrying the Dauphin or a Neapolitan. John II, in order to impress the Spaniards, ordered the frontiers to be fortified and repaired. In August 1488 the matter was broached and the Spaniards agreed in principle; during 1489 nothing was done at all, but in March 1490 the cortes of Évora voted 100,000 cruzados for festivities in connection with the marriage. In the same month the betrothal was performed at Seville and the ceremony arranged for the end of the year at Évora. The celebrations were on a lavish scale: a culinary orgy was prepared: the prohibition on silks was raised; not only cloths of gold, silver and tapestries, but cooks and minstrels were sought abroad: all the Moors, male and female, who could dance, play or sing were bidden to Évora. In the midst of all this, plague broke out, and for a fortnight the city was abandoned, the inhabitants camping in the suburbs. The festivities, begun on November 23, lasted until Christmas. Only in the following June (1491) did the court move to Santarém, for another month's merrymaking. One morning the king, going to bathe in the Tagus, passed underneath the window of Afonso and Isabel and bade his son accompany him. Afonso at first refused, but changing his mind,

took horse and galloped along the river-bank, and challenged a nobleman to race with him to the spot where his father was swimming. A little after the pair had set off, hand in hand, the prince's horse slipped, threw him and fell on top of him. Next day he died. King John, overwhelmed with grief, was yet in the midst of it capable of recognizing that his son would not have been a fit successor—'methinks our Lord Jesus Christ bethinks himself of the people of these realms, for my son would not have made a king for them'. The chronicler Rèsende adds that Prince Afonso was more like his grandfather than his father and was 'always dressed in tabards with sables at the neck lined with satin and garnished with gold, a thing more fit for women than men'.

Princess Isabel went back to Castile, whence she was again to return to Portugal as the bride of Manuel I.

The death of John's only legitimate son made the problem of succession an urgent one. The legal successor was now Manuel, Duke of Beja, the son of Afonso V's brother Fernando and brother of Queen Leonor, but John himself had a great regard for an illegitimate son, D. Jorge, born in 1481, who for the last few years had been brought up in the royal household by Queen Leonor. On the death of Prince Afonso. King John removed D. Jorge from his wife's care and took him into his own house, an action that she did not forgive. The possibility of D. Jorge's succession aroused the queen's bitterest resentment, and although John attempted to cow her by public ridicule, she maintained her resistance. Her brother, the Duke of Beja, was far from asserting his own claims: he was Master of the Order of Christ, and John attempted to put D. Jorge on an equal footing by awarding him the two masterships, those of Avis and Santiago, that had belonged to the dead heir (1491). The oath of obedience was taken without a murmur. Only in 1495, when immediately threatened by death, did John allow a reconciliation with Queen Leonor to be arranged. Attacked apparently by dropsy whilst at Setúbal in 1494, he was advised at length to seek relief from the waters of Monchique in December 1495, and drew up his will and confessed before going. His confessor succeeded in making peace between him and the queen, at the expense of the throne to D. Jorge. In his will, Manuel Duke of Beja was declared to be the rightful heir.

Six days of the waters of Monchique only accentuated the king's pain. Moving to Alvôr in despair he sent away the loved D. Jorge, but feeling some improvement a few days later recalled him. On the next day he relapsed and prepared to die. Whilst signing a donation in favour of D. Jorge's mother, he dropped the pen and began to weep, with these strange words of contrition: 'Console me not, for I was such an ill creature that they never provoked me that I did not bite' (Não me

confortais, que eu fui tam mau bicho que nunca me acenaram que não mordesse). He died on October 25, 1495.

VI. THE DISCOVERIES; LAND AND SEA WAYS TO INDIA; BARTOLOMEU DIAS; PERO DA COVILHÃ AND AFONSO DE PAIVA. With the ending of the lease of the Guinea trade, John II had received from his father the control and responsibilities of Portuguese activity in Africa. Purposeful as Prince Henry had been, he embraced the sources of the African trade in his designs for the aggrandizement of monarchical power: the new shores, their gold, ivory and slaves, had come to play an important part in national life, and in his conception of the state this must be an integral part. Accordingly he ordered the construction of the fortified station of el-Mina, founded by Diogo de Azambuja in 1482 as the principal factory for the gold trade. In the same year Diogo Cão, taking with him durable stone land-marks bearing the royal arms, surmounted by a cross, sailed into the mouth of the Zaire (Congo). Having left a party ashore, he returned to Lisbon, and on his second journey recovered his compatriots and sailed another two hundred leagues south to Cape Cross. Once more revisiting the Congo, he received a friendly welcome and presents from the natives, several of whom returned to Portugal with him.

Four years later, when the Portuguese outposts had been set up in the equatorial region, John II had news of Prester John through a factor at Benin who reported that a priest-king named Ogané existed twenty moons march inland; the emissaries of the king of Benin said that they had kissed his foot, though he himself remained invisible behind a silk screen, and they brought back a cross. Almost at once, in 1487, John II sent out two expeditions, one by land, one by sea, to find out Ethiopia. The latter of these was conducted by Bartolomeu Dias, who left

The latter of these was conducted by Bartolomeu Dias, who left Lisbon with two caravels and a supply-ship in August. On December 8 he passed the farthest point reached by Diogo Cão and entered the Gulf of Santa Maria da Conceição (Walvis Bay). Still sailing south he reached the Serra dos Reis on January 6, 1488 and then lost sight of land for almost a month, reaching Mossel Bay on February 3. To the first land he saw he gave the name of Terra dos Vaqueiros from the many cows and native herdsmen on the shore. Without having seen the Cape, he had doubled it and reached the East African coast. Before turning back he pursued the coast as far as the Great Fish River, and only in December 1488, after seventeen months and seventeen days, returned to Lisbon.

At the same time as Dias was rounding the Cape of Storms, two Portuguese embarked on the most remarkable land-journey yet performed by their nation—the visit to Abyssinia and India. It is difficult to know exactly what John expected of Ogané: Abyssinians had arrived in Aragon as early as 1327, and from time to time others visited Rome,

Naples and France. A Portuguese document of 1452, three years before the birth of John II, shows the monthly bill for wheat and wine for 'George, ambassador of Prester John'. Thirty-five years elapsed before the visit was returned. John II's first envoys gave up, beset by linguistic difficulties at Jerusalem, but in the same year of 1487 he despatched two men versed in warfare, diplomacy and Arabic, Pero da Covilhã and Afonso de Paiva. Well supplied with credentials, money and a planned itinerary, the two sailed from Rhodes, where they had taken council with two Portuguese Hospitallers, for Alexandria in the disguise of honeymerchants. In Egypt they fell ill and lost their merchandise, but they obtained more, and passing through Cairo, Sinai and Suakim, they sailed in the middle of 1488 to Aden, where they parted company, Pero da Covilhã for India and Afonso de Paiva for Ethiopia. Pero da Covilhã spent a year in travelling to India, where he landed at Cannanor, seeing Calicut and Gôa, the former the emporium of the oriental trade in spices and precious stones, and returning to Ormuz. Borne by the north-east monsoon of the end of 1489, he departed for Sofala in Africa, and found his wav back by Aden to Cairo. Here he found two Jews, the Rabbi of Beja and a cobbler, José de Lamego, who had been despatched by John II in quest of the wanderers; they were able to tell him that Afonso de Paiva had perished in Africa.

Sending José de Lamego back to Portugal with the news of his journeys and setting the rabbi on the road to Ormuz, Pero da Covilhã finally reached Abyssinia, where at length his travels came to an end. Honourably received by the emperor, he settled down with an Abyssinian wife in 1493 and was seen by Portuguese travellers, the embassy of D. Rodrigo de Lima, in 1526. Foreigners who entered the land were not allowed to leave: having delivered the valuable information that there was easy access from East Africa to the Indies, information that gave the journey of Bartolomeu Dias the greatest significance, he faded from the European scene, and died a subject of the King of Kings.

CHAPTER XV

AUTOCRACY AND EMPIRE

i. MANUEL I, 1495–1521. John II's cousin and brother-in-law was twenty-six years old, and had been the youngest of a family of nine. Of his brothers, four had died young and the fifth, Diogo Duke of Viseu, had perished at the hands of John II at Setúbal. Not for nothing was he named Manuel the Fortunate.

The description of D. Manuel's person by Gois reveals very little save that he was fair, smiling, thinnish and long-armed. Of his character and habits Gois is more precise; not only was he a man of much business and very diligent, but also a sober eater, a water-drinker, a light sleeper and ever chaste and continent. Yet he was both vain and capricious; the ostentation of monarchy appealed to him and he did not attempt to conceal it. 'He was', adds the chronicler, 'very musical, so that usually at his office, and always for the siesta and after he had got into bed, it was to music, and both for this chamber-music and for his chapel he had excellent singers and players that came to him from all parts of Europe, to whom he gave honours and salaries on which they lived honourably, and moreover granted them great favours, so that he had one of the best chapels of the kings that then lived. Every Sunday and saint's day he dined and supped with music of pipes, sackbuts, horns, harps, tambourines, fiddles and on special festivals with drums and trumpets that all played each one after its kind whilst he ate; apart from these, he had Moorish musicians who sang, and played with lutes and timbrels to the sound of which and of pipes, harps, rebecs and tambourines the young noblemen danced during dinner and supper.'

In the first year of his reign, Manuel announced the pardon of those nobles who had been in exile since 1484. To the new Duke of Bragança alone, he restored some fifty cities, towns, castles and other properties. The society over which he presided was one in which the nobility came to play a new part, as a court circle, the ornaments of and ministers to the magnificence of the king. These nobles constituted the seventy-two families whose shields are still to be seen in the Sala dos Brasões of the Sintra Palace.

In spite of this tendency to centralize the nobility, the court continued to wander, possibly to avoid the scourge of plague which afflicted Portugal continuously from 1483 to 1496. In 1496 for example the king was at Montemór-o-Novo for Easter, whence he moved to Setúbal, then Palmela

and Vila Franca. In September the court shifted to Tôrres Vedras, Alenquer and Muge, and after tarrying at Estremós and Évora, completed its tour by returning to Sintra. In 1505 a boat belonging to the Bishop of Oporto brought a new outbreak of plague from Italy, which lasted until 1507. Other plague-years were 1510, 1513 and 1520. Among its victims had been Philippa of Lancaster and D. Duarte, and the description of Manuel's death in Fr. Luis de Sousa suggests that he also was a victim—'an illness that ran through the city and killed many, and whose symptoms were burning fever with an inclination to drowsiness and lethargy'.¹

ii. DECLINE OF THE CORTES. The increasing absolutism of the political system is reflected in the decreasing frequency of the calling of cortes. John I, who had based his power on the support of the commoners, called twenty-five cortes in his long reign; King Duarte four in his brief reign of six years; Afonso V, twenty-two; John II, four; and Manuel four in a reign of twenty-six years. His successor John III held three cortes in thirty-one years. There had never been any fixed obligation to call cortes at any given interval: John I had undertaken in 1385 to call them every year unless there should be any hindrance, but he had not abided by this. In 1387 and 1391, he called cortes three times within the year, and in 1412, twice; but from 1418 to 1427 he went without summoning them at all. Again the cortes of Tôrres Novas of 1438, held in the minority of Afonso V, had resolved on a yearly meeting, and had even defined their terms of reference—taxation, declaration of war or treaty of peace, proposal of candidates for high offices and control of the value of coinage. But in view of the very variable power of the cortes the institution depended on the interest and vitality of the commoners being canalized through them—the other two classes had always had other ways of approach to the central power. Now, with the continued expansion of the Portuguese world and the influx of riches from overseas, the channel to power for the commoners ceased to be through the cortes, and as royal authority replaced private administration of justice the class interest largely disappeared. Furthermore, as the codification of the law advanced and the forms of Roman justice were referred to, the cortes gradually ceased to intervene in the normal course of law-making: legislation could originate with the absolute sovereign and pass directly to his bureaucratic legal service. When John III called cortes in 1525, no demur was raised to his proposal to summon them only every ten

¹ Apart from other visitations of nature, parts of Portugal suffered from various earthquakes. In 1512 a severe shock demolished buildings in Lisbon and was followed by a tidal wave; in 1531 intermittent shocks were felt for fifty days, whilst a great disturbance twenty years later was said to have buried 2,000 persons.

The military orders passed into the absolutist system with as little opposition as the cortes. As Ferdinand had taken the masterships of the Castilian orders to himself, so Manuel assumed that of the Order of Christ. Under its authority were placed all the overseas churches, and to it members of the Orders of Santiago and of Avis were now permitted to transfer themselves. Already in 1496 the Papacy had granted permission to members of the Orders of Christ and of Avis to contract marriage, whilst retaining clerical privileges. King Manuel recommended in his will that the grand-masterships should remain invested in the king, or at least in one of his brothers or sons; and in 1551 John III finally joined them to the crown.

iii. THE JEWS. Manuel at first dealt leniently with the Jews, freeing those who had been enslaved for not leaving the kingdom within the stipulated time and refusing the large grant which they offered in gratitude. But this clemency was short-lived. Determined to marry the Infanta Isabel, Prince Afonso's widow, he was obliged to bring his policy into line with the intolerance practised over the border. Barely a year after his first decision, in December 1496, he issued an order of expulsion of all Jews and Moors who were unwilling to be baptized, under pain of confiscation and death. For this purpose he undertook to provide ships at three ports at the end of October 1497. But before half of this period had run, an order issued at Évora (April 1497) commanded that the children of all the Jews to be removed should be educated at the king's expense—children under 14 according to Gois (15 according to Gratz, 20 according to Herculano, and 25 according to Samuel Usque). The threat was carried out against the Jews, though some families preferred suicide or baptism under protest; but it was not attempted on Moors for fear of reprisals on Christians in Moslem territory.

It was next announced that the embarkation of Jews would not take place at three points but only at Lisbon, so that in October 1497 all the Jews of Portugal who had refused baptism moved into the city, where they were told that they should have left before, and must now consider themselves the king's slaves. Every attempt was made to convert the twenty thousand Jews who were assembled in Lisbon by threats, promises and forcible conversion. The handful who resisted this treatment, including the king's mathematician and astrologer, Abraão Zacuto, and a doctor, Abraão Saba, were at last allowed to depart. The rest, on conversion, were promised protection and, more specifically, that for twenty years no inquiry would be made into their beliefs: this guarantee was confirmed in 1507 and later prolonged for sixteen years. These measures translate the reluctance of the government to have the state upset by such a large emigration of productive citizens:

the whole aim was to obtain conversions, forcible or fair, false or genuine. The majority, even of those who had accepted conversion, had no wish to remain in Portugal, and it became necessary to issue edicts to prevent their leaving the country: thus, in April 1499 all exchange operations with Jews or ex-Jews were forbidden, and all such transactions in the past ordered to be declared within a week. No ex-Jew was allowed to leave the country without a special permit, which was only granted for commercial purposes and provided that his wife and children remained in Portugal.

Those who objected to the forcible conversions included two bishops, Fernando Coutinho and Jerónimo Osório. To most others the only valid objection found was an economic, not a moral one. The loss of money, of skilled craftsmen and of other 'delicate spirits' was alleged. The only moral argument put forward was the fear that if the Jews were driven abroad they would never get converted: they should therefore be kept in Portugal. Pressure from Castile played its part in the discussion. Ferdinand and Isabella were firmly anti-Jewish; their daughter likewise. 'The Princess-Queen, induced, it was suspected, by the King and Queen her parents, wrote a letter to the king asking him to put off her coming until he should have quite cast the Jews out of his realms', says Gois. The king's words were final: he did this out of his devotion, and did not care about the laws (dicendo, quod sua devotione hoc faciebat, et non curabat de juribus).

Hitherto the dislike of the Jews among the populace, owing to their superior talents as tax-gatherers, had been offset by the favour they found in that capacity with the crown. They had, however, also contributed to what was known of medicine and science, and to the development of printing. Three of the earliest Portuguese printers were Jews—Rabbi Eliezer in Lisbon (1489–1492), Abraão Samuel d'Ortas at Leiria (1492–1494) and Samuel Gascon at Faro (1487–1494). Of the two dozen known Portuguese incunables twelve, including the eleven earliest, are in Hebrew.¹

This, however, was easily forgotten: the majority of the people only saw the Jews as tax-gatherers and usurers and applauded the coincidence of their own wishes with the king's. Their interests in the matter, once aroused, went far beyond his. Whilst he had promised freedom from inquiry into the religious beliefs of the converts for two decades in order to be able to tell Ferdinand and Isabella that he had settled the Jewish problem, as a condition of his marriage with their daughter, his people took the question much more seriously, not understanding why those who had just been converted with so much force and fuss, should be

^{*} Of the rest, seven, including a Jewish almanack, are in Latin, and five in Portuguese.

allowed to relapse as they were evidently doing. The year 1503 was one of dearth, and according to popular rumour the rise in prices had been engineered by the Jews. In the following year a small manifestation took place in Lisbon: some youths stoned certain Jews in the streets, were sentenced to flogging and deportation, but were remitted the latter part of the sentence on the queen's request. A year later another but still mild outbreak of anti-Semitism occurred in Évora and resulted in the pulling down of the synagogue there. Still a year later, in April 1506. occurred the great massacre of Lisbon. The city was in the throes of a plague which had been transmitted from Italy, and a procession had gone to the church of St Stephen to implore delivery. On coming out a wondrous light was supposed to have been discerned crowning one of the crucifixes, and considerable argument prevailed whether a miracle had occurred or not. On the following Sunday after mass, a man, a Jew or New Christian, was describing what he had—or had not—seen when a group of men dragged him by the hair into the street, murdered him, and set about burning his body. Two Dominicans ran through the streets raising crucifixes and crying heresy, and before the day was out some five hundred persons had been put to death by the impassioned mob. Similar scenes occurred on the two following days, until a number estimated by Gois at nineteen hundred and by Samuel Usque at four thousand persons had been butchered. Only on the following Wednesday, when the mob was 'weary of slaughter and desperate of being able to perform more robberies than it had already done', did the authorities succeed in restoring order.

The king at this time was away from plague-ridden Lisbon. When the news reached him at Avis, he at once ordered rigorous measures of punishment. Some fifty persons, including the two Dominicans, were condemned to death; the monastery of São Domingos was closed; the confiscation of the property of all those concerned was ordered: Lisbon was deprived of its titles of 'noble and loyal', and the Casa dos Vinte e Quatro, the organ of the guilds, was suppressed (the sentence against Lisbon was raised in 1508 on the queen's request). As retribution to the New Christians King Manuel repealed the orders of 1499 against their leaving the kingdom, but sought to prevent their doing so by confirming the promise that no inquiry would be made into their religious beliefs for twenty years. The confirmation of March 1507 was repeated in 1512 for a total of thirty-six years from the original date of 1497.

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In spite of stories to the contrary it is doubtful whether the departure of the Jews implied any great exodus of material wealth. Only a small number of the Portuguese Jews were wealthy—many were artisans of various kinds. Only in a few instances, such as that of Diogo Mendes

the banker, was there exportation of capital. On the other hand, their economic prominence in certain trades is suggested by the fact that the leaders of the Lisbon goldsmiths and lapidaries were selected in each case by a committee of six 'New Christians' and six old Christians.

The hitherto considerable income derived by private persons from the tax on Jewries—that on the Lisbon Jewry yielded the Duke of Bragança some million and a quarter reis a year—was compensated at the country's expense by royal grants of equivalent revenue.¹

iv. Forais of D. Manuel; Legal reforms. In punishing the city of Lisbon King Manuel had taken the opportunity to suppress the Casa dos Vinte e Quatro. This consolidation of absolutism is also to be detected through the legal reforms which were undertaken on Manuel's direction. Both Afonso V and John II had intended to embark on a complete revision of the forais; representatives of the concelhos had even requested of both kings such a reform—unaware possibly of the extent to which local administration would disappear with private justice.

An order of July 25, 1498, lays down the aims of King Manuel's reformation of the forais: firstly, to have all the payments in the old documents expressed in contemporary money and secondly to amass information about the difficulties resulting from the traditional system of collecting tolls and tributes. When, some two years later, the new charter of Lisbon was finished, it consisted almost entirely of tributary regulations—'more like a customs tariff than a civil charter', says Professor Newton de Macedo. The work of drawing up the new forais was almost entirely carried out by Fernão de Pina, a gentleman of the royal household, who devoted twenty-five years to the task.

Seven years after the inception of this vast bureaucratic undertaking, a commission was appointed to revise the general legislation—the Ordenações Afonsinas drawn up under the regency of the Duke of Coimbra some sixty years before. Three versions of the new code, or Ordenações Manuelinas, were published, the third and final of these only a few months before King Manuel's death in 1521. The five parts of the original work and its general plan were rigidly preserved, the only differences being in the omission or intercalation of dated or novel matter. As in the older work, Book One was devoted to the regulation of the judicature and magistracy and the treasury, but the royal household and military organization no longer figured in it. Apart from the reorganization of certain branches, an attempt was made to bring justice to the most remote places by a special constitution for juizes de vintena, or magistrates for villages of twenty to two hundred inhabitants situated at more than a


¹ The Santarém Jewry yielded 160,000 reis; Setúbal 80,000; Portalegre 75,000; Oporto 64,000.


league's distance from the nearest town. Book Two still treats of the two privileged classes and the rights of the crown: in it all the old legislation dealing with Jews and Moors is reduced to 'that Jews and Mouros Fôrros shall get out of these realms, and not dwell nor be in them'. Books Three, Four and Five treat, with little alteration of procedure, contract and inheritance, and crime and penal law.

v. Portuguese influence in Morocco. John II made no attempt to extend Portuguese influence in Morocco beyond the unsuccessful effort to establish the small fortress of Graciosa on the river Lukkus: Graciosa would have been a serious danger to the inland town of Alcazar-Kebir, and the withdrawal of the Portuguese seems to have stimulated the Moors to build the town of el-Araish (Larache) at the mouth of the same river.


By the end of the fifteenth century Portuguese possessions in Morocco thus consisted of a compact group of four towns at the northern tip of Africa. If they were not of great commercial value, they were at least firmly held. Under Manuel, Portugal greatly extended her interests in Morocco, and from 1505 until 1514 built up a chain of fortresses stretching the length of the Atlantic coast; these included Santa Cruz on Cape Guer near Agadir, built by a merchant named João Lopes de Sequeira in 1505 and bought by the crown eight years later; the Royal Castle at Mogador, built by Diogo de Azambuja in 1506; Safim (Safi), which recognized Portuguese sovereignty in 1488 but was only occupied in 1508; Azamor, taken in 1513; and Mazagan, founded in 1514.

This expansion was stimulated by the attempts of the Castilians in the Canaries to gain a foothold on the adjacent mainland, especially in the region of Agadir. The construction of castles assured the security of the Portuguese factors, though Castilians and Genoese continued to frequent the coast of the Sus; and indeed were probably more welcome than the Portuguese because their purposes were purely mercantile. The Portuguese knights, men of the stamp of the restless Nuno de Ataide, governor of Safim, never forgot the crusade against Islam, and were therefore never able to create the conditions of intercourse which alone would have permitted the establishment of a permanent dominion in Morocco. As a military enterprise Ataide's governorship was remarkable enough: in 1515 he fought his way almost to Marrakesh, and after being driven off his compatriots attempted an assault on Fez, using as their base a fort which had been built at Mamora. Here they suffered a heavy defeat; and in the following year Ataide met his death not far from Marrakesh, after conducting a raid which penetrated almost to the Atlas. From this point the hope of carving out an empire in Morocco may be said to have vanished. There was already a party in Portugal that





V. PORTUGUESE SHIPS



VIa. VASCO DA GAMA

VIb. AFONSO DE ALBUQUERQUE

opposed the expenditure of men and treasure on the exhausting and unprofitable venture; as the forces of Islam recovered and were canalized in the Holy War, the task grew even greater, and the rewards even less. A quarter of a century later, Agadir was lost and Safim and Azamor were evacuated.

vi. VASCO DA GAMA. After the return of Bartolomeu Dias John II had ordered timber to be cut for vessels to make a new voyage—this time a small fleet under the command of his Admiral Estêvão da Gama. Neither king nor admiral lived to see the plan realized, but Manuel I continued the preparations, bidding Dias see that the ships were stout enough to resist the fury of the seas, 'for in the opinion of seafarers another fable of perils was beginning to spread, like that of Cape Bojador in former days'. The admiral's heir, Vasco da Gama, took command of the four vessels that left the Restelo on July 8, 1497—his own São Gabriel, his brother Paulo's São Rafael, the Bérrio commanded by Nicolau Coelho, and a supply-ship with provisions of all kinds for three years. A caravel captained by Dias accompanied the little fleet as far as the Cape Verde Islands. The four ships contained some 168 men, some of whom were convicts brought to perform any dangerous work. Their equipment included tables for navigation, sufficient nautical instruments, the Bishop of Tangier's treatise on seamanship, and stone landmarks. Gama bore letters to the King of Calicut and to Prester John.

Heavy seas and fog separated the ships until they reached the Cape Verdes. Reunited, their real adventure began on August 3, when they continued the voyage across the empty spaces of the ocean. For three months they battled with recurrent storms, gales and downpours, describing a vast curve across the South Atlantic. On November 8 they came to land at Angra de Santa Helena, some thirty leagues short of the Cape. They found small dusky people, whose speech resembled sobbing, and had an affray with them in which Vasco da Gama was wounded. After two days' sail the Cape was sighted, but the violent wind prevented their passing it for four days. On November 25 they found Dias' Bay of the Cowherds, where they obtained meat and kept friendly relations with the natives for nearly a fortnight, at the end of which there was a quarrel and the Portuguese sailed on, leaving behind the farthest point reached by Dias and sighting on Christmas Day a new coastline, to which they gave the name of Natal. They rested at the Copper River in the Land of Good Folk. Somewhere near the mouth of the Zambesi they met two men who differed from the natives in spurning their trinkets and who declared by signs that they had already seen ships—the first indirect contact with oriental civilization. On March 2, the three vessels—the supply-ship had already been destroyed-put in at Moçambique, where some Arab

merchantmen lay at anchor; here there was news of the rich traffic of the 'Indian Moors', of Prester John, who lived inland but owned many cities on the coast. The Sultan afforded them two pilots, who guided them to Mombasa, where they were recognized as Christians and unsuccessfully attacked by an armed band, and to Melinde, where the sultan proved friendly and found them a pilot who knew the route to India.

After nearly a month's voyage they sighted Calicut, and Vasco da Gama sought an audience of the Samorin in order to deliver King Manuel's letter. But Moslem opposition was encountered from the first. According to the well-known story of the Roteiro, the first of Vasco da Gama's landing-parties was greeted by two Tunisian Moors with the words, 'Devil take you, what are you doing here?' The proposal to initiate a commercial exchange of articles made in Portugal for oriental spices was not well received, and the Samorin, impelled by the Arab merchants, soon showed signs of hostility. In these circumstances, Vasco da Gama decided to return, and after sailing some way up the Indian coast he began the long voyage home. Owing to the loss of men, chiefly from scurvy, it became necessary to abandon the São Rafael, so that only the São Gabriel and Bérrio rounded the Cape on March 20, 1499. From the Cape Verde Islands, Nicolau Coelho hastened back and was first in Portugal with the news. Vasco da Gama took a new ship for his brother, who was dangerously ill, but they had to put in at Terceira in the Azores, where Paulo da Gama died. The admiral at last reached Lisbon in September 1499, after a voyage of two years and two months. Some half of the crews had perished.

As an exploit, Vasco da Gama's voyage was the climax of some three-quarters of a century of heroism, self-sacrifice and endurance; as an event, it turned the course of Portuguese, and of European, history. To contemporaries, Columbus' discovery was a disillusionment; the coveted wealth of the orient that had made the ports of the Mediterranean prosperous and added to their culture was not there; Vasco da Gama's was an achievement, for the hold of the São Gabriel contained specimens of pepper, cloves, nutmeg, cinnamon and precious stones. Already a month before his arrival, on the intelligence of Nicolau Coelho, King Manuel, the Fortunate, wrote to Rome for confirmation of his authority over the new discoveries.

vii. BRAZIL. Only six months after Vasco da Gama's return the largest and finest fleet that had yet been assembled for a voyage of discovery left Portugal, officially to open relations with India. The thirteen ships, commanded by Pedro Álvares Cabral, had on board Nicolau Coelho, Bartolomeu Dias and his brother Diogo, Duarte Pacheco Pereira,

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the author of the *Esmeraldo de Situ Orbis*, various nobles, nine chaplains, a total of some 1,200 persons and provisions for eighteen months.

Their destination was ostensibly India, but after navigating southwest from the Cape Verde archipelago for a month, Pedro Álvares Cabral sighted the coast of Brazil on April 22, 1500.¹ According to a traditional account the discoverer was wind-blown from the true course for the Cape. Against this, evidence has been advanced in support of the theory that the land-mass had been found previously, and that Pedro Álvares' visit was merely the publication of the discovery—hence John II's reservation of Brazil for Portugal in the Treaty of Tordesillas, by having the line of demarcation changed from 100 leagues to 370; hence too an explanation of Duarte Pacheco's words referring to a western voyage in 1498, 'passing beyond the greatness of the ocean sea, where there is found and navigated a great mainland'.

Floating weeds gave Cabral the first hint of land on April 21; next morning birds could be seen wheeling in the distance, but only towards evening did a long curve of mountains loom up, footed by woods leading down to a flat stretch of beach. The land was named Vera Cruz. Next day it was possible to approach the shore and Nicolau Coelho put out in a small boat, which was unable to land in the heavy surf though a group of natives, naked but armed with bows and arrows, appeared on the shore and exchanged a feather headdress and some beads for three Portuguese bonnets. After coasting north and despatching a messenger to report the occurrence to Manuel, Cabral continued his voyage, an ill-omened one, for several of his ships were lost, including that of Bartolomeu Dias, drowned in the very waters that he had been the first to navigate.

Only six ships reached Sofala in the month of July and Calicut on September 13. Although the Samorin still viewed the visitors with suspicion, a number of them disembarked and began to trade for pepper. The seizure of a native ship led to a riot in which a number of Portuguese were massacred, including Aires Correia, the founder of the factory. Cabral bombarded the city, burnt several Indian boats and transferred his attention to Cochin and Cannanor, where the rulers were hostile to the Samorin or intimidated by his punishment, and readily entered negotiations. When Cabral left India in January 1501, he carried with him three ambassadors of the Kings of Cochin and Cannanor and left a group of his compatriots to carry on the factory in Cochin. From this point communication with India was firmly established, and the subsequent

¹ Though this date has been established for over a century, the discovery is still celebrated in Portugal and Brazil on May 3, the date given by Correia and other chroniclers.

voyages passed from the stage of discovery to that of exploration and empire; the Portuguese implanted themselves in India and irradiated along the whole coastline of the Indian Ocean.

As to Brazil, the discovery passed apparently unrewarded and almost unnoticed. For the moment it was only a savage coastline made Portuguese by the presence of a wooden crucifix: only with the exhaustion of the Indian traffic did it very gradually take shape as Portugal's land of promise.

viii. PORTUGUESE ASIA. Without hesitation Portugal embarked on the oriental enterprise. It was soon clear that the comparatively peaceful opening up of the African coast could not be repeated in India. Vasco da Gama realized that the presence of Moslems would lead to hostilities, but had the impression that the Samorin, not being a Mohammedan, was a Christian. In this belief Cabral informed the Samorin that war with the Moslems was a duty to the Portuguese, though in his town of Calicut they would give no offence. The massacre of Calicut and the departure of the Portuguese for Cochin and Cannanor at once affected the Indian balance of power and involved the Portuguese in the affairs of the coastal states.

In the years from 1501 to 1505 six expeditions were sent out: the first of these, four ships commanded by João da Nova, established a factory at Cannanor, where they were well received, and brought back spices. In 1502 Vasco da Gama sailed with fifteen ships, followed by five more under his cousin: in Africa an alliance was made with the ruler of Kilwa, who paid tribute to the King of Portugal, whilst in India Calicut was heavily bombarded and the factories at Cochin and Cannanor reinforced. Notwithstanding this, on his departure the Samorin invaded Cochin and drove its ruler and the Portuguese of the factory to seek refuge on the island of Valpi, from which they were only relieved by the arrival of one of the three fleets of 1503, bringing Francisco de Albuquerque as captain-major. From this point the ruler of Cochin was a client of the King of Portugal, and Duarte Pacheco remained with some 160 Portuguese and three ships to ward off the next assault of the Samorin, duly delivered with enormous forces in the beginning of 1504: Duarte Pacheco not only organized the defence of Cochin and the defeat of the invaders, but saved the factory at Quilon from the threats of the local Moslems. Finally in September there arrived a fleet of thirteen ships with Lopo Soares as commander. Once more Calicut was bombarded, and a Moslem fleet was burnt in Cannanor, and when the return was made, five ships and 300 men remained to safeguard the Portuguese factories.

The entrance of a new phase in Luso-Indian relations was recognized

in 1505 by the despatch of D. Francisco de Almeida with the title of Viceroy and authorization to consolidate Portuguese commerce with the East on imperial lines. Not only did Almeida carry instructions for the organization of forts and factories on the east coast of Africa and the west of Africa, but also for the conclusion of alliances with the Indian rulers and the interruption of the Moslem spice trade by the control of the Red Sea, to be assured by the erection of a fort near its mouth. Portugal thus pitted herself against the whole commercial organization of the Mohammedan world, and incidentally that of the Venetian Republic, already seriously menaced by the dislocation of the spice trade.

Almeida brought 22 ships, carrying in all some 2,500 men, of whom 1,500 were soldiers contracted for three years' service in the East. His own powers were absolute. His first undertaking was the erection of a fort at Kilwa, and the burning of hostile Mombasa. Reaching India, he crowned the ruler of Cochin with a gold crown and built a strong stone fort to replace the wooden one in the city. By a system of licences he sought to control all oriental trading-ships, which were liable to arrest unless they possessed his authorization. This system threatened immediate ruin to his commercial rivals, and it was not long before the struggle began. The Samorin collected a great fleet, which was worsted without difficulty by the artillery of eleven Portuguese vessels. The Arab merchants, for their part, began to take their spices in Malacca and the Sunda Islands and to sail by Ceylon or the Maldives direct to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea; it was in an attempt to cut off this trade that the Portuguese reached Ceylon.

At the same time Tristão da Cunha with a fleet of fifteen ships, having explored the coast of part of Madagascar and the East African mainland, seized the island of Socotra, with the idea of controlling the Red Sea. Although a fort was built, it was soon discovered to be too far away to fulfil its purpose effectively. By now the Egyptians were astir, and a fleet, built with Venetian support, intercepted Almeida's son in a surprise attack at Chaul early in 1508. Although, after long resistance, Lourenço de Almeida was mortally wounded and his ship captured, escorting vessels escaped and reported the new peril to the viceroy. Whilst D. Francisco collected 19 ships and 1,600 men, the Egyptian fleet sailed into Indian waters and made its base at Diu, where it was reinforced by the Samorin of Calicut. On February 2, 1509, a great naval battle was fought off Diu, and the complete destruction of the Mohammedan armada and its Indian allies assured the Portuguese of sea-power in the Indian Ocean. Almeida did not long survive his victory, dying in a skirmish with natives near the Cape on his return.

Three years before, Afonso de Albuquerque, the greatest of the Por-

tuguese governors of the East, had sailed for India, with a secret nomination by King Manuel as governor when Almeida's viceroyalty should finish. The position was a false one, and it is not surprising that trouble should have arisen. Almeida's policy had followed the directions laid down for him to the extent of hindering the Arab trade and of assuring Portuguese commercial preponderance in India; he had decided that the continuance of this preponderance would depend entirely on sea-power and held the opinion that numerous fortresses would be a source of dispersion and weakness. Albuquerque, bolder and more independent, envisaged not only Portuguese sea-power, but imperial dominion throughout the known orient. Thus his exploits before he finally replaced Almeida formed a prelude to the performance of his designs. Under colour of royal orders, but in fact on his own initiative, he separated his division from the main fleet of Tristão da Cunha (who, after the capture of Socotra, proceeded direct to India) and ravaged the cities of the Oman coast. Some surrendered and gave him provisions, but others refused to submit, and were captured and plundered. On September 25, 1507, the six Portuguese ships appeared off Ormuz, the market-place for the wares of Tartary, Armenia and Persia, standing on a barren islet at the mouth of the Persian Gulf. Galleons and galleys between 150 and 200 in number were in the harbour, whilst ashore there were 20,000 men. Albuquerque's captains, very conscious of their numerical inferiority—they were some 400 men in all—were for circumspection, but he himself scorned to doubt, demanded tribute, and after three days of negotiations, attacked the ships at Ormuz and bombarded the city until its regent promised to pay a tribute of 15,000 gold xerafins a year, to make a gift of 5,000, and to submit to the construction of a Portuguese fort, which was begun on October 24, 1507. The work discontented the crews, tormented by the thought of Arab prizes and cargoes of precious pepper whilst they sweated as stone-masons. Their dissensions came to a head: three ships slipped anchor and disappeared overnight, and Albuquerque could only retire to Socotra.

When he returned the next year with some reinforcements, he was astonished to find the regent of Ormuz in possession of a letter from the viceroy disowning him and promising free navigation to the merchants of the city. Albuquerque then decided to go at last to India, arriving in December at Cannanor and claiming the governorship from Almeida, whose three years had run out. But the viceroy, now preparing the expedition against the Egyptian fleet, refused to acknowledge Albuquerque, declaring that he had not yet been ordered to leave India, and the would-be successor retired to Cochin. When he renewed his demand on Almeida's return from Diu, his enemies went about their work so

thoroughly that he was abandoned by everyone and locked in a tower at Cannanor for some weeks.

In October 1509 the marshal D. Fernando Coutinho arrived with fifteen ships, confirmation of Albuquerque's dignity and orders to attack Calicut. The latter exploit was attempted in the following January, but ended in the massacre of Coutinho and his guard in an assault on the Samorin's palace and the wounding of Albuquerque himself. The necessity for a metropolis caused the governor to choose Gôa, which, by its island position half-way down the coast of India, best fulfilled the strategic requirements of the capital of a maritime empire. Having collected a fleet with which he started for the proposed conquest, he had the fortune to find its armies absent on an expedition and captured it with little trouble, though when the absent ruler, the Hidalcão, returned with a large army, Albuquerque was driven back to his ships and forced to retire to Cochin. At the end of the year (1510), however, a second expedition captured and sacked the city; fortifications were begun, administrative machinery installed, intermarriage with Indians encouraged, and the merchants of Ormuz attracted.

Albuquerque next sought to follow the spice trade back to its source, and accordingly in May 1511 departed with seventeen ships to conquer Malacca, the emporium of the wares of China and the Moluccas. Some eighteen months before, Diogo Lopes de Sequeira had made the first Portuguese voyage from India to Malacca, but had met with a hostile reception and retreated; a second fleet of four ships had fared no better. Albuquerque delivered two attacks, on July 24 and August 10, after which the city fell and a Portuguese fort was begun. Rulers of Sumatra and Java at once sought terms; Albuquerque had already sent messengers to Siam, hostile to Malacca, and beyond to the realms of Pegu, the Moluccas and China. However, all the treasure of this expedition was lost in the wreck of Albuquerque's flagship Frol de la Mar off Sumatra. The governor himself escaped on a raft and only reached Cochin again in 1512, to learn that Gôa was closely invested. With his usual energy he collected the forces that had recently arrived from Portugal, and in an attack lasting eight days again drove off the Hidalcão.

Having at length made peace with the new Samorin of Calicut and begun to build a fort there, Albuquerque turned to the long-proposed scheme for ruining Arab trade by the occupation of strategic positions on the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. In February 1513 he sailed for Aden, but failed to take it for lack of strong ladders and fresh water. Entering the Red Sea, he spent three months in exploration before returning to India. His last expedition began in February 1515 and aimed at the reduction of Ormuz and Aden, as a prelude to the destruction of Mecca

itself. Ormuz agreed to pay 125,000 gold xerafins and to restore the Portuguese fort, and, having left a strong garrison, Albuquerque returned to Gôa, already stricken with dysentery. On the way he learned that his enemy Lopo Soares de Albergaria had been appointed his successor. Thus embittered, he died a few hours after his ships had crossed the bar of Gôa. Apart from his conquests, he had built the forts of Gôa, Calicut, Malacca and Ormuz and reconstructed those of Cannanor and Cochin, begun ship-building and other industries in Portuguese India, and established relations with the rulers of western India, Ceylon, Bengal, Burma, Siam and a number of the Spice Islands, a Herculean task accomplished with harshness in war and austerity in administration. His immense schemes—the monopolization of the spice trade at its source and the seizure of the body of the Prophet from Mecca in order to ransom Jerusalem—at least came near realization in his six years of power.

Albuquerque's successors laid Colombo under tribute, opened a factory in the Maldives and developed trade with Burma, but from 1522 Duarte de Meneses, though a successful governor of Tangier, proved incapable of staving off disaster in India. Vasco da Gama, sent out to take strong measures in 1524, died after four months' residence. Nuno da Cunha took Basra in 1529 and reduced the rebellions that had taken place on the Malabar coast: in return for aiding Badur against the Mongols he was ceded the town of Diu, which Badur's successor later tried to recover in a siege lasting three months. Once more Diu was besieged, this time for seven months, under the governorship of D. João de Castro in 1546. The successful resistance of the Portuguese, against vastly superior numbers of men and artillery, nevertheless left Diu practically in ruins. According to the well-known story D. João de Castro, without gold, silver or land, sent the ashes of his son who had died in the siege and his own beard as pledges to the municipality of Gôa for a loan with which to rebuild the city.

Already the Portuguese had reached Ternate in the Moluccas, Celebes, Borneo, Banda and Java. In 1541 Estêvão da Gama sailed up the Arabian gulf to Suez: and in the following year Portuguese merchants established themselves at Liampo in China, later fixing their colony at Macau. The final limits of this tremendous expansion were Japan and the islands of Timor and Solor in Australasia.

ix. THE INDIAN MAGNIFICENCE. The influx of wealth from the orient brought new lustre to the crown. Manuel, Lord of the Navigation, Conquest and Commerce of Ethiopia, Arabia, Persia and India, reaped the results of Vasco da Gama's adventure in tribute and prestige. The first voyage of 1499 was paid for sixty times by the sale of the relatively small quantity of pepper brought back. The succeeding enterprise of

Pedro Álvares Cabral, though marred by the loss of four vessels, produced twice or four times its cost in profits. A few years later Albuquerque assessed the annual income to the crown, discounting loss of ships and other charges, at a million cruzados. This large profit was afforded by the reservation of all commerce in pepper, cloves and cinnamon to the state and the payment of a tribute of thirty per cent on all other spices, five of which was devoted to the erection of the Jerónimos monastery at Belém, and the remainder to the royal revenues. Even at first there were some who doubted the desirability of wasting wealth and blood on the conquest of the Indian trade, but the immediate profits were too dazzling for their opinion to prevail. The contrast between this easily gained wealth and the tortuous and unproductive taxation of Portugal was extreme. It was easy to stimulate captain and cabin-boy to keep up the feverish commerce with the East by allowing them small but lucrative shares. In 1502 Vasco da Gama induced the ruler of Kilwa to pay two hundred gold mithkals a year for the privilege of being subject to the King of Portugal: the first-fruits of the East African gold were devoted to the great gold monstrance of Belém, reputedly the work of Gil Vicente. With the opulence of India D. Manuel lavishly maintained with grants and pensions some 5,000 of his people.

The flood of wealth bore within itself the seeds of poverty. First, the boom led to a slump. Pepper, the principal import from the East, lost its value just as sugar had done. The first pepper brought back by Vasco da Gama sold at 80 cruzados the quintal; it soon fell to 40, and later to less than 20, as the supply increased. A royal order forbade its sale at less than 20 cruzados, and the price was later stabilized at 30. In Cochin it was acquired for about 2. Together with the decrease in profit came an increase in the cost of expeditions. It was soon found that the state could not perform alone the task of supplying tradingvessels and protecting its outposts and preserves with armed ships and soldiers. Private vessels were allowed to join Cabral's and later squadrons. Only then was it found that as the conquest progressed, the profits were reduced, and that the occupation of territory was not a remunerative policy, but that it gradually swallowed up the profits of the whole enterprise. As early as 1518 the flow of African wealth was subsiding. Factories became less profitable; and the factor at Sofala wrote to the king: 'Sofala, Sire, is not worth such great expense. Your Highness thought to profit me in granting me the boon of this factory, but I, Sire, am quite ruined and would not have come here at any price.'

With the increase of commercial traffic by sea came the pirates. Already in 1492 French ships were arrested in Lisbon as reprisals for the seizure of a gold-bearing caravel from the Gulf of Guinea. In the early years of the next century the treasure road to the Indies became the favourite resort of corsairs. When Mondragon marauded off the Azores, King Manuel, who steered a path of careful neutrality in international affairs, failed to get redress from the French government, but at length captured the four ships of the pirate and brought him captive to Lisbon. His release on promising loyal service to Manuel scarcely discouraged his compatriots from similar depredations, which reached their height in the reign of John III. In 1530, eight years after his accession, the Portuguese were estimated to have lost 300 ships worth 500,000 cruzados. Continued representations went politely ignored. In 1532 a Portuguese squadron seized a French ship which had not only despoiled factories in Brazil, but had set up an armed fort with seventy men on Portuguese territory, and brought away cargoes of Brazil wood.

X. PENINSULAR UNITY: MARRIAGES OF MANUEL I. The drain of the East and the consolidation of the other Peninsular kingdoms into a single Spain led slowly towards the eclipse of Portugal in 1580. The result was almost obtained eighty years before by a marriage alliance.

Soon after Manuel's accession Ferdinand and Isabella had approached

Soon after Manuel's accession Ferdinand and Isabella had approached him with a view to a marriage with their daughter Maria; he himself nourished the idea of a union with her elder sister Isabel, widow of Prince Afonso, which was made conditional on the expulsion of the Jews, first decreed in December 1496, and expedited so that the marriage could take place in October 1497. Soon after its celebration came the news of the death of Ferdinand and Isabella's only son, which raised Manuel and Isabel to the positions of heirs presumptive to the Spanish throne.

The cortes of Lisbon of 1498 assented to the departure of the king and queen to be sworn as heirs to Castile and Aragon, so, leaving the widow of John II as regent, they departed first for Toledo, where they received and gave the necessary oaths in respect of Castile and Leon, and then for Saragossa, where they arrived on July 1, 1498. The Aragonese, true to their reputation for obstinacy, refused to accept Queen Isabel as heiress, and only became more accommodating when she gave birth to a prince, christened Miguel da Paz. Isabel died of the birth, but her son was accepted by the Aragonese and remained with his grandparents whilst Manuel returned to Lisbon to assemble new cortes, which discussed the Portuguese succession in March 1499. Here the Portuguese began to express misgivings about the Spanish inheritance. Successive kings had put forward dynastic interests in

¹ The word Spain hitherto covered the whole Peninsula: when Ferdinand called himself King of Spain and was granted the title by Alexander VI, D. Manuel vainly protested against this mususe of the term.

endeavouring to unite the two thrones to reign over the whole Peninsula, without apparently much worrying about the consequences to Portugal. On this occasion the cortes obtained a guarantee that if God willed that Portugal and Spain should be united, none but Portuguese should have control of the treasury, justice, the overseas captaincies and the castles and towns of Portugal. However, in July 1500 the infant prince died without ever having visited Portugal, and the immediate possibility of unification disappeared. Less than two years later Manuel married his sister-in-law Maria, but the Spanish succession passed through the second sister Juana to Philip the Fair of Burgundy and the Spanish line of Hapsburgs.

By his second marriage Manuel had ten children, and by his third, contracted in 1518 with D. Leonor, the sister of Charles V, two more. In spite of this large family the dynasty became extinct in 1580, since Prince John, born in 1502 and succeeding as John III in 1521, had only one son, who predeceased him, leaving the posthumously-born Sebastian. Of the rest, two sons entered the Church, both attaining the cardinalate, and one, Henry, succeeding Sebastian as king for a brief reign. Manuel's daughters included Beatriz, wife of Charles III of Savoy; Isabel, Empress and Queen of Spain, as wife of Charles V, and the cultured Maria, who died a spinster after many betrothals.

CHAPTER XVI

FROM THE GREAT EXPANSION TO THE LOSS OF INDEPENDENCE

i. MAGELLAN; THE MOLUCCA DISPUTE, 1517-1529. Fernão de Magalhais, a native of northern Portugal, began his great voyage of circumnavigation as a Spanish subject. Having seen service in Africa and India, especially under Albuquerque at the siege of Malacca, he returned to Portugal and asked for an increase of pension as a nobleman attendant at court. This was refused on the ground of certain acts of his committed in India, and out of rancour he offered his services to Charles V, taking Spanish nationality in 1517. With him went Rui Faleiro, an astronomer and cartographer, and the two proposed the discovery of new spice islands in the Spanish zone. The Moluccas had already been reached from India by the Portuguese, but as all lands west of the Tordesillas line had been granted to Spain, they could be disputed by a Spanish explorer travelling west. The Portuguese ambassador in Castile tried to thwart Magellan's departure, and at a meeting at Sintra, it had even been suggested that he should be assassinated. Attempts to persuade him to return to Portugal failed. He sailed and died, but the problem he created, complicated by the seizure of one of his ships by the Portuguese in the Moluccas, survived him.

A commission met on the frontiers of the two countries in April 1524, but failed to agree for lack of precise information. Both monarchs upheld their pretensions. Charles had already authorized commerce with the islands and sent new expeditions thither; in November 1522, John III ordered his ambassador in Madrid to send back his retinue as a warning of strained relations, an order which was withdrawn but later amplified. Only by the treaty of Saragossa of April 1529 was the question settled. Portugal agreed to pay 350,000 cruzados for the cancellation of the Spanish claims, unless it could be proved that these were unfounded, in which case the money would be refunded. At the same time an attempt was made to forestall future conflicts by fixing a boundary to Spanish expansion 17° east of the disputed islands. Nevertheless the Spaniards continued to send ships to the Philippines, which under this ruling should have been Portuguese.¹

¹ It is curious to note that as part of the policy of secrecy with regard to the discoveries, John paid an Italian who had accompanied Magellan 2000 ducats to conceal the route to, and chart of, the Moluccas.

ii. JOHN III, 1521-1557. John III had succeeded to the throne in December 1521 at the age of nineteen. His character and action, long denigrated, have recently been strongly defended; neither view is fully convincing. Herculano, in a more generous moment, wrote 'without believing that John III was an idiot, we suppose his intelligence to have been below mediocrity'. It is true that the words of D. Luis de Sousa imply a neglected education—'a good nature accompanied by a good memory,...if he had had any application, the pastimes that usually rule juvenility took it away, or if his masters had dared to use a little more jurisdiction with him, he might have gained a perfect knowledge of latinity and of other arts that his father wished him to know'. King Manuel had delayed granting him a household of his own until late. The relationship between father and son was not very friendly. On the death of his second wife, Manuel contemplated withdrawing to a monastery, or devoting the rest of his life to waging war on the Moslems; according to Gois, it was then that he learnt that 'his son's favourites were advising him certain things founded on disobedience to him', and he himself married Princess Leonor, whom he had asked in marriage for John. These veiled accusations are entirely mysterious.2

From the first year of his reign, John negotiated for a double marriage alliance with Spain, concluded in 1525 and 1526 by the marriages of himself with the Emperor's sister Catarina, and of the Emperor with his sister Isabel. The former match found critics in Portugal, where it was held that John should have married his father's widow in order to retain in Portugal her great wealth and dowry. However, in reply to a memorandum of the Lisbon municipality, the king declared that 'his soul would not suffer him to call her bride to whom he had given the name of mother', and the wealthy Queen Leonor therefore returned to Castile in 1523. The marriage with Catarina was in itself an expensive undertaking. The Emperor refused the offer of 50,000 quintals of pepper in lieu of Princess Isabel's dowry, and stood out for 900,000 dobras of gold, which was in fact handed over in instalments spread over the two years following the marriage.

The whole policy of marriages with the Emperor's family brought little but ruin and disaster to Portugal. The royal line dwindled for lack of new blood, while large dowries helped to consume the wealth of the Indies. The country had given up its normal occupations to wrest riches from two, soon three, continents, only to see them pour into

¹ Contrast Alexandre Herculano, Historia...da Inquisição, with Alfredo Pimenta, D. Foão III.

³ One of Prince John's companions, Luis da Silveira, was banished from the court at this time, to come to power after Manuel's death.

Spain and thence to those parts of Europe where the acquisition of money was managed on a more professional basis.

When in 1544 cortes were called at Almeirim to take the oath to the heir, Prince João, a disastrous picture of the country's financial position was put before its representatives. The cost of the solution to the Molucca question, 350,000 cruzados, added to that of holding India, reached 1,500,000. Dynastic marriages had cost another 1,400,000. Indebtedness on loans reached 1,946,000 cruzados. As the money to finance successive expeditions and to defend Africa was raised in Flanders by means of three-months bills, which were usually not redeemed but prolonged for equal periods at between 16 and 20 per cent, the accumulation of debts is scarcely to be wondered at. But the amount of money involved appears the more conspicuous beside the sums that the cortes could raise, 100,000 and 150,000 cruzados in the years 1525 and 1535. In 1544 the king made no attempt to cancel the debts, but could only ask the country to supply 200,000, an indication of the disproportion between the limited resources of Portugal and the magnitude of the enterprises on which she had embarked. The immediate cause of difficulties was probably the betrothal in 1543 of John's daughter Maria to the Emperor's heir, Prince Philip, the match from which the pitiful Don Carlos was born.

To prevent a worsening of the financial position John III retained his youngest sister Maria in Portugal. Her mother, Queen Leonor, became the wife of Francis I of France in fulfilment of the terms of his release from imprisonment in Madrid, but in spite of the matches that were planned for Maria by her mother in France and the Emperor in Spain, she remained in Portugal with her wealth—'with the dowry she had of 400,000 escudos, she had profited in the Indies to the extent of 300,000, not to speak of 200,000 more of her mother's dowry, mortgaged in the county of Lorraine, apart from jewels and very costly raiment', wrote a Venetian ambassador in 1535. It was not always so easy to prevent wealth from leaving the country.

iii. THE JESUITS AND THE INQUISITION. In the early years of John's reign the experienced advisers of his father's were retained; perhaps to their influence was due the continuance of the tolerant policy pursued towards the New Christians since 1506. Gradually, however, John III, himself devout to the point of fanaticism, found himself giving way to the wishes of his family and entourage. In 1531 the pope acquiesced in his application for a permanent inquisition. Certain cardinals opposed the concession on the suspicion that a contributory motive for the request might have been covetousness of the wealth of the New Christians. But the requisite bull arrived in Portugal, and in June 1532 John ordered,

as a preliminary measure, the revocation of the protective agreement of 1507 and reinforcement of the orders of 1499—sure signs of coming persecution. The New Christians despatched one of their number to Rome, who, by convincing the Papacy of the low motives of John III, secured a temporary suspension. The inquisition was only finally established through the offices of Charles V in 1536.

Three years later, a Portuguese, Diogo de Gouveia, who had founded the College of Santa Barbara in Paris, wrote to advise John III of the projected constitution of the Society of Jesus. As missionary work was one of its objects, John proposed in Rome that attention should be given to the Portuguese Indies. At once two Jesuits, Simão Rodrigues de Azevedo and Paulo Camarte, left for Portugal, and in the following year Francis Xavier followed them. In spite of the favour of the royal family and court, the Jesuits were not unopposed. At a meeting of the royal council to discuss whether they should proceed to the Indies or remain in Portugal, the king's brother, Cardinal Henry, expressed anxiety that they should go, but John III resolved on the establishment of a Jesuit college in Coimbra, and in 1543 selected Simão Rodrigues as tutor to his son, Prince John. Cardinal Henry still remained an opponent. In 1544 he got permission to hold an enquiry into Jesuit doctrines based on charges of disobedience, but the findings absolved the order of all blame, and the Cardinal soon after took a Jesuit as his own confessor. After this victory the Society never looked back. In the East and in Brazil it evangelized and colonized: in Coimbra its college had every possible facility from gifts of groceries to the right to shoot rubbish under the city wall. In return St Ignatius intervened with the Papacy to secure the establishment of the inquisition in Portugal.

In 1547 a new college was established in Coimbra 'in which all the arts shall be read, of which the principal shall be Dr André de Gouveia, whom for this purpose I have brought from France with some lecturers'. These included the Scottish humanist, George Buchanan. In the first year the college of Arts gathered 1,200 students, but it was not long before various accusations were voiced against the staff, their morals and life. The inquisition stepped in, and after some intrigue, the new college was shut down, and its establishment handed over to the Jesuits, who now became paramount in Coimbra. Such was the position reached by the Portuguese Jesuits that the Provincial, Simão Rodrigues, was found deficient in obedience to his superiors and asked to resign in 1552. In spite of the protection of John III, his conduct was reprehended and he was ordered to the Holy Land for a year. Generally speaking, however, the Jesuits demanded high standards in education and evangelization, and their strict discipline was a strong influence in Portugal.

The inquisition, as organized in 1536, was to be directed by a Grand-Inquisitor, not yet appointed, and four Inquisitors-Major, the Bishops of Coimbra, Lamego and Ceuta, and another to be chosen by the king: according to Herculano, the pope's intention was that only the Bishop of Ceuta, of known clemency, should hold office. The bull announcing the inauguration was published in October at Évora, being read before the king and local dignitaries, together with an explanatory letter giving thirty days' grace before operations should begin. The letter, addressed to the district of Évora, adjured all those who felt themselves guilty of heresy or apostasy, or having performed a Judaic, Lutheran, Mohammedan or magical rite, to confess and repent. Just before the expiry of the month of grace, a more precise pronouncement declared certain acts to require confession and denunciation—keeping of the Sabbath on Saturday, fasting for Ramadan, bathing the whole body and praying shoeless, keeping Fridays and refusing bacon or wine, denial of paradise, hell, the articles of faith and mass, the virgin birth and power of priests to absolve and other reputedly protestant doctrines, together with bigamy, witchcraft and the unauthorized possession of Bibles in Portuguese. Acts of Judaism must have been observed after October 15, 1535. To launch the inquisition John III dictated a letter to all his subjects enjoining the strictest respect and obedience.

Of the first two years of its activity little is recorded. An inquisitor took some depositions in January and December 1537, but the Bishop of Ceuta was mild and aged, and resigned in 1539 without having countenanced any violence. His successor was John's brother, Henry, an appointment the New Christians vainly tried to impede in Rome. Henry, a bigoted and vindictive archbishop of twenty-seven, entered upon his duties with enthusiasm. The pope was somewhat suspicious of his intentions. One day whilst a special envoy in Rome was explaining that the inquisition, far from being profitable to the king, cost him 1,100 ducats a year, the son of one Margarida de Oliveira threw himself at the pope's feet screaming that they wanted to burn his mother. In September 1544 all sentences of the inquisition were suspended by papal order.

John III retorted by expelling the nuncio and refusing to have him back until the inquisition had been restored. The nuncio excommunicated the officers of the inquisition for exceeding their powers, and a settlement was only reached in 1548 after Henry had been raised to the cardinalate. Already the pope had offered to come to terms, granting the Holy Office the full exercise of all its powers on various conditions—a full pardon and restitution for all those hitherto condemned, the secrecy of abjurations made by Judaizers and delivery of all those condemned to the civil authorities for a year's detention before the execution of sentences.

Cardinal Henry stood out for public confessions and immediate execution, and regarded the general pardon as a slight upon his authority. In a letter to the king he offered to resign, and a few days later sent a messenger to court to propound the history of his acceptance of his appointment, his services as grand-inquisitor, and the present state of the Holy Office, which was, he maintained, no longer anything but a name: when the inquisition became a real inquisition, with suitable inquisitors and money to support it, he would very willingly come back as grand-inquisitor and suffer 'a hundred thousand insults' into the bargain. At length Henry accepted the papal pardon and resumed office.

Inquisitions functioned in six Portuguese cities, Oporto, Coimbra, Lamego, Tomar, Évora and Lisbon. That of Oporto was instituted by order of John III, who in a letter of June 1541 recommended the bishop to find suitable incumbents for the various offices, which are 'such that they will be delighted to accept them without pay'. After the settling of difficulties raised by the jurisdiction of the bishop in the neighbouring archdiocese of Braga, Oporto witnessed its only auto-da-fé in February 1543. Of those condemned four were burnt in person and twenty-one in effigy. The spectators were said to have numbered many thousands and to have obtained great moral and spiritual benefit from the unaccustomed sight. In 1547 the Oporto inquisition was suppressed.

In Lamego, the home of many New Christians, one Pedro Furtado, a doctor who had cured 'the mother of the sons of the Archbishop of Lisbon', vainly opposed the local desire to have the tribunal, which functioned only until 1546 or 1547. At Tomar only two autos-da-fé were held, in 1543 and 1544; most of those tried abjured or were reconciled; about four were taken to the stake.

By 1547 only three tribunals remained. That of Évora, begun in 1537, held its first auto in 1542 and six others in the next fifteen years. In Lisbon the first recorded auto was in 1540; there were few in the reign of John III. The tribunal of Coimbra functioned only from 1567.

iv. STATE OF PORTUGAL. The introduction of the inquisition and the Society of Jesus did not stay the moral decline of the nation. In the overseas venture, the early thirst for glory had been replaced by a simple greed for wealth; ironically enough, there was glory to be had in plenty in rolling back Portugal's oriental enemies, but little wealth. At home, rural districts fell into impoverishment and neglect; there was a general contempt for manual and agricultural labour, in which a man might labour a lifetime without acquiring a tithe of the profits of one fortunate day of Indian plundering. Those who returned poor had lost their habits of industry, and rural life in Portugal was rendered hard by taxation, the occupation of much cultivable land by the religious orders and lack

of fertile smallholdings. Many people were driven to Lisbon, whose population steadily increased, helped by the import of slaves. Apart from the drain of the East, many industrious Portuguese, unable to earn a living at home, emigrated to the western provinces of Spain, Madrid and especially Seville, where it was said, with palpable exaggeration, that a quarter of the population had been born in Portugal. Diogo do Couto set out for India with 4,000 men, of whom only half reached Gôa. Not only disease, but shipwreck and piracy decimated the Portuguese adventurers. The loss of life is described by Filipe Sassetti: 'every year from 2,500 to 3,000 men and boys go forth from Portugal, abandoned fellows, the worst there could be; of them the quarter and the third part are thrown into the sea, sometimes the half.' To the remainder fell the task of guarding the 15,000 miles of coastline of the Portuguese East.

Hence the need to introduce slaves. Negroes from the Guinea Coast, especially from Mina, poured into Portugal. Garcia de Rèsende feared that the slaves would 'soon be more numerous than we, in my opinion!' Nicholas Cleynarts, the Belgian humanist, wrote: 'Slaves pullulate everywhere. All work is done by negroes and captive Moors. Portugal is crammed with these folk. I should think that in Lisbon the slaves, men and women, are more than the free-born Portuguese.' The last estimate shows considerable exaggeration, for in 1551 the population of Lisbon was estimated at 100,000 with 10,000 slaves, who included some 1,000 waterwomen and even more washerwomen, together with scavengers, porters and messenger-boys. Between 60 and 70 slave-markets were said to exist in Lisbon.

Whilst India sealed the policy of absolutism in the time of Manuel I, it now produced an unhealthy and anarchical indifferentism. Diogo do Couto tells how when John III contemplated sending forty vessels to forestall an Arab attack on India in 1538 he could only raise twelve, because many of the nobles declared that India had been discovered only for trade, not for fighting the infidel, and refused to go. The king threatened to deprive them of their comendas in the military orders, but they brought their case before the Mesa da Consciência, where it was upheld.

Cleynarts wrote in 1535: 'If agriculture was ever despised, it is certainly in the parts where I reside. What is everywhere regarded as the main sinew of nations is here regarded as insignificant and useless. Should anyone assert that the Portuguese do not live slumbering body and soul in indolence, I could assure them that in that case there is no people that deserves the accusation of inertia. I speak of µs, especially, who live beyond the Tagus and breathe most nearly the air of Africa.... There are many no richer than I, who are accompanied by eight servants

whom they sustain, I will not say with abundance, but rather with hunger, and in other ways that I am too stupid to learn in the days of my life. And it is not very difficult to recruit a useless mob of servitors, because these people prefer to support anything rather than learn some profession.' In confirmation Diogo do Couto draws a contrast between the contemporary decline and the austere days of Afonso de Albuquerque.

The cortes called by John III in 1525 and 1535 attempted to deal with some of the problems that had arisen. Of 214 titles presented for consideration, a number are memoranda on gambling, wastrels, extravagance, court parasites: unnecessary servants, dishonest and disorderly: fraudulent officials and unnecessary redundancy of offices; servants of officials who rob with impunity; ecclesiastics who fail to perform their duties and show excessive zeal in demanding payments. In response to these complaints a number of laws, the 36 Leis das cortes, were issued in 1538. In spite of them, gaming continued unabated. Begging was forbidden to all those who were healthy; masters were enjoined to pay their servants; judges and officers were not to demand food and lodging or set up their slaves as constables. Sumptuary laws again forbade the use of silks, silver or gold on the person. Yet these laws only tinkered with the vast problems on hand.


Meanwhile much of the precious stones, spices, perfumes, sugar and cotton that came from the east went to Flanders to buy salt meat, corn, cheese, butter and cured fish-even chickens and eggs, according to Sassetti—that Portugal no longer troubled to produce. Cloth, tapestries, metalwork, and furniture were largely imported. In 1549 the factory at Antwerp had to be abolished because of its insolvency and corruption. The debt of nearly 2,000,000 cruzados that John had declared in 1544rose to 3,000,000 in 1552, and in 1560 orders were issued to cease the payment of interest from the Casa da Índia. Hitherto interest on loans was paid quarterly by notes against the receipts of the customs or the Casa; now all loans were reduced to 5 per cent payable by any department the creditor might choose. Moral palliation for the break lay in the belated reminder that those who had put money out at interest had disobeyed human and divine laws. 'If there were any wealthy persons in the kingdom', declared the Count of Castanheira, the treasurer, 'we might still remedy expenses by selling jurisdictions, which now seems as abominable a thing as did borrowing at interest when that was begun. When I consider the things which Your Highness must sustain and the state of your treasury,' he wrote, 'so many motives for despair appear before me that it often seems that they come more from my melancholic humour than from anything else.'

v. RETREAT IN AFRICA AND ADVANCE IN BRAZIL. The number of strongholds in North Africa had risen to eight—Ceuta, Alcazar Seghir, Tangier, Arzila, Santa Cruz de Gué, Safim, Azamor and Mazagão. These were religious and racial outposts that had never been economically remunerative: though of little use for trade, they required to be strongly fortified. It was during John III's reign that Portugal began to transfer her interests from the barren beaches of North Africa to the toilsome but eventually rewarding development of Brazil. Although the question was raised some years earlier, it was in 1542 that the garrisons were withdrawn from Safim and Azamor, the two remotest and least productive stations. In 1549 Alcazar-Seghir, and in 1550 Arzila, were likewise abandoned.

The rise of Brazil as a colony was slow during the first half-century after its discovery. D. Manuel had almost ignored it, intent on the exploitation of the Indies. No gold had been found there, and it was only valued for the export of parrots, monkeys and the Brazil wood, so-called from its ruddy colour, like embers (brasas). Two years after its discovery the known part of Brazil was rented to Fernando de Noronha. In 1530 the policy of tenure was substituted by the system of donations which had been applied to the Azores and other islands. The first donatory was the Admiral Martim Afonso de Sousa, who beat off French corsairs and founded the settlement of São Vicente, near the present port of Santos, and a village called Piratininga, which has become the modern São Paulo. Gradually stretches of the Brazilian coast, together with the right of penetration into the vast interior, were farmed out to various colonizers, who undertook to found settlements and open up commerce on their own initiative and without supervision. The first introduced crop to be successfully exploited was the sugar-cane.

In 1549 it became necessary to supply a central administration, and Tomé de Sousa was sent out with orders to found a seat of government at Baia. By about 1560 Brazilian sugar-production reached the level formerly maintained by Madeira alone. Tobacco came to Lisbon about 1550, and was used medicinally as 'smoke-weed' or 'holy-weed' for dabbing on wounds, snuffing or smoking. Jean Nicot, French envoy in Portugal from 1559 to 1566, sent some leaves to cure Catherine de Medici, whence a large measure of publicity and the name nicotine.

vi. THE APOSTOLATE OF THE INDIES; THE AFRICAN MISSIONS AND THE EVANGELIZATION OF BRAZIL BEFORE 1640. The earliest missionaries to India were a group of Franciscans who sailed with Pedro Álvares Cabral in the expedition of 1500 which discovered Brazil: their leader, Frei Henrique de Coimbra, was the first priest to celebrate mass in the newly discovered territory. On reaching the East, these Franciscans founded



VII. THE CITY AND PORT OF LISBON

a church and a community at Cochin; other friars joined them, and by 1532 some twenty of them dwelt in their house at Gôa alone. The second Order to reach India was the Society of Jesus. St Francis Xavier, the Apostle of the Indies, arrived in Gôa in May 1542, and began the task of converting the East. Preaching in the woods and on the beaches, he covered the western coast of India in his first years, then in 1545 sailed to Meliapor on the east coast and to Malacca, Ternate and Moro, islands that had been evangelized, and then allowed to lapse for want of missionaries. In August 1549 St Francis carried Christianity to Japan, where he laboured for over two years, returning to India to prepare for the conversion of China: this latter enterprise he never began, dying at Sanchwang in December 1552.

Meanwhile the Dominicans had gone to India, founded a church and begun to teach theology in 1548. Ten years later a Dominican, Frei Jorge de Santa Luzia, became the first Bishop of Malacca. Whilst the Franciscans had already touched Oceania at Solor, Frei Jorge sent thither and to Timor a mission to found churches and schools in 1561. Japan was a field fertile in martyrdoms. Whilst the Jesuits alone were said to have baptized half a million adults before 1590, the last years of the sixteenth century and the period after 1614 were full of sacrifices. Almost all the Jesuits, Dominicans and Franciscans who reached Japan during this time were put to death—925 from 1597 to 1626, and 2,190 from 1626 to 1660.

The Dominicans were the first to reach China, but Frei Gaspar da Cruz, who first preached there in 1556, was forced to retire by the hostility of the inhabitants. In 1565 the Jesuits established themselves in what is now the Portuguese colony of Macau in China, and from here one of their number, Matthew Ricci, an Italian, reached the court of Pekin. The same order opened missions in Pegu (Burma) and Bengal in 1598, entered Cambodia in 1616, Tibet in 1624, and Tonkin and Siam in 1626.

Meanwhile the Jesuits were playing a prominent part in the evangelization of Africa. In the Cape Verde Islands and Guinea the first work had been done by Franciscans, who began to spread the Gospel in about 1466 and continued their labour with a limited number of priests during the sixteenth century. The Jesuits arrived in 1604, and though they proselytized Guinea and Sierra Leone for some years, they eventually withdrew. The River Congo or Zaire had been discovered by Diogo Cão in 1482 and the negroes who accompanied him to Portugal were so impressed by what they saw that the King of the Congo asked for priests and missionaries. These arrived in 1491 and, baptizing the King and Queen John and Leonor after those of Portugal, founded the town of

¹ Miguel de Oliveira, História Eclesiástica de Portugal, Lisbon, 1940, p. 182.

São Salvador, inland and east of the mouth of the Congo. The mission enjoyed varying fortune until the invasion of other tribes in 1570, which, in conjunction with the loss of her own independence, ended Portugal's control of the Congo kingdom. The most ground had been gained at the beginning of the century, when a native king named Afonso sent his son Henrique to study in Lisbon to such good effect that he was made titular Bishop of Utica. In Angola the Jesuits began a mission in 1560 on the island of Luanda. In Moçambique the Dominicans were working from 1546 and the Jesuits from 1560; in this district their power was such that they were able to dethrone the heathen ruler of the Zambesi territories in favour of a convert.

The most effective and lasting work was done in Brazil and Paraguay, where the Jesuits helped to lay the foundations of Portuguese occupation and later developed a civilization of their own. The first six Jesuits led by Father Manuel da Nóbrega reached Baia in 1549, accompanying the Governor-General, Tomé de Sousa. Having founded a hermitage in the Governor's new town, the Jesuits built another among the Indians and began the task of expansion. In succeeding years the number of priests was increased and work was extended southward to Ilheus, Porto Seguro and Espírito Santo and northwards into Pernambuco. The present city of São Paulo springs from a straw hut in which Father José de Anchieta held a school for the Indians. Before the death of Nóbrega, Brazil had been erected into the sixth province of the Society of Jesus, and before that of Anchieta, Brazilian Jesuits founded the first of the missions in Paraguay (1586). Apart from the civilizing importance of native settlements promoted and controlled by the Jesuits in the interior, they had the even more difficult task of maintaining order and decency among the colonists, frequently rough and ambitious men whose cupidity was their strongest instinct. In the years 1549 to 1604 no less than twenty-eight Jesuit missions sailed for Brazil; from 1585 other orders—Franciscans, Benedictines, Carmelites—joined in the enterprise.

vii. DEATHS OF PRINCE JOHN AND JOHN III, 1554, 1557; REGENCY OF D. CATARINA, 1557–1562. The only survivor of John III's nine children was Prince John, who had married a Spaniard, D. Juana, in December 1552. The prince displayed, and transmitted to his posthumous son Sebastian, various signs of physical degeneration. At three he had not been fully weaned, and he began to talk only at three and a half; a prey to continual fevers, treated with frequent bleedings, in his fifth year, he remained a weak and sickly child until his marriage at the age of fifteen. Because of his recurrent fever the doctors soon decided to separate him from his wife. Forbidden to drink more than one cup of water a day, he woke on the rainy night of January 1, 1654 and, tormented by thirst,

soaked a towel in a pool outside his window, and wringing it out, drank the liquid two or three times. Before his nurse appeared, he fell to the ground in a faint, and died the following day.

The princess was approaching the end of pregnancy, and it was decided to conceal her husband's death from her. For three weeks the king and queen, court and servants put off their mourning to appear before her, and sought to distract her rising suspicions of the prince's absence. On January 19 she gave birth to a prince, christened Sebastian. Soon after, the widowed mother retired to Spain, and the child was left to the care of its grandparents.

John III died of apoplexy on June 11, 1557. There was no royal testament, but a council of notables appointed the Queen D. Catarina as regent, this being declared the last will of the late king on the evidence of some unsigned notes taken down by his secretary. D. Catarina was a Spaniard and a sister to Charles V, who at once despatched from Yuste an ambassador to investigate the Portuguese succession, and also sent Francis Borgia on a secret mission to Lisbon—the Commissary General of the Society of Jesus could discreetly begin negotiations for the crown of Portugal to pass to John III's other grandson, Prince Carlos of Spain, in the event of Sebastian's death. The future saint exchanged messages with the retired emperor in a code that masked the subjects of the intrigue with fictitious names: he discovered that Catalina Diez (the queen) favoured the succession of Sebastian Diez by the grandson of Micer Agustino (the Emperor). Her counsellors agreed, and a pragmatic to the same effect would probably have been published were it not for the Portuguese people, who, as the emperor was informed, would go to all lengths to keep their independence.

At first the regent sought to conciliate her brother-in-law the Cardinal. Henry had asked John III for permission to found a Jesuit university at Évora, but, on the protests of Coimbra, only a chair of philosophy had been inaugurated in 1556. Now however Catarina addressed a request to Rome, and Évora became a university town, a dignity it held for two centuries, from 1559 to 1759. A little later Henry was reinstated as perpetual legate a latere. However, both cardinal and queen wished to influence the infant king: the regent chose an elderly guardian, whilst Henry succeeded in having a Portuguese Jesuit made tutor, in defiance of the queen, who favoured the Spanish Dominican Fr. Luis de Granada.

In December 1560, Catarina suddenly announced her wish to retire to a Lisbon convent and hand the regency to the cardinal, who agreed to take her place if the country should assent. Cortes were not called, but a circular letter addressed to those eligible to attend elicited a majority of replies in favour of her continuance. Possibly the 'retirement' was a political pretext to consolidate power over the cardinal: Catarina never did enter a convent. However in 1562 the regency was transferred to Henry. At the beginning of the year the Portuguese garrison of Mazagão in Morocco was besieged for sixty-five days by a well-equipped Moorish force. Although reinforcements had been appealed for, and private persons in the Algarve sent men and ships, help from Lisbon came dangerously late, and Catarina was blamed for hesitancy. In July 1562 cortes were called in Lisbon for the ensuing December, without any mention of the business in hand. Before the gathering, a paper was read in which the queen declared her intention of resigning in favour of Henry. There was, in general, little confidence in his competence or vitality, but cortes gave their approval after nine days' discussion, provided that Sebastian should come of age at 14, the queen retaining the tutelage and education of her grandson.

viii. REGENCY OF CARDINAL HENRY. The recommendations of the cortes of 1562 included patriotic motions in favour of defending the African outposts and protecting the Algarve, even 'that the Studies of Coimbra be done away with as noxious to the kingdom and the revenues be applied to the war; and whoever wishes to learn, let him go to Salamanca or to Paris, and there will not be so many graduates in excess, nor so many suits'. With regard to Sebastian, the cortes urged that he 'be brought up in the customs of old Portugal....Give him back the guard of cavalry and remove this [of halbardiers] that more befits the King of the Congo than the powerful King of Portugal....Let him dress Portuguese with his camareiro-môr; eat Portuguese; ride Portuguese; speak Portuguese; all his acts be Portuguese, and thus you will accustom him to have great love for the kingdom and its affairs.' Furthermore cortes recommended a Council of Twelve to guide the cardinal, who, though he created the future Council of State, did not nominate any of the four persons proposed by cortes.

The financial situation remained uneasy. The siege of Mazagão added an unexpected burden. The 100,000 cruzados voted by cortes would only be collected from 1564—it was considered that great economies could be made during Sebastian's minority. One financial remedy lay in the application of a bull conceded by Pius IV which provided for the raising of 250,000 cruzados over five years by taxing the clergy, the proceeds being devoted to equipping a fleet to fight the infidel. When issued, the conditions of the bull, which put the fleet under papal control, were thought derogatory to national sovereignty and it had been laid aside, though not annulled. Its resurrection upset the clergy, which regarded itself as only liable to contribute to the defence of Portugal when all else

failed. After discussions the sum was reduced to half, payable in two years—though the commoners requested in cortes 'that the 50,000 cruzados that His Holiness conceded for the wars, let His Highness obtain of His Holiness that they be for ever'. The obligation to crusade was fulfilled by the co-operation of eight caravels and 1,800 men with the Spaniards in the successful attack on Peñón de los Vélez in August 1564.

ix. THE PRIOR OF CRATO. In 1531 a bastard son, António, was born to the Infante Luiz and one Violante Gomes, known as 'the Pelican'. The boy, destined for the priesthood, studied theology at Évora, where his uncle was archbishop. Although a deacon, he refused to take orders when in 1555 his father bequeathed him the title of Prior of Crato. The cardinal remonstrated, but in vain. António gave himself up to extravagance and debts, to the horror of his uncle, who prized chastity as the first of the virtues. When cortes were called in 1562, the prior retired in dudgeon to Crato because his father's younger brother, Duarte, was placed above him. He failed to obtain the see of Évora for himself when the cardinal was transferred to that of Lisbon, but received a pension and a grant to pay off his debts. Retiring to Spain, he interested Philip II in his affairs, who sent a confidential agent, Cristóvão de Moura, a Castilianized Portuguese, to Lisbon on his behalf, and obtained new grants and a promise that the prior should not be forced into the priesthood. He returned in September 1566: two months later the quarrel was renewed, and Cardinal Henry banished him from court, a sentence that held good until Sebastian took over power and made him governor of Tangier. His wish to exchange clerical robes for the lay garb of the order of St John was at length granted by Gregory XIII on the request of Philip II.

x. SEBASTIAN. In January 1568 Sebastian reached the age of fourteen and the cardinal's administration came to an end.

The young knight-errant, whose vain, headstrong and ascetic spirit was to lead the nation to disaster, hunted, rode and prayed, all three to excess. From his guardian he had heard tales of the infidel and of the wars of Africa and India, and his mind seized upon the shame of the relinquishment of Alcazar-Seghir and Arzila. Trained in military exercises from his earliest youth, he rode and tilted, killing his first wild boar at the age of eleven. His piety was extreme. Accustomed to a daily mass, two on Saturdays, he communicated weekly, in public at festivals, and wished of his own accord to fast during his ninth Lent. One day after communion he was found kneeling in ecstasy before the crucifix with tears coursing down his cheeks, and begging God, who had conceded victories, empires and monarchies to others, only to grant

him to be His Captain. On paper Sebastian was already copious, though his confusion of thought and vanity were even now perceptible. From the age of twelve, Sebastian came under the influence of his confessor and master, Luis Gonçalves da Câmara, an authoritarian ascetic whose ascendancy only diminished as the king came to love power himself.

Already in 1565 Sebastian suffered from a disease at first ascribed to the cold, but later thought to forecast impotency. Eight doctors attended him, and disagreed. When his mother sent her private physician from Spain in the spring of 1566, he seemed to improve, but next January he resumed his violent exercise and at once grew worse. In 1569 he was again thought better, but unfit to marry for four years, yet a year later his illness returned. In 1571 Catarina, after several months separation from him and sundry displays of dislike on his part, resolved to return to Spain. The resulting commotion ended in her staying. Sebastian was constrained to visit her frequently to remove bad impressions, but when she sought to restrict his exercise, after a violent scene between the two, she fell into a fit that lasted two hours.

It was Catarina who sounded Philip II in 1574 with a view to a marriage between Sebastian and the Infanta Isabel-Clara-Eugenia. Philip was not anxious to sacrifice his favourite daughter, but the persistent queen continued to raise the question. In 1576 Philip's ambassador reported that Sebastian was being attended in secret by many cloctors. In the same year Sebastian sought an interview with his uncle of Spain, hoping to obtain support for a war in Africa through a family alliance. Philip agreed to a future campaign against Larache but was evasive about the marriage.

By now the breach between Sebastian and his grandmother was practically complete. Though at first he had unwillingly accepted her assistance, he suddenly changed his ministers in April 1569 and cut himself off from her. The old palace of the Alcáçova was hastily restored in 17 days at a cost of 20,000 cruzados to satisfy this whim. A month later plague attacked Lisbon, and in the three hottest months many thousands of the inhabitants perished miserably. Sebastian left the capital for Sintra and Alcobaça, where he ordered the tombs of the kings of Portugal to be opened so that he might stand in contemplation over the bones of his ancestors. Although the plague abated in November, Sebastian did not return to the neighbourhood of the capital till next spring, and then ignored the festivities prepared in Lisbon and turned aside to Sintra.

Before the plague a plan existed for the organization of a Lisbon militia against a possible Protestant invasion. This was now set afoot, and the first twenty companies exercised before the king in October 1570. The spectacle of men arrayed for war excited the king, and the cardinal and council persuaded him to travel north again. On his way he tarried at Batalha to have the tomb of John II opened; finding the corpse incorrupt, he put his own sword in its hand and bade the Duke of Aveiro kiss it. At Coimbra he went to hear several lectures, and on his first visit to the University, he was received with a loud stamping, which caused him to lay hand to sword. On being told that the demonstration signified applause, he expressed his satisfaction, and was received in the same way on each subsequent attendance: the demonstration probably expressed criticism of his unwillingness to marry and subjugation to Jesuit influences, and was fomented by the discovery that Sebastian, taking it as a compliment, bowed and smiled in acknowledgement.

The influence of Fr. Luis da Câmara and his brother was now the only one Sebastian recognized. When Catarina again decided to withdraw to Spain, the Lisbon municipality requested that she should stay, that the royal council be amplified, that the king give up hunting and that he marry Marguerite of Valois. Bowing to public opinion, Sebastian visited his grandmother, who deplored the excessive influence of the Câmaras. Again a hunting expedition brought down the king's health, and Catarina got no further than a personal reconciliation.

The Papacy had proposed the formation of a league against the Turks. and Sebastian, ready to fulfil the glorious mission to which he felt himself destined, ordered money to be raised. It was necessary to write to nobles and prelates for loans, to confiscate funds and seize suitable ships in the ports, and to pardon criminals to man them. By dint of these measures a fleet was ready in August 1572. But by now the Spaniards had decided to drop out of the league because of their difficulties in Flanders. It was rumoured in Lisbon that the fleet would therefore be used to defend Cascais from a projected French invasion. Quite suddenly the Lord of Cascais with all his household was thrown into prison on a charge of secretly negotiating with France, though on investigation it was discovered that the arrest was the result of the false accusation of a servant. A persistent idea of Sebastian's was to test the effectiveness of the defence by ordering a false alarm; when persuaded of the unnecessary confusion that would result, he seized on the scheme of a journey to India to war against the infidel. However on September 13, 1572 a great storm tore away from their anchorage all the thirty vessels that had been fitted out and littered their wreckage along the Lisbon shore.

xi. THE AFRICAN EXPEDITIONS, 1574-1578; ALCAZAR-KEBIR. In the first days of 1573 Sebastian, after witnessing an auto-da-fé at Évora in which seventeen persons were publicly burned, began the first of two tours of the Algarve. The approach to Africa excited his desire for glory

in a war against the infidel: on learning that the governor of Tangier had won a skirmish with the Moors, his only reaction was to criticize the officer for not having pushed back the frontiers of Morocco with his scanty garrison. A year later he named the Prior of Crato Governor of Tangier, as a prelude to his own departure for Africa. António left in July 1574, and in August Sebastian sailed from Cascais to the Algarve. Only on reaching Lagos did he write to his grandmother and great-uncle to reveal his intention of crossing to Africa and to appoint the cardinal as regent. Letters to the nobility and cities ordered men and horses to be sent to Tavira. Some of the nobles responded, but many of these, obeying the urgency of the summons, failed to raise men. Meanwhile the royal household and chapel left for the Algarve by sea, and the whole party crossed to Ceuta, where the Moors did not appear and the king hunted. Moving to Tangier, he deposed António, who had been guilty of seeing the enemy without fighting them. The same treatment he meted out to those who offered advice. He had no plan of campaign, and seemed to spurn all that was not improvised, hot-headed and capricious. As winter was approaching, when the north African ports would become dangerous, the Bishop of Miranda, whom Sebastian had taken to Africa to celebrate his victories in glowing discourse, made bold to suggest in a sermon that the forces were insufficient for a great enterprise and that the wisest course would be to return. The king furiously demanded the bishop's resignation, though this did not take effect. At Queen Catarina's request Philip II pressed him to return, without result. Finally she threatened to go herself to Africa and bring him back or die. This, with Philip's refusal to sell him horses and grain, made him return; as if to excuse the futile excursion, he drew up a long report, replete with confusion and conceit. But, unhappily, he found too much acceptance of his vanity. When he dropped his sword in a single fight, he was granted the prize for his knightliness in picking it up; since he could not bear to be outdone in sport, there were plenty to attest his superior skill. Thus, such young nobles as Cristóvão de Távora now replaced the Câmaras in influence over him.

In the middle of 1576 Sebastian sent an embassy to Philip II to propose an interview; to obtain collaboration against Larache, Sebastian would marry Philip's daughter. Philip at length agreed to meet Sebastian on December 22, at the Hieronymite monastery of Guadalupe. The parleys lasted ten days. Although Philip II was attended at the interviews by the Duke of Alba and Cristóvão de Moura, Sebastian appeared alone and unadvised. To the request for the hand of the Infanta, Philip returned a delaying answer, which satisfied the uncircumspect Sebastian. When asked for 5,000 men to go against Larache, Philip advanced reasons

against the enterprise, but perceiving his nephew's obsession and the damping effect that a refusal would have on his own cherished influence in Portugal, he offered 50 galleys, men, and the sale of supplies, provided that his own military affairs should permit, that Sebastian should have at least 15,000 men including veterans, and that the expedition should take place within eight months. The impossibility of the last condition must have been plain even to Sebastian. The kings took leave on January 1, 1577 and Philip amiably embraced his nephew. Sebastian, who intended an early start, returned raging to his apartments, where he paced the room sword in hand swearing to challenge his uncle the moment he was back in Portugal, even sitting down to word the defiance-because Philip had not offered to get up at six o'clock to see him off. At length his favourite, Cristóvão de Távora, privately sought out Philip's counsellors, who aroused their king: he, discreetly arising at half past three, awoke the still sleeping Sebastian and heard mass with him before his departure.

Sebastian's one idea was now to prepare the campaign. The country must be racked for money. The silver in the mint was negotiated; deposits for orphans and those absent were compounded; a loan of 400,000 cruzados at 8 per cent was contracted with a German, Conrad Roth, on the security of 92,000 quintals of pepper over three years. The subject kings of India were to be asked for loans, while an envoy was vainly sent to the Grand Duke of Tuscany to negotiate a marriage with his daughter for a large dowry. The New Christians offered 240,000 cruzados for the suspension of the inquisitorial rights of confiscation for ten years: the cardinal resigned his inquisitorship-general.

As to men, Sebastian believed that his own magnetism would draw waves of volunteers and that unhardened territorials could form the backbone of his force. Roth helped to contract 3,000 of Alba's German mercenaries. Philip II showed no haste in providing his contingent. But Sebastian's confidence in his own star was unshaken; he exercised himself. slept under canvas, sailed out on stormy nights, hunted for hours through the royal forests, but left the rest to chance. A bare month before the expedition was timed to start Távora persuaded him to postpone it till the next spring. An emissary in Rome was ordered to raise 6,000 Germans and Italians, whilst Sebastian wrote to ask Philip to prolong his support. But Philip made the situation in Flanders a pretext to refuse, though he offered supplies and arms. On hearing that Sebastian proposed to be his own general, he urged him to desist and sent a military report from the Duke of Alba describing the hazards of such a war: to this voice of experience, Sebastian replied with a diffuse and illogical memorial of refutation.

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In January 1578 the cardinal was forewarned of the intention of the king, but his criticism was stifled. Catarina, barely informed of the news, died in February. Henry suggested that the councillors of Lisbon should approach the king, but Sebastian was so furious that the delegation betrayed the cardinal's complicity. Having compelled them to put this in writing, Sebastian accused his great-uncle of instigating his subjects to unrest. The nobility was easily quelled. A royal council was held at Sintra in February 1578, and the dumb distaste of the sane passed almost unnoticed. A band of young flatterers surrounded the king; others feared his capricious rancour.

Philip sent two captains. The first, Francisco de Aldana, visited the defences of Morocco, reported favourably to Sebastian and was engaged by him. The other brought newer and adverse reports, and was at once dismissed. In May Martin of Burgundy, Lord of Tamberg, arrived in the Tagus with 2,800 Germans, Dutch and Flemings, who were quartered with their wives, children and lutheranism near Cascais. Though Philip forbade the recruitment of Spaniards, about 1,000 came from Andalusia in June. Just before, Sebastian had been able to secure the services of an English adventurer, Sir Thomas Stukeley, and 600 Papal Italians. Stukeley had undertaken to invade Ireland, and Gregory XIII had created him Marquis of Leinster and fitted him out with Genoese ships. The Portuguese troops were in four regiments of 3,000 men raised in Lisbon, Estremadura, the Alentejo and Algarve. As exemptions were plentifully purchased, the ranks contained many pressed paupers. A force of some 2,000 adventurers consisted largely of the poorer nobles.

The cardinal was not invited to assume the regency in Sebastian's absence, and a council of regents was named. As to successors, the first was naturally the cardinal, a sixty-six-year-old bachelor in failing health; the second was neither immediately apparent, nor officially named.

The length of Sebastian's obstinacy now began to be seen. D. Duartede Meneses offered to take Larache with 4,000 men; Sebastian would not allow him: the feat was reserved for himself. Instead of sailing into Larache, he would land at Arzila and march from there 'because there were more military actions in marching and quartering his camps, crossing rivers and other difficulties'.

On June 14, the king embarked. A triple column of ostentatiously clad gentlemen accompanied him to the cathedral and followed his unfurled banner thence to the waterfront. Ten days later the fleet departed; between 600 and 800 ships were assembled, and perhaps 500 sailed, since the Prior of Crato and his friend the Duke of Aveiro at first

refused to go, after being insulted by the king. The last contingent caught up at Cadiz, a four days' sail. On July 7 part of the fleet went to Arzila, and part put in at Tangier, where Sebastian received the pretender to the Moroccan empire, his protégé. After witnessing a Moorish sham battle Sebastian rejoined the rest of his force at Arzila, where the whole army bivouacked in some 2,000 tents, unprotected by ramparts or ditches. One night as Stukeley went the rounds an Italian sentinel fired at him and many of the recruits stampeded for the ships.

Sebastian hoped for a pitched battle. Only about a week after landing did he call his chief supporters and point out the advantages of a land attack on Larache—the Moors were feeble and terrified by his approach, they would desert to him as he advanced, the fort of Alcazar-Kebir could easily be reduced. He asked for no advice on the campaign, merely for opinions on the organization of the march. Only one voice criticized the hazardous whim. In reply Távora declared that kings often possessed secret news which they could not divulge to all and sundry. Subsequent events proved the 'secret news' to be fictitious. The Count of Vimioso pointed out some of the difficulties of the march, but Sebastian rudely interrupted him twice and rang his bell for dinner as he concluded.

The army waited at Arzila for wagons. On the eleventh day a pair of muleteers cutting grass a league from the town were suddenly abducted; 2,000 Moorish cavalry were reported wheeling in the distance, but though Sebastian galloped forth three and a half leagues no contact was made. Rough seas delayed supply-ships, and rations had to be cut, to the dismay of the still sea-sick Germans. On July 24 a Tetuan Jew appeared with the news that the Emperor 'Abdu'l-Malik was at Sallee with 70,000 men; two days later a French renegade confirmed that the enemy had 34 cannon, 17,000 good cavalry and 7,000 harquebusiers. A mere lying spy, said the king: he knew for certain, and told the Spanish ambassador, that the Moors had few men. The ambassador did not mince words about the rawness of the levies and his conviction that death was hovering over them, but Sebastian retorted bluntly that he had not come to turn back.

On July 28 a six-day ration of biscuit, cheese and wine was issued, but the starved troops devoured it at once, and a new ration was made next day. Sebastian's discipline did not inspire confidence; a private was hanged for arguing with a sergeant, and a colleague who interceded had a hand cut off. On July 29 the train set out; 100 ox-carts with biscuit, 200 with barley and powder, 40 water-carts, apart from the royal chapel and wardrobe and the establishments of the officers, making between 700 and 1,100 vehicles. In spite of this the infantry got only biscuit and water. The fighting force numbered some 15,500 foot and 1,500 horse,

but camp-followers, ox-herds, pages, lackeys, priests and German and Andalusian women numbered perhaps 9,000 more.

In two days, only two leagues out of six were covered, and the six-day rations had been half consumed. A numerous group of leaders approached the king and addressed him on the impossibility of carrying on in the face of starvation. For the first time Sebastian did not upbraid them, but allowed himself to be convinced that the only way was to march back and rejoin the fleet at Arzila and invest Larache from the sea. Forty horsemen were despatched to order the town of Arzila to prepare for the return and detain the fleet. But the fleet had already sailed. Sebastian again had his way; the advance must continue. Meanwhile the Spanish Captain Aldana had arrived with five hundred recruits, but no arms for them: he urged Sebastian to send back to Arzila the artillery, which, by hampering their progress, threatened them with starvation. Sebastian refused.

On Friday, August 1, the army marched three leagues. Bands of robbing Moors seized those who lagged behind from sickness, lack of food or sunstroke. The next day the journey was still southward. The wiser leaders urged an immediate turn in the direction of Larache, but the king, whose belief in his own infallibility died hard, even now was against turning back towards the coast without having fought a battle, lest he should be accused of cowardice.

On the 3rd the army marched again, searching for a ford over the River Mokazim. Suddenly several thousand Moorish horsemen were seen on a hill. When scouts were sent out it was revealed that a great host of Moors lay below. The army marched on.

The Moors set fire to the dried grasses of the plain, and it was necessary to extinguish them with baskets of earth. A camp was made, and lines of carts drawn up round it; the two rivers, Mokazim and its tributary the Rur, afforded protection to the camp, and the position was for the moment favourable. However, as some of the men were crying out with hunger, the king ordered an ox and two sacks of biscuits to be given to each company.

Here Sebastian was begged to stay for a few days, not only to allow his army to recover from the march and the heat, but in the hope that the Moroccan emperor, 'Abdu'l-Malik, known to be on the point of death, should die, and thus leave his forces in confusion. Sebastian refused all advice: he was only anxious to fight with 'Abdu'l-Malik before his imminent death.

Next day Sebastian was urged to retire on Larache under cover of night, leaving if necessary the artillery. He spurned such counsel. Although there was no sign of the desertions from the enemy, which he had so confidently promised, he followed the advice of Aldana—to fight at once.

Aldana himself ranged the infantry in line of battle whilst Sebastian rode up and down counting the number of men in a file, prodding them with his lance, insulting his gentlemen. In the middle he rode off to breakfast. By nine o'clock the enemy host could be seen advancing in a vast crescent whose horns stretched out as if to embrace the Portuguese army.

At length the Moorish emperor gave the signal to fire the cannon, which had been concealed in a thicket. The unexpected din terrified many of the recruits, who cast themselves down on the ground. The first two salvoes killed only three men, but caused such terror that the king had to go among the ranks and harangue the troops.

Only at the third salvo of the enemy did the Portuguese artillery reply: by now the enemy harquebusiers were firing into the infantry, and the king seemed paralysed, not giving the order for battle. Impatiently the soldiers called for the order: none was given until the adventurers surged forward and threw themselves on the advancing enemy. Then the king ordered his own cavalry forward, but forgot to send word to the rest of the line.

Meanwhile the first five lines of adventurers had pushed vigorously forward and beaten back their opponents. Seeing this, the Emperor 'Abdu'l-Malik came out of his litter, mounted his horse and struggled to lead back his retreating line. As he tried to draw his sword his heart failed and, falling forward, he was hastily thrust back into his litter, the curtains being drawn. He died almost at once, but a renegade attendant concealed his death by giving out feigned orders from beside the litter.

Already the adventurers, who had seen the emperor fall, were beginning to cry victory, when their captain was shot by the Moorish harque-busiers. A voice cried 'Hold!' The line wavered, and was presently crushed back on the rest. There was no plan, but isolated groups fought with the now advancing hordes of Moors. Aldana; Aguilar, the Colonel of the Spaniards; Stukeley; the Duke of Aveiro; Martin of Burgundy—all fell in successive onslaughts. A group of Portuguese besought Sebastian to withdraw at once; victory was impossible, the only escape toward Arzila; the king's only answer was to order the ford to be taken and he would give a reply. The ford had been strongly held by the Moors throughout—perhaps even now Sebastian could not believe the truth. After four hours of battle, between one and two o'clock, there was no longer any resistance except from a little group round the king, who had not yet been recognized. Accounts of the end differ. Possibly a white flag was hoisted on a lance, the signal misunderstood and the

group about it put to the sword. The ex-emperor, Mulay-Muḥammad, Sebastian's protégé, fled on horseback down the river until his horse tripped in the reins, throwing him into the stream, where he drowned in the incoming tide in sight of both friends and enemies. The battle and the scene after it were of the bloodiest—about 8,000 of Sebastian's men were killed, 15,000 captured and herded to Alcazar and Fez for sale; between 50 and 100 only succeeded in making their way to Arzila or Tangier.

xii. FIRST EFFECTS OF THE DISASTER. The first reports of the disaster reached Lisbon on August 10 or 11, and although the governors suppressed the news, the general uneasiness was expressed in local disorders. The cardinal was summoned from Alcobaça, the news released, and the town filled with consternation and mourning. The fate of Sebastian was still unknown, so the cardinal was named governor and successor.

The fleet, which had vainly waited off Larache and then returned to Arzila, had shipped the very few survivors and now reached Lisbon, still without news of the king's death. This continued ignorance gave birth to the rumour that Sebastian had already returned, but in disguise and ashamed. If this rumour had any root, it was probably that a few knights had arrived at Arzila on the night of the disaster and clamoured for admittance. The garrison, fearing trickery, refused admission until one of them declared that the king was there, whilst a second wrapped himself in a mantle and passed in, with the others holding a respectful distance. In the morning the inhabitants displayed such fury at the deception that the practiser had to escape to one of the galleys. This incident seems to have reached Lisbon by way of the sailors, and gaining wide currency among the people of the capital, gave rise to the mystical beliefs of Sebastianism.

Only on August 24 was it learnt that Sebastian had been buried in the house of the governor of Alcazar-Kebir. For the return of the body the new Emperor of Morocco demanded the surrender of the Portuguese fortresses, though later he accepted 60,000 cruzados. Noblemen, about eighty in number, required a collective ransom of 400,000. As to the rest, even servants were priced at 100, and almost every gentleman at 4,000. The government was able to put down only 117,000. Contributions in kind were collected from the families of captives, and jewels and fine clothes, now unsaleable in Portugal, were traded in Ceuta to the value of 1,100,000 cruzados, but this soon disappeared. The prisoners of Fez were not released until November 1579, and then only by D. Francisco da Costa's remaining as a pledge. When they reached Lisbon they forgot their debt and Costa remained in Fez till his death. The wealth of Portugal poured into North Africa. Philip II ransomed a few prisoners for his own interests. The Prior of Crato managed to

keep his identity concealed and was ransomed in the guise of a parish priest.

xiii. THE CARDINAL KING; THE SPANISH INVASION. No sooner was Henry crowned king than the question of succession arose. The direct line of John III was extinct: of his brothers only Henry survived, but two others had left issue, one the bastard prior, the other a legitimate daughter, Catarina, married to the Duke of Bragança. Philip II was at once a son-in-law and nephew of John III. In pursuing his claim he amply compensated in activity for what he lacked in legality. On hearing of Sebastian's fate, he despatched Cristóvão de Moura, who condoled with the cardinal and conciliated those of his subjects who would accept money or promises, a task facilitated by jealousies and divergencies. The cardinal's advisers clutched at a straw. In spite of his advancing years, poor health, lifelong continence and professional celibacy, he might yet marry and have issue, perhaps by the eldest daughter of the Braganças, a girl of thirteen, or by the widowed Queen of France. Henry even wrote to Philip II for advice about the latter match, and to Rome for facilities. Philip at once took steps to impede the dispensation, and overlooked the letter to himself for three months. A second letter from Henry brought a Spanish theologian to Lisbon, who sought to dissuade him from thoughts of marriage on religious grounds: Philip was at least resourceful. Despite the Spanish theologian, Henry announced on January 31, 1579 his willingness to marry. Yet the Papacy showed no haste to grant the dispensation. Time passed, and the cardinal weakened in health, he began to cough blood, and was bed-ridden for periods. Simultaneously he lost faith in the good intentions of Rome, and in his own aptitude for matrimony.

Already in February he had proposed that all claimants to the succession should submit their arguments for appreciation within two months. Philip refused to admit comparisons—'the right of the Catholic King was so clear and evident before general law and that peculiar to the Kingdom of Portugal that it had never entered his thoughts that there could be any doubt, or that any other claim could reasonably and justly be admitted'. These words were delivered by the Duke of Osuna, who was empowered to use, if necessary, arguments against the legitimacy of the cardinal's own succession, for which Philip had paid a Portuguese jurisconsult. Cristóvão de Moura presented Philip's claims before the Lisbon municipality, which heard politely and promised an answer: Henry upbraided the council for heeding Moura, who returned to Spain to receive ostentatious titles and preferment from Philip and resumed his corrosive work in Lisbon a month later.

Cortes met in Lisbon on April 1, 1579, to assist the king in choosing

fifteen governors to take charge of the country in the event of Henry's death. To sift the arguments of the claimants, twenty-four judges were named, of whom eleven, selected by the king, would give a final opinion. At the second meeting on June 1, cortes promised obedience to the governors and acceptance of the judges' verdict.

Henry, though a loyal supporter of Portuguese independence, counterbalanced his opposition to Philip II by long-standing dislike of the Prior of Crato. António had set up as a claimant with considerable popular support, but little from the nobility or clergy. His friends put it about that his father had secretly married his mother; and, when this came to the king's ears, António was banished to twenty leagues from court. The king obtained a brief to have his status judged, and secured a decision confirming his bastardy, but António obtained the revocation of the brief. Order was given for his arrest, but he was warmly received by the students of Coimbra, and found general welcome and protection as he travelled northward.

Plague assailed Lisbon, and Henry retired to Almeirim in very feeble health. At Salvaterra, on the way, a boar was tied to a stake, but in such a way that it appeared to be loose, so that the king might shoot it from his litter, thus bolstering up the pathetic fiction of health. News soon arrived that António had furtively re-entered Lisbon; Henry first ordered him to appear for judgement within ten days and on November 23 dispossessed him of all titles and favours, and banished him. The outlawed prior spent a few days in Spain, but, fearing arrest by Philip II, returned to Portugal and found no difficulty in moving freely from place to place. His activities and the possibility of his proclaiming himself king in the face of Philip probably explain the care with which the cardinal extracted the oath of obedience from the cortes.

In June 1579 two Spanish lawyers arrived to give official voice to Philip's claim. There was also news of warlike preparations on the frontier, whilst before the Castilian cortes on May 30 Philip had declared that his rights were supported by the most expert Spanish, Italian and Portuguese jurisconsults. The other claimants despatched their advocates at about the same time. However, when on July 14 there arrived Edward Walton, who presented the king with a gold chain worth 1,000 cruzados and made other gifts to António and the Duke of Bragança on behalf of Queen Elizabeth, he soon reached the conclusion that there was no possibility of opposing Philip II, who was determined to have his way. Henry himself was undecided. He hesitated to declare the Duchess of Bragança his heiress for fear of Spain; he would not make himself responsible for the loss of Portuguese independence by proclaiming Philip. On June 25 he weakly and vainly suggested the accession of

Philip's second son, in the hope of preventing a union of the two crowns.

In November 1579 procurators were elected for cortes, and Osuna and Cristóvão de Moura carried on an intensive campaign of bribery to ensure the election of malleable men, even proposing that commoners be prevented from intervening in the election of a successor. In Lisbon the first two elected were supporters of António and as such removed by the king. A Coimbra deputy of the same persuasion was imprisoned. At length cortes met at Almeirim on January 11, 1580, though the commoners had to sit at Santarém for lack of space. The nobles began to elect the judges of the succession; when the first two were found to be supporters of the Braganças, Osuna and Moura protested and obtained their replacement. The commoners, led by the patriotic Febo Monis, demanded wider consultation, but Henry suspected that the prior was involved and sent out heralds to proclaim penalties for all who sheltered him. On January 15 the Bishop of Leiria appeared at Santarém with a message which, after pointing out the king's power to choose his own successor, suggested that as the only possible candidates were Philip II and the Duchess of Bragança, it would be best to come to terms with Spain. This capitulation raised a hubbub. Febo Monis went to Lisbon to remonstrate with the king: without effect, for two days later Henry weakened under the pressure of Moura to the extent of advising the commoners that he thought Philip's claim the best. Febo Monis tore his beard with anguish. That night posts were sent to the cities and towns, and to the nobles and clergy at Almeirim. The latter approved agreement with Spain, but the nobles were sharply divided and after a heated discussion only decided in the same sense by a majority of one. The commoners, undeterred, declared their readiness to die rather than obey Philip. Those who represented the chief towns were called to the king's bedside, and urged to come to heel, but they obtained two days in which to work up their case, a concession that brought a heavy onslaught on the moribund king from the almost triumphing Spaniards.

On January 28 Henry sank into a coma. António arrived secretly in Almeirim that night. Next day the Duchess arrived, hailed as queen by groups of bystanders, but not by Henry, who even at this late hour was besieged by Osuna and Moura, endeavouring to extort a declaration. He died undecided on January 31 and was promptly forgotten.

Of the five governors, three had been suborned by Cristóvão de Moura; one hesitated, one was against Philip. They had already collected 2,000 soldiers to preserve order. António made for Santarém; shortly before, a brief had arrived to reopen the question of his legitimacy. The governors feared lest the populace should take an open attitude, and

urged the commoners to co-operate. In reply Febo Monis pointed out the known corruption of three of the governors, and demanded an enquiry into cases of bribery, the despatch of ambassadors to assure Philip that justice would be done and of others to Rome to urge the Papacy to restrain Philip from violence. Obviously the governors would profit by the closing of the cortes, but no precedent existed to decide whether these automatically dispersed on the death of a king, or whether they must sit until his successor closed the session. In March the governors decided to close the cortes. The clergy easily, the nobility uneasily agreed; the commoners dissolved slowly, leaving representatives in touch with the governors.

In view of the delay Philip decided to use force. Alba was appointed to the Andalusian command, whilst letters offering attractive terms were sent to the governors, the three orders of cortes, the cities of Lisbon, Coimbra and Évora, the Braganças and the prior. Philip offered to dismiss no one appointed by the late king, to admit Portuguese to his household, to supply Portugal with corn, contribute to the ransom of prisoners, remedy the havoc of the plague, defend Portugal, India and Africa, and have his son brought up in Portugal.

There was little prospect of help in the face of invasion. In February the governors had written to Rome and elsewhere to convey the news of Henry's death. Queen Elizabeth had been asked for assistance, and she, whilst desiring to help in securing Portugal's independence, recommended the urgency of uniting about one of the candidates. The Duchess of Bragança replied that she could raise 34,000 men, an optimistic overstatement that did not unduly sway Elizabeth. Her messenger William Wade pressed for unity, but soon found that the duke could command no sympathy.

Yet even the bribed governors under threat of invasion had to wear the face of loyalty and make military preparations which Cristóvão de Moura assiduously sabotaged. Two emissaries from the governors met Philip at Guadalupe to ask that there should be no violence. After keeping them two and a half weeks, he replied that he refused to allow any judge to pronounce on the rights of his case. In May he gave the governors a month in which to obey.

Their chief fear was now the uncontrollable wrath of the people if they should recognize Philip, and they resolved to call cortes again, intending to juggle with the elections and give Philip the satisfaction of thinking that his claim was generally recognized. He, however, was well aware of the reluctance of the Portuguese people, and pressed for a hasty conclusion. The first choice of the commoners of Lisbon soon made it clear that there would be no collapse of opposition.

On June 18 the frontier town of Elvas handed itself over to Philip. The news caused widespread agitation. Next day António was proclaimed king at Santarém amidst great popular enthusiasm, and departed for Lisbon, where, in spite of the governors, he was warmly welcomed. The governors, now at Setúbal, mistrusted even their own guards and made a hurried flight by sea, only stopping at a Spanish port. It was now easy for Philip to obtain from them a declaration that António was a bastard, a traitor and a rebel, and that he himself was the rightful heir.

The Spanish army began its invasion on June 27, entering Évora, Arraiolos and Montemór. Alba's 20,000 men were too few for a real conquest, but enough now that the way had been well prepared by bribery. In Setúbal there was some resistance, but the Spaniards were admitted to the city overnight, and after three days the fort of Outão surrendered. Embarking here, Alba ferried his men over to Cascais. António had collected a small force, but was ill supplied with officers, men and money. Those told off to stop the disembarkation were scattered by cannon-fire. The fortress of Cascais hoisted the white flag after two days' battering. At first Alba ignored it, and next day he hanged the governor and two gunners and beheaded the Portuguese general of the Algarve. This cruelty worked its effect as he moved on Lisbon. António had raised some 5,000 men with 3,000 liberated negro slaves and 500 horse, which he ranged from the Tagus to the present Prazeres cemetery. The encounter, called the Battle of Alcantara, was short. António fled through Lisbon to Santarém, and Coimbra, where the students enlisted behind him. He besieged and sacked Aveiro, but on the approach of Sancho de Avila with a Spanish force retired on Oporto, which he could not hold. He himself disappeared, and though Philip offered rewards for his apprehension—a full pardon and 80,000 ducats—he remained concealed in Portugal for seven months, only taking ship for France in May 1581.

Philip had crossed the frontier in December 1580, receiving the homage of the chief nobles and churchmen, including the representative of the Duchess of Bragança. Only the Azores remained loyal to D. António.

CHAPTER XVII

THE THREE PHILIPS

i. PHILIP II (I OF PORTUGAL) 1580-1589; SOJOURN IN PORTUGAL, 1580-1583. Philip assumed the direction of the kingdom from December 1580, when he issued letters summoning cortes for the end of January, enjoining the cities and towns to see that no one who had been a follower of, or favoured by, António should be elected or even elect. No place of assembly appeared in the letters, but eventually Tomar was fixed and the date deferred until March 25.

By now Philip had already a dependable Luso-Spanish council. João da Silva, a Spaniard who had inherited the Portuguese title of Count of Portalegre from his wife's grandfather, became mordomo-mór; Cristóvão de Moura, nominally treasurer, had even wider powers. These men smoothed the way for the meeting of cortes at which Philip was quietly sworn king. Two days later a pardon was issued to those who had joined António's 'rebellion'; some fifty persons were reckoned stubborn or dangerous enough to be officially excepted as 'unworthy', though in fact a much larger number of exceptions was made—confidential papers reveal twenty-four names in Bragança and eighteen in Chaves alone.

Yet Philip could afford to be clement. The cortes of Tomar consolidated his position; he was able not only to publish his 'General Pardon', but also to fulfil the promises that Osuna had made on his behalf. These were issued on November 12, 1582 in a charter of twenty-five headings, which gave guarantees of the confirmation of all rights and privileges, of the retention of all offices, civil, military and ecclesiastical, by Portuguese, and of the cortes meeting only in Portugal: Portuguese trade in Africa and India, and the language, coinage, justice and garrisons were safeguarded from Castilian influence. In the absence of the king his viceroy might only be a person of his family no farther removed than cousin, failing which a Portuguese governor would be named. On his departure he would take a Council of Portugal of six members through whom all Portuguese affairs would be despatched. In general this autonomy was respected by Philip II, with certain exceptions. Under his successors the difference between paper autonomy and independence became gradually more apparent.

At Tomar the nobility requested an extension of the pardon, which was granted after the reduction of the Azores: only the prior and

eight others remained excluded. The commoners, recalling the promised integrity of Portuguese garrisons, asked for the withdrawal of Castilian troops, which was refused. Of their other requests, that Philip should marry a Portuguese, that Prince Diego be brought up in Portugal, that the New Christians be refused office and that taxation be reduced, the first three were shelved and the last rejected.

The problem of the choice of a governor now faced Philip. The widowed Empress of Germany passed a few months in Lisbon with the king, but she was finally rejected in favour of his nephew the Cardinal-Archduke Albert, aged twenty-three, who now received the title of legate. To assist him Philip picked a council of regency of three Portuguese, the Archbishop of Lisbon, Pedro de Alcáçova Carneiro and Miguel de Moura. The army of occupation and the naval forces preparing to attack António's last stronghold in the Azores remained under Spaniards, the Dukes of Gandia and of Santa Cruz, respectively. In February 1583 Philip, accompanied by the Council of Portugal, departed for Spain.

ii. RESISTANCE OF THE AZORES. Of the Azores seven islands had declared for D. António, under the leadership of a capable magistrate, Dr Ciprião de Figueiredo, whose headquarters were at Angra on Terceira. Philip had offered an amnesty to the seven islands if they would surrender, but his messenger met with a very hostile reception at Angra, and retired to the island of São Miguel, which had presented its allegiance to the King of Spain.

While a fleet was prepared at Lisbon to reduce the seven islands, a Spanish commander sent out to convoy the incoming treasure fleet, Pedro Valdés, was ordered to deliver a new offer of pardon, but on no account to begin hostilities until the necessary force was assembled. However, receiving the same reply as the former envoy, Valdés was persuaded to attempt an assault on Terceira. His landing-force of 600 men met with a savage welcome; the half-wild bulls of the island were driven into them and they were cut to pieces as they fled to the ships.

Meanwhile António reached Calais and proceeded to England. Walsingham and Burghley favoured the sending of an expedition to the Azores: the Count of Vimioso even made an agreement with Drake and Hawkins, but Elizabeth was unwilling to make war on Philip, and António returned to France. Here Catherine of Medici agreed to lay aside her own claim to the Portuguese throne (based on the marriage of Afonso III to the Countess of Boulogne) in favour of António. In return for the future cession to her of Brazil, she sent out 800 men to hold Terceira, whilst some fifty ships and 5,000 men made ready under the command of Philippe Strozzi to meet the Spaniards. But affairs had gone

awry in the Azores. The people, excited by the victory over Valdés, were not content with Figueiredo's moderation and demanded the punishment of all suspects of Castilianism. His enemies slandered him and persuaded António to send out a new governor, Manuel da Silva, who soon made himself conspicuous for ineptitude and corruption.

In June 1582 António's French fleet left Belle-Isle, intending to reduce the two islands of São Miguel and Santa Maria and to capture the treasure fleet which would probably put in at the Azores for water. However, on learning that Strozzi had sailed, Santa Cruz also made for the Azores with less but larger ships than Strozzi and about an equal number of men. He arrived too late to prevent the French from landing on São Miguel, but in time to save the capital, Ponta Delgada. On July 26, after a five-hour naval engagement, the French, weaker in battle-power, were routed; seventeen of their ships deserted, and Strozzi himself was killed. Men over seventeen who were captured were put to death as pirates.

António himself was on Terceira, where he supervised the raising of levies for defence, but left in November to persuade the French to furnish another 1,500 men, who arrived in June 1583. Santa Cruz had increased his fleet to ninety-six ships and 9,500 men, with a garrison of 2,000 on São Miguel. His lavish offers of mercy, marriage and money for António's capitulation were refused, but after one day's fighting Terceira fell. French and English soldiers on the island were allowed to retire unharmed, but sixteen supporters of António, including Silva, who had tried to flee on the night of the attack, were executed.

The pretender, now at Rueil, was reduced to a shifting life to avoid the blows of assassins. Taking refuge at La Rochelle, he made an approach to Queen Elizabeth, which was at first unsuccessful. Later, however, after the doom of the Armada, she countenanced a raid against the mainland of Portugal. Though unable to make terms with the Emperor of Morocco for combined action against Philip, she sent a fleet under Drake with thirty warships, 4,000 sailors and 11,000 soldiers to accompany António back to his native country. In May 1589 Corunna was attacked and entered, though the citadel held out. The expedition hastened southward. The castle of Peniche fell, but Lisbon had had time to defend itself. Supporters of António were cowed by some terrorism within the city, and Drake, lacking siege artillery and losing men from disease, had to withdraw.

Disappointed but not despairing, António began to organize a new expedition from France, but died in Paris in August 1595 with nothing accomplished.

iii. sebastianism. The belief that Sebastian was not dead took root

in the time of the last Portuguese king, when many refused to consider the ransomed body as genuine. With the occupation the national consciousness seized on a superstition that kept alive the idea of independence. Already when Philip entered Lisbon, it is said that a street-vendor greeted him as king, until 'Sebastian should return, since then he would have to go'. The people refused to accept the realities of the situation and took refuge in mysticism. As Sebastian's pitiful reality was forgotten, and the economic ruin of the Spanish occupation began to be experienced, it came to be believed that the leader of Alcazar-Kebir was a mighty man of war, a paragon of knighthood, the one possible deliverer from the Spanish voke. The Messianic ideas of the New Christians were particularly adaptable to the phenomenon of Sebastianism. Already in the 1530's one Gonçalo Anes, known as Bandarra, a cobbler of Trancoso, had written popular verse, the Trovas, containing references to the second coming culled from the Old Testament, and appeared before the inquisition in 1541. The prohibition of this verse, with its allusions to the 'coming of the King', did not decrease its popularity.1

The Messianic hope produced its fruit in the shape of four false Sebastians, impostors who intended to practise deceit on a smaller or greater scale, but who through excessive publicity incurred heavy punishments. The earliest of these appeared in 1584 as a hermit in the Spanish village of Alburquerque. The mysterious stranger, a dark, handsome youth of 20, attracted the attention of the pious inhabitants. He had, it turned out, been born at Alcobaça, accompanied a maker of rosaries to Lisbon, and been educated by the Carmelites, who allowed him to use the habit of the order on his departure. In this role he had the good fortune to be adopted by the wealthy widow of a victim of Alcazar-Kebir. Sent away by order of the parish priest, he received from the widow good clothes, a horse and money, and settled at Penamacor in Portugal, where he put it about that he had been in Africa, described the disaster, and spoke certain gibberish that passed as Arabic. He gathered a little court, christening two of his followers Cristóvão de Távora and the Bishop of Guarda—the latter a devoted adherent of António. The king, it was said, was performing a self-imposed penance of seven years. Probably he had not intended to do more than open an approach to local charity, but the news of his doings reached Lisbon, where an enquiry was ordered. Philip was highly sensitive about any display of national feeling, and the matter was treated with sufficient gravity for a couple of companies of Spanish troops to be despatched to bring the 'court' to

¹ A curious parallel to the case of Sebastian is that of the Encubert of Valencia, found in the Coplas de Fray Pedro de Frias, published at the time of the terrible Germanias of 1520, during which a mysterious leader, the Covered, appeared, only to be murdered by bribed assassins.


Lisbon, where for the space of a morning the 'King of Penamacor' was exhibited so that all might see that he bore no resemblance to Sebastian. His two close companions were condemned to death and he to the galleys; his vessel left the Tagus with the Armada and was wrecked on the French coast, he himself disappearing into France.

The second pretender was the only one who had the pale complexion and reddish fair hair of the dead king. His background resembled that of the King of Penamacor. The son of an Azorean mason, he had been a novice in two monasteries, then wandered until in 1585 he settled down as a hermit at Ericeira. At first he was overheard lamenting his part in the downfall of Portugal and amending for his sins by penance. He described the battle amidst great groans and sighs that convinced many people of his genuineness. Amongst these was a wealthy farmer, who took charge of an army of some 800 men, equipped mainly with agricultural implements, and was in return created a count, marquis and governor of Lisbon. In addition the pretender communicated his existence in royal letters to various towns, thus attracting attention. His partisans arrested a judge sent from Tôrres Vedras to investigate, and besieged a member of the Council of State of Castilian sympathies near Mafra. In the face of detachments of soldiers sent up from Lisbon the insurgents threw the captured judge into the sea at Ericeira and murdered the counsellor. After two sharp fights the considerable Spanish forces arrested the impostor-king and dispersed or killed his followers. He himself declared that he had planned to enter Lisbon under cover of the traditional festivities of St John's night, expel the Spaniards and afterwards confess that he was not Sebastian, leaving his countrymen to choose their king. He was hanged and quartered; some 200 of his allies were executed and others sent to the galleys.

The third and fourth pretenders both appeared outside Portugal, one in Spain, the other in Italy: both cases involved political intrigue rather than a simple imposition. The scene of the third incident was the small town of Madrigal, near Valladolid, where one of the nuns in the convent of Santa Maria was D. Ana de Austria, an illegitimate daughter of Don John of Austria, who had been obliged to profess at the age of 21, some seven years before. She, credulous, generous and without vocation, had as confessor a Portuguese, Fr. Miguel dos Santos, who had supported the Prior of Crato, and had been arrested and deported to Spain after the invasion, to be later released and made chaplain to the convent at Madrigal. He had been one of Sebastian's preachers, and delivered a sermon at his exequies by order of King Henry. He found D. Ana an easy subject for an extraordinary deception. A certain Gabriel de Espinosa had recently settled in Madrigal as a pastrycook. He spoke



VIII. KING SEBASTIAN



1EAN 4: Roy de Loringal najquit i an too4-gluni premierentent. Dut de Drayand, fut den Roy de Portugal le t'Decembre toto, auquel temps tout le Portugal fytunt jaubithosit de la domination Espaincle, recomeut ce Prince pour fon legitume Roy. ce qui fut faini par tous les Estats des Indes, tunt Orientales qui Occidentales.

Paris the Baltafor Monternet Aux privilege du Roy.

IXa. KING JOHN IV

some French and German, had been a soldier of Alba's and had met Fr. Miguel in Lisbon. The chaplain's scheme was no less than to present Espinosa to D. Ana as King Sebastian. If at first she had any doubts, her spiritual director found no trouble in banishing them. The chance of protecting an unfortunate king and possibly of sharing his throne, brought out the generosity, chivalry and distaste for the cloister of the daughter of Don John. Fr. Miguel wrote to certain patriots in Portugal, and the scheme was ripening when Espinosa let some jewels he had be seen. Denounced on suspicion of theft, he was found to possess a portrait and a lock of hair of D. Ana, together with letters from Fr. Miguel. Investigations were begun at once and prolonged for eight months: the beguiled niece of Philip II was condemned to four years of solitary confinement at Avila, with the loss of all her honours and privileges; the conspirators fared worse.

Whilst the pastrycook of Madrigal attracted some attention, including that of Philip II himself, within the confines of Spain, the last of the false Sebastians appeared in Venice and became the object of some international interest. A number of friends of the Prior of Crato and Portuguese Jews were residing in Venice, and therefore when in 1598 it was reported that King Sebastian was in the city, the Spanish ambassador made it his duty to obtain an order for the deportation of the impostor. Certain Portuguese residents did not appear to be at all impressed by the self-styled king, who did not even speak their language, though this was attributed to a vow he had taken not to use Portuguese for a number of years. In spite of the order to leave Venice, the king remained and was arrested on the behest of the Spanish ambassador, an intervention which probably did more to interest the Portuguese than the lame explanations of the king himself. Whilst he was in solitary confinement, the number of his adherents grew, and he profited by the opportunity of learning some Portuguese and corresponding with enemies of Spain. About a year after his first appearance, and seven months after his arrest, a Portuguese Dominican, Fr. Estêvão de Sampaio, arrived in Venice and accepted the story of the prisoner. He departed for Lisbon, where he collected a list of sixteen physical peculiarities of the late king, and on his return in 1600, failing to get admission to the prisoner, called D. João de Castro, who had retired to Paris and devoted his exile to proving Sebastian's survival. These two, still without having seen the prisoner, asserted that all the distinguishing marks, in addition to wounds from the battle, were to be found on him. On this testimony, the French ambassador, the Prince of Orange and others took heed of the case. Various Portuguese were called to verify the identification. On December 13, 1600, the senate at length ordered the alleged king to leave the republic in three

days. He was at once brought to D. João de Castro's house and presented to the assembled Portuguese. Instead of the sandy-haired, pale-faced and blue-eyed Sebastian, there appeared a swarthy individual. Nevertheless Castro knelt before him, and the rest did the same. It was agreed that the newly found king should go to France. But on the way through Tuscany he was arrested by Spanish request, taken to Naples and identified as a Calabrian named Marco Tullio Cattizzone. In May 1602 he was condemned to the galleys for life. He was not, however, forgotten by his adherents: when in the following year his galley entered Seville, probably so that he could be exhibited as an impostor, Fr. Estêvão collected 2,000 cruzados for him and wrote letters to prominent persons on his behalf. Although the Dominican urged him to escape, he himself was apparently most concerned with the raising of funds. An imprudent letter to the Duchess of Medina Sidonia, whom he claimed as a relative and of whom he asked money, called the attention of the authorities to the galley-slave. He was found to possess considerable funds and compromising letters. The result of the escapade was the execution of six of the most prominent figures involved, including Marco Tullio, in 1603.

iv. THE ECONOMIC SACRIFICE OF PORTUGAL. When the Cardinal-Archduke Albert left Portugal in 1593, five governors were appointed to take his place. These were naturally strong supporters of the regime, and could probably have done little, even if they had wished, to prevent the sacrifice of Portugal to Spanish interests. Since her formation, Portugal's most valuable contact with the world had been from the Atlantic sea-board, not across the Peninsular frontier. Both climate and land-configuration as well as the great overseas expansion of the last two centuries had favoured the development of the coast and coastal centres of population. These now acutely suffered by Philip's prohibition of the use of Portuguese ports by English ships in 1589, drawing Portugal into his war with England. In attempting to encompass the ruin of English trade, he ruined the Portuguese, legalized piracy against African and Oriental shipping, and provoked the foundation in 1600 of the East India Company, which broke the Portuguese monopoly.

Lisbon might have withstood this economic blow if the Dutch trade

Lisbon might have withstood this economic blow if the Dutch trade had remained open, but as a retort to the troubles of the Spanish Netherlands the same policy was applied, to the disadvantage of Portugal. In 1594 fifty Dutch vessels were seized in the Tagus and all further intercourse with the rebels prohibited. A Dutch resident in Lisbon, Cornelius Hautman, who had sailed in Portuguese ships to the East, but had been arrested for failure to pay a heavy fine, now wrote to Amsterdam and offered to show the way to the Orient if his release were arranged. The

fine was settled and in 1595 Hautman sailed for Java. Three years later a fleet of eight ships brought back spices; by 1600 forty ships were freighted, and in 1602 the Dutch East India Company was founded. Beginning with the Moluccas, the Dutch overran southern Asia from their base in Java. From 1610 to 1620 the Company was able to reward its shareholders with ample dividends.

Three English expeditions took place against Portuguese territory, one in 1591 under Cumberland against the Azores, the second Essex's attack on Cadiz, which sacked Faro but failed to take Lagos, and a third in 1597, which failed to capture São Miguel in the Azores or to arrest the treasure fleet. The direct effects of Philip's war on Elizabeth were felt much less acutely than its economic consequences.

Only after the truce of 1609 between Spain and the Low Countries was any attempt made to alleviate the situation. Cristóvão de Moura, then for the second time viceroy, attempted to raise the prohibition on Dutch trade in Lisbon, to distract it from the East—in vain, for the truce already signed not only re-established Dutch trade with Spanish territory in Europe, but allowed the Dutch to negotiate with 'other princes and peoples' outside Europe, a clause interpreted as giving the right to make agreements with the subject peoples of the Portuguese empire. The truce with Spain merely facilitated Dutch enterprise in the East.

v. Philip III (II of Portugal), 1598–1621; the New Christians. On the accession of Philip III, various Spanish ministers were dispensed with; among them Cristóvão de Moura temporarily lost his position as Viceroy of Portugal and commander of the Spanish garrison. Two years after the arrival of the new viceroy the privileges of the kingdom were infringed by the appointment of five Spaniards to the Council of Portugal. A year before a committee of investigation of three Spaniards had arrived in Lisbon to audit the affairs of the treasury, in spite of Portuguese protests; but the appointment of 1602, followed by the detachment of three Spaniards as permanent inspectors of the Lisbon Casa da Índia and Treasury, raised such indignation in Portugal that Cristóvão de Moura, who had not been consulted, dissociated himself from the government. From August 1603 he was replaced by D. Afonso de Castelo Branco, Bishop of Coimbra.

The shattered state of Spain's finances contributed to the gradual infringement of Portuguese liberties. The New Christians offered the sum of 170,000 cruzados for permission to leave Portugal with all their goods and the erasure of all charges against them. The offer was favourably received and led to another—that of 1,700,000 cruzados and relinquishment of claims to a further 225,000 in the hands of the treasury, in exchange for admission to all offices and a general pardon for all cases

of Judaism and apostasy. The bargain aroused intense antagonism in Portugal, both amongst those who might easily lose their offices to New Christians, and from the clergy and inquisition, which saw their influence overthrown, and from the easily excited masses. The protest of the governors went unheeded. The three Archbishops of Braga, Lisbon and Évora travelled to Spain to lodge their objections, which were only attended to when they undertook to raise 800,000 cruzados to compensate Philip for his loss. The first offer of the New Christians still stood and was accepted by Philip's minister: in 1601 two orders authorized them to leave Portugal and settle in the colonies. The question of the 800,000 cruzados was now put by Cristóvão de Moura before the municipalities of Portugal, who refused to raise it; it had not been voted by cortes, but merely referred by the archbishops to the governors. Unable to obtain this money, the Spaniards withdrew their refusal of the second offer of the New Christians, and tempted them to repeat it by the issue of an order in November 1601, rendering punishable the customary impolite epithets for New Christians-marranos, judeus, confessos. This insincere courtesy had its effect. The three archbishops hurried to Valladolid to record their protests, which were assuaged by the assurance that Philip III would not do more for New Christians than secure absolution. This much was granted by Rome and published in 1604. The debt of 225,000 owed by the treasury to the New Christians was at once struck out, and summary measures were taken to raise the 1,700,000. Curiously enough the then viceroy, the Bishop of Leiria, was also inquisitor-general. The New Christians naturally objected to the payment, since no mention of their admission to office—the principal purpose of their offer—had been made. The voluntary bargain was in fact being converted into a forced tribute. Some of the victims paid; others sought to leave Portugal, but the first privilege, already paid for, was quickly retracted, and rewards were offered for the denunciation of those who sought to escape. 1610 all privileges granted to New Christians were withdrawn, and the inquisition was permitted to proceed with its pristine rigour.

When in 1608 Cristóvão de Moura resumed the viceroyalty, the atmosphere of discontent in Portugal had been aggravated by Philip III's failure to visit the country. Not only were the customary oaths untaken, but the national privileges remained unconfirmed. Pressed by the viceroy, Philip promised to visit Portugal in 1600, raising hopes of redress which were promptly dashed when he changed his mind. At the same time Lisbon was asked for 300,000 cruzados to equip three ships and 400 men for the defence of the Guinea Coast from Spain's enemies, the Dutch. In 1615, still without having visited Portugal, Philip appointed a Spaniard, the Count of Salinas, as his governor, but after an energetic

protest at this contravention of the privileges the count was replaced by the Archbishop of Lisbon. However in 1617 the same count was appointed, and given the Portuguese title of Marquis of Alenquer a further infraction of the statute. As a consequence of Portuguese indignation, all the deficiencies of the administration were laid at the governor's door.

At last in 1619, Philip III made his long-delayed visit. His sojourn of five months cost Portugal over 500,000 cruzados in lavish receptions, expensive decorations, an auto-da-fé and other festivities arranged with the ulterior motive of pleasing him into some concession; but after an assembly of cortes at Lisbon in which the privileges of Portugal were duly sworn to but none the better heeded, and the chapters of grievances presented and ignored, he suddenly returned to Spain. He had cheaply purchased plebeian popularity by the distribution of 20,000 cruzados—of Portuguese money.

vi. PHILIP IV (III OF PORTUGAL), 1621-1640. The divergencies of interests of Spain and Portugal approached breaking-point as the reign of Philip IV proceeded. The first measures of Olivares regularized the finances and defence of both countries, rendered necessary so that Portugal should accompany Spain into the renewed war with the Netherlands. The effects were at once felt in Portugal. Commerce with Holland stopped, and a Dutch West Indies Company began to operate in America and Africa. In May 1624 the organization was strong enough temporarily to seize Baia, the capital of Brazil. It began the conquest of Brazil in 1630, and under Maurice of Nassau the Dutch overran almost all Brazil north of the São Francisco river. Between 1623 and 1638 its squadrons took 540 Portuguese and Spanish ships. In 1625 it was reported that the English fleet was coming out, and the governors were required to look to the defence of Portugal, but the only money found for the purpose was lent by the municipality of Lisbon. To increase these difficulties eight ships leaving Lisbon in 1626 to bring in the trade-fleet from India were blown to Gascony, and all but one lost: two Indiamen with cargoes valued at 3,000,000 cruzados also disappeared.

Olivares hoped to use all the national units subordinated to the Castilian crown to raise a permanent army of 100,000: unable to obtain this, he sought to enforce heavy taxation. In July 1628 Portugal was bidden to provide as a forced loan the sum necessary for her defence over six years. The announcement caused a popular demonstration in Oporto. In January 1629 the clergy were obliged by papal orders to contribute, and joined the number of the discontented. Scandal had it that all the money collected was given to Spanish monasteries or paid for bull-fights in Madrid. The acceptance of a new offer of 1,500,000 cruzados by the New

Christians in return for a promise of protection caused further annoyance. In 1631 the imposition of a tax known as meia anata produced an equally unfavourable impression—all those obtaining any lay office for over three years were taxed at the rate of half the first year's salary. A salt monopoly was also established, subjecting Portugal's oldest and one of her best exports to decline. Yet the aim of raising 500,000 cruzados was not attained. The Lisbon câmara pleaded the impossibility of the situation—lack of trade was aggravated by excessive taxation.

vii. THE MOVEMENT FOR INDEPENDENCE. The adoption of rigorous methods with Portugal coincided with the appointment of a cousin of Philip IV, Margaret, widow of the Duke of Mantua, to the regency. To assist her as secretary of state one Miguel de Vasconcelos was sent from Madrid; this Portuguese who had been closely associated with Olivares aroused the general detestation of his compatriots.

The first forewarnings of the struggle for independence came from Évora in 1637, when the corregedor attempted to wrest taxation from the municipality by violence. The juiz do povo, threatened with death if the tribute were not paid, went to the window and called for help, with the result that the house was burnt and the corregedor forced to take refuge in a monastery. The general excitement quickly spread, followed by repression, and afterwards a general pardon.

In 1638 Richelieu, interested in the possibility of encompassing the collapse of Spain by provoking disintegration, despatched a former consul, Saint-Pé, to make soundings about a revolt in Lisbon. France would offer assistance—the reduction of the Tagus defences, the free use of 13,000 men and fifty ships and collaboration with Portugal in the subsequent conquest of Spain. Should the Duke of Bragança refuse the crown, the French very conveniently offered to produce a king—presumably a son of the Prior of Crato.

Much depended on the attitude of the Duke of Bragança, the head of the largest private organization in Portugal, and overlord of some 80,000 Portuguese. Hitherto he had held aloof from all agitation and prudently declared his adherence to Philip IV. Now a group of nobles unsuccessfully approached his brother D. Duarte, who had served for four years in the Imperial forces, and might have put his military skill at the service of the revolution. His refusal and return to Germany led to a miserable death in captivity.

Olivares made two moves in 1638; the first calling a number of prominent Portuguese to Madrid with a view to revising the administration, the second ordering the recruitment of large levies to serve against the enemies of Spain, thus depleting Portugal of her own defences. Spanish captains were appointed to Portuguese ships, whilst four trained regi-

ments and two tercios of volunteers were demanded, together with 1,000 men from the Duke of Bragança. The duke was appointed in 1639 as Governor of the Arms of Portugal, an office which Olivares perhaps selected for him to facilitate the observation of his activities: as a servant of Philip IV he would appear less eligible for the Portuguese throne. The duke's objections were overruled and he began slowly to raise the demanded troops, still refusing to commit himself to any of the approaches made by the conspiring nobles.

In the middle of 1640 Catalonia rebelled. Olivares' intention was to make the Portuguese fight the Catalans, and demanded new taxation. The number of adherents to the conspiracy now rapidly swelled; it was urgent to find a leader. Bragança, again approached and persuaded by his agent in Lisbon, Dr João Pinto Ribeiro, agreed to take the throne. The ambitions of his wife, D. Luisa de Guzmán (Gusmão), a daughter of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, helped to weigh the scales.

of the Duke of Medina Sidonia, helped to weigh the scales.

By November 25, after a series of clandestine meetings in Lisbon, the conspirators were ready to move. They chose nine o'clock on the morning of Saturday December 1 as the hour for ending the sixty years' captivity. The duke's caution was well known, and as 'any novelty and the least delay would do irreparable harm', he was not at first informed of the advanced state of affairs, though Pinto Ribeiro afterwards declared that the duke was to raise the Alentejo from his palace at Vila Viçosa.

At the last moment an unexpected wave of discouragement nearly upset the plan. It had been decided to inform large numbers of useful persons at the last moment; some of these proved frankly pessimistic and their attitude damped the enthusiasm of the conspirators. In the early morning of November 29, two gentlemen urged João Pinto Ribeiro to tell the duke that the day had been postponed. He refused, but when they left sent a messenger to warn him to hold his hand. Next day by dint of energetic work the wave of pessimism was fought down, and a second messenger informed the duke that there would be no hesitation.

On December 1 the conspirators slowly assembled in the Terreiro do Paço, where a crowd of citizens joined them. When nine sounded from the cathedral clock, they swarmed up the palace steps. With a few stray shots the Spanish garrison was dispersed. A band of nobles sought out Miguel de Vasconcelos, the double-dyed opponent of independence, found him in a paper-cupboard, shot him and threw him from the window. The Duchess of Mantua, who had endeavoured to scream for help from the palace windows, was put under arrest. Three governors were chosen to take charge of Lisbon until King John IV should arrive.

CHAPTER XVIII

THE RESTORATION

i. John IV; defence. King John IV arrived in Lisbon on December 6. He was not a spectacular figure. His mild and affable nature, coupled with a love of hunting and musical composition—'adjusting the consonance of the solfa', as the Count of Ericeira called it—led some of his contemporaries to judge him weak, contrasting his unexpressive manners with those of his dynamic and wilful Andalusian wife D. Luisa de Gusmão. Nevertheless John IV was far from being a puppet in her hands; and if others criticized his lack of interest and ability in military affairs, he at least displayed a careful and dogged obstinacy that was not without its effect on diplomatists. He had already been acclaimed in the principal cities, and the few forts with Spanish garrisons, Setúbal, Viana and the defences of the Tagus, surrendered in the course of the following week. On December 15 he was solemnly crowned on a platform erected in the Terreiro do Paço. Cortes were held in Lisbon at the end of January.

The Restoration was fortunate in finding the Spaniards unprepared for immediate action: in view of this the governors had ordered all magistrates to proceed as usual and confirmed them in their various functions on the very day of the revolution. The change of dynasty was thus effected without disturbance or vindictive action; indeed a month later the king confirmed the general dispositions of the previous regime on condition that holders of privileges obtained new titles in his name. Of the relatively small number of hispanophiles, a handful of nobles fled to Spain, and two of these were confirmed in the governorships of Ceuta and Tangier to which they had been appointed by Philip IV. The rest bided their time: they rallied round the Archbishop of Braga, who, though he had attended the coronation, had attempted to defend the Duchess of Mantua on December 1, and still nourished pro-Castilian sentiments. Among the associates of the archbishop were the Marquis of Vila Real, the inquisitor-general and other dignitaries, but it was not long before a treasury official who had at first joined the conspirators decided to lay information, which was confirmed by that of servants. On July 28, 1641, the nobility and royal council were called to the palace and the king delivered an address summarizing what had happened, while his officers were arresting the various individuals who had been denounced. The case was quickly dealt with; judges were appointed on August 9 and on the 26th four noblemen were sentenced

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to the block and six commoners to the gallows, the bodies of the latter being quartered and publicly exhibited. If the procedure of the new government had hitherto been extremely mild, the present punishment was stern, especially in the case of the young Duke of Caminha, whose only crime consisted in not having denounced his father; the Archbishop of Braga died in prison, but the inquisitor-general had the good fortune to be released early in 1643.

More formidable was the external enemy. Although Olivares resolved to concentrate his forces on the reduction of Catalonia before dealing with Portugal, and the first six months after the accession of John IV passed without any sign of hostilities, it was necessary to prepare with vigour for all contingencies. The cortes of Lisbon, which began their sessions on January 28, 1641, recommended the repair of fortifications, defence of towns, raising of troops and preparation of warships: the cost of raising twenty thousand infantry and four thousand horse was reckoned at 1,800,000 cruzados. This was soon raised to 2,000,000, but revenue continued to fall considerably short of expenditure. For the purpose of the war a ten per cent property-tax was voted, applicable to all classes save the clergy, who contributed a lump sum according to the resources of each diocese; taxes on all public offices and on business were instituted, and the Lisbon municipality agreed to the levying of increased duties on meat and wine.

The work of organizing national war service fell upon the Council of War that had been created on December 11; a governor and staff were appointed for each province with powers to conscript all able men between the ages of fifteen and seventy. All second sons were enrolled as paid troops: labourers and the only sons of widows were exempted, but could be called upon as auxiliaries. In order to foment local patriotism and prevent desertion, the defence of each province was allocated to its own recruits.

ii. EMBASSIES TO CATALONIA, FRANCE AND HOLLAND. The most urgent need of the new government was for foreign support against the day when Spain should be freed from her other embarrassments and demand restitution. Consequently, whilst various books and pamphlets were prepared to prove the legitimacy of John IV's claim to the throne, diplomatic relations were initiated with all present or possible enemies of Spain.

Already on December 19, 1640, two Jesuits, Inácio de Mascarenhas and Paulo da Costa, were despatched to Catalonia, where they arrived the day after the proclamation of Louis XIII as Count of Barcelona. According to Mascarenhas, the Catalans would have declared John IV king if they had had the news of his accession a few days before. How-

ever, they availed themselves of him as an intermediary with the King of France, and signed a treaty of alliance and assistance: certain merchants of Barcelona agreed to supply Portugal with arms, and a group of Portuguese soldiers who had been engaged by Philip IV to fight in Catalonia returned to Portugal with Mascarenhas on hearing of the successful revolution.

In February 1641 messengers departed for France and Holland, the opponents of Spain and the Empire in the Thirty Years' War. Of French assistance great things were expected in view of Richelieu's soundings in Lisbon two years before the restoration, and the ambassadors were instructed to ask for men and ships, and the conclusion of a league, so that Portugal should not be omitted from any general peace and left to face Spain alone. The league was to include the allies of France, especially Holland, and on the same day as instructions to this effect were issued to the ambassadors, John IV attempted to conciliate the Dutch by granting them the same commercial rights in Lisbon as his ancestors had allowed. Twenty ships were to be asked for to join the Portuguese in an attack against Cadiz and in an attempt to capture the Spanish treasure fleet: in addition permission was sought to raise a regiment of cavalry in France and to procure munitions.

Whilst the mission was still on the journey, Richelieu had quite independently resolved to send Saint-Pé, the former French consul in Lisbon, to assure the Portuguese government that France was prepared to make no treaty with Spain that did not include Portugal. The outlook was therefore very favourable: the embassy was received by Louis XIII and Richelieu, and began its work at the end of March. Shortly afterwards a treaty was drafted, based on the conclusion of a league, and satisfactory to both parties. But here an obstacle arose. The Portuguese mission to Holland had been instructed only to make a truce in order to avoid the ticklish question of the colonies, and the French, aware that Spain was working to attract the Dutch away from them, did not wish to give offence to their allies by concluding independently an agreement which closely affected Dutch interests. Richelieu therefore retracted, and informed the Portuguese embassy in May that no definite steps could be taken without the assent of Sweden and Holland. On reflection the French minister must have considered that since the Portuguese had committed themselves to a revolution, they had no alternative but to go on, and that consequently he had no need to grant them an alliance which would certainly impede the conclusion of a peace with Spain, should he wish to make it. The Portuguese had no alternative but to complain and accept. In the treaty of July 1, 1641, France therefore promised in a secret article to endeavour to retain the right to help

Portugal, provided that her allies did the same; a note appended to the treaty shows that the French fully intended to wriggle out of this promise if it suited them—'I put the allies of the king in general, so that His Majesty may have further means of not being bound by such a condition, even if the Dutch consent. I do not know if the Portuguese ambassadors will accept this secret article, but it seems they are bent on some kind of a treaty now.'¹ At least the Portuguese were able to sail back to Lisbon with a fleet of twenty-two fighting ships and ten auxiliaries under the command of Richelieu's nephew, the Marquis of Brézé. They arrived in the Tagus amid general rejoicing on August 9, 1641.

In Holland the news of the Portuguese revolution was hailed with enthusiasm as a sign of the break-up of Spain. But the Dutch, like the French, displayed considerable reluctance to pay anything for a triumph which they regarded as a free gift, and they showed no anxiety to restore the occupied colonies to Portugal. John IV had already adopted a conciliatory policy; he granted Dutch merchants freedom to trade in Lisbon, and the States-General in return prohibited the seizure of Portuguese ships. But while the Dutch were perfectly ready to recognize the Portuguese revolution, it suited their book to consider the colonies as still under Spanish domination, in spite of their declarations of adherence to John IV. Maurice of Nassau was instructed to take advantage of the enmity of Spaniards and Portuguese to extend Dutch influence in South America, for example by the capture of Baia; however, on his own initiative he embarked on a different scheme. Although he had informed the Portuguese viceroy of Brazil that he wanted peace, he despatched an expedition to occupy Portuguese West Africa, which was done in August 1641 in spite of the governor's protest that the colony had already declared for John IV and was included in the agreement between him and Holland. Maurice, who had told the Portuguese in Brazil that the fleet was to attack the Spaniards in the West Indies, gave a different account to the Dutch government: he needed the slaves of Angola for the Dutch-Brazilian sugar industry and he hoped to ruin the Spanish colonies by cutting off their supply of slaves at the same source.

Whilst these hostilities were in progress, John IV had concluded a truce with the States-General. The embassy, despatched on February 9, arrived in the Hague, after passing through London and being received by Charles I. Its proposals included the conclusion of a truce for ten years, during which time the question of the East Indies would be left open, but the parts of Brazil and Africa that had been seized by the Dutch would be returned to Portugal in return for compensation, financial, or territorial, in the latter case at the expense of Spain. Beyond this a joint

¹ E. Prestage, Diplomatic Relations of Portugal 1640 to 1668, p. 4.

ever, they availed themselves of him as an intermediary with the King of France, and signed a treaty of alliance and assistance: certain merchants of Barcelona agreed to supply Portugal with arms, and a group of Portuguese soldiers who had been engaged by Philip IV to fight in Catalonia returned to Portugal with Mascarenhas on hearing of the successful revolution.

In February 1641 messengers departed for France and Holland, the opponents of Spain and the Empire in the Thirty Years' War. Of French assistance great things were expected in view of Richelieu's soundings in Lisbon two years before the restoration, and the ambassadors were instructed to ask for men and ships, and the conclusion of a league, so that Portugal should not be omitted from any general peace and left to face Spain alone. The league was to include the allies of France, especially Holland, and on the same day as instructions to this effect were issued to the ambassadors, John IV attempted to conciliate the Dutch by granting them the same commercial rights in Lisbon as his ancestors had allowed. Twenty ships were to be asked for to join the Portuguese in an attack against Cadiz and in an attempt to capture the Spanish treasure fleet: in addition permission was sought to raise a regiment of cavalry in France and to procure munitions.

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Portuguese and Dutch fleet would be organized to make common war on the Spaniards: the Dutch would receive commercial privileges in trading with Portugal and permit in return the recruitment of officers and purchase of munitions for the Portuguese army. At once the clause relating to the return of the Dutch conquests raised objections; clearly it was out of place in a truce proposed for ten years. The counterproposals made by the Dutch denied the Portuguese claim to the return of the colonies, merely offering to make exchanges in the event of further conquests from the Spaniards. After some discussion between the component parts of the United Provinces, the influence of the Prince of Orange, Frederick Henry of Nassau, as Staathouder, exerted itself: the truce was agreed to by the States-General on May 17, and signed on June 12. It comprised the suspension of hostilities for ten years on sea and land, on both sides of the line, dating in Europe from the time of its ratification and in the Orient a year from then. In all the colonial dominions the status quo was preserved, the Dutch continuing to occupy what they had seized in India, Africa and America. During the time of the truce the Dutch and Portuguese should give each other mutual assistance in fighting Spain, each party retaining what it won. Reciprocity of navigation and trade should apply to the subjects of both signatories, except between Dutch Brazil and Portuguese Brazil. Portuguese would be allowed to travel to Brazil in no other foreign ships than those of Holland. Freedom of conscience and worship would be granted to Dutchmen in their houses and ships. No other foreigners would be allowed to deal with the Portuguese colonies. Only Dutch ships, and these of over 260 tons and 16 guns, would be freighted by Portugal. A fleet of twenty Dutch ships was to co-operate with the Portuguese and French naval forces, whilst men and arms would be raised in Holland for service in Portugal. Although the terms of the agreement came in for severe criticism in Portugal, it is difficult to see how they could have been bettered, since John IV had very little to bargain with. In the long run it proved more advantageous than it seemed at sight, for a definite treaty would have necessitated permanent concessions which would have prevented the eventual return of Brazil. For the moment the essential point was naval and military assistance.

Meanwhile, in the middle of 1641, a mysterious visitor arrived in Lisbon from Andalusia in the shape of the confessor of John IV's brother-in-law, the Duke of Medina Sidonia. The motive for his coming caused much speculation, and immediately afterwards Frei Denis de Lencastre, John IV's nephew, was despatched to France on an urgent mission. Frei Denis travelled in lay disguise by Holland to Amiens, where the French court was. The news that required to be so urgently and con-

fidentially transmitted was the projected insurrection of Andalusia, which would be raised into a separate kingdom under the Medina Sidonia family. This scheme depended for its execution on Portuguese, perhaps French and Dutch, connivance and assistance, and might best be concerted with the proposed Franco-Portuguese assault on Cadiz. The result of Frei Denis' interview was a letter from Louis XIII to John IV dated August 26, which promised help, confirmed by another from Richelieu approving the scheme and saying that orders were being given to de Brézé to fall in with it.

To the French fleet, which had arrived in the Tagus at the beginning of August, were joined thirteen Portuguese warships and six caravels, and as the Dutch division had not yet arrived, these forces sailed for Cadiz on August 26, carrying four thousand infantry. An encounter with five Spanish frigates off Cape St Vincent destroyed any possibility of a surprise attack, and when the allied fleet arrived outside Cadiz Bay on September 14 the port had been heavily garrisoned and there were no signs of disaffection. Medina Sidonia himself had been arrested. Judging an attack on the port too perilous to warrant the attempt, the French and Portuguese commanders separated and returned to their respective ports. Since winter was approaching, de Brézé made for La Rochelle, thus bringing French naval intervention to a close.

The Dutch fleet, consisting of twenty vessels, accompanying twelve more which the Portuguese ambassador had contracted in Holland and filled with a thousand Dutch infantry, with officers contracted for three years and arms, munitions and horses, arrived in the Tagus on September 10, too late to take part in the futile parade before Cadiz. The Dutch ships left Lisbon indeed with the intention of joining the expedition, but after doubling Cape St Vincent, their admiral sent back for reinforcements with which to intercept the Spanish treasure fleet. Four vessels were sent, but though they searched for twenty-nine days no trace of the fleet was found. In an engagement with Spanish warships two Dutch ships were sunk before a gale dispersed the combatants, and the Dutch fleet returned to the Tagus, where it lay until the following January. The end of the expedition was no more glorious than that of the French. In the new year there arrived news that the Dutch had invaded Maranhão in Brazil and Angola in Africa. Some of his council tried to persuade John IV to seize the Dutch ships lying in the Tagus as reprisals, but he was unwilling to extend the war to European waters. The admiral Gijsels, having wind of the advice given to the king, offered to join his fleet to an expedition which was being prepared against Angra in the Azores, where the Spaniards still held out. John agreed, but when on January 6 the Dutch fleet crossed the bar of the Tagus, Admiral Gijsels gave orders to steer north for Holland and his ships were not seen again in the waters of Portugal.

iii. EMBASSIES TO ENGLAND, SWEDEN AND ROME. The embassy which was despatched to England on February 2, 1641, consisted, according to Portuguese usage, of a nobleman, D. Antão de Almada, a descendant of Vaz de Almada, the Knight of the Garter who fell at Alfarrobeira; a lawyer, Dr Francisco de Andrade Leitão, and a secretary, Dr António de Sousa de Macedo, whose volume Lusitania Liberata, published in London in 1645, comprises a history of the Portuguese revolution and a vindication of John IV's claims to the throne. These three personages were instructed to pursue a mild course in view of the friendly relations subsisting between Spain and England: they were to ask that there should be mutual friendship between the two thrones, neither helping the enemies of the other; that Englishmen should be permitted to fight for Portugal and provide ships and arms, with reciprocity; trade should be re-established and the ports of each country opened to the ships of the other. Landing at Falmouth on March 5, the embassy sent forward an interpreter asking permission to present itself: this, in spite of the vigorous protests of the Spanish ambassador, was granted. In a public audience on April 8, Charles declared the interest that had been aroused in him by the recent news of Portugal's autonomy and recommended that John should fortify his frontiers. The ambassadors received a good impression; and Almada wrote back to the Archbishop of Lisbon: 'It would be impossible to exaggerate the affection and courtesy with which we were treated by all: it seems as if this kingdom desires to depopulate itself to go and serve the King our master.... I see all this North delighted at the destruction of Castile, so that truly I already feel pity for her.'1

At first the diplomatic discussions developed well. The more platonic objectives of the mission were readily agreed to: what produced friction was the news of the truce signed between Portugal and the States-General on June 12. The English commissioners at once demanded the same privileges as had been accorded to their rivals, especially those contained in three articles. Firstly, the exclusive hire or purchase of Dutch ships to which Portugal had bound herself could not very well be undone, but compromise and time provided a solution: by the treaty with England commissioners were appointed to go into the problem within two years; during this time Luso-Dutch relations grew steadily worse until English ships were gladly contracted instead of Dutch. The second point, that of the privilege of free trade conceded to the Dutch in West Africa, was settled in the same manner as the first: the English representatives rested assured that no other nation would be allowed privileges that were not

¹ Prestage, Diplomatic Relations, p. 101.

extended to Great Britain, and postponed the solution of the problem. Finally, the clause which allowed the exercise of the protestant religion by the Dutch in their houses or ships in Portugal was demanded for British merchants: the question could not be settled without instructions from Lisbon. A decree of September 22 established a commission presided over by the Archbishop of Lisbon and including John's chaplain, confessor and almoner, two Jesuits, a Franciscan, a Dominican, an Augustinian and an inquisitor, who decided that liberty of conscience could not be actually permitted, though 'negative action' might be taken. There could be no objection to Englishmen receiving the same treatment as other foreigners. On January 29, 1642, the treaty was signed, and the ancient alliance entered upon a new phase of existence. For the moment, indeed, little effect was felt because of the troubles in England, but Portugal, after assisting Charles I and protesting against the regicide, was ready to renew her agreement with England in 1650. Her establishment of relations with the Commonwealth led directly to a revival of the treaties.

Sweden and Denmark were both approached in 1641. Francisco de Sousa Coutinho, the Portuguese envoy, reached Copenhagen in April. The Danes, although surprised at the news of the revolution and very civil to Sousa Coutinho, were unwilling to commit themselves even to a royal interview, since Christian IV had offered to mediate between the Empire and the protestant states and wished to avoid giving any possible offence to Spain, the emperor's ally. After five weeks' delay, Sousa Coutinho took ship for Sweden, where fortune ran entirely in his favour. Received by Christina and Oxenstjerna on June 10, he had negotiated a treaty of peace, friendship and freedom of commerce by June 29. Each nation denied help to the enemies of the other, and general provisions for diplomacy, trade and religious freedom were adopted. Beyond the cordial terms of the treaty, Portugal secured the services of several warships under a Swedish commander who brought to the Tagus a considerable supply of armaments—guns and munitions, four thousand muskets, as many pikes, a thousand pistols and armour. Payment for this was to be made in coin or sugar, spices and salt, which the Swedish fleet would take on its return voyage. The following spring a consignment of iron, copper and ships' masts would be delivered in Swedish bottoms.

The last and least successful of the Portuguese embassies was directed to the Papacy. One of the factors that caused delay in seeking recognition of Urban VIII was the difficulty of the journey to Rome, since the Spaniards possessed northern Italy and their ships overran the Mediterranean. When the Bishop of Lamego, D. Miguel de Portugal, reached Rome on November 20, 1641, he and his suite had sailed to La Rochelle,

travelled to Paris to obtain a French safe-conduct, continued to Marseilles and there taken ship for Civita-Vecchia. The six-months journey was followed by a wait of seven more months, during which the pope refused to recognize the embassy. Hot opposition came from the Spanish envoy, who had already demanded a pronouncement of papal condemnation of Portuguese independence: Olivares enjoined his representative, Vélez, to obtain the excommunication of the Duke of Bragança by cajolery or subornment, always taking armed servants about the streets in case an opportunity should occur of kidnapping the Portuguese bishop. A committee of cardinals had been appointed to settle the treatment to be accorded to the envoy, who would not appear before them until they should acknowledge his position as representative of an independent state. The Portuguese agent in Rome, Pantaleão Rodrigues, faced the committee and after some demur consented to produce a defence of John IV's claims. These proved to be without effect: Portugal was found lacking in obedience and respect to the Holy See, various cases being brought up to substantiate this charge, including the arrest of the Archbishop of Braga, whose liberation was demanded. Rodrigues repelled this attack to some effect, and the Spanish ambassador prepared to take violent steps to prevent the reception of the bishop. On August 20, 1642, a cardinal conveyed to him a warning of the projected outrage. The bishop, who was at the house of the French ambassador, collected his friends and the servants that were available in the French embassy and directed his steps towards his own dwelling. The dark street was filled with forty lackeys belonging to the Spanish ambassador and seven or eight carriages full of officers who had been brought from Naples. Shots were exchanged between the two parties, and eight Spaniards, two Frenchmen, a Portuguese and an Italian were killed. Eventually the Spaniards dispersed. The pope took no further action than to post guards at the bishop's house, and, in spite of complaints delivered through the French ambassador, displayed no greater disposition to receive him than before. In October, a year, the stipulated period of his embassy, had elapsed, and after receiving one audience in his private capacity as Bishop of Lamego, he withdrew from Rome on December 18.

iv. The Early years of the spanish war; montijo, 1644. The first encounter of the war was a skirmish between the garrisons of Elvas and Badajoz on June 9, 1641. Six months had passed since the accession of John IV and something had been done to organize regiments, collect munitions and repair the dismantled frontier defences. Portugal had been stripped by the Spaniards of cannon and of its limited number of regular regiments, so that the first border actions of the war were carried out with only the forces that could be assembled by the new regime. The

obvious course for an invasion would be the valley of the Tagus, and therefore Elvas, Olivença and Campo Maior were the first places to be fortified and garrisoned, though with troops inferior in quantity and quality to those defending the Spanish side of the frontier. Points of importance on the Galician frontier were also entrenched, and, to a lesser extent, others in Beira and the Algarve, whilst governors were appointed to the key forts defending Lisbon.

The campaign of 1641, however, was limited to the Alentejo and Galician frontiers. On the former, after the initial skirmish, there followed manœuvres and insignificant brushes between opposing forces of cavalry: only on September 16 was any movement of importance attempted, when eight thousand Spaniards attempted a surprise nightattack on Olivença, which was beaten off. A Portuguese attack on Valverde had no better success. At the same time the northern frontier was the scene of reciprocal raids and agricultural depredations: a minor success was the capture of three hundred Spaniards at Brandillanes. This, with the meanderings of the French and Dutch fleets, completed operations for 1641. In the following year organization and fortification continued, but estimated expenditure was found to have been greatly exceeded, whilst revenue fell disastrously short. To meet the situation cortes were convoked once more for the autumn. Meanwhile plundering raids again occurred in Beira, each side gradually receiving reinforcements until the Portuguese under Sancho Manuel mustered eight thousand men in their attack on the Spanish castle of Guardián. The Duke of Alba received reinforcements of eight hundred cavalry from Madrid, with which he raided Beira. Among the forces raised to oppose him was a company of a hundred and fifty priests from the diocese of Viseu, commanded by a canon of the cathedral. Still no decisive action was fought. A Memorial, drawn up by D. João da Costa, warned the king of serious grounds for complaint against his ministers: their lack of energy led to open criticism; failure to observe contracts alienated the foreign troops; persons without military experience succeeded in altering the recommendations of the Council of War; the king himself never attended the meetings of the latter body, although he pursued 'occupations less necessary to the defence of the kingdom'; four ministers alone dealt with all the nation's business, they were not military men and treated those who were with scant courtesy. The peril of underestimating the power of Castile was stressed: John himself was urged at least to inspect his army in the Alentejo. In response to this stimulus he expressed his readiness to visit the Alentejo in the following spring, and declared the necessity of an invasion of Castile.

The threat of peace between France and Spain made active steps

necessary. In April 1642 D. Vasco Luis da Gama, later Marquis of Niza, was despatched to France to urge the conclusion of a formal league instead of the vague secret clause which provided Portugal no real protection, and to do what he could to prevent the success of Franco-Spanish negotiations. On behalf of John IV he pointed out that the kingdom had been practically defenceless a year and a half before, and that now an army of twenty thousand foot and three thousand horse existed, and steps had been taken to defend the colonies. The failure of de Brézé's expedition had not been the fault of the Portuguese: the Andalusians did not rise, bad weather had been encountered, and part of the silver fleet had still not arrived and therefore might yet be captured. In order to carry on the war John needed a loan of 600,000 cruzados. Once more the undertaking that Portugal should be included in any general peace was given, but Mazarin, like his predecessor, jibbed at the conclusion of a formal pact. At least the danger of a peace between France and Spain, which might otherwise have come about on the death of Louis XIII and assumption of the regency by Ana of Austria, Philip IV's sister, was lessened.

Such was the position when the cortes of September 1642 assembled in Lisbon. As in the previous year the three estates met in three separate monasteries. The principal problem which had to be faced was that of covering the cost of defence: the throne proposed that an increase of taxation should be voted so as to raise 2,400,000 cruzados, but the commoners, who would in this case have to find the vast majority of the contribution, suggested that the sum should be first divided between the three estates, each of which should then raise its own quota. This occasioned loud protests from the two privileged classes. For John IV the situation was embarrassing: he dare not offend either party. Accordingly, the Jesuit orator and writer, Father António Vieira, who on other occasions served the king on diplomatic missions, attempted in his sermon of St Anthony to persuade the subjects of King John of their general duty to support with taxes and contributions the monarchy to which the church originally owed the grants of its monasteries and the nobility the creation of its titles. The Secretary of State, Francisco de Lucena, whose sharp tongue, overbearing manner and disrespect for the military had given grounds for the complaints of D. João da Costa, launched on the king's behalf an offer to provide 900,000 cruzados from the royal revenues provided that the estates would contribute 1,500,000, thus making up the sum originally demanded. The quota to be paid by the nation would in this case not be divided among the three classes, and must therefore be furnished by the commoners alone: in fact the privileged classes had their way, and the representatives of the people accepted the burden.

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Lucena's conduct had excited widespread hostility. Among the nobility he was accused of favouring Castile; he had represented Portugal in Madrid under the old regime, and had worked with the detested Miguel de Vasconcelos until very shortly before the revolution. He had become Secretary of State through his ability rather than enthusiasm for the change, and hesitated before accepting the post because his son was still in Madrid. His enemies accused him of correspondence with Olivares: the fact that he had the king's permission to treat for the release of his son did not abate their ill-will, and on their strongly represented demand for an enquiry, John had him confined in the fort of São Julião, pending investigations. These established no grounds for the accusations and the order for his release was signed in January 1643. Nevertheless the hatred he had incurred did not die down. The commander of a fort at Elvas, accused of dealing with a Spanish general, under torture implicated both Lucena and the governor of the fort of São Julião, though he afterwards declared the falseness of his declarations. On hearsay evidence Lucena was executed at the end of April 1643: in the words of the Count of Ericeira, 'his guilt remained very doubtful in the opinion of those who had not sentenced him to death'. The success of this conspiracy, carried out under John IV's very eye, serves to illustrate the power exercised by those who had put him on the throne.

The early part of 1643 passed without any military activity of note. In July the king set out to inspect the troops in compliance with the desire expressed by D. João de Costa, but taking his court with him, he settled in Évora, waiting for the attack on Castile to begin. For this purpose a larger force than that previously available had been assembled under the command of the Count of Obidos. At the beginning of September, 2,000 cavalry and 12,000 foot captured Valverde and marched on Badajoz: once in front of the city, Obidos decided that his force was not large enough for the enterprise and decided to retire. The king, intent on glory, showed his displeasure by ordering him to consider himself under arrest, and reappointing the previous leader Matias de Albuquerque, who restricted his activity to small towns, thus ensuring himself of success and pleasing his master. In Galicia the Count of Castelo Melhor captured Salvaterra, defeating two Spanish generals, the Prior of Navarre and Cardinal Spinola. When the campaigning season of 1643 closed, still no decisive or even major action had been fought, though at least the Spaniards had nothing to boast of. The general situation had worsened for them with the defeat of Rocroi and the fall of Olivares. This decline was reflected on the Portuguese front in the defeat of Montijo in 1644. A new general, the Marquis of Torrecusa, had been sent by the Spanish government to the Alentejo front, but in view of the situation in Catalonia and Flanders no more troops were afforded to him than to his predecessors. Matias de Albuquerque for his part had only seven thousand men at his disposal when in May he advanced on the town of Montijo. The town had already been taken when Torrecusa despatched 2,500 horse and 8,000 infantry under the orders of the Baron of Mollingen to give battle. This force crossed the Guadiana and faced the Portuguese on the morning of May 26, adopting a semicircular formation which would permit a simultaneous attack on the Portuguese front and flanks. The first attack of the Spanish cavalry seriously upset one of the Portuguese wings, breaking up the corps of a hundred and fifty Dutch cavalry which covered it: the onslaught was even carried round to the Portuguese rear, but in the crisis Matias de Albuquerque rallied part of his forces, took advantage of the slackening of the enemy, recovered the cannon and drove the Spaniards back over the Guadiana, with a loss, according to Ericeira, of over three thousand.

The victory, due to the enterprise of Matias de Albuquerque, caused great rejoicing in Lisbon. Madrid, on the other hand, stung by the reverse, ordered Torrecusa to occupy some town, and 17,000 men, the largest force yet employed in the war, were gathered for an assault on Elvas. At the end of November an attempt was made to reduce the outposts of the fortified town, but the Portuguese general, now dignified with the title of Count of Alegrete, resisted with his small garrison and after ten days the Spaniards withdrew. This campaign had been much more favourable to the Portuguese than in any previous year; but the success was not sufficiently marked to prevent a certain indifference and discouragement, which resulted from the protracted strain, both nervous and financial, of the war. Some of the mercenaries went over to the enemy: it was necessary to prevent Portuguese officers from visiting Lisbon without royal licence, and the rank and file from desertion. Even worse, the government distrusted its officers; Alegrete was withdrawn from the eastern command and in favour of the Count of Castelo Melhor, who hoped to make a secret attack on Badajoz but was prevented by the talkativeness of his officers and the obstructive attitude of the Council of War. The articles put forward by the representatives of the Third Estate in the Cortes of 1645 summarize some of the grounds for complaint: the overweening behaviour of officers, plundering and indiscipline of the ranks, imprisonment of the parents of deserters, hardships suffered by unfair billeting, requisitioning and conscription. A vote of 2,150,000 cruzados was made towards war expenditure.

v. SPANISH ACTS OF VIOLENCE: PEACE OF WESTPHALIA, 1648. If the Spaniards did not display great military vigour in pursuing the war

against Portugal, they did not disdain other methods of attack. They found little difficulty in preventing the recognition of John IV by the Papacy. When in 1644 the Portuguese clergy resolved to represent to the pope the grave harm that resulted from the suspension of relations, the Prior of Cedofeita, Nicolau Monteiro, was sent with King John's permission to point out the increasing ecclesiastical disorder resulting from the absence of bishops—seventeen sees were now vacant. Monteiro arrived in Rome the following year and was subjected to the same treatment as the Bishop of Lamego. Attacked in open daylight in the streets of Rome, he was with difficulty able to escape from his carriage, leaving a servant and a horse dead. By 1649 there was only one bishop left in Portugal, none in Brazil, Africa and the Islands, and two in Asia—only in 1668 did the attitude of the Papacy change, and in May 1670 bishops were at length furnished in the traditional way.

Violence was also employed in an attempt to put an end to the reign of John IV in 1647. One Leite, a Portuguese who had fled to Madrid, was bribed to kill the king as best he might. Returning to Portugal, he hired a house in the centre of Lisbon and bored holes in the outer walls with the idea of shooting the king as he passed down the narrow street in the Corpus Christi procession. At the critical moment the assassin's courage failed him, and he returned to Madrid for fresh instructions. But when he reappeared in Lisbon his accomplice, in whom he had not previously confided his full intentions, learnt that the plot was directed against the king and denounced the affair. Leite was hanged, his hands cut off and his body exposed.

At the time of the revolution, John IV's younger brother, D. Duarte, had made a military career for himself in the service of the Emperor Ferdinand III. On the instigation of Philip IV's ambassador, the emperor, after a certain hesitation, arrested the Infante at Donauwörth in February 1641. Attempts by John IV to obtain his liberation were fruitless. Sousa Coutinho, the ambassador to Sweden, presented a memorial of D. Duarte's innocence and his services to the emperor to the diet of Ratisbon, which protested against the arrest; the Marquis of Niza was ordered to approach Louis XIII and attempted to make the release of D. Duarte a condition in the event of a truce with Spain. Nevertheless the Infante, after being transferred from Passau to Gratz and deprived of his servants and correspondence, was at length sold by the emperor to Philip IV for forty thousand cruzados, and in spite of John IV's attempts to interest France, Rome and the congress of Münster, perished in prison at Milan in 1649.

The same methods of violence were used to exclude the Portuguese from the Peace of Westphalia, which put an end to the Thirty Years'

War in October 1648. It was clearly to Portugal's interest to secure attention in the congress that was to settle the balance of power in Europe for the following century and a half, and the successful opposition of the Spaniards outweighed the effect of the small-scale military operations that were being conducted in the Alentejo. The discussions preceding the treaty were carried out in two divisions; the protestant powers with their mediator the King of Denmark assembled at Osnaburg, whilst the Catholic powers, with representatives of the Papacy and of the Republic of Venice as mediators, met at Münster. In spite of Portugal's justifiable claim to be represented, none of the countries which had themselves recognized her independence were prepared to vindicate it before the attitude of firm hostility adopted by Austria and Spain. John IV sought representation at both Osnaburg and Münster: his first emissary to Osnaburg died in 1644, and a successor only reached the place of the congress in 1647. But the most important questions affecting Portugal were discussed at Münster, where Austria and Spain faced France. The initial difficulty of getting Portuguese envoys across hostile territory was solved by their inclusion in the French and Dutch parties: the emperor had flatly refused to grant them safe-conducts. When the congress opened in May 1644, the Spaniards produced credentials in which Philip IV used the titles of King of Navarre and of Portugal and Count of Barcelona. Since Louis XIV claimed to be King of Navarre, and the Catalans had offered him the County of Barcelona, and furthermore he had acknowledged John IV as King of Portugal, the titles were at once disputed by the French, though to little purpose. The swashbuckling of the Austrians and Spaniards had its effect: the body of the dead Portuguese envoy at Osnaburg was seized and searched, and the house of those at Münster was broken into. Unfortunately these latter quarrelled between themselves, and Francisco de Andrade Leitão, who had represented Portugal on the first mission to England, offended the French negotiators who were the only channel through which the Portuguese had access to the conference. From Paris the Marquis of Niza did his best to agitate for passports for his compatriots, but the Spaniards declared that they would retire rather than deal with or recognize the rebels. When the mediators at Münster favoured the inclusion of the Portuguese problem in the treaty, the Spanish ambassador, the Count of Peñaranda, exploded with indignation: at the end of 1645 no progress had been made. In the following year, the French persuaded Oxenstjerna to plead for the concession of passports to the Portuguese and to intervene in favour of D. Duarte, but again without profit to Portugal, for the Spaniards knew that no formal league existed between France and Portugal and concluded that therefore the French interest in the point was

not prompted by affection for John IV, but merely by the desire to gain a point. In order to call the French bluff, Peñaranda proposed that her envoys should give an undertaking not to assist any rebels against Philip IV: this, though unacceptable, since it would apply to France's chief ally, Holland, made it clear that there was no chance of getting Portugal recognized.

In August 1646 the French dropped their insistence on the recognition of Portugal, and the Portuguese emissaries attempted to obtain the concession of a truce for ten or twelve years: the Spaniards did not fail to rejoice when their point of view prevailed. To some extent the attitude of the Dutch told against Portugal; relations between the two countries had deteriorated and the Dutch refused to support the French in their demands on behalf of Portugal. On the other hand Mazarin would undoubtedly have thrown more weight into the balance if John IV had been able to conduct an energetic campaign against Philip, as the Catalans had done, instead of pursuing a policy of procrastination. Although the French proposed terms that provided for a truce with Portugal and reserved the right to help her in the event of war, the Spaniards stubbornly resisted the very mention of Portugal in the treaty. The demands in Portugal's favour gradually dwindled to two, the release of John IV's brother, which was not obtained, and the reservation of the right to assist Portugal in case she were attacked. Such was the obstinacy of the Spaniards that in view of their refusal to admit the name Portugal in the treaty, it was proposed that the mediators should declare in a separate document that this point was to be understood as referring to Portugal.¹ At long last a note was drawn up giving France the right to give defensive help to Portugal, but Peñaranda was criticized in Madrid for conceding so much. Eventually Mazarin interrupted negotiations with Spain, and the two countries continued at war. If Spain was weakened by the loss of the Low Countries, Portugal was only to feel the adverse effect of this in the corresponding release of Spanish troops.

vi. THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE TREATY OF 1654. During the quarrel between the English king and parliament, relations between Portugal and England were almost suspended, but after the execution of Charles I, the two Princes Rupert and Maurice sailed into the Tagus with eleven warships on November 30, 1649. The Portuguese government had already declared its willingness for the port to be used by both parties, and had laid down rules for the alternate entry and departure of their ships in order to provide against a conflict in Portuguese waters. However, although the princes were hospitably received by John IV, they proceeded to use the Tagus as a base for naval operations, not only

¹ Prestage, Diplomatic Relations, p. 38.

capturing English vessels and bringing them into Lisbon to sell, but also apprehending a Portuguese emigrant ship. The presence of these marauders in the Tagus naturally drove away peaceable merchantmen and impaired the commerce of the port of Lisbon. For some time Prince Rupert disregarded the notes of the Portuguese government, which was obliged to adopt a firmer attitude in the spring of 1650 by the arrival of Blake off Cascais. An envoy, Charles Vane, had been sent to ask John IV for the surrender of the princes and their ships. This was refused, and for a moment Blake contemplated forcing an entry into the Tagus, but found the system of fortresses at its mouth too strong. Renewing pressure through Vane, he demanded either to be allowed to enter the port or to have the princes expelled. Both demands were rejected, and Blake seized fourteen ships laden with sugar from the Brazil fleet. His attempt to blockade the estuary proved unsuccessful, and the difficulty of getting supplies from Spanish ports caused him to depart in October. Soon after the princes sailed out and were heavily defeated by Blake off Cartagena in the following December.

Although John IV had been inclined to favour the cause of Charles II, the bad behaviour of Rupert and Maurice led him to seek a settlement with the Commonwealth, which was in any case necessary because of the combined hostility of Holland and Spain. Towards the end of 1650 an envoy was sent to England to conclude a new treaty. Before its negotiation the Council of State demanded his agreement to six articles, covering reparations and restitution for the damage and expense caused to Blake's fleet and English merchants in the events of the previous winter. Until this was agreed to and performed, parliament refused to treat. The Portuguese envoy returned home, and was substituted by an ambassador, the Count of Penaguião, who reached England in September 1652 with instructions to agree to the six articles and have the treaty of 1642 renewed. Parliament however had different views. English merchants had sent in thirty-eight points which they wished included, and these provided material for nine additional articles. Having nothing with which to bargain, Penaguião was compelled to give way on almost every point, so that the draft of the treaty gave each party the right to trade with all the colonies of the other and permitted the English warships to enter Portuguese ports for supplies or repairs. English merchants in Lisbon received extensive privileges. Except when taken in a criminal act, they might only be arrested on a warrant issued by a special Judge-Conservator; they would be exempted from taxation; when they died they would be buried in their own cemetery, and no Portuguese courts would have the right to interfere with their property; they would never pay more than 23 per cent customs-dues, nor would these be altered

without their consent. It was this treaty of 1654, the Commonwealth Treaty, that determined English commercial hegemony in Portugal.¹

vii. OTHER NEGOTIATIONS, 1643–1650. The continued possession of Brazil by the Dutch caused John IV to despatch to France and Holland Fr. António Vieira, a Jesuit who, once a missionary in Brazil, had made a great reputation in Portugal as a pulpit orator and as a politician. As the confidential negotiator of John IV, he was to approach the French government with a view to securing their support in a project for buying back the part of Brazil that had remained in the hands of the Dutch West India Company. Having obtained a promise that the French would back the scheme, he proceeded to the Hague.

Since May 1643 Sousa Coutinho had been acting as Portuguese ambassador in Holland. Part of his work consisted in persuading the States-General to advocate the inclusion of Portugal in any peace with Spain, for which purpose he was authorized to offer the Prince of Orange up to 200,000 cruzados. His other objects were to obtain a permanent treaty with Holland instead of the existing truce, and to recover Portuguese possessions that had been seized by the Dutch: 400,000 cruzados were made available for the latter purpose. If necessary the sum of 2,000,000 was to be offered for the evacuation of Brazil. Numerous difficulties stood in Sousa Coutinho's way; not the least were the continued trouble with the Dutch in Angola and elsewhere, and the limited sum at his disposal. The crucial moment for a settlement of the colonial problem appeared to be 1644 and 1645, when the Dutch East and West India Companies would reach the term of their respective concessions. In the East Indies he could not hope for complete success owing to the great profits the Dutch were obtaining there, and limited his labours to securing Dutch observance of the truce, but in Brazil and Angola there was the chance of concluding a favourable agreement since the shares of the West India Company were declining in value. However, in May 1645 there came news that the Brazilian Portuguese had revolted against the Dutch. Unable to foresee the measure of success that the revolt would attain, Sousa Coutinho found his work undone and the Dutch people hostile towards him. He had no news from Lisbon, and had difficulty in convincing the Dutch authorities that John IV had played no part in the rising. Only in November did he hear that a Portuguese squadron had been defeated in Brazilian waters, and receive orders to negotiate the purchase of Dutch Brazil. Almost simultaneously the Dutch received later news from Brazil of a defeat at the hands of the

¹ A petition of English residents in Portugal for the confirmation of privileges given at various times was granted by John IV in November 1647. These privileges correspond with those incorporated in the treaty (cf. *Privileges of an Englishman in the Kingdoms and Dominions of Portugal*, London, 1736).

Portuguese; although Sousa Coutinho persuaded the government to await the arrival of full details, the West India Company began to receive military support. The demand that John IV should give the Dutch redress by punishing the Brazilian rebels and restoring their conquests was answered submissively in view of the precarious state of Portugal in Europe and of the partial agreement reached with regard to the East Indies. The king was reluctant to antagonize the Dutch merely for the sake of Brazil: for this reason he affected to disown the insurgents, ordering them to lay down arms and proscribing their leaders.

At this stage Vieira reached the Hague with orders to raise the sum offered for the repurchase of Brazil to 3,000,000 cruzados, which was refused. In July he returned to Portugal: he probably influenced John IV to promise Sousa Coutinho money for bribes. As peace between Holland and Spain was now being negotiated, there was acute danger of the two countries being joined in enmity to Portugal, and Sousa Coutinho contemplated offering the value of the capital of the Dutch West India Company—8,000,000 cruzados—for an immediate solution and the inclusion of Portugal in the peace, but Niza in Paris found this sum excessive and the king instructed him to offer only 3,000,000. In December 1647 Vieira returned to assist the ambassador and buy ships and corn. In spite of the announcement of peace with Spain, made in June 1648, the two agents were approaching a settlement when they were recalled. Vieira went to Lisbon to attempt to persuade the king to continue negotiations in view of the dangers of a war with Holland as well as with Spain, but the idea of leaving the Brazilians in the lurch was repulsive to patriotic sentiments; moreover the settlers would have broken away from Portugal rather than give in. For three more years Sousa Coutinho continued at the Hague; by his bargaining he delayed the despatch of Dutch forces to Brazil until the colonists were in a strong enough position to win.

The other negotiations upon which António Vieira was employed concerned the establishment of a dynastic tie with France. John IV's eldest son, D. Teodósio, had been only seven years old in 1643 when a special emissary was sent to Paris to propose his marriage with Louis XIII's niece, the Duchess of Montpensier, la Grande Mademoiselle. In this way it was hoped to secure the formal alliance with France, but nothing was obtained. Three years later Niza was despatched to Paris with secret orders to offer Mazarin the archbishopric of Évora—which brought in 7,000 cruzados a year—if he would obtain the same marriage: no dower would be asked for if Portugal were included in a peace, or offered a truce, or promised military help. Again the project was turned down. Later, in 1647, John IV devised a more attractive plan, and sent

Vieira to Paris to make soundings. Only the desperate need for an alliance with France could justify the scheme, which was no less than the retirement of John IV to the Azores, whence he would rule Brazil as an independent kingdom, whilst Prince Teodósio, having married the Duchess of Montpensier or any other princess that the French might select, reigned over continental Portugal. In other words, in his desire to involve France in his defence, John was prepared to abandon Portugal entirely to French influence if, as indeed happened, Teodósio should die young. Vieira had interviews with Mazarin and the queen-mother, but the scheme found no sympathy with either, and he passed on to Holland at the end of November.

Two other projects were put into Vieira's hands. In 1650 he went to Rome to meet a band of Neapolitans, refugees from the unsuccessful rising against the Spaniards of 1647–1648, and offer them 600,000 cruzados to begin a new revolt which would have French support. The scheme failed. The Jesuit's other mission surpassed the rest in fantastic impossibility: whilst in Rome he was to approach other Jesuits who were in contact with the Spanish government in the hope of bringing about the marriage of Teodósio and the Princess of Spain—if Philip IV had no further offspring, Teodósio would become king of the two Peninsular states; otherwise, he and the infanta would rule a Portugal offensively and defensively united to Spaiń.

viii. NEW ATTEMPTS TO OBTAIN A FRENCH ALLIANCE. Vieira held the view that was put forward by the representatives of the people in the Cortes of 1653, that military operations should be of a defensive nature, small incursions into Castile being relinquished in favour of the general fortification of towns. For this purpose a levy of a tenth on all possessions was voted, to be increased by a quarter as much again in the event of a major siege. The defensive policy had been opposed by Mazarin throughout: in 1644 his ambassador, de Rouillac, was instructed to represent to John IV the necessity for an active campaign that should coincide with the French movement in Catalonia, for example the capture of the rich cities of Andalusia; on this occasion the ambassador's overbearing manners aroused the annoyance of the Portuguese and he was withdrawn. In 1648 Niza sought assistance from the French in troops, ships and money, in view of possible hostilities with Holland as well as Spain: in the following year, the queen's confessor, Father Daniel O'Daly, a Kerryman, known as Frei Domingos do Rosário, the founder of the Irish Dominican community of Corpo Santo in Lisbon (1634), went to Ireland to raise a body of soldiers. At the same time a Portuguese agent contracted 2,500 men in Hamburg, and a Frenchman who had served in Naples offered to bring 200 veterans.

In 1652 the outlook for Portugal seemed to darken: France had the Fronde to contend with at home: in Spain it seemed likely that Barcelona would be lost. Finally, in March 1652, Mazarin sought Portuguese help with the allurement of the long-desired league—which however was to be expensive. Sousa Coutinho should prevail upon John IV to provide France with 3,000,000, later 2,400,000 écus, to be paid in instalments over five years. The offer was not favourably received: Mazarin was more remarkable for his avarice than for affection towards Portugal, and in any case the financial state of the country did not permit so much money to be raised. Not to discontent the French, promises were given to assist in an expedition against Naples, but no payment was ever made.

In the following year Spain was able to transfer some troops from Catalonia to the Portuguese frontier, but their attack was broken in the engagement of Arronches: no advantage had been gained when in 1656 England declared war on Spain. Meanwhile Mazarin again sought to involve Portugal in the cost of the expedition to Naples, and sent the Chevalier de Jant to remind John IV that the only way of securing his own position was to attack Spain with energy, and extract either Portuguese naval assistance for France or a contribution towards the attack on Naples. At the same time Jant was bidden to collect information about Portugal-the wealth of John IV, the strength of the fortifications, the value of the Portuguese army and navy. To gain the sympathy of Queen Luisa, he was to suggest that Mazarin might be prevailed upon to arrange a match for her daughter Catherine when Louis XIV should be old enough to marry, and to get two genuine portraits of the infanta. It was popularly supposed in France that the Queen of Portugal had complete influence over the king; if this was not true, at least the hint of such an illustrious match aroused all her ambitions, and put them at the service of French policy. With her husband Jant had less success: following his instructions, he committed the mistake of reproaching John IV for his lack of activity on the Spanish frontier in his initial speech at his public reception. After protracted haggling about the past conduct of both countries, John declared his readiness to conclude a league with France, but he would make no treaty without a league; Jant, whose powers did not extend so far, prepared to leave, but was delayed by an illness. At the end of June he learnt that the Spaniards had approached the king with an offer of a truce: he demanded further information, which was given, and eventually returned to France in the company of Father O'Daly, who had the duty of making any necessary explanations to Mazarin. The two envoys had already gone on board when John IV received a definite offer of a truce with Spain and ordered O'Daly to return. At

once the French chargé d'affaires urged Jant to stay, and the Francophile party, the queen, Niza and O'Daly, urged him to discuss a treaty, which, in spite of his restricted powers, he consented to do. The Portuguese offered the sum of 2,000,000 écus, payable over nine years, a sop to Mazarin's cupidity. The French continued to believe in the wealth of John IV in spite of Queen Luisa's denials, whilst the Portuguese protested that they were being made to pay for an alliance with France whilst the Swedes and the Dutch had received large subsidies from her. No sooner were the bases of the treaty set down, than the incident of Salvaterra took away John IV's best weapon, the threat of a truce with Spain. A Spanish general had tried to bribe the governor of Salvaterra to surrender the town, the latter pretended to accept, but when a party of Spanish officers appeared disguised as peasants, they were admitted by a postern and knifed one by one, apparently with the king's sanction, though the act earned the condemnation it merited from contemporaries. Jant attempted to use this incident to bargain for better terms; the Portuguese threatened to conclude a full alliance with Spain, a threat which was coloured by Father O'Daly's calling Jant to the bed to which he was confined with gout and swearing on the sacrament and by the salvation of his soul that France was on the verge of losing the Portuguese alliance. Jant, knowing that the treaty would in any case be void without the ratification of his government, signed it for the simple purpose of keeping Portugal away from Spanish influence. In an attempt to secure the ratification of the treaty, O'Daly was sent to France in October 1655: at the same time he was to attempt to negotiate the marriage of Catherine to Louis XIV. When he returned, he gave out that he had attained both objectives: but, unable to promise the dower that the French demanded, he had offered the cession of Tangier, and in order to make certain, it would be necessary to offer Mazarin the handsome bribe of 600,000 cruzados—£90,000. In fact, a letter from Mazarin showed that as far as the league was concerned, the French had seen black where O'Daly saw white, for they disowned the negotiations of Jant, who had exceeded his powers. Luisa, at least, had set her heart on a match with Louis XIV for her daughter, and in 1656 O'Daly was sent back: the match had resumed a certain political importance through the rupture of Franco-Spanish discussions. In the hope of catching the phantom league, Catherine's dowry would consist of either Tangier or Mazagão, a million cruzados and Mazarin's tip.


CHAPTER XIX

LUSITANIA LIBERATA

i. AFONSO VI; THE REGENCY OF D. LUISA DE GUSMÃO. For some time John IV had suffered from 'gout and stone', and the queen took his place in affairs of state whenever he was confined to his bed. When he died, on November 6, 1656, Luisa therefore naturally assumed the regency.

Three children survived the king, Catherine, future Queen of England, and Afonso and Pedro, successive Kings of Portugal, born respectively in 1638, 1643 and 1648. Prince Teodósio, John's eldest son, died of chest-disease three years before his father: in his extreme piety and misogyny he resembled Sebastian, and the remark that, had he lived, he would have led Portugal to an Alcazar-Kebir on the Spanish frontier was not without justification. In 1651 he had fled from court to the army in the Alentejo, in search of the perils and discomforts of military life. From Elvas he urged his father to settle the arrears of pay owing to the military, with whom he found such favour that John feared a revolt. Summoned to court, he at first refused and, when he complied, was only prevented from departing again by the grant of the title of Governor and Captain-General of Arms. On his death at the age of nineteen the cortes of 1653 were called to confirm the succession of his younger brother Afonso, who was accordingly proclaimed nine days after his father's death. At the age of three, a disease had left the new king partly paralysed in the right arm and leg. The degree to which he was incapacitated is difficult to determine: at times his acts were those of an idiot, but there were at least occasions when he displayed normal intelligence. Physically his gait was limping, but he could at least ride and hold a sword. According to Ericeira, some of the queen's advisers thought it prudent to wait until it should be known whether he would prove fit to rule before proclaiming him. Others considered that the perils of the times were too great for Portugal to be without a king, and it was this view that the queen accepted.

ii. FRENCH NEGOTIATIONS AND THE PROGRESS OF THE WAR. Luisa de Gusmão, on the other hand, was a queen by temperament, ambition and destiny: a Moorish astrologer had prophesied as much to her father when she was born. She lost no time in furthering her cherished scheme of marrying Catherine to Louis XIV: to this extent the death of John IV favoured the negotiations that O'Daly was still conducting in Paris. In March 1657 Mazarin decided in favour of the league, and the Dominican



Map 6. The World, showing Portuguese explorations and discoveries, and the present Portuguese empire.

offered to conclude it at once, since he had full powers to do so. Mazarin, however, preferred to transfer the scene of negotiations to Lisbon in the hope of getting improved terms. Once more O'Daly informed Lisbon that all was well, when the French had merely changed their ground. The queen wrote stiffly to O'Daly, bidding him drop all idea of a league and pointing out that the marriage would cost Portugal 3,000,000 cruzados—including the value of the African fortress to be ceded. Instead of the old idea of a league with France, Portugal now tried to obtain a quadruple alliance with England, France and Sweden.

O'Daly returned to Lisbon in July, accompanying the French ambassador Cominges. The latter was rapturously received, by the queen because she hoped he had instructions to forward the desired marriage, by others because he did not conceal his view that Portugal urgently required assistance. Nevertheless, the raptures did not last long: Cominges had nothing to say about the marriage, and had been sent to ask for help, not to give it.

At the moment the outlook had blackened. The Spaniards, taking advantage of John IV's death and of the intrigues of the Portuguese court, were preparing troops on the border. D. João da Costa, who had been entrusted with the Alentejo frontier, reported the danger to Lisbon, but was himself dismissed through the influence of his enemy the Count of Penaguião. The two had long been rivals and João da Costa had obtained from John IV an order forbidding Penaguião to vote on any matter touching himself: he refused to accede to the queen's request that this should now be waived, and was unsuccessfully attacked one dark night as he left the Palace in his coach. The affair split the court into two factions, and at length João da Costa was dismissed. His successor on the Alentejo front, the Count of São Lourenço, came straight from prison -where he was expiating his responsibility in a political affray that had resulted in the death of the Count of Vimioso-and at once declared that the preparations of the Spaniards did not require any special countermeasures, but that an invasion of Spain must be attempted. Whilst the count thus threw overboard the now traditional defensive policy, the Duke of San Germano suddenly appeared with 8,500 men and besieged Olivença. The garrison consisted of 4,000 men, but the Spaniards were strong in cavalry and had twenty-nine cannon, a considerable number for these campaigns. São Lourenço raised 1,200 men in Elvas and marched out to the relief of Olivenca, but on his attempting to occupy a good position he was driven off by the enemy artillery. As a diversion he attempted a futile attack on Badajoz. Olivença gave in and was garrisoned by the Spaniards, who also seized Mourão. When São Lourenço had been dismissed, Mourão was recovered, but not Olivenca.

Meanwhile negotiations had begun with Cominges, who made three heavy demands: offensive operations against Spain, the supply of ships to operate with the Catalans or against Naples, and the contribution of two millions in gold. No mention was made of the marriage of the infanta; in fact a match with Maria Teresa of Spain was already being contemplated. Moreover the French demanded the cession of Tangier, which O'Daly protested he had only offered as the infanta's dowry and not in exchange for the league. However, such was the queen's desire for a French alliance that the two millions were agreed to, though the size of the instalments was still under discussion. According to Cominges, not only the queen, but also the people, strongly favoured the alliance; the only difficulties came from the ministers, who feared a loss of their own prestige or were pro-Spanish. As to the treaty, there were limits to what might be expected from 'this kingdom afflicted on all sides'. Apart from the military and financial situation, Ceylon had been lost, and the Dutch were cruising off the bar of the Tagus in the hope of capturing the Brazil fleet, or of demanding money. Luisa de Gusmão, meanwhile, never gave up hope of arranging the match with Louis XIV, treating secretly through O'Daly.

Negotiations dragged on. It began to be rumoured among the Portuguese that Mazarin merely intended to use them as a bargaining weapon in peace discussions with the Spaniards: nevertheless an attempt was made to make a great military onslaught in the campaign of 1658. Joane Mendes de Vasconcelos, who had succeeded São Lourenço in the command of the Alentejo, offered to take Badajoz if he were given 15.000 men. In fact he led 17,000, with twenty pieces of ordnance, out of Elvas, and succeeded in reducing the fort of San Miguel, but the arrival of Spanish reinforcements made it necessary to raise the siege after four months. The Spaniards, having lost several towns in Flanders and being defeated in the battle of the Dunes, thought to compensate by an attack on Portugal, and the army of D. Luis de Haro hoped to capture Elvas. The siege, begun at the end of October 1658, continued until the new year, by which time the garrison had been much reduced and disease was rife inside the town. However, a relief force was raised in Estremós and. in spite of numerical inferiority, surprised the Spanish lines and drove the invaders back to Badajoz. In view of the presence not only of Philip IV's ministers, but also of the Dukes of San Germano and Osuna, the victory, though a defensive one, had raised the prestige of Portuguese arms.

In the expectation of another Spanish invasion, D. Luisa decided to ask the French for military help, and despatched D. João da Costa, now Count of Soure, to France. On his arrival at Le Havre he learnt that

a Franco-Spanish armistice had already been agreed to. These preliminary articles contained an undertaking by France to break off relations with Portugal, so that 'the affairs of Portugal should be placed in the state they were in previous to the Revolution'.¹ Naturally this was kept secret: all that João da Costa learnt was that France was compelled by public opinion to make peace. At first he offered Mazarin the spectacular bribe of a million cruzados and the archbishopric of Évora if he could get Portugal included in the peace; next he drew up and had printed a long defence of Portugal's conduct and a criticism of the dangers of the peace; lastly he quoted the promise that Louis XIII had made to Niza 'to establish the king of Portugal in his actual state by means of a general peace'. All was in vain: although the ambassador himself followed Mazarin to St Jean de Luz, he could not prevent France from abandoning Portugal. On November 7, the treaty was signed on the Ile des Faisans on the Bidassoa.

iii. THE ENGLISH ALLIANCE: MARRIAGE OF CATHERINE OF BRAGANÇA. All that D. João da Costa could obtain from France was permission to raise men and contract a general for the Portuguese army: two generals were available, an Irishman, Lord Inchiquin, and the German Count-Duke Frederick of Schomberg. The Irishman came first, but his ship was captured by Algerian pirates and the queen had to ransom him: in spite of this he retired to Ireland dissatisfied at the end of 1662. Schomberg arrived in Portugal with the returning ambassador, who had also contracted six hundred officers and men by arrangement with Turenne. His reforms of the Portuguese army included the organization of cavalry in regiments instead of companies (which encouraged administrative waste and lack of cohesion on campaign), and the side march, which permitted immediate battle formation. In spite of his experience Schomberg accepted the office of mestre de campo general, under the young Count of Atouguia, who was now in charge of operations in the Alentejo: his presence quickly aroused the jealousy of certain officers, especially the victor of the engagement of the lines of Elvas, now the Marquis of Marialva, who exercised considerable influence at court.

With the collapse of the French league, Portugal turned towards England for help. In April 1660 her ambassador in London, the Marquis of Sande, obtained permission to raise 12,000 foot and buy 2,500 horses and arms in England. Even before the Restoration he had made sure that Charles II and Monk both favoured the continuance of help to Portugal. As it turned out, the new English government hesitated in allowing the departure of troops, not wishing to go to war with Spain; but orders were given for the continuance of commercial relations until

the existing treaties should be revised. The originator of the idea of fortifying these treaties with the marriage of the Infanta Catherine to Charles II is uncertain; possibly Sousa de Macedo, who had long experience of England and whose son was given the title of Lord Mullingar in return for his services to the royalists, or Schomberg, who had passed through England. Louis XIV later boasted of having urged Charles II to accept the marriage by offering him 2,000,000 livres if he would send military help to Portugal. The project was first put forward by Sande in conversation with Monk. In return for a league, with a promise that England should defend Portugal from Spain and Holland and not make a separate peace, the infanta's dowry would consist of 2,000,000 cruzados, Tangier, and free trade with the Portuguese colonies. Bombay was added later. Charles, attracted by the size of the dowry, put the proposal before Clarendon. In October 1660 Sande returned to Lisbon to arrange the match: Queen Luisa, who had sighed long over the French marriage, declared that an angel from heaven could not have brought her better news. Although certain counsellors were reluctant to part with Bombay and Tangier, Father Russell, of the English seminary in Lisbon, was sent off with answers to Charles' letters. Sande for his part refused to return to conclude the negotiations unless he was given a title, which was reluctantly conceded.

In spite of the vigorous activity of Batteville, the Spanish ambassador in London, who proposed other matches, bribed Catholic peers to portray Catherine's probable defects to Charles and threatened war with Holland and Spain, negotiations continued. At one moment it seemed as if Batteville's machinations would be effective, but his arrogance, the arrival of a portrait of Catherine and the exhortation of Louis XIV destroyed Charles' hesitations. On May 9 the marriage was declared, and Sande informed: on June 23, 1661, the marriage treaty and alliance between the two countries was signed. By it England agreed to defend Portugal by land and sea, sending two cavalry regiments of five hundred each and two of infantry of a thousand, with full arms and maintenance, and supplying ten good warships in case of attacks and three or four as coastguard vessels whenever pirates should appear. In case of emergency British ships should succour Portugal from Tangier. No peace should be made with Spain that would restrict England's freedom to help Portugal. In return England received a million cruzados as the infanta embarked, and a million to be paid after a year, Bombay and Tangier, free trade in India at Goa, Cochin and Diu, and in Brazil at Baia, Pernambuco and Rio de Janeiro: if Ceylon should be recovered from

¹ Part of this money was handed over to raise 4,000 men for Inchiquin, the rest was paid to French troops in Portugal or to the Portuguese.

the Dutch, England would receive Galé, whilst Portugal retained Colombo.¹

On April 25, 1662, Catherine of Bragança sailed from Lisbon for Falmouth. In return the first English troops, two thousand foot and seven hundred horse, arrived in Portugal in time to meet the invasion of the Alentejo threatened by John of Austria. Although the dowry was said to be almost double what any monarch had ever obtained before, the prompt conclusion of the treaty and its immediate fulfilment make a favourable contrast with the protracted and frequently deceptive negotiations that had been conducted by Richelieu and Mazarin.

iv. THE PORTUGUESE OVERSEAS IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY. During the sixty years of the dual monarchy, most of Portugal's commercial interests in the East disappeared, largely owing to the attacks of the Dutch, who, once Lisbon was closed to them, were quick to find their way to the sources of exotic merchandise in Asia, Africa and Brazil. In the East, Portuguese trading supremacy had depended on the possession of a monopoly in the spice-trade, especially in nutmeg and cloves. To keep this was impossible without control of the sea, which would permit the sources of production to be fenced off from intruders, and Arab competition to be smothered in the Persian Gulf. But in the first decade of the seventeenth century the Dutch were able to break the back of Portuguese sea-power. They reached Java only three years after their exclusion from Lisbon, took Amboina in 1605, and Ternate and Tidore, the precious Moluccas, in 1607, and though they failed to capture the station of Macau in China, they ousted the Portuguese from Japan and conducted operations against Portuguese establishments in India and Ceylon: despite the conclusion of peace in Europe, these latter were protracted until 1663. Long before this the port of Ormuz, an important point in the Portuguese plan for pinning back the main Moslem powers, fell to Shah Abbas, who had the assistance of English ships. The forces of Oman continued to reduce the Portuguese strongholds in this area until the last of them, Muscat, was lost in 1650. Although this exposed the possessions in East Africa to attack from the north, it was only at the end of the century that the Arabs took Mombasa.

In East Africa, the Dutch tried unsuccessfully to capture the island fortress of Moçambique in 1604, 1607 and 1608. Their failure here and their success farther east secured comparative peace to this colony for the rest of the century. Indeed with the loss of the oriental trade

 $^{^{1}}$ A secret clause promised that the Portuguese overseas possessions should be defended against all enemies.

² Prestage, *Diplomatic Relations*, p. 140. The port of Tangier remained in English hands until 1693, when it was abandoned as useless: Bombay, on the other hand, followed Madras as the centre of British power in India.

Moçambique came to be perhaps the most prosperous of Portugal's possessions. Early in the seventeenth century the Monomotapa, the principal potentate of the interior, became a Portuguese client and subsequently a Christian and a vassal. His submission, his trade and his tribute were of great value, until, almost at the end of the century, the rising power of Changamira largely replaced his authority: in 1695 Manica was lost to the Portuguese.

A colonial system peculiar to Portuguese East Africa was that of the prazos da corôa which was developed in the region of the Zambesi at this period. Crown estates were granted to the female descendants of European Portuguese on condition that they in turn married white Portuguese. This was calculated to guarantee white hegemony, whilst the appointment of prazo-holders by the representatives of the crown, either the Governors of Moçambique or their delegates, the Captains of the Rivers, should have assured the permanence of Portuguese sovereignty. But in practice, the donas da Zambézia and their husbands were frequently Goans or half-castes, and exercised their feudal powers of taxation and of levying military forces in almost complete independence of the governors.

To Angola Portuguese attention was drawn by a dispute between the kings of the Congo and of Angola—the name Angola properly refers to the people of the Ngola, the ruler of a tribe of the Luanda region. In October 1574 Paulo Dias de Novais, a grandson of Bartomoleu Dias, was appointed Conquistador and Governor of Angola, and founded São Paulo de Luanda with a colonizing force of about 400 settlers. He fought a number of engagements with the natives, and carried on remunerative slaving operations until his death in 1589, after which his concession was recovered by the crown. For a while the Portuguese wavered between a policy of war and tribute and one of peace and trade. When the former prevailed, the Ngola was defeated in 1621. Colonization had proceeded slowly, and was limited to Luanda and its environs, and Benguela, founded in 1617.

The Dutch had failed to take Luanda in 1602, but stimulated by an interest in the slave-trade after the launching of the Dutch West India Company, and taking advantage of the defection of the native Queen Ginga, they seized the place in 1641 and entered Benguela soon after. The Portuguese retired on to the river Cuanza, and in 1643 came the news of a truce between Holland and Portugal. This was not observed by the Dutch in Angola, and though Ginga was beaten in 1645, the Dutch were expelled only in 1648, when Corrêa de Sá e Benevides brought reinforcements from Brazil. For the remainder of the century there was little development, and Angola remained primarily an agency

for the Brazilian slave-trade. Various schemes for trans-African travel were put forward, but little was accomplished. Farther north the Portuguese retained their station at Bissau on the Guinea coast, but lost Arguim, Goree and al-Mina to the Dutch.

In Brazil, the first half of the seventeenth century was marked by the Dutch invasion and its final collapse, and the second half by the exploration of the southern interior, which led to the opening of the great mining period in the last decade of the century. Soon after the occupation of Portugal, French and English pirates and privateers were attacking Brazilian ports, and Cavendish sacked the city of Santos. The Dutch made their first appearance in 1598, and entered Recôncavo in 1604, but their early attacks were not of great consequence. Three years after the founding of their West India Company (1612), they sent a fleet against Baia and were able to drive out the Portuguese until the arrival of reinforcements from Lisbon a year later, when they capitulated. Another attack on Baia was repelled in 1627, but in the following decade the Dutch succeeded in taking Olinda, Rio Grande do Norte, Paraiba, Pernambuco, Ceará and Sergipe. These places were governed for a time by Prince Maurice of Nassau as a Dutch colony, but southern Brazil remained in Portuguese hands and provided the forces which first dislodged the invaders from Angola and then recovered the north of their own colony. By 1654 all Brazil was again in Portuguese hands.

v. THE PALACE REVOLUTION, 1662. In 1662 Afonso VI reached his nineteenth year. Although his portraits do not reveal any abnormality, his paralysis, according to the suspect medical evidence produced to nullify his marriage, resulted in a twisting of the mouth discernible when he spat, a hesitation in his walk and sexual impotence. The author of the Genealogical History of the Royal House depicts him as 'of agreeable presence, fair, blue-eved, with a perfect nose and long, fair hair and great memory, which, though not applied to any lesson, yet was so prodigious that he had already given admirable proofs of it on certain occasions'. Sir Robert Southwell, the English ambassador, described him as being pitifully stupid, though on occasion apparently sound in the head. None the less he walked in his sleep, overate in bed, delighted in killing bulls, bears and other beasts with his own hands, and drank wine 'like no other Portuguese'. When thwarted, he gave way to fits of rage and would try to assault those who came near, afterwards relapsing into apathy.

In a measure the king's upbringing had been at fault. D. Luisa de Gusmão, it was said, preferred his younger brother. Neither she nor his tutors displayed much insight in their treatment of him. Ericeira describes how the Prior of Cedofeita strove in vain to interest him in

the precepts of grammar; he preferred 'less decent exercises'. One of these was to watch from the windows of the Palace the children of the lower orders throwing stones, who, on learning of his inclination, passed from the Terreiro into the Chapel-Court, 'the king favouring one or other partiality of these youthful gladiators'. Among the stall-holders in the Court who watched these battles was a youth, António Conti of Vintimiglia, born in Lisbon of Italian parents, a seller of ribbons and knick-knacks. Conti, who had his wits about him, made himself prominent by egging on and leading the band of stone-throwers favoured by the king, until at length he was called to the palace. He had no difficulty in capturing Afonso's friendship by bringing gifts of gilt knives, and similar prizes. An anonymous writer whose Anti-Catástrofe makes a defence of Afonso VI blames those entrusted with his upbringing for their negligence—especially his governor the Count of Odemira, 'a man as attentive to his own conveniences as heedless of the Prince's instructions, judging that he would best forward himself in the king's good graces by leaving him to give rein to his appetites rather than by restraining and educating him....The king did everything he wanted, and as he grew up, he changed his vices and occupations, attracting to himself criminals and numbers of mulattoes, who, with the protection of the king, ill-treated and scandalized the people.' For a moment the queen forbade the admission of Conti to the palace, but Afonso became so depressed and unmanageable, refusing to eat or do his lessons, that Conti was allowed to return. There even existed those within the palace who found Conti's influence over the king to their advantage, and he was able to give up selling ribbons and establish himself as a royal companion with the sanction of the queen and of Odemira. Installed in a room next to that of the sixteen-year-old king, he soon made himself intolerable: he not only invented his own genealogical tree, but upset the whole household by countermanding the queen's orders. What was worse, he led Afonso out on night escapades, molesting respectable citizens and raiding the taverns and brothels in the company of stableboys and mulattoes.

Afonso reached the age of eighteen without displaying the slightest interest in the government or having been taught anything about it. In 1661 Luisa de Gusmão suddenly expressed a desire to quit the regency, but on the representation of the ministers, who pointed out the dangers of handing over the kingdom to an incapable youth dominated by a Conti, she agreed to continue. Possibly at this time she entertained the idea of replacing Afonso by his brother Pedro, who was now given his own apartments in the Corte-Real Palace, where a second court gathered round him. The installation of the infante took place on June 4, 1662.

On the same day, Luisa announced her intention of resigning the regency in two months' time-perhaps an ultimatum to obtain the expulsion of Conti. In any case, the future supporter of Pedro, Nuno Álvares Pereira, Duke of Cadaval, offered to attend to the business, and on June 16, whilst the king was with his mother, he went to Conti's room and by threatening to break in and kill him, persuaded the favourite to unlock the door. At once arrested, Conti, his brother and other associates of the king were put on board a ship destined for Brazil. As soon as this was done, the nobility, upper magistracy and representatives of the Casa dos Vinte e Ouatro were ushered into the room where Afonso and Luisa were waiting. Before them the secretary of state made a declaration in the name of the queen urging the king to look to the realm, find 'occupations worthy of his royal person, so as to be able to govern by himself', avoid low company 'who sowed discord among his nobility which, perhaps, if the king knew them, he would punish rigorously'. Afonso had not understood a word of this diatribe; according to Ericeira, he walked out with a pleased air and asked if this meeting was the cortes. When he realized that his companions had been arrested, however, he burst into anger, demanding to know Conti's whereabouts. Pacified for the moment, his anger flared up again in his own apartments. His attendant, the Count of Castelo Melhor, seized the opportunity to point out to Afonso the danger that what had befallen Conti might happen to the king himself. Afonso did not need much persuasion. Accompanied by Castelo Melhor and two or three others, he rode out of Lisbon to the royal estate of Alcântara: various noblemen were informed and by nightfall four hundred armed men had been collected for his defence.

The queen, as soon as she learnt of the flight, despatched an order to all the resident nobility to appear at the Lisbon palace, but most of them had already been summoned to the king's side: only Cadaval and João da Costa, now Count of Soure, the Marquis of Marialva, António Vieira and a few others adhered to the queen. Meanwhile Afonso declared to the assembled nobility that the time had come for him to take the government upon himself, and all those present kissed his hand and congratulated him. The news was then conveyed to the queen, who was invited to rest from the great burden with which she had been saddled. On June 21, Luisa de Gusmão replied pointing out that Afonso would do better to take over the government in a less abrupt fashion, but since he and Castelo Melhor stuck to their purpose, she had no alternative but to deliver the reins of government to her son. For the moment a ministry was formed around the king, but on July 12 Castelo Melhor became escrivão da puridade, a position from which he could control all the affairs of the government, as he in effect did for the following five years. The king's confessor was changed, a new companion was found for him, and though Conti was recalled he did not return to the court. The king's brother, now fourteen, protested against the dismissal of the Count of Soure and Rodrigo de Meneses, the brother of the Count of Ericeira: after a while Meneses was allowed to return to his side and became his guide in the conspiracy that was to overthrow Afonso. For the moment Pedro kept close company with the king, who treated him with a certain affection which was repaid with dissimulation—Ericeira depicts Pedro even as a child beholding the extravagances of his elder brother with a certain superiority and detachment.

The author of the Anti-Catástrofe draws a curious picture of Luisa de Gusmão's departure from the secular world. She was requested to retire to a Carmelite convent, presumably because Castelo Melhor found it safer to have her out of the way. She was to be escorted by her two sons to the convent, and two coaches attended the royal party. For some time the queen awaited the arrival of the king and his brother, but without result. No sooner had she set off, than her sons appeared, entered the other coach and followed her. Hoping to speak to Afonso, she ordered her coachman to stop: the second vehicle followed suit. She ordered her coachman to turn about, a manœuvre which was imitated by the king, who galloped off at full speed for Lisbon. Luisa, apparently embittered by her exclusion after the coup d'état, did not long survive. Some three years later, she sent urgently for Afonso to come to her bedside. He agreed to return from Salvaterra, where he had been hunting, but the journey, easily accomplished in a day, took him three: whilst coming down the river, the king ordered the oarsmen to stop and the musicians to sing. When he arrived in Lisbon, the queen had already died, on February 27, 1666.

vi. Government of castelo melhor, 1662–1667. The title of escrivão da puridade, or secret notary, which Castelo Melhor assumed, had not been used since the days of John III: in the hands of the new minister and in view of Afonso's incapacity the office of private secretary to the king meant personal dictatorship. The third Count of Castelo Melhor, by name Luis de Vasconcelos e Sousa, was the son of the Castelo Melhor who, after serving in Brazil against the Dutch, had distinguished himself in the command of the Galician frontier until his death in 1659. To the activity and tenacity of the new minister were due the successful conduct of the war until the final peace of 1668, the regularization of the economic situation, and control of the various dissidences and jealousies by which generals and courtiers undermined national solidarity.

Already on Castelo Melhor's rise to power the military situation was

serious. Philip IV's son, John of Austria, appeared on the Alentejo front with an army of 14,000 early in May 1662: a more vigorous leader than those who had hitherto appeared in this war, he occupied Borba and invested Juromenha, which capitulated after a short siege, and moving northward took Monforte, Alter do Chão and Crato. For the first time a Spanish army had captured and devastated an important area. Meanwhile Marialva, who had only 7,000 men, had marched to Elvas, found it unprepared for resistance and fallen back on Estremós: from here he hoped to attack the Spaniards in front of Juromenha, but found their position too strong and retired. Only the height of summer and the fevers of the region drove John of Austria back to Badajoz. Naturally his advance provoked great alarm in Lisbon. Marialva was replaced by the Count of Vila Flor for the coming campaign, whilst Castelo Melhor strove to raise money, arms and supplies: unfortunately he fell out with Schomberg, who came near to leaving Portugal. When John of Austria returned to the attack the following May with an even larger force of 18,500 men, Vila Flor had not had time to complete his preparations. Borba fell again. The Spaniards this time directed operations from the south and on May 14 appeared before Evora, where the garrison consisted of only 7,000 men with four guns to match the invaders' eighteen. Vila Flor collected 3,000 horse and 11,000 foot at Estremós, but when he at last marched out on May 22, he heard that Evora had fallen. The news led to riots in Lisbon: the Spaniards were now more than a third of the distance from Badajoz to the capital. Those who most aroused the resentment of the mob were Sebastião César de Meneses, an ambitious priest who had become a minister and archbishop-elect of Lisbon on Afonso's coup d'état and was now accused of treachery and forced to take refuge behind an altar in his own cathedral; his colleague, the Count of Atouguia; and the Marquis of Marialva, who was blamed for the military situation and whose palace was assaulted. Castelo Melhor took the opportunity of strengthening his own position by dismissing these three, and quelled the disturbances with a body of musketeers. Rumours ran round Lisbon that the Spaniards had already reached Setúbal, and the appeal for volunteers met with a good response. Meanwhile the Portuguese forces from Beira, numbering 3,000, were united to Vila Flor's army, which faced the Spaniards at Ameixial near Estremós. For some time the two armies covered each other from opposite banks of the river Degebe: Ericeira's artillery prevented the Spaniards from crossing on one occasion, and on another the rapidity with which Schomberg raised earthworks made them reconsider giving battle. In this way Ameixial was reached, where John of Austria was able to take up a favourable position on higher ground. From it he proposed to withdraw his main forces whilst his cavalry fought a rearguard action. The Portuguese commanders decided to attack at once. In the engagement an English force under Thomas Hood formed a square and stoutly warded off the Spanish cavalry while the enemy positions were stormed. Finally John of Austria withdrew in haste to Badajoz.

The victory of Ameixial, won on June 8, 1663, led to the recapture of Évora on June 24. The relief of the Portuguese expressed itself in general rejoicings; even Sebastião César gave 2,000 escudos to the people of Lisbon.

For the campaign of 1664 it was possible to put 28,000 men in the field, thanks to the activity of Castelo Melhor. Not only were the troops paid, but fortifications were renewed and towns armed. The command of the army was given to Marialva, in spite of the objections of Schomberg. Marialva refused to command with Schomberg as his mestre de campo, although the latter's standing and ability entitled him to the position of chief of staff: Castelo Melhor composed the difference as best he could. The Portuguese wished to take immediate advantage of their superiority, the more so since John of Austria had enemies in Madrid who sabotaged his work by preventing the supply of fresh troops—though his cavalry remained strong, he could still raise only 14,000 men. In June, Marialva successfully attacked Valencia de Alcântara, but as John did not present himself for battle, the large Portuguese army passed the season without consolidating its position on the main front.

the season without consolidating its position on the main front.

The last great effort of Philip IV was made in 1665. John of Austria had fallen into disfavour, and the Marquis of Caracena received the command with reinforcements from Germany, Switzerland and Italy to a total of 15,000 men. On the news that Caracena had reached Badajoz in May, Castelo Melhor had already concentrated troops in the Alentejo and even strengthened ports against a sea-attack, which was threatened by the concentration of troops at Cadiz under the Duke of Aveiro, a Portuguese serving the Spaniards. Nevertheless the total forces put in the field this year slightly favoured the Spaniards, who had some 23,000 to the Portuguese 20,000. Caracena's first objective was Vila Viçosa, which had suffered a week's assault when the Portuguese force left Estremós and reached Montes Claros, half way to the besieged town. The enemy abandoned the siege: Schomberg at once disposed the Portuguese troops for battle. The encounter began early in the morning with a heavy charge by the Spanish cavalry, broken by the Portuguese artillery but soon repeated. By three in the afternoon Caracena had exhausted his offensive and the Portuguese maintained their positions. A well-judged cavalry attack completed the victory of Montes Claros on June 17, 1665. The Spanish losses were put at four thousand dead, six thousand

prisoners and three thousand five hundred horses captured. Although Castilian recognition of Portuguese independence was not obtained until the treaty of 1668, the last large-scale exertion of Philip IV was countered by the battle of Montes Claros and the following two and a half years saw a return to the minor skirmishes of previous years.

vii. MARRIAGE AND DETHRONEMENT OF AFONSO VI, 1666–1668. Soon after Montes Claros, Charles II offered his mediation between Portugal and Spain, recommending Fanshawe, now ambassador in Madrid, to visit Lisbon in order to promote the peace. But France found the state of war between the two countries convenient and began to angle for the Franco-Portuguese league. French interference in Portuguese affairs was encouraged by the marriage of Afonso VI, negotiations for which began in 1665 and were concluded in the following year.

Since the conclusion of the Peace of the Pyrenees, France had continued to maintain secret relations with Portugal, although she had formally abandoned her in order to make peace with Spain. England's friendship for Portugal was largely commercial, France's was purely diplomatic. Louis XIV listened to Philip IV's suggestion to reconquer Portugal, which he might claim through his wife Maria Teresa, but he did not accept it because Philip would not put the promise of the succession on paper. Unable to obtain the throne for his descendants, Louis XIV began a movement of approximation to the Portuguese, rather than let his ally reconquer the country for himself. Thus the ground was prepared for French marriages for Afonso VI and D. Pedro.

Already in 1662 Turenne had suggested a marriage with Mlle de Montpensier, and later a daughter of the Duke of Orleans was proposed as an alternative; but the capture of Évora by John of Austria, which seemed to threaten the very existence of Portugal, made the French hesitate until the battle of Ameixial improved Portugal's position. Sande, who had negotiated the marriage of Catherine of Bragança, travelled to France in disguise late in 1663 and attempted to arrange a match with a daughter of the Duke of Nemours: after a year, in view of the difficulties encountered, the subject of negotiations became a younger sister, Mlle d'Aumale, Marie-Françoise-Isabelle of Savoy, then nineteen years of age, ambitious and wilful. When the contract was signed in Paris in February 1666, she was said to have been fully aware of the bridegroom's limitations, but in going to Portugal she had the express intention of wielding power. Married by proxy at La Rochelle, the new queen reached Portugal on August 2, 1666. Afonso met her in the Tagus and escorted her in procession to church, after which celebrations were held in the palace. The king, it was said, found the ceremony boring

and left Maria Francisca to preside over the official gaieties whilst he dined heavily in his apartments.

The queen from the first interested herself in the conduct of affairs. On her own request she gained admission to the meetings of the council of state. Her confessor, a French Jesuit, Father Verjus, ably directed her activities, acting as an agent for Louis XIV and intervening in Portuguese politics. Schomberg soon made contact with the new party, and at length obtained for himself the supreme command of the army. The Marquis of Saint-Romain, sent as an agent of Louis XIV to dissuade the Portuguese from concluding peace with Spain, declared that by November 1666 Maria Francisca had gained great influence over the king and persuaded Castelo Melhor to do nothing without consulting her, but it did not take long for her to find that Castelo Melhor was the chief obstacle to her ambitions.

Almost as soon as she arrived D. Pedro was captivated by her. Although Castelo Melhor wanted to marry the king's brother to a niece of Marshal Turenne's, Pedro flatly refused. The situation was difficult, since Turenne had proved a good friend to Portugal, but Castelo Melhor met with a stubborn resistance from Pedro, whose adviser brought the answer that the king could have his head cut off, but not force him to marry. The prince asked permission to retire from the court, but when it was conceded he lingered until he was sent by order of the king to his country estate at Queluz. When, shortly after, the queen fell ill, it was observed that he came into Lisbon almost daily to visit her. Pedro well knew that his brother's government was identified with the person of Castelo Melhor, and began to do his best to disparage him, using the incidents and bickerings of court life for his purpose.

The minister had plenty of enemies—Marialva, Ericeira, Cadaval, São Lourenço and others, so that D. Pedro had no difficulty in forming a party. According to the British ambassador, Southwell, when Maria Francisca arrived in Portugal she found the king little better than a slave to Castelo Melhor, but on learning that they intended to exclude her from the government she resolved to thwart them; she carried on a secret correspondence with D. Pedro, which at first had as its only object the fall of Castelo Melhor, but later took on a more personal character. Her chief agents and advisers were Verjus and Saint-Romain. A cabal composed of such active spirits would be sufficient to upset all the states in the world, it was said.

By turning incidents to advantage Maria Francisca gradually isolated Castelo Melhor and her husband. She advertised the king's lack of affection and the minister's ill-treatment of her. On one occasion a woman who used to go to the palace to amuse the king appeared at one of the windows to watch a bull-fight in the Terreiro do Paço, and the queen was at once taken ill and had the entertainment stopped, adroitly turning the annoyance of those who had missed their sport on to Afonso and Castelo Melhor. The secretary of state, now Sousa de Macedo, also incurred her displeasure. Having forced him into a false position over a question of precedence, she summoned him for a dressing-down, and when he attempted to kiss the hem of her dress in abasement, she pretended to be outraged at his presumption and demanded that Afonso should punish him. An attempt to murder Castelo Melhor was attributed to the inspiration of D. Pedro: this having failed, D. Pedro reversed the plot and accused Castelo Melhor of attempting to poison him. Since the council of state refused to take cognizance of the matter, the Infante was able to construe this as a tacit confession of guilt. Such was his activity in conspiring that Castelo Melhor feared a palace revolution such as he had himself brought about five or six years before, and doubled the guards. His enemy at once took offence and protested that the palace was armed against him, that Castelo Melhor wanted to show that Afonso could not rule without him, that he and the whole nobility had been offended, that he would leave the court. Finally Afonso began to give way: on September 9, 1667, he asked Castelo Melhor to leave the capital. Two days later the minister withdrew and found his way to the monastery at Buçaco. Here a troop of cavalry appeared with orders to arrest him, and would have set fire to the building, where he was hiding under an altar, but for the pleas of the monks. Some time later he escaped to England, where he became the counsellor of Queen Catherine. Sousa de Macedo and his other colleagues were promptly dismissed.

At once the partisans of the queen and her brother-in-law took over the government: the numerous group of nobles who made up their party was well received in the streets, when they accompanied D. Pedro in a band to the palace. The municipality of Lisbon asked for cortes, with the object of transferring authority to him; when, a fortnight later, Afonso had taken no step, they boldly demanded the convocation in a week's time, for November 18, 1667, under threat of refusing the wartax. Once the king agreed to the convocation of cortes on January 1, everything moved rapidly towards his ruin: guided by their French advisers Verjus and Saint-Romain, the future king and queen had carefully planned their campaign. First there came a rumour that Maria Francisca would ask for the annulment of her marriage and return to France: then on November 21 she with her household left the palace for the Esperança Convent. In a farewell letter to Afonso, she declared her regrets that, after sacrificing family, home and property to come to

Portugal, she had not been able to fill her part to his satisfaction, and accordingly asked permission to return to France, together with the return of her dowry. When Afonso learnt what had happened, he dashed to the convent and ordered the gates to be opened. The abbess coolly replied that the queen had the keys. At this moment, D. Pedro appeared with his followers, and having blandly urged his brother not to profane the cloister, suggested that the provincial of the Franciscans be called who still failed to get the gates opened. After this comedy, Afonso returned to the palace and gave way to a fit of depression. His brother offered to go to reason with the runaway queen. Afonso consented, and Pedro, entering without difficulty, spent the afternoon alone with Maria Francisca. On his return he declared that he had found no opportunity to suggest that she should return to the palace, since so much of the visit had been taken up with her complaints. However he offered to resume the conversation on the following day, but Afonso begged him to desist, and let the queen do as she liked.

The day after her flight, Maria Francisca lodged a suit for the annulment of her marriage, directing it to the chapter of the See of Lisbon, since the archbishopric, like almost all the Portuguese sees, was vacant. Next day, one of the queen's circle, the Marquis of Cascais, came to the king to hold a singular conversation, recorded by the anonymous author of Monstruosidades do Tempo e da Fortuna: after waking Afonso up in the morning, he offered to tell him a great truth, and showing him a knife, said that 'if he had to give him it after, he had better give him it then'. Reminding the king that he had been born a fool and that he could have no succession, so that the cortes would surely deprive him of the kingdom in favour of his brother, he suggested, as an old friend, that it would be best to do willingly what he otherwise must—give over the government to his brother, who would marry and have succession, and so stay just as he was under Castelo Melhor. Afonso agreed. His brother came in with members of the state council. An instrument was drawn up by which Afonso made over the crown to Pedro and his descendants, keeping an annual revenue of 100,000 cruzados and the estates of the duchy of Bragança. Afonso signed, and was at once a prisoner. Surrounded by his brother's men and deprived of his own service, he thought of making his escape to the Alentejo in the hope that the army would obey him, but the nobleman to whom he entrusted the secret and a sum of money at once betrayed him to D. Pedro.

Meanwhile the suit of nullity was being carefully prepared. No detail, however revolting, was neglected to make the case against Afonso as complete as possible. Some days after the marriage Maria Francisca had declared to Verjus with all maiden modesty that she thought

'Portugal would never have succession from the present king'. She now took a Bible oath that the marriage had never been consummated and that she had not in any way been responsible. Professional evidence supported her assertion of Afonso's incapacity, with a profusion of intimate, though not entirely conclusive, details. Unfortunately for his own case, Afonso at once acceded to the request of the vicar-general of the archdiocese of Lisbon that he should swear on the Gospels that he had done his best to consummate the marriage. Maria Francisca took a complementary oath on the same day. No oral examination was made of either spouse, as canon law demanded, and the marriage was officially annulled the day after the two royal depositions had been taken. Four days later, by proxy, Prince Pedro, represented by the Marquis of Marialva, married Princess Maria Francisca of Savoy, represented by the Duke of Cadaval.

Afonso himself probably did not understand the significance of his own evidence. When the following August he protested to the pope, he affirmed that he had never been examined nor allowed to present an advocate. The witnesses had been bullied or cajoled, and those whose evidence was incompatible with the required result went unheard: the judges received promises of bishoprics. In the same letter Afonso adverted to the indecent haste of the wedding: he asserted that papal dispensation for the marriage of his brother and sister-in-law had been falsely declared to have arrived. In fact the union was canonically legalized by a very doubtful document, a brief signed by Cardinal Louis de Vendôme, a member of Maria Francisca's family, and dated Paris, March 15, 1668. In view of the lack of contact between Portugal and Rome, the cardinal had taken it upon himself to issue the certificate. which, though dated nine days before the day the sentence was pronounced, treated the suit of nullity as already settled. The brief had reached Lisbon on March 27 by the safe hand of Father Verjus.

Already in January cortes had met in Lisbon to declare D. Pedro prince and heir to the throne. At the same time they requested him not to let Maria Francisca leave Portugal, but to marry her himself, 'both for the great love these realms bear to her great virtues and for the necessity of succession'. Undoubtedly official support for the match was stimulated by Maria Francisca's demand for her dowry, which would have to be refunded if she left the country. Various suggestions were made by the three estates. Whilst Afonso's deposition was confirmed on the grounds of his inadequacy to govern, his incapacity to procreate and abuses and wrongs perpetuated during his reign, each of the classes made a different recommendation with regard to D. Pedro's position: the representatives of the people wanted him to take the throne at once, the clergy suggested

he should be entitled Prince Governor, the nobles would have put the matter in the hands of a committee of lawyers and theologians. D. Pedro settled the matter by taking the title of Prince Regent, professing to be no usurper, but simply the saviour of his country.

Afonso was at first confined to rooms in the palace in Lisbon; but after a while he became an unwelcome guest, and having expressed a desire to see the open fields of Vila Viçosa, he was despatched to the healthy castle of Angra in the Azores, where he landed in June 1669, by night lest the interest of the inhabitants of the island should be aroused. For five years he dwelt in a gallery and three rooms in the governor's house, rising late, and, according to the castle chaplain, spending the rest of his time in making the situation of his attendants well-nigh as intolerable as his own. Eventually in 1673 a plot was discovered in Lisbon; the Spanish ambassador and certain nobles serving his ends planned to bring Afonso to Spain, where he might marry the queen-mother and be replaced on his throne. Although the participants were promptly executed, Pedro judged it safer to have his brother at hand. In August 1674 Afonso embarked. In a fit of rage on the voyage he attempted to murder the governor of Angra, and was shut in his cabin. Arriving in Lisbon, he was met by Cadaval, who persuaded him to disembark quietly by saying that the ship was sinking: put into a litter, he was conveyed straight to the palace at Sintra. Here he passed the last nine years of his life, still closely confined in a small apartment from which he only emerged to hear mass through a hole in the chapel wall. One morning in September 1683 he woke up screaming and demanded mass to be celebrated. From the chapel he was carried to bed and ended his most miserable existence the same day. Just over three months later died his brother's wife, Maria Francisca of Savoy.

viii. PEACE WITH SPAIN AND RECOGNITION OF PORTUGUESE INDEPENDENCE, 1668. As early as 1662 preliminary negotiations between Spain and Portugal had taken place on the northern border, where the Portuguese general had met the commander of the Spanish cavalry, also a Portuguese by birth, and discussed conditions on which representatives of the two countries might meet. Both parties agreed to a truce and to the mediation of Charles II, and in November 1662 a great step forward was made by the Spaniards' agreement to treat as equals, thus recognizing the existence of a King of Portugal. The reason for this concession was the precarious condition of Spain herself: Philip IV was a sick man and the queen feared lest, on his death, his bastard son John of Austria should attempt to seize the regency from his position as commander of the army. The prospect of an immediate peace vanished with the Spanish capture of Évora; but in 1664 Sir Richard Fanshawe, who represented

England in Lisbon, was moved to Madrid, through the influence of Castelo Melhor, in order to obtain a truce. After the death of Philip IV in September 1665, Fanshawe's mission began to bear fruit and he was able to bring to Lisbon a draft agreement between Portugal and Spain providing for a long truce. By now, however, the victory of Montes Claros had inspired the Portuguese to accept nothing short of a treaty in which the title of King of Portugal should appear. Castelo Melhor affected indignation at the project Fanshawe brought and refused to let Afonso VI receive him: the Portuguese demands were elaborated in a draft treaty which Fanshawe with his colleague at Lisbon, Sir Robert Southwell, took to Madrid.

Castelo Melhor had pitched his demands high; 'a very strange method of negotiating and one only suited to the Roman Republic at the height of its power', wrote Louis XIV. He had already decided that if he could not obtain a peace-treaty, or a well-guaranteed peace on his own terms, he would fall back on the French league. Louis XIV's envoy Saint-Romain had arrived in Lisbon at the beginning of 1666, prepared to point out all the disadvantages of peace with Spain, and using every specious argument to conceal the fact that Louis XIV wanted the state of war between Spain and Portugal to be prolonged until he should again come into conflict with Spain. In August 1666 Louis XIV's hand was strengthened by the arrival of Maria Francisca and her retinue in Lisbon. Castelo Melhor discussed the possibility of a league with Saint-Romain, again making considerable demands for French help: the need for money impelled him to take this step, since Portugal was already in debt to England and could hardly hope to raise more money in any other quarter.

The league with France, constantly sought for since 1640, was eventually signed in March 1667. By it Louis XIV agreed to declare war on Spain when England should make peace with her, or at least within thirty months, or alternatively to pay Portugal 900,000 cruzados for the war. Portugal in return agreed to use all her forces to fight the Spaniards, receiving an annual subsidy of 600,000 cruzados to pay for French troops until France herself should be at war with Spain and 300,000 more for other purposes. The whole treaty was to last for ten years, during which time neither party should make peace without the other. While this treaty appeared to be a great victory for French influence, especially in view of the consolidation of French power round Maria Francisca, it produced the contrary effect of stimulating England and Spain to bring it to nothing. Spain now made up her mind to recognize Afonso's title, while England agreed to raise no difficulties about the immediate signing of the treaty, rendered necessary by Portugal's financial position,

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provided that she did not bind her hands not to make peace with Spain in the future.

Castelo Melhor, though he had helped to formulate the terms of 1666, upon which the final treaty with Spain was based, was not to see the conclusion of his work. The revolution that overthrew him occurred in September 1667—a French retort to the announcement made by the Queen-Mother of Spain in August that Spain was prepared to make peace and acknowledge Afonso VI as king: on September 9, the very day of Castelo Melhor's fall, Sandwich put forward the terms that the Portuguese minister had demanded—recognition of the Portuguese monarchy, liberation of prisoners, retention by Portugal of her conquests from the Spaniards and restitution of property confiscated from Portuguese. In view of Louis XIV's attack on the Spanish Netherlands, Spain was now willing to pay this price to break the Franco-Portuguese league. In Lisbon Southwell took immediate action. The Judge of the People was informed of the possibility of peace, and the populace embraced the opportunity with joy. The general demand for the conclusion of the treaty forced D. Pedro's hand: newly established in power, the regent had the choice of incurring popular displeasure or of sealing his position with an action for which he would find general support. In December he made up his mind: one Carpio, a son of Olivares and a prisoner in Lisbon, was empowered to represent Spain. On February 13, 1668, the peace was signed—all prisoners would be freed, commercial relations restored as in the time of King Sebastian, reparations paid for damage to the property of individuals, and all conquests restored, except Ceuta, which would remain in Spanish hands. The only dissentient voices were those of Saint-Romain and Schomberg.

CHAPTER XX

THE PORTUGUESE AND SPANISH SUCCESSIONS

i. PEDRO II; DIPLOMATIC INFLUENCES; THE PORTUGUESE SUCCESSION, 1669–1699. The treaty between Portugal and Spain cut across the recent Franco-Portuguese approximation, but Louis XIV, faced with the almost simultaneous formation of the Triple Alliance between England, Holland and Sweden, preferred to continue a policy of attraction towards Portugal, availing himself of her bad relations with Holland to make a league against that country, which he had selected as his principal enemy. In March 1669 Colbert drew up a scheme by which the French might join Portugal in depriving the Dutch of their Eastern trade. Since the treaty of 1661, Portugal owed Holland a considerable sum as indemnity for the loss of Brazil: in spite of a new treaty reached in 1669 the debt continued to be a stumbling-block, and Portugal listened with ready ears to the French scheme, which would rid her of the indemnity and recover some of her oriental possessions.

In April 1672 Louis XIV despatched an ambassador to Lisbon to unfold the anti-Dutch project. If the Spaniards should join the Netherlands, France would defend Portugal with a force of 1,000 horse and 4,000 foot maintained at her own expense. Here was the rub. Enmity with Holland might be profitable, but a new rupture with Spain would prove unpopular and perilous: only a small section of the nobility hoped to profit by it as intriguers or generals. Most Portuguese re-echoed the sentiments of the Marquis of Cascais when he declared that the security of the monarchy and the prosperity of its subjects demanded peace. It appeared to many that whilst a war with Holland would be a just war, one with Spain would not. Consequently two incidents, one in Madrid, one in Lisbon, which the French hoped would lead to war, were amicably settled: in Madrid the Portuguese ambassador was insulted and withdrew from the capital until such time as the culprits should be punished—in Lisbon, the Spanish ambassador was accused of complicity in the plot to restore Afonso VI and recalled on the request of the Portuguese government—the latter plot was the sequel of a series of vain efforts to persuade Portugal to embark on a Spanish alliance against France and England.

Portuguese caution was amply warranted, for in 1673 Holland, Spain and Austria joined against France, whilst England drew away from

France and made peace with Holland in the following year. But France still sought to attract Portugal into a treaty. To attain this, one of Louis XIV's manœuvres was to lead D. Pedro to offer his mediation between Spain and himself, fully expecting that the offer would be rejected and that the Portuguese would take offence and could be adroitly induced to declare war on Spain as a result. So much subtlety overreached itself, however, for Spain eventually accepted Portuguese mediation.

European peace was settled at the congress of Nimegen in 1678 and 1679; but there was no peace for diplomacy, and now a new pawn appeared in Portugal. In January 1669 a daughter had been born to the Prince-Regent and Maria Francisca of Savoy, receiving the names Isabel Luisa Josefa. At the age of five her right to succeed to the throne was confirmed by a convocation of cortes, so that as soon as the princess had passed the perils of infancy, the question of whom she should marry arose. A Spanish suggestion was Carlos II, but the idea of a new union of the two crowns repelled the Portuguese. France devised a less violent solution intended as a vehicle for moulding the Peninsula into a pro-French block: Isabel Luisa Josefa would marry Victor-Amédée II of Savoy, and Carlos II one of his nieces of Orleans. The latter match came about in 1679. In the following December D. Pedro assembled cortes once more to obtain permission for his daughter to marry Victor-Amédée.

The procedure obeyed the stipulations of the so-called cortes of Lamego. In 1632 these 'fundamental laws of the kingdom' were published as a sort of constitution of Afonso Henriques, ascribed to an assembly of cortes held at Lamego in 1139. The immediate purpose of the publication was to illegalize the Spanish claim to the Portuguese throne, for among the alleged dispositions was one that deprived a princess who married a foreigner of all right to succeed. Conscious or unconscious of the spuriousness of these laws, the Portuguese had clung to them since 1640 as a proof of John IV's right, transferring the stigma of illegality from the Portuguese restoration to the Spanish invasion. Thus the cortes of 1679 met expressly to put aside the clause concerning foreign marriages, and seeing that no suitable bridegroom could be found in Portugal, approved of the match with Savoy.

Negotiations progressed so far in Lisbon that in May 1682 the Duke of Cadaval sailed with a fleet of twelve vessels to bring back the bridegroom. For some months the vessels waited in the port of Villefranche for him to come aboard. After various excuses, he eventually declared that reasons of state prevented his leaving his people, and withdrew from the whole affair. The fiasco outraged Portuguese susceptibilities, and

French diplomacy received a check which was aggravated the following year by the death of Maria Francisca of Savoy, hitherto its most effective instrument.

A little before, on September 12, 1683, Afonso VI had died, so that the Prince-Regent could ascend the throne as Pedro II, his usurpation being legitimized by time. With the eclipse of French influence close relations with Spain were possible. In 1687 Pedro contracted a second marriage, with Maria Sophia Elizabeth of Neuberg, a daughter of the Elector-Palatine, Philip William of Neuberg. A year later an heir was born, who however lived less than a month. For a moment Pedro contemplated marrying his daughter to the King of Spain, but the majority of his council vehemently opposed the idea or advised delay; however, in October 1689, an heir was born and survived, and though Maria Francisca's daughter died in the following year, the royal line was strengthened by the birth of three more sons and a daughter before the death of the queen in 1699.

ii. ECONOMIC SITUATION SINCE THE RESTORATION. The restoration found Portuguese commerce completely dislocated: the policy of paralysis imposed by Spain had diverted the swarm of northern merchants from the great exchange of Lisbon to the various sources upon which it had drawn, so that not only had the restoration to resurrect Lisbon, but also to attempt to recover the colonial trade of three continents.

In January 1641 the ports of Portugal were opened to all comers. Persons of any nation could freely bring merchandise and take away the proceeds of their trading, all legislation to the contrary notwithstanding. This measure, though calculated to gain the goodwill of the commercial powers, exposed Portugal to a commercial inferiority which could only be combated by a well-fortified indigenous mercantile organization. For the moment this was lacking. The only capitalists who could compete with foreigners were the New Christians: already in 1643 Fr. António Vieira addressed a memorial to the king, pointing out the folly of persecuting 'those of the Nation', since Portugal desperately needed wealth, and this could best be obtained by commerce, the ablest exponents of which were precisely the New Christians. Two years before, Spain had adopted a similar policy of leniency for economic reasons. But it was not until February 1649 that an order was made by which John IV disclaimed the goods of New Christians confiscated by the Inquisition, provided that they were pooled to serve as capital for a Brazil Company, to be organized on the Dutch or Spanish model. The statutes of the new company, published the following March, showed that the enterprise was intended to undertake the defence of Brazil from the Dutch and was bound to provide two fleets, each consisting of eighteen vessels of twenty

to thirty guns, fully manned and equipped: one of these fleets reached Brazil in 1653 and contributed to the recapture of Pernambuco. The company enjoyed considerable privileges, both commercial, such as the monopoly of Brazil-wood and of various imports, and judicial—the possession of its own Judge Conservator. It was accorded facilities for obtaining ships and beasts of burden in Portugal. Some difficulty was encountered in raising the requisite capital; the powerful New Christian families of Carvalho, Botelho, Serrão and Silveira could not provide the full amount and had to enrol others whose racial origin had almost been forgotten. Moreover Brazilian sugar could find no adequate market in Portugal, and merely served to depress the sugar production of the Atlantic islands. In 1658 the company's monopolies were suppressed: six years later it was absorbed into the state, its shareholders receiving a dividend of 5 per cent out of the revenue of the tobacco monopoly.

But the root of economic decline lay within the bounds of Portugal herself. The ascendancy of English commerce dates, not from the Methuen treaty, but from that of 1654, which placed British merchants in an excessively favoured position, allowing them to form a nation within a nation, beyond the laws of England and outside the laws of Portugal. Even graver was the agricultural situation. Sheer lack of man-power was felt all the more keenly on account of the protracted war. The cortes of 1641 proposed the enforcement of legislation of the time of D. Denis, depriving those who did not cultivate land of its possession. For a time grain was imported duty-free, then again after the peace with Spain urgent demands were voiced for the compulsion of labourers in order to make up the deficient supply of wheat.

In 1675 D. Luis de Meneses, Count of Ericeira, was appointed Vèdor da Fazenda, and he introduced protectionist legislation modelled on that of Colbert, and derived apparently through a thesis of the Portuguese minister in Paris, Duarte Ribeiro de Macedo, who strongly urged the need of official support for Portuguese industries. The cortes of 1668 had registered protests against excessive luxury. Hitherto the only remedy applied had been sumptuary laws of one sort or another, but from the time of Ericeira, sumptuary legislation, pragmáticas, contained constructive dispositions. Thus whilst laws of 1677, 1686 and 1698 restricted luxury in clothes, jewellery, coaches, animals, lackeys and mourning, the first of these also ordered that only Portuguese-made cloth, ribbons, lace and hats should be worn. The measure must have been of limited effectiveness; large supplies of cloth, baize and silk stockings—over 80,000 pairs a year—were imported from England, and other articles of apparel entered from France and elsewhere. The pragmatic of 1686 repeated the ban on the import of woollens of various

categories, to be fully enforced within two years; this was later extended to druggets and cheaper woollens. The report that Brazilian hides found no better use than as wrappings for tobacco caused another pragmatic to be issued in favour of Portuguese and colonial leather. Various efforts were made to promote the manufacture of silk—restriction on the price of mulberry leaves in 1676; orders in 1677 to plant mulberries wherever possible in the district of Lisbon; similar orders delivered to all magistrates, who were forbidden to hold office until they had taken the measures prescribed, in 1678; and the publication of Bluteau's work on the rearing of silkworms in 1679. Ignorance and idleness were formidable obstacles; and numerous interests prevented the free exercise of the sumptuary measures. But gradually Ericeira's policy made itself felt. A considerable number of Sevillian weavers emigrated to Portugal in 1679, and in 1690 an effort was made to raise the standard of work by a Regulation for the Cloth Industry, drawn up to advertise the best methods and processes. Nevertheless in 1692 it was recognized that in high-grade work the Portuguese factories could not yet compete with foreigners, and the ban on the import of black cloth, fine hats, porcelain and glassware was lifted. On the other hand D. Luis da Cunha could boast a little later that he had travelled to France and England dressed in Portuguese cloth made at Covilhã and Fundão.

The Portuguese salt-trade was perhaps the oldest national industry and had long been a standard export. The threat of competition from the rias of Galicia was met in 1695 by an order forbidding the emigration of Portuguese salt-workers under pain of death, extensive also to those who did not return to the country within six months. A year later foreigners were forbidden to enter the country for the purpose of learning the secrets of the salt-industry. The severity of the penalties applied in economic cases foreshadows the regime of Pombal, though the repetition of the previous sumptuary legislation in 1698, in which a standard male dress was recommended, shows that continual evasions and infringements had robbed the law of its force. With Ericeira's death in 1690 his schemes ceased to be developed.

iii. John Methuen's treaty of commerce, december 1703. In May 1702 John Methuen was sent as envoy extraordinary to Lisbon to negotiate the adherence of Portugal to the Grand Alliance, and a year later the requisite treaties were signed. In December 1703 the envoy extraordinary concluded, without express authority, the more famous commercial treaty that bears his name. It consisted of only three—or two effective—articles: one of these admitted English cloths into Portugal according to the custom until the late prohibition: the other admitted-Portuguese wines into Great Britain at a third less duty than

that payable on French wines, forever, whether England and France should be at peace or at war. If the latter clause should at any time be infringed, the Portuguese might rightfully prohibit the import of English cloth.

The treaty came at a singularly apposite moment. The traditional trade with Portuguese Brazil was in tobacco and sugar, but the former had gradually been replaced by Virginian tobacco, and the British sugar colonies, assisted by the navigation laws, had almost eliminated the imports of sugar from Brazil. Since 1688, however, England had been at war with France, and Portuguese wines entering Britain had paid only half the duties applied to French, an advantage which was likely to vanish as soon as peace was concluded. On the other hand the British woollen industry, after a period of great expansion at the end of the seventeenth century, was faced with an acute crisis due to the restriction of markets in 1701 and 1702. In Portugal, Ericeira recognized in his last measure, the Regulation of the Cloth Industry, of January 1690, the inadequacy of his protective legislation, for the quality of Portuguese cloth had remained on the whole poor. His death in March 1690 was followed by a relaxation of his principles, and the Methuen treaty finally sacrificed the incipient Portuguese cloth industry in order to retain the profitable wine trade. Whether in fact English cloths had been greatly affected by the pragmatics is difficult to say. The British merchants grumbled doubtless, and John Methuen sought to have the restrictive measures set aside: none the less an Englishman writing an account of D. Pedro's court in 1700 could still declare that the English dressed the Portuguese with their woollens. It would seem therefore that the Methuen treaty gave stimulus to an existing tendency. John Methuen could hardly have known that the riches of Brazil would so develop in the eighteenth century as to permit the great expansion of trade which in fact followed.

The Methuen treaty doubtless owes some of its fame to its inclusion, with a commentary, in Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. It has been pointed out that it was not a comprehensive treaty like that of 1654, 'but rather two supplementary clauses added on to that great treaty', and the complaints of merchants against Pombal's measures in defence of Portuguese industry were certainly based on the Commonwealth treaty with 'hardly any references to the treaty of 1703':¹ nevertheless John Methuen had good reason to be proud of his work. That the 'Methuen treaty was not comprehensive, but of a limited and fairer nature, cannot be regarded as a disadvantage from the Portuguese point

¹ Chapters on Anglo-Portuguese Relations, ed. Prestage: Sir R. Lodge, 'The Treaties of 1709'.

of view; nor does the fact that complaints were made largely against the earlier treaty tell in its disfavour. On the contrary 'the privileges gained so obstreperously by the triple treaties of 1642–1661 were of advantage only in case the Englishman could find a profitable interest in the Portuguese trade. These privileges could not create commerce: their purpose was to give England a commanding advantage in case such a trade existed.'1

It has been suggested that the Methuen treaty was an inducement for Portugal to enter the war of the Spanish succession. Sir Richard Lodge rightly says, after pointing out the error of regarding the treaty as a mere bribe: 'The simple facts of chronology are fatal to this contention. Portugal joined the Grand Alliance on 16th May; the commercial treaty was not signed until 27th December. The late treaty was the result of, not the motive for, its predecessor. Methuen's despatches make it clear that the initiative in concluding the mercantile agreement was taken by Portugal. But he was right in assuming that it would be cordially welcomed in England.' The treaty found general favour in both countries. The steady expansion of imports into Portugal during the early years of the eighteenth century, principally due to the stream of gold from Brazil, which multiplied Portuguese buying-power, was of special benefit to the English merchants because of the Methuen treaty. When once the English people had accustomed themselves to the sweetish taste of port, many slopes of the Douro valley that had hitherto borne only brushwood came to yield wealth and build up the prosperity of Oporto.

The attachment of English commercial interests to the 'Portugal trade' was amply shown in 1713 when the Anglo-French commercial treaty, agreed at Utrecht, which gave the French most-favoured-nation treatment in England, was rejected in the House of Commons, and the victory of the 'Portugal trade', the 'very best branch' of England's European commerce, was popularly celebrated with bonfires and illuminations. After the middle of the eighteenth century Pombal's attempt to break the British hegemony in Portuguese trade by introducing restrictive legislation lessened the popularity of the treaty. When in 1786 a new French treaty came up, Fox's efforts to make a campaign like that of 1713 failed, and the French treaty was passed. However, the French revolution was soon to cancel the effect of this measure.

iv. Portugal in the war of the spanish succession. For over thirty years Europe waited for the sickly Carlos II of Spain to die, in order to begin the battle for his inheritance. Neither of his marriages with Marie Louise of Orleans and Maria Ana of Neuberg brought issue; and those of his sisters and aunts who married into the French and

¹ A. K. Manchester, British Pre-emmence in Brazil, p. 23.

Bavarian lines had generally renounced their claims to the Spanish throne. The partition treaty agreed to in 1698 produced a storm of indignation in Spain, and Carlos at once bequeathed his kingdoms to the Prince of Bavaria, whose death within three months led to a new partition treaty, dated March 25, 1700 and sponsored by France, England and Holland. By general agreement France sought the adhesion of Portugal to the project, taking advantage of the good feeling generated by a Franco-Portuguese treaty of March 4, which settled difficulties caused by the incursion of the governor of French Cayenne into northern Brazil.

Pedro II, as one of the remoter claimants to the Spanish throne, asked for the towns of Badajoz and Alcántara as the price of his adhesion to the proposed partition: furthermore in the event of the Archduke Charles refusing its terms he wanted one of his own sons to be advanced as pretender. The conditions were voiced in London and in Paris: William III rejected them, but Louis XIV invited Pedro to put forward a draft of his requirements. Although these met with a flattering reception, Portugal eventually in October 1700 adhered to the original project. Less than a fortnight before, Carlos II had signed his last will in favour of a French succession, provided that the union of the two crowns should not occur. In doing so he hoped to enlist the interests of France in preserving the unity of the widespread Spanish possessions; the idea of partition revolted Spanish patriotism and pride. On November 1 he died.

Louis XIV lost no time in changing his policy. The prospect of obtaining the whole inheritance for his grandson made him drop the partition agreements at once, and the Duke of Anjou was crowned Philip V of Spain within a few weeks. At once France attempted to attract Portugal away from England and Holland so as to form a Franco-Peninsular block. Various considerations affected the Portuguese attitude. The ambassadors in Paris and the Hague depicted France as much weakened, so that in the event of incurring difficulties with England and Holland she would be unable to detach a fleet to defend the Portuguese empire. On the other hand it was not at first apparent that England and Holland would go to war: English Tories and Dutch Republicans did not find a separate French monarchy in Spain very objectionable, in spite of William III's personal feelings: in April 1701 England recognized Philip V. Meanwhile the latter king had resolved upon the reconquest of Portugal. Not unnaturally Pedro II accepted the offer of a treaty with Louis XIV, who only with difficulty persuaded the Spanish government to assent to a guarantee of Portuguese independence. On June 18, 1701, however, Portugal signed alliances for twenty years with France and with Spain, acknowledged the succession of Philip V, and promised to close her ports to any power that should move war against France or

Spain. In return the French promised military and naval assistance in case of war, and undertook to support Portugal in obtaining relief from debts to England and Holland and in recovering some of her Indian settlements. The debts referred to were the damages claimed for the depredations of Princes Rupert and Maurice, and the indemnity promised in the Luso-Dutch treaty. Eight French ships reached Lisbon in July 1701.

But three months later, on September 7, the threatening behaviour of Louis XIV drove England, Holland and the emperor into the Grand Alliance, intended to remove the Bourbons from the Low Countries and from Italy, where they threatened the security of commerce. In case of war, Portugal would at once become important to the allies as possessing the only suitable harbours to give support to a sea-campaign in the Mediterranean. It therefore became imperative to detach her from the Franco-Spanish alliance. The provocative conduct of Louis XIV in recognizing James III as King of England had already made the Portuguese government consider where the alliance was likely to lead and to attempt to maintain neutrality. Two avenues of withdrawal from the threat of war were explored: the first that of asking the allies to declare war on some grounds that should not involve Portugal, and the second, suggested by the able ambassador in London, D. Luis da Cunha, that of asking France for military help on such a scale that France could not comply and would thus infringe the treaty herself. In fact Portugal was unprepared for war, and her ports ill-defended. In November 1701 an attractive offer came through her ambassador at the Hague. Holland would be ready to forego a large part of her claim—a million cruzados and England, it was said, would send a hundred ships and ten thousand men to Portugal. Accordingly, the following February, the Portuguese diplomats in England and Holland were instructed to broach the question of the form of the declaration of war-if it were based on Louis XIV's recognition of James III. Portugal might be excluded. The Portuguese minister in Paris at the same time pressed for the immediate despatch of twenty ships and three thousand men to Lisbon, and of twenty more ships to Brazil and India, alleging that the opposing fleets were ready to sail; although this request was repeated, it obtained no response.

Thus Portugal's hands were somewhat freed when John Methuen arrived in Lisbon early in May 1702 as envoy extraordinary. His son Paul had succeeded him as minister in Lisbon, but for the present negotiations it was thought well to send out the more experienced father and give him powers assume the rank of ambassador at his discretion. England, Holland and Austria successively declared war on France and Spain in the first half of May: their action was based on the Spanish issue,

and thus directly affected Portugal. Methuen soon found that the Portuguese were willing to guarantee the security of the English and Dutch in the event of war, but that no further commitment would be taken until the result of the appeal to France were known. Appreciating that the essential point to the Portuguese was to discover where the greater strength lay, he returned to England on June 10 to hasten the despatch of the fleet that was destined to join the Dutch against Cadiz. Soon after his return to Portugal, this fleet appeared. In August the Franco-Spanish treaty was denounced, and it was possible to approach the question of Portugal's adherence to the Grand Alliance. On the one hand the arrival in Lisbon of the Count of Melgar, Admiral of Castile, with the intention of supporting the enemies of Philip V, braced the Portuguese: on the other the failure of Rooke before Cadiz caused them to doubt, until the victory at Vigo restored English prestige. Those who held that the signed treaty must be honoured, or that Portugal could not afford to enter the war, were soon outnumbered by those who feared any alliance with Spain for traditional and patriotic reasons. A little before, prints of Philip V captioned 'King of Spain and Portugal' had appeared in Paris, and though quickly seized they had not passed unnoticed.

Before committing herself to a treaty, Portugal made demands which fell under two headings, the guarantee of security whatever might come from the hostilities with Spain, and territorial advantages as the price of joining the alliance. To cover the first point Portugal could only feel safe if the Bourbons were expelled from Spain: no peace must therefore be concluded except on this condition; furthermore the Archduke Charles must come to lead his army as Carlos III of Spain, whilst his allies must guarantee Portugal assistance in case of attack. Pedro II's territorial demands for Badajoz and other towns in the Peninsula raised objections on the ground that the Archduke could not afford to take steps which would certainly offend his future subjects—the Philippines, the Canaries, parts of Estremadura, Sardinia, Oran were offered in turn. The Emperor Leopold showed no disposition to concede anything in Europe; the Portuguese wanted their admiral to command the allied fleets; the Dutch raised the question of the Portuguese debt of 1669. Losing patience with the resulting delays, John Methuen departed from Lisbon in April 1703. On May 16, agreement was eventually reached and two treaties were signed, a defensive alliance between Portugal and the English and Dutch, which was concluded without difficulty from any of the parties, and a treaty admitting Portugal to the Grand Alliance and committing the other members of the alliance to drive the Bourbons out of Spain. In the latter treaty naturally Austria also intervened. Of fundamental importance in the question of the Spanish succession, it committed the

allies to the imposition of the archduke on the Spanish throne, and formed the diplomatic basis for England's acquisition of Gibraltar. Portugal's main demands were incorporated in the treaty; the expulsion of the Bourbons, the appearance of Carlos III in person, the granting of military and naval assistance. Territorially, she would receive Badajoz, Alburquerque, Valencia and Alcántara in Estremadura; Tuy, La Guardia, Bayona and Vigo in Galicia; and the Sacramento colony north of the River Plate in South America. The armies that were to sustain the struggle would consist of 33,000 foot, made up of 10,000 veterans, 11,000 Portuguese maintained by the allies, and 12,000 Portuguese supported by their own government, and 7,000 cavalry, divided into the same three classes, which numbered respectively 2,000, 2,000 and 3,000. Two trains of artillery of ten pieces each, arms for 13,000 infantry and 4,000 hundredweight of powder a year would also be furnished. The subsidy payable to Portugal consisted of a million and a half cruzados for the first year and a million in succeeding years. Finally the Portuguese were conceded their demand to appoint the admiral, and agreed to pay 850,000 cruzados as their debt to Holland.

Only in December did Portugal and Spain break off diplomatic relations. On March 7, 1704, the Archduke Charles landed in Lisbon from the Anglo-Dutch fleet. He at once offered pardon to those of his subjects who abandoned his rival within a month, but proceeded to waste time until Philip V declared war and invaded Portugal on April 30. The Bourbon king himself accompanied the main army of the Duke of Berwick, entering Portugal north of the Tagus from Alcántara, whilst Francisco Ronquillo delivered an attack on Beira and the Prince of Tilly penetrated the Alentejo from Badajoz. The forces were large, and having seized Salvaterra do Extremo, advanced on Idanha-a-Nova, which fell after some resistance. On May 20 the invaders attacked Castelo Branco, which held out for four days. Meanwhile the allies, expecting that the Duke of Berwick would continue his attack down the north bank of the Tagus, collected reinforcements at Abrantes, whither the frontier forces retired. But on May 30 Berwick crossed the Tagus to join Tilly's army, and, clambering over the Serra de São Mamede, appeared before Portalegre, which surrendered on June 9. In spite of these successes the position of the invaders was not strong. The Portuguese general Marquis das Minas despatched a small force to carry out a diversion in Spanish territory, bringing an immediate reaction in the abandonment of Castelo Branco, Idanha and the other conquests north of the Tagus, except Monsanto, which was taken by surprise attack. At the end of July, the governor of Moura, D. Francisco de Melo, successfully launched a similar incursion with 4,000 men against the Spanish townlet of Puebla

de Guzmán. Meanwhile Minas had retired to Almeida, where Pedro II and the archduke joined him. These two had met at Santarém at the end of May, but lingered there until the beginning of August. Pedro travelled to Coimbra, where he tarried amidst academic and other festivities, and only reached Guarda on August 30. Here he was joined by Carlos III, who had been delayed by illness. At length on September 20 the two kings reached their armies at Almeida, the Dutch under Baron Fagel, the English under Galway and the Portuguese under the Marquis das Minas and the Counts of Alvôr and Atalaia. At a council of war, it was decided to attack Ciudad Rodrigo, but the crossing of the river Águeda proved impossible in view of enemy cannon-fire, and at a new council most of the generals voted against continuing the attack. The army therefore went into winter quarters, whilst Pedro returned to his capital, followed by Carlos III, who eventually left Lisbon at the end of June 1705 to take part in the war on the Catalan front.

The campaign of 1705 began with the concentration of troops at Arronches, between Portalegre and Elvas. Portuguese, English and Dutch troops under Galveias attacked Valencia de Alcántara and Alburquerque, which surrendered after short sieges, whilst Salvaterra was recovered. An attempt to reduce the strong town of Badajoz proved impracticable, and the season closed with some gains, appreciable but small in relation to the forces engaged. But the following campaigns of 1706 and 1707 compensated fully for any lack of incident in their predecessors. At the end of March 1706 the Marquis das Minas led a force of 5,000 horse and 15,000 foot against Alcántara, which he took from Berwick on April 16. From Alcántara he resolved to embark on a grandiose plan, nothing less than a march on Madrid. As Berwick retired before him, laying waste fields and villages, he advanced upon Coria. Plasencia and Almarez, whence he decided not to deliver an attack on Ciudad Rodrigo until he received news about the campaign in Catalonia, which would decide whether the march to Madrid were practicable or not. Although Berwick hovered behind them, the Portuguese forced the capitulation of the city on May 27. On June 6 Salamanca declared for Carlos III and received them with rejoicing, and a week later they returned to the advance on the capital. On June 20 Philip V left Madrid and five days later the Count of Vila Verde's cavalry entered the city, where Carlos III was acclaimed.

Philip V and Berwick held Guadalajara. The Marquis das Minas had expected to be able to attack them with the aid of the archduke's forces, but the position, though spectacular, proved insecure, and the council of war resolved that without Peterborough's forces, which were still in Valencia, it would be imprudent to attack. On August 14 the army

moved off to join Peterborough, and in October went into winter quarters.

When Pedro II died on December 9, 1706, an allied relief force was preparing in Lisbon, but this event caused the expedition to be moved to Alicante by sea. The campaign of 1707 began with futile attacks on small towns in Murcia; on April 17 Villena was sacked, though its castle held out. Meanwhile French and Spanish forces accumulated at Almansa, still under the command of Berwick. The Portuguese commander decided to give battle and on April 25 the allied forces faced the difficult ridge, which they prepared to storm in spite of their weaker numbers. A first attack, begun in the early afternoon by Portuguese cavalry and English infantry, forced back the enemy flank; both sides threw in heavy forces and at length Almansa was entered. In the course of the action, however, the allied flanks had become detached from the centre, which weakened and crumpled under a vigorous cavalry charge. The resulting confusion spread over the front and when the day ended the allied army had suffered a complete reverse. In one action the advantages of the past campaign were lost, and the shreds of the army joined the archduke's forces in Catalonia. The Count of Atalaia and Stanhope replaced the Marquis das Minas and Galway, who now retired to Lisbon.

After Almansa the Portuguese restricted their efforts to the region of the frontier. The intended relief force was now made the nucleus of an invasion to operate from Beira. Unfortunately, the exposed Alentejo frontier was sacrificed for the purpose, and the enemy, delivering an attack farther south, recovered Alcántara and seized Serpa and Moura, and held the line of the Guadiana. In the following year, 1708, this territory was wrested back. Only Noudar remained in Spanish hands till the end of the war.

Already in 1705 Louis XIV had approached Holland with peace proposals, but owing to Marlborough's influence these were frustrated. The events of the next two years told heavily against France—Ramillies, the recognition of the archduke in Flanders, the occupation of Madrid, the defeat at Turin, the evacuation of all northern Italy. Again peace was offered to Holland with Charles XII of Sweden as mediator. But the year 1707 showed an improvement in France's fortunes with Almansa, Villars' advance to Stuttgart, and the successful defence of Toulon. In 1708, when France suffered the loss of Lille, the Dutch were again sounded and their heavy demands agreed to as a basis for negotiations. The preliminaries of the Hague, put forward in May 1709, still insisted on the withdrawal of Philip V from Spain, and proposed that France should see that this was carried out. Louis XIV, in spite of France's exhaustion, again had recourse to war; Malplaquet was lost and won in September

1709, and negotiations began once more in March 1710. This time Louis conceded so much as to allow allied forces to cross French territory in their campaign against Philip V, and even to pay indemnities that would be used against his grandson. When the alliance rejected anything less than the concerted dethronement of Philip V, hostilities were renewed. Carlos III had some preliminary successes in 1710, including the battle of Saragossa, but when he entered Madrid on September 28 he was coldly received, and soon departed, to suffer defeats at Brihuega and Villaviciosa. On the French front Douai fell but Villars prevented the allies from advancing farther. In August 1710 the fall of the whig government translated the English desire for peace into action. When the archduke succeeded to the Empire on the death of his brother in April 1711, his former allies found that the balance of power would swing too far in his direction if they continued to support his candidature in Spain. October of the same year the preliminaries of London were considered: Louis XIV undertook that France and Spain should not be united, and the way was cleared for the congress of Utrecht.

The last three years had produced little change in the Portuguese situation. In 1709 Galway, now ambassador in Lisbon, was reported to be planning a new campaign, in spite of the lack of supplies, men and money. Whilst John V and his ministers opposed any such scheme, Galway declared that he had been ordered by Queen Anne to embark on a campaign in the Alentejo. Eventually in April Portuguese forces under the Marquis of Fronteira, with Galway's English and some Spaniards, left Elvas and faced the enemy forces of Badajoz. Fronteira was reluctant to give battle without royal consent, but the appearance of the enemy made the engagement inevitable. Galway advanced his cavalry, which was cut off, whilst the Portuguese infantry were beaten back by the enemy onslaught. The cannon were lost, and used by the Spaniards. Galway's infantry advanced and was also encircled, and Fronteira at length withdrew to Campo Maior. After this reverse no major operations were attempted. Miranda was lost by treachery and won back after a short siege in 1711, and Campo Maior resisted a siege of a month in 1712, but these operations merely beguiled the time until peace should come.

The first meeting of the representatives of the nations at Utrecht took place on January 29, 1712; the Count of Tarouca had been appointed to put forward the interests of Portugal. Naturally the solution that would have been most convenient to John V was the approval of Carlos III's claim to the Spanish throne, by which alone Portugal might compensate herself for the ravages of the war by the territorial advantages for which she had been induced to fight. But in the event, the expulsion of the

Bourbons from Spain had proved impossible, and of the allies Portugal was in the worst bargaining position. A little before the first session at Utrecht, D. Luis da Cunha had sounded the English Secretary of State about the possibility of the erection of a frontier province between Spain and Portugal, similar to the buffer-state with which Holland proposed to protect herself from France. Tarouca, made aware of the unlikelihood of any success, displayed reluctance in taking up the ungrateful task assigned him. He arrived at the congress on February 11, and on the same day put forward Portugal's requirements, hoping to avail himself of the fact that Portugal held several (but few) Spanish forts, whilst the Spaniards now held only Noudar from the Portuguese.

In April D. Luis da Cunha was sent from London to assist Tarouca, and the two for some time held a watching brief, whilst negotiations went on between England and France. All they could do for the moment was to express Portugal's now chimerical desire to see Carlos III on the throne of Spain. When they raised the question of a buffer-state, they were merely told by the Bishop of Bristol that the French thought it was a matter for the Spaniards, not for themselves. In consequence Portugal had to seek peace by herself and signed a four-months armistice in November 1712, which was continued for the same period from March 1, 1713. On April 11, a treaty was concluded between Portugal and France, ensuring perpetual peace, true friendship and entire forgetfulness of all hostilities. Certain territorial adjustments were agreed to in Brazil. There remained Spain. Even before the death of Louis XIV on September 1, 1715, Spain thawed towards Portugal; in February 1715 the peace which Portugal anxiously desired was signed, and its twentyfive articles ran roughly on the lines of the Luso-French treaty. Philip V agreed to pay certain debts owing to Portuguese concerned in the slavetrade. In return for the Spanish frontier towns she held, Portugal received possession of the Sacramento colony. This, in addition to the recognition of her rights between the Amazon and Japoc (Vicente Pinzón) rivers and over both banks of each, obtained in the French treaty, constituted all the gains that were obtained from the war. To a certain extent Portugal had relinquished her claims by the very tepid pursuit of hostilities since 1707, but she had recognized this by pitching her claims low.

CHAPTER XXI

THE GOLDEN AGE OF ABSOLUTISM

i. JOHN V, 1706-1750; EARLY YEARS. John was aged seventeen when he succeeded to the throne in December 1706. The aspects of his reign which have attracted most attention, his excessive piety and extravagance, have been made to suggest an almost barbaric figure indulging his appetites and superstitions with the boundless wealth he derived from beyond the Atlantic. Such a portrait of him is not a complete one. His interest in the development of instruction and art was what befitted an enlightened despot; a considerable part of the gold of Brazil served to make lasting memorials, not merely to glorify the passing hour. John himself learnt the three principal romance languages, made mathematics his hobby and, like his grandfather, delighted in music. His undeniable desire to instruct himself had been curbed by the manner of his upbringing: until the time of his accession he had been left almost entirely in female society, and had no opportunity to accustom himself to the functions of a governing monarch. He aspired to play the part of a Louis XIV, but lacked the equipment and training to do so.

At first John left the government to ministers of experience: his youth, combined with a natural shyness, prevented his taking any leading part, but after some five years he began to come out of his shell: 'occupying himself seriously with the affairs of his kingdom, as though the timidity and indecision which had at first appeared proceeded rather from lack of practice in affairs and the habit of command, than from any mistrust of his own capacities, he settled business as appeared best to him and as soon as he took a decision invariably persevered in it with such constancy that he might have been accused of obstinacy if...there were not evident proof of the contrary'. His first ministers were the Marquises of Marialva and Alegrete and the Count of Viana, together with his confessor, the Jesuit Luis Gonçalves. Castelo Melhor, now over seventy, had been allowed to return to Portugal in 1685, and two years later, on the request of Charles II, he was admitted to the capital; now at length he returned to the council of state, and occupied a position of distinction until his death in 1720.

John V's desire for experience suggested the idea of a tour abroad. His intention was to spend a year travelling incognito through Spain, France, Italy, Germany, Holland and England. When Castelo Melhor

¹ Santarém. Ouadro Elementar. v. p. ccxxxvii.

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pointed out the inconveniences of such a long absence from the kingdom, John V replied that apart from his great desire to see foreign lands, his own honour was engaged in not desisting from what he had decided: the obstinacy with which he clung to his decisions was engendered by a fear of being thought hot-headed or irresolute. According to Mornay, the French minister, he fell into a severe depression on finding his scheme impracticable, and had to retire to Vila Viçosa to convalesce in May 1716. Already preparations had been made for the departure: in spite of his desire to be unidentified, he had planned to take with him a household of two hundred persons and eighty guards. Probably the expense of this, estimated at 8,000,000 cruzados, as much as the inconvenience of his absence, prompted the ministers to exert themselves to prevent its realization; Cadaval presented the argument that the king must not leave the country without having first obtained the assent of cortes.

Lack of money was indeed serious in the first years of John's reign. The ravages of the war of the Spanish succession remained to be repaired. Supplies to the troops furnished in 1706 were still unpaid in 1758 though this was probably due to the complications of a lawsuit. Nevertheless in order to obtain money in 1709 it was necessary to sell some of the principal offices, including those of Provedor dos Armazens, Casa da Índia and Casa da Moeda. Two years later it was necessary to take 150,000 cruzados from the so-called Fund of the Dead and Absent. At this time eleven months' pay was due to the army. Only gradually did the situation ease as the wealth of Brazil flowed in. Mornay, writing in 1715, adverted on the remarkable contrast between the wealth, possessions and trade of the Portuguese crown and the financial disorder that existed. John, though one of the richest kings in Europe, was unable to raise any considerable sum. His receipts from the colonies disappeared owing to all kinds of embezzlements and frauds; public finances were never audited—only a quarter of his revenue was said to reach him. Many of the sources of revenue were mortgaged, while vast numbers of persons had the right to claim annuities, salaries or dividends directly from the custom-houses, tobacco-monopoly, or other royal establishments.

As early as the time of the war of the Spanish succession, Pedro II and the Archduke Charles had concerted John's marriage with the latter's sister, Maria Ana of Austria, which was celebrated in 1708. In 1711 a daughter had been born who was to become Maria Barbara, Queen of Spain, but the first heir to the throne, Pedro, born a year later, died at the age of two. The actual successor, D. José, was born in June 1714. During the three years which had elapsed before the birth of Pedro, the anxious father had taken a vow to build a vast and magnificent monastery

if heaven should vouchsafe him an heir. In compliance with this oath, he began the construction of the enormous monument of Mafra. The site was selected at the end of 1712; in 1717 work was begun, and year by year the gold of Brazil was poured into the work. The pile is a monstrous one, but some of the grace that is lacking in the exterior is to be found in its spacious library. The basilica was consecrated in 1730, and the whole edifice completed in 1735. According to the French consul the work had absorbed above 12,000,000 cruzados a year.

ii. EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY ABSOLUTISM. Although the cortes never recovered their medieval vigour after the restoration, they retained at least their prestige until the reign of Pedro II. In the early years of John IV, they had continued to approve new taxation, but in the financial confusion that resulted from the prolongation of the war this essential attribute was lost, and the three convocations made by Pedro II had as their object the approval of purely dynastic questions: in 1674 the acknowledgement of D. Isabel Luisa Josefa as heiress to the crown, in 1679 the repeal of dispositions of the cortes of Lamego so as to permit her marriage with the Duke of Savoy, and in 1697 the acknowledgement of Prince John. Whilst the estates might take advantage of the assemblies to present petitions, these no longer played any prominent part in the proceedings. In fact the respectable traditions of the real cortes were eclipsed by the false cortes of Lamego, for the invented laws of Afonso Henriques provided the motive for both of the last assemblies—that of 1697 was made necessary because of the stipulation that when a king died childless his brother should succeed, but that the brother's children should only succeed with the assent of the three estates. An indication of the dying authority of the cortes is given by the contrast of these two last assemblies of 1679 and 1697. On the former occasion the authorization for the heiress presumptive to marry a foreigner was given as an exceptional case, the decision of cortes being equivalent to law: in the second instance, after a lapse of nearly twenty years, it was resolved that the assent of the cortes was not necessary when such cases arose in the future, 'and for greater surety we ask our Lord the King to interpose his royal approbation and authority that this declaration, interpretation and derogation may be firm and valid and that he may order the law to be established, even though in such cases it may be considered that by the wording or meaning of the law of the cortes of Lamego, their disposition may have been different..... Having recognized Prince John, the cortes dispersed and disappeared from the Portuguese political scene.

From the accession of John V until the liberal movements of 1820, the pure absolutism of divine right prevailed in Portugal, its handmaiden

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the gold of Brazil—which relieved the monarchy of any need to obtain supply through the cortes—and its fetish the glorification of the Portuguese imperial monarchy. It was this absolutist faith in divine right that permitted the savage repression of the Távora conspiracy by Pombal: From the grandiose, opulent, amiable and indolent absolutism of John V, it passed through the rigid, violent and saturnine period of Pombal, recovering some of its flexibility under Maria I before it expired with the tergiversations of the Prince Regent under the threat of the Napoleonic war. Its model was the despotism of Louis XIV, from whose ministers it derived its economic principles. Three aspects of his reign chiefly impressed the Latin world: the magnificence and ceremonial of Versailles, the personal rule and influence of the monarch himself, and his wars and conquests. The first two of these were the source of Portuguese emulation; instead of the last-named was the far-flung empire Portugal already possessed.

John V, the Magnanimous, was able to remark: 'My grandfather owed and feared; my father owed; I neither fear nor owe.' The monarchy of John IV had been both financially and militarily dependent on all those, Portuguese and foreigners, who would co-operate in the restoration. In the time of Pedro II the position of the king was greatly strengthened by the terms of the peace-treaty with Spain; the king of Portugal was no longer a revolutionary, but a personage whose existence and rights were generally conceded; not only abroad, but within Portugal, did this treaty fortify the position of the ruler. Finally the discovery of the wealth of Brazil, at least apparently, brought the country out of the financial confusion that dated from the restoration and had been multiplied by the war of the Spanish succession. The field was thus clear. John could dedicate himself to the attainment of the magnificence and dignity he associated with Louis XIV, the monarch of whom he said that no one else had known so well how to be a king.

iii. BRAZIL. The early development of Brazil had been handicapped by lack of labour. Since the Papacy had prohibited the enslavement of natives of the Indies, corresponding legislation had been passed by Sebastian, Philip III and John IV, and the Jesuits had used their influence in the same sense. The guarantee was frequently infringed, and operated less effectively in favour of the freedom of the natives than did the introduction of negro labour, found to be more suited to heavy work. Negroes from Angola and the Guinea coast entered Brazil steadily: from 1715 until 1721 the average import was 2,240 a year, in the following six years the number rose to 2,321. The whole of the sugar industry and all manual tasks in the fields, haulage, and industrial labour depended on them. Their compounds were strictly governed, though emancipation

was often granted for pious reasons. Many negroes fled to the shelter of the forests, where they formed their own villages from which they raided estates and even towns. At one time such a settlement or quilombo mustered 10,000 men under their chief Gangazuma, who resisted a punitive expedition for three years, only being reduced in 1695.

Hitherto the interior had hardly been tapped, though successive expeditions had met with more or less fierce resistance from the natives during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. In spite of innumerable failures and disappointments, the conviction that gold and other precious metals would be found never died down-treasures like those of Peru must exist somewhere within the vast expanses of Brazil. This faith had already found expression in the legends of the Emerald Range and the Golden Lake; Braz Cubas affirmed in 1560 that São Paulo contained good gold and wonderful green stones. In 1608, a year before the discovery of the mines, the governor of the southern captaincies was created General Superintendent of the Mines, and bureaucratic and even technical machinery awaited the anticipated results. During the first half of the seventeenth century no appreciable discoveries were made; it was only in 1653 that a small but regular revenue issued from the Casa dos Quintos of São Paulo. Though John IV, Afonso VI and Pedro II urged the principal prospectors to hasten the impending discoveries, the period of intensive exploration did not begin until the last quarter of the century, and the great mining age until the last decade.

The pioneers responsible for the penetration of northern, western and southernmost Brazil were known as bandeirantes, from their custom of departing in groups with a flag (bandeira), under a chief, who took his family, clients, slaves and any natives who showed themselves friendly. For the time of the expedition the whole band acknowledged the dictatorial authority of the leader. They went armed with flintlocks and swords, and carried lead for making bullets. A padded leathern waistcoat to ward off the Indian arrows, doublet and cotton hose, a cloth round the head, and heavy shoes on the feet formed the usual dress; and a length of baize served as cloak and blanket. In 1674 the bandeira of Pais Leme set out on a seven-years' journey in the course of which they passed through the heart of the modern Minas Gerais, but discovered only tourmalines, which they took for emeralds. Although succeeding pioneers obtained gold from natives, river gold was first discovered in 1692 on the Casca River in the Mato Grosso region by António Rodrigues Arzão. Two years later his son-in-law Bueno de Sequeira and Miguel Garcia discovered gold in abundance. In 1697 Borba Gato, Leme's son-in-law, was able to show the governor-general a site near Sabará from which in a short time over nine hundred pounds of gold were

lifted. Very soon the metal was being intensively extracted. In places its original colour was extremely dark, whence the name Black Gold given to the settlement later known as Vila Rica. From 1720 the Minas Gerais became a separate district and in 1728 diamonds were discovered in the midst of the gold-bearing region. In 1718 Pascual Moreira Cabral Leme, the son of Pais Leme, found the Cuiabá mines in Mato Grosso, and these were exploited by colonists who travelled in flotillas of canoes from São Paulo down the Tiêté and Paraná rivers and up the Paraguay, a journéy attended by almost incredible difficulties and dangers. The gold-rush began; all ages and classes, women, noblemen and monks flocked to the new world. Violent scenes took place between the new arrivals, nicknamed emboabas, and the colonists. Not only in Brazil but in the home-country the thirst for wealth threatened ruin to agriculture, and already in 1720 it was necessary to forbid emigration from Portugal.

In spite of the richness of the deposits, which caused great wonder at the time, the quantity of gold received by John V fell considerably short of the exaggerated estimates current in Europe. The official tribute was one-fifth part of all gold and diamonds. According to Lúcio de Azevedo, John V received over his reign of forty-four years some 107,000,000 cruzados, 'an impressive sum for the times, but not at all of fabulous proportions, as historiographers who follow tradition have accustomed us to imagine. Of this total we may allocate a third, say 36,000,000, to the first twenty years, when the tribute of the quintos was greatest, and diamonds had not yet appeared, and the rest, say 71,000,000, to the following twenty-four years. Let us say 3,000,000 a year at the most fruitful period. There is nothing to suggest the probability of larger sums.'1

iv. Economic situation and achievements of the reign. Yet the inflowing wealth, contrasted with the previous penury of Portugal, was great, and, since contemporary experts estimated the mines to be capable of producing for centuries, it guaranteed a certain financial stability. The proportion of the wealth of Brazil to the total revenue of the crown in 1716 was some three million cruzados in sixteen million—naturally the general state of the kingdom was also profoundly affected by the influx of private wealth, which in turn raised the receipts of the crown indirectly. On the occasion of the marriages of Prince José to the Infanta Mariana Victoria and the Portuguese Infanta to the Spanish prince, a so-called 'voluntary donation' of seven millions was demanded from Brazil to meet the extraordinary expenses of the ceremonies. The financial position was not yet stable enough to permit the desired extravagances, and only after 1730 was a satisfactory position reached.

¹ J. Lúcio de Azevedo, Épocas de Portugal Econômico, p. 383.

No longer was it necessary to raise money within Portugal; the doom of the cortes as a political organization was thus sealed.

The abundance of money made it possible to liquidate outstanding debts. State loans were converted to 5 per cent, and those creditors who refused to convert were reimbursed; a second conversion scheme, launched in 1749, gave holders only ten days in which to exchange their stock for a new issue at 41 per cent. So much suffices to show that not all the riches of Brazil were frittered away. Indeed John V's reputation as a purposeless squanderer and megalomaniac requires some tempering. His gifts were undoubtedly extremely liberal, but they were those which he considered his position required of him, and usually were calculated to contribute to his policy of aggrandizement. Thus the two Portuguese cardinals, going to the conclave of 1721, took two crates of bars of gold and above fifty dozens of gold and silver plate. When the Marquis of Abrantes went to Madrid to arrange the marriages of the heirs of the two kingdoms he was given 60,000 cruzados for his expenses and a large quantity of diamonds to distribute in Madrid. Similar semi-political gifts were constituted by John's portrait surrounded with diamonds and usually accompanied by a sum of fifty or sixty thousand cruzados. In 1730 he heard from the Princess of the Asturias that it was said in Madrid that he had no money: he promptly sent her sixty thousand cruzados in bar gold as a present, asking her to use it to refute the rumours. Anxious to impress Rome, he gave the nuncio Bichi twenty-five thousand cruzados on his elevation to the rank of cardinal; another cardinal received a box studded with diamonds worth twenty thousand. In 1744 the empress's envoy, Harrach, was given four thousand and also six bars of gold. Apart from these presents exacted by the idea of monarchical prestige, John V rewarded those who served him or were in difficulties. Thus a Portuguese captain who had fought a successful engagement with Algerian pirates was rewarded with twelve thousand cruzados, and the Count of Tarouca, having contracted debts as ambassador, was recompensed with eighty thousand. On hearing that the queen-mother of Spain had difficulty in obtaining her pension from the government, he sent her a hundred thousand, and in 1735 he sent two thousand measures of corn to the peasants of the Alentejo, who were without seed. Others who benefited by John's munificence were the artists he had engaged. architects and painters especially, who would receive presents of nine or ten thousand cruzados.

His wealth enabled him to indulge his appreciation of art and learning. As early as 1720 he founded the Royal Academy of History and later promoted the copying of a hundred volumes of documents relating to Portugal, reposing in Rome. A course of surgery was instituted in

Lisbon, and Portuguese were sent abroad to study astronomy, mathematics and economic practice. The two libraries of Coimbra and Mafra were founded, that of the university being housed in an elegant and gorgeously ornamented building. Various monumental publications, Caetano de Sousa's História Genealógica da Casa Real, Bluteau's Vocabulário, the Biblioteca Lusitana and Corpus Poetarum Lusitanorum were sponsored. In Rome the Academy of Portugal was founded for Portuguese artists, and in Portugal the destruction of any antiquities of the times of the 'Phoenicians, Greeks, Romans, Goths and Arabs' was officially prohibited. Of the architectural monuments of his reign, that of Mafra is undoubtedly the most grandiose, though the influence of the German architect Ludwig does not seem to have been a salutary one. More satisfying perhaps was the Aqueduct of the Free-Waters, whose 109 arches cover a distance of eighteen and a half kilometres. Built between 1729 and 1749 by Manuel da Maia, it brought the blessing of plenteous water to the capital, which was further adorned by the handsome fountains (chafarizes) which form one of its most pleasing features. The hospital at Caldas da Rainha and various churches date from the same period. The influx of Brazilian gold stimulated industry for a time and helped directly or indirectly in the launching of various enterprises—the silk industry, the woollens of Covilhã which supplied uniforms for the army, the paper-factory of Lousa, the Lisbon arsenal, an ordnance factory and others.

v. RELATIONS WITH ROME. Already in the first year of his reign, John V despatched an envoy to Rome, the harbinger of various and prolonged negotiations with the Holy See. The elevation of the same envoy, Melo e Castro, to the rank of ambassador in 1718, gave occasion for a display of magnificence intended to dazzle the eyes of Europe. Rome indeed was the best market in which to buy the reputation for splendour that John V desired; he paid his representative there 3,000 cruzados a month. In 1710 Clement XI had erected the collegiate church of São Tomé into a royal chapel with six dignitaries and eighteen canons. Six years later, by 'a supreme political and pecuniary effort', John obtained the creation of the patriarchate of Lisbon; the bull In supremo apostolatus solio divided the archdiocese into two, eastern Lisbon with the ancient cathedral as its see, and western Lisbon, comprising some 50,000 houses, to form a new see about the patriarchal church. Three months later the patriarch of Lisbon obtained all the honours and prerogatives enjoyed by cardinals. In 1720 the right of the patriarch to crown kings was sanctioned, and finally in 1737 Clement XII conceded the patriarch and his successors a cardinalate. Already the patriarchate had been granted the sees of Leiria, Lamego, Funchal and Angra as suffragans, and in 1710 John V had ordered the annual sum of two hundred and twenty gold marks as well as certain revenues to be awarded to the patriarch.

The distinction of the patriarchate was conferred as a reward for the services of the Portuguese against the Turks. After Achmet III had seized Morea, Venice appealed to Rome and to the emperor for help. Charles VI declared war in May 1716; and Clement XI sought the assistance of Portugal and Spain in three appeals, one in January 1715 and two in January 1716. Spain limited herself to a guarantee not to attack the emperor in Italy so long as he was engaged against the Turks, but Portugal provided six warships, a fire vessel, a hospital ship and an armed brigantine, under the command of the Count of Rio Grande. The contribution of this force was made possible by the foundation of a naval school and the building of six ships in 1713. The fleet proceeded to Leghorn and Corfu, but the Turks, after their defeat at Peterwardein in August 1716 and the fall of Bucarest and Temešvar, had retired. Rio Grande returned to Portugal with his fleet in November 1716. However, the following month a new appeal arrived from Rome, and in April 1717 the fleet, increased by three vessels, once more left the Tagus for the Mediterranean. In the battle of Matapan fought on July 5, 1717, the Portuguese fleet bore the brunt of the engagement, though 'we cannot count this engagement as an extraordinary triumph for the defenders of the church. In truth, if the Turks retired, we must suppose that the motive was rather the peril their comrades were undergoing ashore, than the defeat inflicted. As to our action in the battle, we have strong evidence in affirming...that the Portuguese fleet conducted itself in accordance with its glorious past. Thus there is still no explanation for the attitude of John V, who, whilst he ordered a commemorative medal to be struck for the exploit of Matapan, arrested the admiral of our victorious fleet and sent him off to Angra.'1

The battle of Matapan was followed by a period of difficult relations with Spain. When the Quadruple Alliance was signed in July 1718, a stipulation was included that Portugal might enter the league. As a precaution, Spain seized Portuguese ships in Galician ports in March 1719. In the following September D. Luis da Cunha, now ambassador in Madrid, had an altercation with Alberoni, arising out of debts payable by Spain in accordance with the peace of 1715, which resulted in the latter turning his back on the diplomat. The incident almost drove Portugal into the arms of the alliance, but satisfaction was given, and the state of tension gradually eased. The age, one in which national greatness consisted chiefly in dignity and prestige, was fertile in minor incidents

¹ Dr Eduardo Brazão, Relações Externas de Portugal: Reinado de D. João V, 11, 122.

exaggerated into international conflicts. In 1724 the new French ambassador demanded that the secretary of state should approach him first, which was not the Portuguese custom. Notes were exchanged, 'an epistolary duel', and France demanded the execution of her version of the ceremonial under threat of breaking off relations. The envoy accordingly received his passports and diplomatic relations between the two countries were interrupted for the next fourteen years.

In spite of the demonstrations of piety and the religious parades which filled his reign, John V did not hesitate in carrying his insistence on the election of the nuncio in Lisbon to the Sacred College to the point of breaking off relations with Rome. Since 1720 the king had made this claim in order to establish the right of the nuncio accredited to Portugal to the same rank as those in Paris, Madrid and Vienna. The kings of Poland had failed to obtain the same privileges from Paul V and Urban VIII. In John's eves the point of honour involved the dignity of his country. The request met with the refusals of Clement XI, Innocent XIII (1721-24) and Benedict XIII, but in 1725 Cardinal Pereira obtained a written promise in the king's favour from the latter pope. Unfortunately the nuncio who formed the subject of the petition, Valente Bichi, proved a very unworthy vessel; he had disobeyed orders from Rome, even from Clement XI himself, and the Portuguese clergy had made serious complaints against his mercenary and unapostolic conduct. For these reasons he had been substituted in 1720 by Mgr. Firráo, who arrived in Lisbon, but was not recognized as nuncio by order of the king. There were thus two nuncios in Lisbon, neither of whom was allowed to exercise his functions. As a solution, Rome offered to nominate Bichi auditor under Firráo, which the king refused. Ordered to withdraw from Portugal, Bichi disobeyed. In 1726 and 1727 two reunions of cardinals found against the elevation of Bichi, a decision to which Benedict adhered. To his brief explaining the motives for this refusal, John did not even reply, and when a new cardinal was appointed in January 1728, the Portuguese agents in Rome complained bitterly and refused to illuminate their dwellings, and were later ordered to withdraw. In July 1728 negotiations were formally broken off, and Portuguese subjects forbidden to go to or write to the Papal States or send thither any money or merchandise. In return both Firráo and Bichi were ordered to leave Lisbon, the one within five days and the other with a handsome present. Firráo refused to depart on the pretext of illness until threats had been used. This state of affairs continued until 1730, when Clement XII made Bichi a cardinal. John V had already sent him four thousand cruzados for the expenses of his election, and in 1732 added twenty-five thousand so that his assumption of the honour might not lack magnificence.

vi. RUPTURE WITH SPAIN, 1735-1737. Notwithstanding the royal marriages of 1728, a state of considerable tension continued to exist between Portugal and Spain. In May 1734 a French agent reported that Portugal was arming and fortifying the frontiers, and that the king had invited his brother Manuel to return from Austria, where he had made a career for himself in the imperial army, though the latter request was refused. 'This tension of relations had its principal source apparently in the differences that existed between the members of the Spanish royal family. Philip V's second wife, Isabel Farnese, frowned upon the influence exercised on Fernando, Prince of the Asturias, by the court of Lisbon, through his wife D. Maria Barbara, daughter of the King of Portugal. An open breach occurred, both sides taking up violent attitudes. The Portuguese ambassador, Pedro Álvares Cabral, Lord of Belmonte, was an intimate of the Prince and Princess of Asturias. Hence the hatred of which he was the object on the part of Isabel Farnese and her followers.'1

A conflagration between the two countries was all but precipitated by an incident that occurred in February 1735. A man who had been apprehended by the royal authorities in a Madrid church was being led past the Portuguese embassy amidst hostile crowds demonstrating against the sacrilege, when, assisted by bystanders, who included two servants of the ambassador, he escaped and took refuge in the embassy. Next day the authorities appeared at the embassy, and forcing an entrance, arrested nineteen servants.

Reprisals were at once taken in Lisbon. The Spanish plenipotentiary was forbidden to appear at court until satisfaction was given, whilst a company of grenadiers entered the Spanish embassy and arrested nineteen lackeys. Military help was asked from England; the British ambassador offered a fleet of twenty ships and a force of twenty thousand men, as the Spaniards were moving forces towards the frontier. Marco António de Azevedo Coutinho left for London as envoy extraordinary, and Norris arrived in the Tagus on June 9 with twenty-six vessels, with the ostensible intention of protecting the Brazil fleet. Although Norris and Tyrawley, the ambassador, had powers to negotiate an agreement, the incident was only settled in Paris in March 1737, when England, France and Holland sponsored a settlement, negotiated on the Portuguese side by D. Luis da Cunha.

vii. DECLINE. Towards the end of the reign a noticeable decline set in. In 1736 the number of secretaries of state was increased from two to three; and official work divided into internal affairs, foreign affairs and war, and colonial and naval transactions. After the death of Diogo

¹ Prof. Ângelo Ribeiro in *História de Portugal*, ed. Peres, vi, 190.

de Mendonça the prime minister was Cardinal da Mota, a personage to whom the diplomatist Alexandre de Gusmão attributed the stagnation and retrogression of the final years of John V. Waste, superstition, the revival of the distinction between New and Old Christians, and a decline of agriculture and commerce are features of the state of lethargy and indolence with which Pombal struggled a score of years later. The second Portuguese cardinal, the inquisitor-general Nuno da Cunha, whom Gusmão declared to believe in witchcraft, exercised a similar influence to that of the minister. Cardinal Mota and the minister of the colonies, António Pereira, both died in 1747. The secretary of state, Marco António de Azevedo Coutinho, was of an indolent temperament and neglected the bureaucratic machine that always displayed a tendency to clog. On his death in 1749 the government passed into the hands of one man, Frei Gaspar da Encarnação, who did nothing to prevent the decline of public affairs. His interests lay in the favouring of certain claims of his family, particularly that of a nephew, the Marquis of Gouveia, who had put forward a claim to the dukedom of Aveiro on the death of the last duke without descendants.

The absolutist regime made the condition of the country directly dependent on the abilities and energy of the ministers. Yet no one appeared with the necessary vision, activity and permanence to protect the nascent industries, even to adopt a consistent policy towards them. In spite of casual protectionist legislation, such writers as D. Luis da Cunha and Alexandre Gusmão pointed out how little had been done to establish national industries by the end of John's reign. 'If then Your Highness would go about your Realms,' concludes the latter, 'Your Highness will find, not without alarm, many lands usurped for trade, others untilled and many roads impracticable, so that whatever the land produces cannot be used...many great places almost deserted with their manufactories ruined and lost, and their trade quite extenuated.' A new compilation of protectionist laws, drawn up in 1749, could not be enforced until the following reign, owing to the protests of English merchants and the weakness of the government, whose lack of vision permitted the Portuguese silk factories to be starved of raw material by export to France at the very same time as it took the unnecessary trouble of prohibiting the export of rags, for the sake of the paper factory at Lousã.

It was not only the incapacity of the ministers that brought about the decline. For the last eight years of his life the king suffered from a 'dropsy of the chest'. Frequent visits to take the waters at Caldas delayed the moment of dissolution, but finally he died, amidst scenes of piety, on July 31, 1750. Among those who ministered to his soul in the last days of his illness was a Jesuit named Gabriel Malagrida.

One of the activities of John V that has excited the most curiosity is his series of amorous affairs with nuns. The scene of the best-known of them was the convent of Odivelas, where a certain Mother Paula received the king on his semi-official visits in richly ornamented apartments. A child of this oddly assorted union, D. José, became an inquisitor-general and died at the age of eighty in 1801. He and two half-brothers D. Gaspar, later Archbishop of Braga, and D. António, were brought up at a palace on the outskirts of Lisbon, whence they derived the collective name of Meninos de Palhavã. Voltaire's comment is well known: that John's gaieties were religious parades; when he took to building, he built a monastery; when he wanted a mistress, he took a nun. It is only just to add that love-affairs with nuns seem to have been a recognized diversion for the nobility of the day.

viii. AFRICA AND ASIA IN THE EIGHTEENTH CENTURY. In view of the exploitation of the mineral resources of Brazil, it was natural that the Portuguese of the eighteenth century should look across the Atlantic for adventure and profit, and that the other overseas possessions should receive less attention in consequence. Indicative of this tendency was the abandonment of the last Portuguese establishment in Morocco in 1769, when the inhabitants of Mazagão were transferred to Brazil and founded the town of the same name in Pará. The various settlements of West and East Africa were chiefly esteemed for their importance in the Brazilian slave-trade, and little progress was made in development and colonization. Nevertheless the stations occupied during this period provided the frame-work of the Portuguese colonial empire of to-day.

In Africa the Cape Verde Islands and Guinea formed a single colony, and existed principally as agencies for the slave-trade, of which Bissau, the present capital of Portuguese Guinea, became the chief centre. In 1792 a British expedition under Lieutenant Philip Beaver unsuccessfully tried to found a colony at Bolama. This attempted settlement was the basis of a future English claim to Bolama, which was finally submitted to the arbitration of the United States and disposed of in Portugal's favour by President Ulysses Grant in 1870.

Little can be said of Angola in the first half of the century save that it served for the shipment of numerous slaves: the colonists were too engrossed in this traffic to permit themselves the more arduous and less profitable tasks of colonization. Though in 1758 Ambriz was occupied and the interior stations were subsequently strengthened, there was still no contact by land between the two main settlements of Luanda and Benguela. Above the Congo, Cabinda was occupied in 1783, but fell to a French expedition soon after. In 1785 a step of great future importance for the southward extension of the colony was taken with the founding

by the Governor-General, Barão de Mossâmedes, of the township named after him, though little was done to develop this settlement till sixty years later.

In East Africa the period was also one of decline. First, control was lost over the Swahili coast: Mombasa fell to the Arabs in 1698 after a siege of a year and a half, and in spite of a recovery of the territory from Brava to Zanzibar in 1728, Portuguese troops fell back on Moçambique island in the following year. Ground was lost in the interior, too, as the Monomotapa's influence waned; gold was still produced in Changamira's country, but communications with the Portuguese coast were dangerous, so that it became more profitable to trade in slaves than to risk the difficulties of travel in the interior. As long as Gôa was the centre of an important conquest in India, Moçambique had been on the main route to the orient and had shared in Gôa's prosperity. Now with the shift of the centre of Portugal's possessions to Brazil, it tended to become isolated. Although in 1752 Moçambique was politically detached from Gôa, and became a colony with its own Captain-General, ranking with those of Rio de Janeiro and Luanda, this step was not enough to arrest decay. Deleterious factors were isolation, the outnumbering and displacement of Europeans by Goans and half-castes, lack of adequate military resources for the control of the natives, the entry of deportees and convicts from Portugal and the onslaughts of French and English privateers. By the end of the century there was little activity save in the export of slaves.

In India the Portuguese had been left with the nuclei of their present territories, comprising only the Old Conquests at Gôa, to which the New Conquests were added between 1741 and 1743. In the Sunda Islands the war with the Dutch ended in theory in 1661, with Timor and Solor Portuguese, though the Dutch maintained their installations in the former island. In 1701 the Dominican administration of Timor was succeeded by a civil governorship, but strife with the Dutch continued spasmodically and led to the transfer of the capital of Portuguese Timor from Lifau to its present seat at Dili.

CHAPTER XXII

THE IRON AGE OF ABSOLUTISM

i. POMBAL. Even before the death of John V preparations had been made to remove Fr. Gaspar da Encarnação, who fondly imagined that his influence would survive the political change. The Austrian Queen Maria Ana assumed the regency during her husband's illness, and a new figure was brought to her notice, that of Sebastião José de Carvalho e Melo, future Count of Oeiras and Marquis of Pombal.¹

Born in 1699, either near Soure or in Lisbon, Pombal came of an undistinguished line of rural nobility; his father held a commission in a cavalry regiment, and he was the eldest of three sons. Of his life until 1733 practically nothing is known. Educated by Jesuits at Coimbra, he passed into the army, and came to Lisbon to seek official employment through the influence of his uncles, one an archpriest of the patriarchate, and the other the future secretary of state, Marco António de Azevedo Coutinho. Through the influence of the former he met the prime minister, Cardinal da Mota, and was appointed a member of the new Academy of History with the task of making researches into the history of the royal family. Suffering probably from the coolness with which he was treated by the higher nobility, he forced himself into its closed circle by a runaway marriage with a noble widow, the niece of the Count of Arcos. His wife's property and his uncle's, which he now inherited, enabled him to make himself more prominent, and the cardinal entrusted him with a plenipotentiary mission to London. Pombal's years in England from 1740 to 1744 had a profound influence on his mental formation. In his diplomatic encounters with Newcastle he exerted himself in defence of the dignity of Portugal, outraged by sundry naval incidents which provided ample opportunity for him to exercise his forceful and rather overladen style with impunity. More fruitful were his investigations into the causes of England's prosperity—'The most interesting material that can form the subject of the reports of a minister who resides in London,' he wrote to the cardinal, 'I considered, after my arrival at this court, was that of investigating, in order to put them before our Lord the King. the causes wherefore His Majesty, from the beginning of his reign, found the commerce of Portugal in such decay, whereas that of England and of other nations had an excessive expansion.' On his return to

¹ The latter titles were conceded to him in 1759 and 1770 respectively, but it will be more convenient to use throughout the title by which he is generally known.

Lisbon he attempted to persuade the Portuguese government to float an enterprise organized on similar lines to the East India Company in order to revive Portuguese trade with the East, but met only with indifference and protestations of penury.

In the middle of 1745 Pombal was sent to Vienna to represent John V as a mediator between the future Empress Maria Teresa and Benedict XIV, a thankless task since both parties suspected the mediator of partiality. Pombal regarded his selection for this mission as the equivalent of exile, the fruits of his commercial schemes which had been ill-received in Lisbon. Furthermore his debts acquired in London were augmented by new liabilities; money did not arrive from Portugal, and he was obliged to leave behind his plate when he left Vienna in 1749. His first wife, who had remained in a Portuguese convent when he departed for London, had died: and five months after his arrival in Vienna he married Leonor Ernestina Daun, the daughter of Marshal Daun, of ancient lineage but slender resources, a connexion which stood him in good stead with the Austrian-born Queen of Portugal. In view of the temporary nature of the mission, Pombal had not relinquished his post in London on going to Vienna, and the news that a successor had been appointed must have warned him that hostile influences were working against him.

Eight months passed between his return to Lisbon and the death of John V; during this time John's dislike of him was proof against the protection of the queen and of his relative the secretary of state, whose death preceded that of John V by a few months. The general neglect of which he was the victim was only ended by the queen's influence; he was called upon once to give his opinion on the question of the importation of corn. On the death of the king, the country was known to be on the verge of financial ruin. Stern measures were required, and a new minister was preferred to the inveterate mediocrities inherited from the previous decade. Either because of the intervention of the queen-mother, or through the influence of D. Luis da Cunha's Testamento Político, which indicated Pombal as a future secretary of state, 'whose genius, patient, speculative and rather diffuse, though without vice, accords well with that of the nation', Pombal was nominated minister on August 2, 1750, and three days later allocated the office of Foreign Affairs and War.

Alexandre de Gusmão, who reasonably enough expected his own advancement, expressed himself in a fit of prophetic spleen: 'The Pasha has obtained his purpose, such are the ways of this world! The people will suffer for it, and the news will go down to future times, which will admire the effects of his spacious ideas in everything that falls within his own department, if he does not meddle in the others!'

ii. josé i, 1750-1777. The new king was aged thirty-six. By his

wife Mariana Victoria, a daughter of Philip V of Spain, he had four daughters, of whom the eldest was sixteen at the time of his accession. Hitherto his father had never allowed him to take any part in public affairs, nor had he shown any interest in them. The occupations of the court, described by the Austrian minister Starhemberg, consisted of hunting, riding and the theatre. Every day the king and queen went to Belém, accompanied by the court, which rode or played faro; only at eight or nine at night did they return to the palace. The king worked with his ministers until midnight, it was said, though others added that he rarely appeared in his cabinet before eleven, and then merely limited himself to signing the many papers that were presented. Perhaps at first he showed some interest in their contents, but it was not long before he left them to Pombal. His benevolent, vacant and superficial character did not permit of great mental exertions, and his own tastes were elsewhere. The temptations of the chase and the delights of the opera were too great. Mariana Victoria, though more robust and wilful than her husband, shared his inclinations. She had been betrothed to Louis XV at the age of five and had been educated in France for a year or two, but on the cancellation of this match had been despatched to Portugal at the age of eleven, and married José at fourteen. An excellent horsewoman, she doted on the chase; on one occasion she peppered her husband with stray shot.

On August 26 the French consul Duvernay wrote that the king had fixed three days a week for business with the ministers, that order was already beginning to appear out of chaos and affairs were transacted with exemplary speed. In September Pombal refused to receive Louis XV's letters because they did not bear the style Fidelissimo, that John V had purchased from Rome. The Austrian envoy's evidence suggests that the exemplary speed did not last long. According to him, everything was found to be in a terrible state of abandonment and neglect. Within the first year, José lost his little taste for affairs and left everything to 'Carvalho, who governs all as a despot according to his own whims'. Various other despatches add curious details: 'as I hear, Carvalho tries to delay as long as possible his attribution to other departments in order to make himself a necessity.' His rising favour was proved by the appointment of his brother, a naval officer, as captain-general of Grand-Pará. There was little expedition in public affairs: the personal letter of King George announcing the death of the Prince of Wales was unanswered after two months in spite of reminders, whilst in 1751 the Maranhão fleet was held back for three months waiting for royal despatches. Pombal's preoccupation with extraordinary measures was partly responsible for the shelving of all routine work; and the trouble

was aggravated by his exclusiveness. As soon as he held the reins, all business was transacted by him alone. 'For the last twenty-six years the Marquis of Pombal has resolved everything alone and by himself', wrote the Austrian minister after his fall.

Pombal came to power at the mature age of fifty-one. He had his plans already thought out. They were based on a revival of the protectionist theories of Colbert and Ericeira, and aimed at combating the preponderance of English commerce. While in England, he had drawn up a Report on the hardships of the commerce and subjects of Portugal in England, in which he pointed out the advantages of colonial over foreign trade, the 'only secure and perpetual commerce'. During the first period of his government, a considerable number of miscellaneous affairs were disposed of—the problem of the Brazilian mines, the exportation of coin of the realm, regulation of the tobacco, sugar and diamond trades, the concession of Indian commerce to F. Velho Oldemberg, definition of the boundaries of Brazil and the establishment of the Grand-Pará Company. Much of this work may have been incomplete or violently executed, but it bears the mark of a bold mind. The first affair of an economic character which was assigned to Pombal was that of the Brazilian mines. These were in abject decadence; John V's ministers had been unable to stop contraband, and had reduced the royal fifth to a tenth and then turned it into a personal tax on miners, which operated so severely as to make many abandon the industry; over 15,000 negroes left the mines in 1748 and 1749. Pombal now accepted a solution that had been proposed by the colonists in 1734, the payment of a fixed levy of a hundred arrobas a year. This stabilization, according to Southey, considerably increased the revenues from the quinto, which rose to £400,000 in 1753. The criticism of the Conselho Ultramarino, in which the personal animosity of Alexandre Gusmão found expression, was returned unanswereda foretaste of Pombal's methods. A second problem, also concerning Brazil, was that of the tobacco and sugar trades. For their better protection the ships sailed only once a year in a fleet, with the result that the warehouses of Lisbon were crammed and the markets glutted for a period every year. There was thus no stabilization of prices and the goods themselves deteriorated. It had already been proposed to burn the stock of tobacco to ease the situation, when Pombal simplified the customs procedure and offered a reduction of duties of 50 per cent on re-exported tobacco by decrees of January 1751. To avoid speculation prices were fixed, quality was ensured by inspection at the point of embarkation in Brazil, and privileges were granted to new refineries, which in turn were obliged to take sugar from the Lisbon customs-house. The diamond trade was suffering from over-production in Brazil and a

Jewish monopoly in London and Amsterdam. Stones of good water reached a low price of 2\$400 the carat, and the market appeared saturated. In 1734 John V ordered mining to cease. Afterwards a monopoly of the diamond trade was leased to a private contractor. The purchaser for the term 1749–1753 permitted extensive contraband, and having undertaken not to put his diamonds on the market until those of the previous period were sold, was bankrupt at the end of his term. Pombal's remedy was to keep the system of monopoly, whilst closely controlling the output and export. Once the diamonds were in Portugal, the marketing monopoly of English and Dutch Jews was to be counterbalanced by a Portuguese market, established in Holland, but this proved unsuccessful. The first two syndicates gave up the struggle before the end of their respective terms, unable to compete with the trade in Indian stones, according to themselves, or suborned by the Jews, according to Pombal. At length, in 1771, the diamond trade was taken over by the state.¹ The attempt to float an India Company proved a failure; the concession for ten years of all navigation to India and China demanded a capital out of all proportion to the proceeds, and after heavy borrowing from the treasury, the undertaking was liquidated. The experiment had lasted three years.

From this first period of government date Pombal's hostilities with two classes, the nobility and the Jesuits. Already Starhemberg noted that 'the fidalgos, however great their abilities and distinguished their actions, fail to obtain any employment at court, much less any diplomatic post'. In 1752 the Marquis of Alorna, newly honoured for his service as Viceroy in India, returned to Portugal, but was forbidden to appear before the king until his acts had been investigated, and died in disgrace. In 1751 various youths belonging to the nobility were exiled for rescuing a servant from justice.

The struggle with the Jesuits had its origin in Brazil. The missions had long opposed the ambitions of settlers who coveted the lands and persons of the Indians. In the religious view the Negro was enslavable, and the Indian not; the Jesuits had made the conversion of the latter their special objective, and their theocratic communities formed a barrier against the incursions of colonists, and thus of the commercial bourgeoisie which Pombal hoped to build up as a basis of his nation's prosperity. The actual conflict between the Jesuits and the civil authority had begun before Pombal's rise to power with the Boundary Treaty of 1750,

¹ The exports of diamonds cited by Lúcio d'Azevedo, O Marquês de Pombal e a Sua Época, p. 113, n. are as follows:

Date	Contractors	Carats	Value
1753-1755	Bristow, Ward & Co.	121,814 1	1,188,348\$425
1757-1760	John Gore & Joshua Van Neck	115,659	1,067,198\$850
1760-1771	Daniel Gilder-Meester	925,589	8,144,165 \$ 537

in which Portugal and Spain had divided the Plate and Paraguay areas in such a way that the former should receive seven of the Jesuit reductions of Paraguay in exchange for the surrender of the Sacramento colony to the north of the Plate. Pombal's brother, as governor of Grand-Pará, had also been appointed to the frontier commission, and was surprised to find the extent to which the government of the interior was in the hands of the Jesuits. They in turn found that they were expected under the treaty to abandon the seven reductions ceded to Portugal and transplant their possessions and thirty thousand Indian subjects elsewhere. Although their superiors held that they must obey, it was not long before fighting broke out, and a three years' jungle campaign ended in the dispersal of the Indians by Portuguese and Spanish forces. In 1755 Pombal decreed the freedom of the Indians and at the same time prohibited priests from holding civil authority, founding the Grand-Pará Company, the first of three planned to monopolize the trade of Brazil and thus exclude English competition. Considerable privileges, loans and protection were put at the disposal of the new Company, whose statutes bear a resemblance to those of the Brazil Company of 1648, but include clauses controlling prices and limiting the company's activities to wholesale trade. All members of the board of direction must be Portuguese.

In 1756 Pombal established a Junta do Comércio with control over all matters relating to commerce and able through its own court to overrule the Judge Conservator of the English. Already in 1752 the Judge Conservator had been forbidden to set aside orders issued by the ordinary courts, and now his powers were further curtailed. Moreover, the junta declared a whole series of articles to be luxuries whose importation was prohibited. This contributed towards the breaking down of the English pre-eminence and privileges. In effect, the trade in woollens fell to about half between 1755 and 1765, and there were decreases in other branches of British trade with Portugal.¹ Generally speaking, indeed, Pombal was more successful with his restrictive measures than in his attempts to stimulate Portuguese enterprise.

Whilst attempting to nationalize the trade with Brazil, Pombal also sought to restrict the export of gold and silver. Measures in this sense had been repeatedly passed over the past three centuries, and Pombal's decree proved no more effective than its predecessors. The import of essential goods, especially corn, rendered inevitable a drain of gold in the direction of England. According to Bank of England returns this

¹ Pombal's own views about the state of economic vassalage to which Portugal had been reduced are often quoted from John Smith's *Memoirs of the Marquis of Pombal (London, 1843, 1, 112–126)*: but Pombal was pleading a case, and allowance must be made for this. He had a good sense of the Alliance, and knew how to bargain with it.

totalled £3,552,572 for the years 1766 to 1770, a considerable sum given the size of Portugal and the efforts made by Pombal to restrict it.

iii. THE LISBON EARTHQUAKE. On November 1, 1755, a fine Sunday morning, the churches were packed for the All Saints' day masses, when without warning at about half-past nine, the earth shook violently, successively rolling and pitching like a ship at sea. When it came to rest, after perhaps seven minutes, a large part of Lisbon was lying in ruins, shrouded in palls of dense smoke, its streets here obliterated with mountains of rubble, there blocked with panic-stricken people. A violent motion of the sea uncovered the mud of the Tagus shore, then threw up an immense bank of water which inundated the riverside streets and squares. In places flames, many originating in the hosts of candles blazing on the altars, began to rage; sulphurous exhalations proceeding from the earth, mingled with the volumes of smoke and dust, rendering the atmosphere barely breathable. In the first shocks the church of São Domingos, the palace of the Marquis of Louriçal and other buildings were set alight; the devastation was probably severest in the older quarters of the town—especially on the central water-front, where the Lisbon palaces collapsed, together with many official buildings. The Arsenal, the palaces of the Patriarchate and the Inquisition, and the Casa da Índia, were among the ten thousand buildings destroyed. Estimates of the number of dead vary greatly; Pombal himself put the figure between six and eight thousand. Five thousand were reckoned to have been killed immediately, and as many more probably succumbed later to wounds or nervous shock. Of the English colony, possibly not a very large body, seventy-eight members were killed.

At the time of the catastrophe José I was in the Quinta at Belém, where the shock was comparatively mildly felt. Of the ministers Diogo de Mendonça had fled and Pedro da Mota was ill. The situation was in Pombal's hands. In answer to the king's terrified request for guidance, the Marquis of Alorna was said to have replied, 'Bury the dead, care for the living and close the ports'; the remark, in the form 'Bury the dead and feed the living', has since become inseparably attached to Pombal himself. The minister displayed calm and good sense; by his order companies of soldiers at once began the extraction and burial of the dead; the preliminary clearing of the streets commenced, emergency hospitals and canteens opened, gallows were erected as a warning to pilferers, prices were fixed and corn ordered from the provinces, all food on ships in the Tagus was commandeered whilst taxation on supplies entering the city was temporarily lifted. The work of numerous companies of bandits recruited from the escaped convicts was stopped by rigorous measures.

The phenomenon fixed the eyes of Europe on Lisbon: the tidal wave had been felt with force at Cadiz, and was perceptible in the ports of the Baltic as far afield as Danzig. Practical aid was forthcoming from various countries. The English government on first hearing the news sent 6,000 barrels of meat, 4,000 of butter, 1,200 sacks of rice, and 10,000 quarters of flour, as well as footwear and other necessities. Parliament voted £100,000 for relief. The offers of France and Spain to send money were refused. A host of accounts, reports and relations of the occurrence appeared in various languages; it served Voltaire and Rousseau for a discussion whether providence or natural causes should have the credit for it, and Dr Johnson grew weary of hearing of it.

It was promptly resolved to rebuild the city on its actual site, and the erection of houses at Belém was therefore forbidden. Provisional cantonments were put up for the homeless, whilst the desolation of the centre of the city gave the opportunity to execute a bold piece of town-planning, the results of which subsist to-day. The main part of Lisbon, from the Terreiro do Paço to the Rossio, is a well-planned system of ample thoroughfares and uniform edifices. The general scheme, executed by the architects Eugénio dos Santos, Manuel de Maia and Carlos Mardel, is said to have been based on that of Covent Garden. A tax of 4 per cent on all merchandise entering the city was set aside to pay for the reconstruction.

Shortly after the earthquake the secretary for the interior, Pedro da Mota, died, aged and no longer active. Pombal at once assumed his office, whilst D. Luis da Cunha Manuel, a nephew of the diplomatist Luis da Cunha, took charge of the department of foreign affairs and war.

iv. ANTI-POMBALISM: THE NOBILITY AND THE IESUITS. One of the results of the earthquake was to plunge José and his family into religious observance. Whilst the energetic action of Pombal had strengthened his hold over the king, the Jesuits who had been deported from the Pará-Maranhão district arrived in Lisbon, and the old priest Malagrida, who had been prominent in the devotions of John V and was reputed a saint, was eagerly received by the court when he began to preach against the vices of mankind, predicting even more frightful calamities. José I selected as his protector St Francis Borgia. It was perhaps no more difficult to convince the people than the king that the wickedness of the times would bring new retribution, nor was it difficult to proceed a step farther and implicate the government; those who had lost their homes and possessions were ready to listen. The excluded nobility, in concert with the minister Diogo de Mendonça, prepared to take action, and constituted a cabal, comprising the Dukes of Lafoes and Aveiro, the Marquises of Angeia and Marialva and the Count of São Lourenço. One

Martinho Velho Oldemberg, a merchant in whose houses the royal family was lodging at Ajuda, approached the king with a scheme for the reconstruction of Lisbon, casting vague aspersions on Pombal, which he promised to justify in a memorial. This turned out to be a demonstration in twenty-eight pages of the usurpations of Pombal's grandfather, uncle, the archpriest, and father. As to Pombal himself, he had wormed his way into the Academy of History so as to obtain private information and destroy wealthy and eminent houses; he had received 50,000 cruzados from the gunpowder concession, 600,000 from the diamonds and 150,000 in shares in the Grand-Pará Company; the court and kingdom complained bitterly, but had applauded the legislation in the hope of seeing some good come out of ill; even more horrible and unpardonable wrongs were hinted at, which would ruin the kingdom by impeding the succession of the monarchy. José showed the document to an Italian priest, one of two whom he had taken into his household after the earthquake; the priest replied ambiguously that if it were true, the king was very much mistaken in the minister. It was not long before Pombal found out the plot; he at once arrested Oldemberg, the Italian priests, the compiler of the memorial and others. The priests were confined in the Junqueira fort, the rest despatched to Angola; a month later the secretary Diogo de Mendonça was banished from the court, then deported, and finally imprisoned at Peniche, where he died. In the evening he had been giving a dinner to the diplomatic service; by midnight he was exiled for 'the disorder and unquiet he had occasioned in the royal service on barbarous and disloyal pretexts'. Towards the end of the same year, 1756, or early in the next, the Duke of Lafões was sent to Vienna, where he spent the next twenty years of his life. Aveiro was dealt with later.

The following October Malagrida published a Judgement of the True Cause of the Earthquake, which inveighed against the sins of those who left the churches empty, to flock to theatres, balls and bullfights, and ended by arraigning as heretics those who professed to believe that the late cataclysm could be 'the pure effect of natural causes and not fulminated especially by God for our sins'. The government pointed out to the nuncio the danger of terrifying the people and obtained Malagrida's banishment to Setúbal, where members of the aristocracy continued to resort in order to hear his prophecies. Among those who assiduously visited the exiled Jesuit were the Marchioness of Távora and her daughter the Countess of Atouguia.

v. THE OPORTO REVOLT, 1757. In September 1756 the General Company for Wine Culture in the Upper Douro was created to regulate the port-wine trade. Before the earthquake, vintage wines had slumped on the English market, through a combination of over-production, decline

in quality and the difficulties put in the way of foreign merchants by Pombal's reforms. Thus the pipe of wine, worth 60,000 reis at the beginning of the century, dropped to 48,000 in 1731 and 6,400 after 1750. According to Pombal's apologia, written after his fall, a delegation of the wine-growers and merchants presented to him a memorandum showing that the English had used their monopoly of purchasing and shipping to depress prices to such an extent that the growers were plunged into misery. To meet these complaints the export of wine was limited to the production of a strictly demarcated area in the Upper Douro, and wine could only be brought down the river after a permit had been obtained from tasters employed by the Wine Company. The tasters could approve wine for export or condemn it to be sold to the Wine Company for local consumption. This measure, in combination with a monopoly of sales in Oporto and its suburbs and of export to Brazil, gave the Company control of the whole trade. The Wine Company was modelled on the Grand-Pará Company: it was administered by a Dominican friar, João de Mansilha, who acted as the mouthpiece of Pombal before a committee of merchants and growers. The result was the sacrifice of the interests of small retailers; shop and tavern wine went up in price. On Ash Wednesday, February 23, 1757, a popular demonstration called the Tipplers' Revolt, instigated by various taverners, set Oporto in an uproar. A mob of soldiers, slaves, vagabonds and others ran through the town crying death to the Company. They sent out to find the juiz do povo, who, as their representative, could appeal to the governor for the suppression of the monopoly. In order to placate the demonstrators, who had attempted to besiege the house of a member of the board, the corregedor, in the governor's absence, declared the Company abolished.

Five days later a judge was despatched to conduct an inquiry into the riots and punish the ringleaders. The magistrates had classed the affair as a disorder, which would lead to very mild penalties, but the judge suspended this decision and put the matter before Pombal, who reprimanded the magistrates and turned the case into one of lèse-majesté. The doctrine that an offence against the law constituted an offence against the king was a dangerous one, which if followed through would convert justice into a mere instrument of political despotism. Of four hundred and seventy-eight persons arrested and tried, only thirty-six were acquitted. The unfortunate juiz do povo and twenty-five others were sentenced to death; one hundred and eighty-eight were whipped, deported to the colonies, reduced to penury or fined. All the culprits with the exception of the juiz do povo and a lawyer, the latter only a remote accessory after the fact, were persons of the lowest rank who had no

channel through which they might voice their grievances. The city itself, guilty of a crime of omission—Pombal's phrase—in having tolerated the uprising, received as a general punishment the task of supporting and paying five regiments, which were billeted in it. The Casa dos Vinte e Quatro was suppressed.

In the course of his correspondence with the judge appointed to administer the repression, the minister wrote: 'Majesty does not consist only in the person of the king, but also in his laws.' This interpretation, as Lúcio de Azevedo pointed out, was henceforth the standard of

Pombal's political action.

vi. THE ATTEMPTED REGICIDE AND THE TÁVORA TRIAL, 1758-1759. It was only later that the Jesuits were made responsible for the revolt of Oporto: they were found to have instigated the popular revolt by declaring that the wines of the Company 'were unsuitable for the sacrifice of the mass'. At the moment the scene of the struggle was still Brazil, whence the governor of Grand-Pará wrote that 'the regulars are the most powerful enemy of the state, even the more powerful and mischievous for being domestic enemies'. The decrees of 1755 remained unpublished for two years, but in May 1757 the secularization of civil power was ordered in Pará. The laws extinguishing the missions and declaring the liberty of the Indians left the Jesuits as mere parish priests, a position they refused to accept. Many left their churches and carried off their images and vessels, of which the state claimed ownership. Two missionaries were reported to be in possession of cannon, actually two small guns used for saluting distinguished visitors. Numerous local disturbances occurred between the priests and the civil authorities sent to supersede them. News of the publication of the laws and the resulting disorders reached Lisbon in September 1757. One evening, the 20th, the royal confessor, José Moreira, sought out the king as he came in late from hunting in order to express the alarm and distress of the Jesuits. He was denied access. At four o'clock the following morning all the palace Jesuits, the confessors of the whole royal family, were turned out of the building. When the provincial of the Society appeared to reason with Pombal, he and his brethren were forbidden future admittance to the palace. A little later sixteen missionaries were deported from Brazil. including ten Jesuits. In a pamphlet drawn up under Pombal's supervision, the Relação abreviada, the story of the Jesuit revolt was published for public consumption. In it the missionaries were declared to have prepared for war, as their possession of artillery indicated; they themselves were described as 'disguised engineers'; as merchants they made the Indians produce tobacco, cotton and sugar and profited by the proceeds; as soldiers they attempted to erect a state of their own. The

indictment of the Jesuits was later translated into French, German, Italian and Latin, and followed by an ampler Portuguese version, the Dedução cronológica.¹

As for the nobility, by now their detestation of the minister had reached boiling-point. It seems possible that they despaired of ousting Pombal except through the death either of himself or of the king. In the question of the marriage of D. Maria Francisca, the Princess of Brazil, they had supported a match with her uncle, the king's younger brother, D. Pedro, who favoured the nobility and acknowledged the Jesuits as 'his fathers'. This was a convenient arrangement; it was furthermore patriotic, in that the danger of a foreign monarch would be averted. In the time of John V matters had gone as far as the procurement of a dispensation permitting the incestuous union, but José, who had little affection for his brother, was reluctant to give his assent, in which Pombal must certainly have encouraged him. It was said that Pedro had been even ordered to retire to his estate of Queluz. Though the infante was not a dangerous enemy in himself, Pombal was able to cite the example of Afonso VI and Pedro II. Thus although the princess had now reached the advanced age of twenty-three, and D. Pedro was generally supposed to be the contemplated bridegroom, no steps were taken to secure the succession, and the blame was attached to Pombal. José, certainly aware of what was said, possibly through his mistress, the younger Marchioness (Teresa) of Távora, cleaved the closer to his minister.

Malagrida continued to receive in Setúbal the visits of the more superstitious nobility, including the Távoras. Here the two currents of hostility to Pombal met. Pombal was aware that Malagrida had written to Clement XIII ascribing the misfortunes of the Jesuits to his government, possibly he even knew the terms of the letter, treasonable in the extreme for the ideas of the day: 'What a fatal scene! What a grievous spectacle! What a sudden metamorphosis! The heralds of the word of God expelled from the missions, proscribed and condemned to ignominy!...And who does this? Not His Most Faithful Majesty, son of D. John V and of D. Mariana of Austria, but the minister Carvalho, whose will is supreme at court. He, yes, he has been the architect of so many disasters and seeks to darken the splendour of our Society, which dazzles his livid eyes, with a flood of bigoted writings that breathe an immense, virulent, implacable hatred. If he could behead all the Jesuits at a blow, with what pleasure would he do so!' Although there is not a shred of evidence that the Jesuits plotted to murder the king,

¹ An incident of 1726 foreshadowed the expulsion of the Jesuits: when the Society refused to take part in a Corpus Christi procession in which the king himself was to figure, John V used the threat of placing them aboard any ships in the Tagus for deportation in order to bring them to obedience.

there is proof that they exercised a strong influence over the female Távoras, that they foretold the chastisement of the king and that they made propaganda against the regime. For Pombal the connection was enough.

On September 3, 1758, the king had gone out with his confidential servant Pedro Teixeira on an amorous errand. Closely watched by his wife during the daytime, he had formed the habit of slipping away from the palace when she thought he was at work with Pombal, and returning in the early hours of the morning. On this occasion the return was made before the usual time, and the carriage drawn by mules bowled along the road from Belém at about eleven o'clock, only to find the lock of the gate at which it usually entered jammed, so that a detour was necessary. The carriage proceeded, when suddenly three mounted men appeared under the darkness of an arch and fired a volley into the vehicle. The coachman whipped up his horses into a gallop. Farther on more mounted figures, lurking in an ambush, shot into the back of the carriage. The king was wounded, Teixeira and the coachman grazed. It was decided to hasten to the Junqueira to find the royal surgeon, who treated the king's shoulder, arm and chest for bullet-wounds. The top of the arm was bleeding profusely.

The following day a brief bulletin announced that the king had been taken ill overnight. Unofficially, rumour had it that the Távoras had ambushed him; another version was that the attempt was against Teixeira, but that the king had been hit by mistake. For three months the king convalesced, and no measures were taken. Only on December 13 were the mansions of the Távora and Atouguia families surrounded by troops, together with the Jesuit houses of Lisbon. Five male members of the Távora family were arrested, with the Count of Atouguia, the Duke of Aveiro and his young son the Marquis of Gouveia, various priests and some servants of Aveiro. The tribunal was appointed on January 4, 1759, and out of regard for the royal person Pombal ordered all its deliberations to be conducted in secrecy. The trial was not to be concerned with the motive of the crime, but merely to establish guilt.

Of the defendants, the Duke of Aveiro was accused of being the originator of the plot. He had borne a grudge against the king for the loss of certain privileges which he had hoped to retain; he had been on bad terms with the Jesuits until recently, when he held various conferences with them. On the day following the crime he sought an interview with the younger Marchioness of Távora at the house of one Escarlate or Scarlatti, and communicated to her his fears lest the rumours that associated the Távoras with the crime should lead to 'some excess'. As a result the marchioness, infected with Aveiro's alarm, probably

betrayed him to the king in order to save her own family. In return the duke, in the course of the trial, sought to throw suspicion back on the Távoras by asserting that the elder marquis had only learnt of the king's relations with D. Teresa on August 29, and that he. Aveiro, feared that the revelation had caused the Tavoras to instigate the crime. The judges refused to accept this plea, alleging that it was impossible that the marquis should have learnt so recently what was common knowledge. Furthermore, it was added, no vassal would ever presume to compete with the Supreme Majesty in such a matter, 'because the Throne was many spheres above the competency and temerity of vassals'-indeed history recorded many similar cases in which the highest families had been involved, but the consequences had never been any except silence, or at most dissimulation, 'neither is the above-mentioned Marquis of Távora so rustic, and, so to speak, so barbarous, as to be ignorant of this fact which is so notorious to all, even to those who do not know how to read or write'. This was the only reference to the king's affairs in the trial.

Aveiro at length confessed and incriminated the Távoras. According to his account there had been a subscription to pay for the assassins. These had waited for the king for ten or twelve nights; on some occasions the carriage had gone too fast, on others it had not appeared, or their courage had failed them. The duke had at last gone out himself, placed the assassins and joined the first group. To cover his retreat an entertainment was to be held at his house, and he would appear there as soon as the deed was done. A youth waiting in the garden for one of the duke's servants saw him come in, and declared that he banged his pistol on a stone and said, 'Devil take you: when I need you, you fail me'.

In spite of tortures the elder marquis and his second son revealed nothing. The first son and Atouguia confessed under torture and betrayed the elder marquis, but retracted their statements in making their defence. The evidence of the Count of Atouguia and his wife as to the manner in which he had spent the night, presented certain discrepancies, which invalidated his alibi. Counsel for the defence was only appointed a bare two days before sentence was passed.

Already on December 16 the Casa dos Vinte e Quatro had besought the king to withdraw his wonted clemency in the case of this crime 'against the anointed of the Lord, and a sovereign of such virtues that he is the delight of all those who have the good fortune to live under his Most August Protection'.

On January 12, 1759, the sentences were carried out: first the elder marchioness was beheaded, then the two Távora sons with Atouguia and three commoners were broken on the wheel and strangled. Amidst the litter of bodies Aveiro and the elder Marquis of Távora were brought forward and broken on the wheel, whilst a last assassin was burnt.

Searches of Jesuit houses had begun on December 22. Aveiro, among his other confessions, had conveniently declared that the crime had been suggested by Jesuits, and even mentioned the names of certain priests. On the day of the executions, ten Jesuits, including Malagrida, were arrested. The tribunal met on January 13 to consider what should be done with them. It was resolved to confiscate the society's property, disband its communities, close its schools and send its members to Africa. If it was hoped that enormous riches would be apprehended, the expectation was not fulfilled. In Brazil property, horses, cattle and libraries were acquired, but in Portugal the possessions of the Jesuits had no considerable value. The following May, the inquisitor-general listed the errors commonly believed to have been taught by Jesuits and ordered all those guilty of such errors to confess or be denounced. As the present inquisitor, one of the illegitimate sons of John V, showed no signs of activity, he was removed, and Pombal's brother, Paulo de Carvalho, took his place. After a strong course of propaganda and bribery of officials the Papacy was induced to allow the trial of ecclesiastics on this occasion by the Mesa de Consciência, though in a letter to José, Clement XIII asked that they should be reformed and not expelled. Pombal refused to have this letter delivered to the king, and eventually a diplomatic breach was brought about between Portugal and Rome. Unable to try all the Jesuits in prison, Pombal decided to deport those who were not vet arrested, and on the first anniversary of the attempted regicide, September 3, 1759, the law for the expulsion of the society, called 'corrupt, deplorably alienated from their divine institution, rebellious, perfidious', was published. Malagrida, confined in the Junqueira, suffered various hallucinations and transports, and composed a Treatise on the Antichrist. At length Pombal himself appeared to denounce him as a heretic. After nine months in the prisons of the inquisition, he at length perished in an auto-da-fé held in September 1761.

So ended the Távora case. The terrible example sufficed to seat Pombal firmly in the saddle until the death of José; in recognition of his energy in defence of the king he received the title of Count of Oeiras in July 1759.

vii. RELATIONS WITH SPAIN, 1759-1762. The first years of war between England and France passed without affecting Portugal. Only in 1759, when the French were preparing fleets in the Channel ports and the Mediterranean, did Rodney and Boscawen set out to destroy the projected invasion, the former successfully attacking Havre in July and the latter defeating the French Mediterranean fleet on the Portuguese coast

in August. The action, in which three enemy vessels were burnt, two captured and only two escaped, took place off Lagos, in which harbour the French commander took refuge. At once the French ambassador in Lisbon, whilst thanking the Portuguese for their hospitality, began to demand strong action in defence of Portuguese territorial waters. Pitt at once tendered satisfaction, offering to send an extraordinary ambassador to express regret, but refused to hear of the return of the prizes taken in Portuguese waters.

In March 1760 Lord Kinnoull arrived in Lisbon, and under pressure from the French Pombal handed him a note asking for the return of the ships; as the matter had not hitherto been raised, Kinnoull could only politely procrastinate. Pombal himself was perfectly satisfied to avoid the question, but the jealousy of the French was heightened by questions of precedence on the occasion of the queen's birthday gala; the French ambassador went to the lengths of assembling his compatriots and putting on his uniform as a musketeer officer in order to combat Kinnoull's pretensions by force if necessary. Similar incidents continued to occur. In May Carlos III of Spain had formally asked—not without ulterior motives—for the hand of the Princess of Brazil for his son D. Luis. The refusal came as a surprise, and to cover it the Portuguese heiress was wedded the following month to her uncle D. Pedro. The refusal of the nuncio to illuminate his dwelling for the wedding led to the breaking off of relations with Rome, for long lukewarm.

In view of the continuance of the French demands, Pombal had already asked Pitt for military assistance, and was assured on May 30 that the alliance would be integrally fulfilled in case of hostilities, being advised to see to the coastal defences of Portugal without delay. Preliminary steps were taken to combat French influence by the arrest of D. António and D. José, the 'meninos de Palhavã', on the grounds of their having aspired to the hand of the Princess of Brazil with the support of the nuncio and of the French ambassador. An attempt to smooth over the difficulty of protocol was made by establishing an order of precedence of ambassadors, which however annoyed the susceptible Frenchman, since he was given first place because of the priority of his nomination, not because of the pre-eminence of his nation.

In August 1761 Louis XV and Carlos III signed the Family Pact between France and Spain, attracting the duchy of Parma and the Two Sicilies; by a secret convention Carlos III bound himself to declare war on England by May 1, 1762, if France and England had not made peace by that date. In view of the failure to involve Portugal, an invasion of her territory was at once contemplated. It was only necessary to await the safe arrival of the Spanish treasure-fleet before proceeding to action.

Portugal had begun to realize her error in not having prepared, and vainly sought to intervene in the negotiations going on between England and France, with the view of obtaining some guarantee of security, whilst attempting to appease the King of Spain by agreeing to the revision of the Colonial Boundary Treaty (February 1761).

By January 1762 it was known that an ultimatum was to be delivered to Portugal, and Pombal renewed his request for English help. Hay, the English minister, paid a tribute to his calmness in the face of impending calamity; and indeed the state of the defences gave little reason for optimism. Since the peace of Utrecht the army had been abandoned; apart from the unpreparedness and incapacity of the ranks, officers were completely lacking, and promotions had been held up for years. Six months' arrears of pay were arranged, and efforts were made to put military organization into working order.

In March 1762, Spanish and French forces concentrated on the frontier. A French envoy, O'Dunne, had arrived in Lisbon the month before and joined the Spanish ambassador Torrero in presenting the demands of the Family Pact. José I, as brother-in-law of Carlos III, was requested to close the ports of Portugal against English ships, whether naval or mercantile; an answer was sought within four days. The ultimatum received a dignified rejection: in view of Portugal's alliance with England, defensive by its nature and consecrated by many treaties, it was against the principles of justice that she should bow to this demand. On April 1, a different argument was put forward by O'Dunne and Torrero: the old grievance of the Lagos incident was revived. An English fleet had dared to attack French units in a Portuguese port, and no effort had been made to obtain restitution. Therefore the Spanish forces must invade Portugal. In reply the Portuguese government declared its intention of resisting to the last.

Already in March Lord Tyrawley had arrived in Lisbon; in spite of his seventy years he had been requested by the Portuguese as commander. So far no troops had arrived. Tyrawley and Pombal soon fell out; the former accused the latter of misrepresenting the forces at his disposal as 35,000 horse and foot; whilst Pombal found the elderly general as autocratic as others found himself. The situation was thus most unpromising when the Franco-Spanish note of April 23 announced the intention of freeing Portugal 'from the heavy shackles of Britannic dominion'. José replied that he would defend his country from all intruders, and O'Dunne and Torrero accordingly took their departure. On April 30, the Marquis of Sarria, commanding the Spanish forces, published a declaration to the Portuguese people and entered the province of Trásos-Montes. On May 18 José declared war. A force under O'Reilly

seized Miranda, where an explosion of the powder magazine necessitated an immediate surrender, and entered Bragança and Chaves without opposition. However, after a check delivered by a force of peasants commanded by Tyrawley's son O'Hara, the Spaniards retired to their own side of the frontier, merely leaving a garrison at Chaves.

By now Tyrawley's inability to command had been discovered in England, and an experienced general was detached in the person of Count William of Schaumburg-Lippe, an English-born German, who was accompanied by the Earl of Loudoun and General Burgoyne, with Prince Charles of Mecklenburg-Strelitz as commander of the artillery. Pitt had appealed for assistance in the shape of a vote of a million pounds; and a force of 8,000 men, one cavalry and six infantry regiments, with arms, supplies and money, was despatched. Already various reforms had been put into practice in the Portuguese army by decree of the preceding February, increasing the size of its units and limiting the extravagance of supplies: officers' meals were reduced to a 'cover of twenty various kitchen courses together with the respective cover of dessert'; N.C.O.'s were to subsist on only eight courses.

In July a Spanish force occupied Castelo Rodrigo and laid siege to Almeida, where it was joined by a considerable French force. The garrison was heavily outnumbered, and compelled to surrender before Lippe could move up sufficient forces to come to its relief. The main Anglo-Portuguese forces were now concentrated in the Tagus valley. Lippe and Burgovne decided to move forward on Valencia de Alcántara to forestall the activities of enemy concentrations, and Burgovne suddenly crossed the Tagus and seized the town, capturing the French general Dumberry and other officers on August 27. A Spanish division occupied Castelo Branco and moved towards the Tagus, but after wasting its impetus on minor manœuvres, it retired into Spain. By November a truce was declared on the Luso-Spanish front, and preliminaries of peace were signed at Fontainebleau: on February 3, 1763, peace was made in Paris. Portugal received full restitution from Spain, though the clause appertaining to the Sacramento colony of Brazil, which the Spaniards had seized, was not fully carried out. In spite of the peace it was to be feared that Louis XV would attempt an invasion of Brazil in conjunction with the Spaniards, and once again military help was sought from England. However the Portuguese fears were not shared in Whitehall, and Lippe, who had remained in Portugal until 1764, refused to return without English troops, so the alarm was left to pass away.

viii. THE EXPULSION OF THE JESUITS. A factor that contributed to the easing of relations between Lisbon, Madrid and Paris was the common front of the three courts against the Jesuits. When the populace of

Madrid objected to the reforms of Carlos III's ministers, the blame was laid on the Jesuits, and the king himself was easily convinced that the society had planned to prove him a bastard, so that his brother Luis might reign. Numbers of Jesuits were shipped from Spain to Italy, just as their Portuguese fellows had been a few years before. Pombal lost no time in congratulating Carlos III on his escape from this doubtful peril, offering armed assistance and co-operation in watching the frontiers.

The situation of Portugal, France and Spain was curiously analogous. In 1764 Louis XV had been convinced that the Jesuits were at the bottom of the Damiens affair; the attempted regicide, though he had been armed with only a penknife, was put to death with the same brutality as the Tayoras and Aveiro, and in November the order was expelled from France. Now, after inquiries in Spain, the Jesuits were declared to have given money to the participants in the revuelta de los sombreros and were expelled from Spain by a decree of April 2, 1767. Pombal proposed that the three courts should approach the Papacy to ask for the extinction of the society. Clement XIII, influenced by his secretary Torregiani, flatly refused to comply. Pombal would have declared war on Rome, but the Spaniards proposed gentler methods, and for the moment no advance was made. When Clement XIII felt the approach of death, he sought to come to terms with José, addressing him the bull A quo die in August 1767, and writing simultaneously to Pombal. His approaches were in vain; Pombal found them inadequate and replied with an anti-Jesuitical diatribe. Not long afterwards, the pope himself precipitated events; the Duke of Parma had produced various laws which curtailed the exemptions of the clergy, and in January 1768 Clement XIII annulled them and excommunicated the duke. This attack on an outpost of the Family Pact excited the three courts. A retraction was demanded within a week: it was refused. Bourbon forces seized Avignon and Benevento; Venice, Modena and Bavaria expelled the Jesuits. In December the French envoy again demanded the abolition of the order; Clement XIII gave no reply. but a little later he suddenly died. Meanwhile Pombal's Dedução Cronológica, a three-volume polemic against the Jesuits, had appeared under the name of José de Seabra da Silva, later one of Pombal's ministers. Its publication caused a considerable stir, since the whole procedure of the Holy See was depicted in an unfavourable light. This, the realization that the whole temporal power of Rome was at stake, and the machinations of the Bourbon powers made the task of electing Clement XIII's successor a difficult one. The Jesuits struggled vigorously to gain sympathizers and votes, but the Bourbons made it plain that the election of an unsuitable pope would lead at least to a diplomatic rupture. When therefore Cardinal Ganganelli was elected on May 19, 1769, taking the

name of Clement XIV, it was asserted that he had already given a promise to extinguish the society, though in fact he made some resistance. In December 1769 diplomatic relations were resumed with Portugal; Pombal had requested as much, and Rome had a certain fear lest an autonomous Church should spring up in Portugal, where in effect ecclesiastical affairs had developed towards independence through the various ruptures with the Papacy since 1640.

On December 3 José was on a hunting excursion at Vila Viçosa, where a countryman, apparently aggrieved at the seizure of a horse or mule, attacked him at the gate of the royal preserve with a bludgeon, which the king avoided by pricking his horse. Once more the Jesuit bogy was aroused, and the incident urged in Rome as a new motive for the suppression of the order, which was backed up by the French ambassador, Cardinal Bernis. Clement XIV feared to provoke a schism, and said so in a letter to Pombal, but both José and his minister replied again asking for the extinction. By now a new Spanish ambassador had arrived in Rome and added his weight against the Jesuits. In March a draft of the proposed bull reached Lisbon, and the other regalist courts, and at length on July 21, 1773, the brief Dominus ac redemptor noster suppressed the Society of Jesus. Its announcement in Lisbon the following September gave occasion for Te Deums, illuminations, and general rejoicings. The Marquis of Pombal himself—the possessor of the title since a few months after the Vila Viçosa affair—expressed his satisfaction at having been the first to attack the insidious Company. His action in resuming diplomatic relations with Rome stood him in good stead with Ganganelli, who would exclaim with admiration to the Portuguese envoy 'Grand' uomo! Grand' uomo! Fortunato monarca!'

ix. LATER REFORMS. In his later administration Pombal continued to pass laws as complete and as drastic as ever, but the lack of execution grew more and more noticeable, and the absence of all opposition deluded Pombal into a belief in the greatness and durability of his work, which became progressively more remote from reality. Failures ceased to preoccupy him; the limitations of his own lifetime and the non-fulfilment of much that he had already decreed he did not observe, lost in the megalomania of his schemes.

From the time of the foundation of the Wine Company, he attempted to interest the nobility in commerce. In 1757 he had decreed that nobles might participate in the Grand-Pará Company. An enormous difficulty in his way was the lack of a commercial middle-class. Many Portuguese traders were illiterate; even the shortage of clerks was acutely felt. In 1759 a commercial institute was designed to give a complete training to three hundred book-keepers and office-workers. Already before the

earthquake, the Junta do Comércio had been instituted, and its statutes were issued in December 1756. Its duties were to supervise trade, issue licences to retailers and recover debts, but also to take what measures it thought fit for the stimulation of commerce.

National industries, which had decayed after the unco-ordinated efforts of the previous reign, were encouraged or revived. The silk factory taken over by the state in 1750 received strong official support by a reform of 1757, which placed it under the Junta do Comércio and nominated various representatives of the trading companies to its board of direction. Development was encouraged by allowing workmen who could prove their skill by submitting to an examination to set up their own workshops. The regulations of the Royal College of National Manufacturers, otherwise the silk factory, were later extended to other state enterprises. The woollen industry and private undertakings for making glass, paper and linen received state support, while the Junta do Comércio sponsored a number of manufactures. The Royal Hat Factory at Tomar (1759) was later merged into the silk factory; the Cutlery factory (1764) and the factory of Ivory Combs, Cardboard Boxes, Varnish and Lacquer (1764) were followed by various enterprises for clock-making, button-moulding, porcelain, tapestry, and iron-foundry. In many cases foreign experts were established to train Portuguese workmen.

In an effort to save the decadent tunny-fishing industry in the Algarve, the General Company of Fisheries of the Kingdom of Algarve came into being, with exclusive rights for twelve years. Similar steps were taken to safeguard the sardine fisheries; the foundation of Vila Real de Santo António on grandiose lines was accompanied by the extinction of the neighbouring village of Monte-Gordo when its inhabitants did not at once comply with the order to establish themselves at the official fishery.

There was little novelty in Pombal's general plan. The policy of Colbert, practised by Ericeira, was attempted on a vast scale, at a time when other countries were absorbed by physiocratic theories. The whole scheme was too general, too abstract and too dependent on a non-existent executive organization to succeed. The Brazil companies especially involved the state in heavy debts.

University studies had stagnated since the renascence. The action of John V had only scratched the surface and the reform of education was still to be done. An anonymous writer describing the activities of the University of Évora, the Jesuit institution closed in February 1758, describes the inadequacy of the system—four or six years of Latin, with no Portuguese, followed by a course of purely scholastic philosophy and physics. After a year of metaphysics, the student was ready for his final year, consisting of two hours of classes in the afternoons composed of revision

and cramming. 'Nothing of Newton, of Gassendi, of Descartes; the fathers of the university had never seen the works of Wolf, Leibniz, Verney, Locke, Malebranche, Boyle and many others who in their time wrote with such taste and criticism. I never saw a philosophical history, ancient or modern. I found only one philosophical or mathematical dictionary; whence I plainly perceived that these men could not know, nor did they know anything, because they had no books.' Yet the Dictionary of Bayle, though prohibited, was to be found in many private libraries.

On the banishment of the Jesuits, Pombal took the matter in hand. A decree of June 1759 created a free grammar-school in each ward in Lisbon, and prescribed the system of instruction. Four schools for Greek and rhetoric were set up in Lisbon, two in Coimbra, Évora and Oporto and one in every principal town. The best pupils could have their first year and a half in Greek subtracted from the time they would spend at the university, and received preference in the inscriptions for the four faculties of theology, canon law, civil law and medicine. Eighteen months after the foundation of the schools of rhetoric, matriculation at Coimbra would be dependent on a successful examination in the study. The repetition of Latin verses was at length made subsidiary to a knowledge of Portuguese grammar. What provision was made for the enormous number of trained teachers this organization called for does not appear, though a Director-General of Studies was created for three years from 1759, Latin masters were appointed in some places, and in November, five months after the decree, four classes of rhetoric, eleven of Latin. and one of Greek had been started in Lisbon.

Two other creations of Pombal were the College of Nobles (1761) and the Royal Board of Censorship (1768). The former was to house a hundred boys from seven to thirteen years of age, all gentlemen, who should learn Latin and Greek, with rhetoric, poetry and history, French, Italian and English; arithmetic, geometry and trigonometry; algebra; optics; astronomy; geography and navigation; military and civil architecture; drawing; physics; fencing; riding and dancing. In spite of detailed regulations, even Pombal could not make boys of thirteen absorb this enormous programme. Discipline proved difficult to maintain and decadence followed. The Royal Board of Censorship, with the right to approve all books and papers in Portugal, was granted the direction of lower education in 1771. It administered a scheme for the distribution of schools from 1772, and a plan of the masters available appended to this scheme shows 479 teachers of reading and writing, 236 of Latin, 38 of Greek, 49 of rhetoric and 35 of moral and rational philosophy.

An examination of the causes of the decadence of teaching at Coimbra

led to the publication of the new statutes of the university in August 1772. Pombal, as 'plenipotentiary and lieutenant' of the university, spent a month in Coimbra and reorganized the studies, adding faculties of mathematics and natural sciences and creating an observatory, laboratories, a botanic garden, a natural history museum and a theatre. Among the numerous ramifications of study Pombal proposed to promote were those of the history of law, exegesis and ecclesiastical history; the Board of Censorship created a chair of diplomatic orthography.

Yet Pombal was no encyclopaedist, no philosopher: his censors continued to proscribe the works of Voltaire, Rousseau and Diderot, together with those of Spinoza, Locke and Hobbes.

X. LAST YEARS OF JOSÉ I. In spite of his age, a year older than the century, Pombal continued to govern with unabated vigour. In June 1775 an apotheosis of his regime was held with the inauguration of the equestrian statue of José I in the Terreiro do Paço. For the three days of celebrations to commemorate the reconstruction of Lisbon, the halfcompleted edifices of the Terreiro were filled in with a wooden and canvas frontage, so as to give an impression of the final effect, and José wondered at his own greatness and glory as he surveyed the fine, but rather small, statue of himself, with Pombal's medallion let into the base. A few days later he received Pombal's Most Secret Observations on the Inauguration of the Equestrian Statue, a complimentary catalogue of the progresses realized by the happy monarch. These were, firstly, literacy before 1750 it was rare to find a person who could write a legible letter, whereas now when a clerk is to be appointed numbers of excellently written applications are received'. Secondly, Portuguese industry could now supply for home consumption all clothes, carriages and sundry articles that were previously imported. Architecture, painting and the other arts flourished. Literature, in Portuguese, Latin, Greek, Hebrew and Arabic, flourished. Learning, internal, foreign and colonial trade flourished. Portugal was wealthy: 'observant foreigners did not fail to remark the many millions that in a few years were spent in public and private buildings after the earthquake. They saw a most magnificent square surpassing all others in Europe in size and beauty. They saw a costly and unexampled equestrian statue erected in the square.... Every foreigner who observed such a reunion of riches, could not but be convinced that the capital and kingdom were in the highest state of prosperity and opulence.'

On the morning of the inauguration a petard was found under the seat of Pombal's carriage. The police discovered an infernal machine, and two false keys to Pombal's stables, in the house of a Genoese traveller, Battista Pele. Condemned to a traitor's death, Pele kept silence. No

one knew the origin of the mysterious affair which resulted in an obscure foreigner being executed with the strange barbarity applied to French regicides. His hands were cut off and four horses dragged his body round the streets.

Terrorism sufficed to hold the country down, but Pombal's authority was still vulnerable at one point. If José should die, he could not count upon D. Pedro, around whom his enemies had clustered, impotent now, but waiting. For a time he apparently considered the exclusion of the Princess of Brazil in favour of her son, D. José, born in 1761, said to be of considerable intelligence and educated by persons friendly to himself. The plan failed. In some way Maria Francisca heard of the scheme and pleaded with her father, who consulted Pombal. The minister is said to have discovered that the source of her information was his protégé, José de Seabra, who was stripped of his offices and banished from court in January 1774, to be deported to Brazil later in the year. If the plan of succession was the true cause of Seabra's disgrace, Pombal still did not relinquish it. It was said that the marriage of Prince José to his aunt D. Maria Benedita was intended to strengthen it; whatever the truth of the matter, the last match was performed only on the king's request, a day or two before his death, so that the scheme, however deeply laid, availed Pombal nothing.

The minister's last act was also not his least brutal. Towards the end of 1776 the possibility of a new war made it necessary to rearm. Numbers of old soldiers were called up, and recruits were pressed in Lisbon, but many deserted and slipped away, and some took refuge in the fishing-village of Trafaria near the bar of the Tagus. One night towards the end of January 1777 a detachment of soldiers was sent across the river to surprise the village and burn it. Most of the fishermen's houses were destroyed in this display of needless savagery.

But already José I was ill, and since the previous November Mariana Victoria had exercised the regency. Since November 29 the king had remained speechless; on February 24, 1777, he died. On the following day when Pombal arrived at the antechamber, Cardinal da Cunha met him with the words: 'Your Excellency has no longer anything to do here.'

CHAPTER XXIII

MARIA I: THE PENINSULAR WAR

i. STATE OF THE KINGDOM AT THE DEATH OF JOSÉ. The death of José and the opening of the prisons were hailed with popular rejoicings. The last recommendations of the late king enjoined his successor to govern with peace and justice, treat her mother and sisters well, finish the construction of the Memória church, pay off the royal debts, protect his faithful servants and pardon those guilty of crimes against the state whom she should think worthy of clemency, for he had pardoned them all, that God might forgive his own sins. Whether or not Pombal made an attempt to prevent the release of his victims, as the Italian director of the royal press declared, the new queen carried out her father's behest on the day after his funeral. In the words of the Spanish ambassador, it was a sort of resurrection of the dead, a phrase which struck the contemporary imagination, since it was used also by the Austrian minister and the Italian press-director. The Bishop of Coimbra, released, according to Walpole, the day before the king's death, was the first of a great number of men and women of all ages and conditions who issued from the strongholds of the Tagus, from Setúbal and from various convents that had been converted into prisons. Ragged, dirty and hungry, some of them had spent up to twenty years in duress, and their appearance, widely advertised by the clergy, excited popular indignation against the minister. In the Junqueira fort eleven of the thirty-three prisoners had perished; those who survived included Enserrabodes, now eighty years of age, who had spoken and written too freely, various Jesuits, the two priests of Santa Apolónia imprisoned in 1756, a coachman known as the 'prophet of Leiria' who had had the misfortune to foretell the earthquake and the outrage against the king, and the son of Aveiro. The Távoras refused to leave their confinement until their innocence should have been legally recognized. Of the hundred and twenty-four Jesuits who had been shut up in the fort of São Julião da Barra, only forty-five issued forth. Altogether over eight hundred individuals were reckoned to have been liberated by D. Maria's order; how many died in prison or were exiled is a matter for speculation rather than computation.

Lisbon eagerly availed itself of the lost privilege of free gossip. 'At the moment there is no particular news except the continuation of conversations, satires and popular follies against Pombal, reaching such lengths that boys make his effigy and burn it, reading and publishing

various sentences and therewith a thousand fooleries. It is certain that Pombal deserves the general hatred of the public for his cruelty, but the savage persistence of the people is by now reaching a point where the disorder that is stirred up is out of hand and may lead to ill consequences. It is known that the clergy chiefly stimulates it', wrote the Spanish ambassador on April 8.

The other wishes of the dead king proved less easy to comply with, especially the payment of his debts. It had been rumoured that a large sum of money had been accumulated, some 78,000,000 cruzados; Pombal himself now estimated the treasury to contain over seven millions, with in addition five or six in rough diamonds. Even this figure was misleading, since it included nearly three millions that had been raised in advance for pressing expenses. The confiscated property of the Távoras and the Jesuits had brought in some two and a half millions: this had been swallowed up long ago. As early as 1763, according to the Austrian minister, salaries, pensions and dividends all went unpaid; Wraxall declared in 1772 that most officials and servants in the royal household had gone some years without receiving their salaries, and in the following year another Austrian minister wrote that the servants had not been paid for ten years, and that most of them depended on charity. Pensions amounting to forty contos, due for the year 1773, were paid thirteen years later. Whilst these facts suffice to prove that Pombal had done nothing to mend the state of chronic financial turmoil that had prevailed since the entry of the Bragança dynasty, it is only fair to recall that contemporary Europe could produce parallels, leading in the case of France to much more violent consequences than were experienced in Portugal. Perhaps the most depressing facts revealed on the fall of Pombal were those relating to the colonies, which for the last fifteen years, far from supporting the mother-country, had drained of 6.979.336 \$684 reis.

Not only this, but the affairs of the kingdom and the army and navy were long in arrears. Packets of papers that had been awaiting attention since 1755 remained to be sorted out in the various departments of government that Pombal personally supervised. 'He is obliged to transact everything himself, for he cannot confide in anyone', wrote Dalrymple; the result was the accumulation of papers and neglect of certain departments. The army had relapsed after the departure of Count Lippe into the state of disorder that dated from the close of the war of the Spanish succession. It has been asserted that much or most of the army lived by begging, but Dalrymple, himself a soldier, merely says that he saw one sentry begging; 'such a band, in general, I never saw'. This, however, is scarcely to be wondered at in view of the rough-

and-ready methods of recruiting. As to the navy, it consisted of a dozen warships rotting in the port of Lisbon. Dalrymple mentions an officer whose wife was a laundress because he earned only forty shillings a month. The same author declares that much of the capital had still not been cleared of the ruins of the earthquake, 'whole streets lying in a demolished state'.

ii. MARIA AND PEDRO; THE REHABILITATION OF THE TÁVORAS AND THE DEATH OF POMBAL. Maria I had been born in 1734; her consort and uncle Pedro III was her senior by seventeen years. Both were devout, amiable, indolent figures who interfered very little in the government of the country. Neither had played any part in the administration of Pombal, and Pedro at sixty was no longer of an age to adapt himself to a new life. Their favourite existence was that of the country palace of Queluz, where they entertained the nobility and diplomacy with musical evenings, horse-races, fireworks, bull-fights, serenades, suppers, operas and religious services. Their piety was not stained with scandal like that of John V, nor at the mercy of policy like that of José; both were absorbed in it and much influenced by the clergy. 'She has a great deference for her husband, and the king has a great veneration for her, and speaks of her as a saint', wrote Walpole. 'The king is of a confined understanding, hears three or four masses in the morning in the utmost ecstasy, and attends evening prayers as devoutly. He is liberal in his alms; talks much in precepts of goodness and justice: but as he has no knowledge of mankind or business, he is easily governed, right or wrong, by those immediately about him, especially if they belong to the Church.' Maria had the clearer mind of the two, notwithstanding her later insanity. According to an official biographer, as a child of 'prodigious beauty'. she knew all the Christian doctrine at the age of two, read Portuguese and Spanish at four, and went on to Latin at five. She had learnt to sing. paint and ride; even in her fifties she took exercise on horseback. The author of the Voyage du duc de Châtelet calls her 'a woman worthy of esteem and respect; but she has not the qualities that constitute a great queen. No one is more human, more charitable nor more sensitive than she, but these good qualities are spoiled by an excessive and misplaced devotion. Her confessor, who has an unlimited ascendancy over her, fills with acts of piety and penitence time that could be more usefully devoted to the happiness of her people, without harming the salvation of her soul.' Nevertheless D. Maria's most recent biographer has stressed the lack of any evidence of excessive piety in her voluminous and regular correspondence.1

Of the royal pair the consort was the most accessible: 'the good

1 Dr Caetano Beirão, D. Maria I. Lisbon, 1934.

Dom P. readily believes everything he is told by the Angejas, Marialvas, Minas, etc. but the Q. is more circumspect in what she says, more prudent, more enlightened in her opinions', wrote the Abbé Garnier in 1781. As the protector of the interests of the nobility, it was thus to D. Pedro that the request for the rehabilitation of the Távoras was addressed. Maria possessed a strong sense of duty towards her father, in spite of her respect for D. Pedro; the conflict of these two feelings probably contributed to the delay in the revision of the Távora case. Her restrained dislike for the Marquis of Pombal probably originated in his scheme to obtain her exclusion from the succession, but she both revered D. José's memory and dominated her feelings without difficulty.

On March 1, 1777, Pombal saw that his situation was hopeless and offered his resignation. 'I do not pretend, Madam,' he wrote, 'to compare myself with the Duke of Sully in merits. Yet it is certain and public in all Your Majesty's palace and in the whole city of Lisbon that I am equal with him in misfortune and in the motives for which I have recourse to Your Majesty's royal clemency, beseeching Your Majesty to be pleased to approve the resignation I have requested of all the appointments I have hitherto held, and to concede me permission to spend at Pombal the last space of life that remains to me, and resting assured that, in the incomparable superiority with which your virtues rise above those of the Queen of the Medici, I shall not fail to arouse at least those same sentiments of benignity which the requests of the Duke of Sully found in that Princess.' Three days later permission was given. Although he was to retain his income as secretary of state and received the comenda of Lanhoso with its revenues, he was warned of a possible action in the future arising from the unsatisfactory state of the treasury, while the queen openly declared that her motive in conceding his request was 'nothing other than the veneration and respect that she conserves and ever will conserve for the cherished memory of her august father and lord, and the clemency and benignity which will be inseparable from the resolutions of her cabinet in everything compatible with rectitude and justice'. On March 14, Angeja and Cerveira, long indicated as the most prominent members of the nobility, joined the ministry.

The new ministers had to face the task of straightening out the financial situation. The palace servants received their wages; in the arsenal, six hundred of the three thousand workers were dismissed with a quarter of the two years' pay that was due to them. To curtail expenditure, royal bull-fights were suppressed, and the bulls and carriages sold up: two thousand horses and mules, the property of the royal household, were disposed of. All public works were suspended, even the reconstruction

of Lisbon. 'No money leaves the treasury for any object, which greatly displeases the people, and may make them grumble aloud if it continues', wrote a French informer in May 1777, and a month later: 'People speak very loud against the Marquis of Angeja...he is accused of loving gold no less than the Marquis of Pombal.' Angeja—D. Pedro José de Noronha e Camões de Albuquerque Moniz de Sousa, fourth Count of Vila Verde and third Marquis of Angeja—had enjoyed the esteem of the late king, and was, in Pombal's words reported by Walpole, the only one of the noblemen whose thoughts the dictator could not penetrate. Intelligent and erudite, he had formed the first botanic garden in Portugal, and installed a natural science museum in his palace; but he had no particular bent for statesmanship, and had lost his habits of industry. Detractors, mostly scurrilous, were not wanting, but in general Angeja's work proved salutary: the adverse balance of trade with England, amounting to five million cruzados in 1777, was gradually wiped out, and three years after Angeja's death the treasury could obtain loans at as little as 31 per cent, 'a fact that had never occurred before and was never repeated after'.1

Cerveira, whose father had died in prison, obtained a declaration from the queen that the previous count had always served the crown with loyalty and zeal. Even earlier, Enserrabodes had been given the title of chanceler-mór with the right to receive its and other emoluments and a dispensation from performing its duties. Many of the other victims of Pombal were assisted in a similar fashion, but the refusal of the noble prisoners of the Junqueira to abandon their jail until their innocence was officially attested, presented an awkward problem. The first solution found was to allow them to withdraw to twenty leagues from the court. where they might take the necessary steps for the appreciation of their case. The Marquis of Alorna quickly obtained a decision; on May 17, 1777, a decree was issued certifying his entire innocence and restoring him to the honours and liberties to which he was entitled. The same steps were taken with the three Távoras, D. Nuno, D. Manuel and D. José Maria. In October 1778 the Count of São Lourenço was offered reparation; but being apparently unwilling to accept anything less than the visit of the monarch in person to free him, he refused to reappear at court. The Countess of Atouguia, the daughter of the Távoras, obtained a declaration of her innocence in June 1780. The chief opposition to these rehabilitations came from Mariana Victoria. 'Your Excellency is not unaware of the repugnance displayed by the queen-mother in the matter of the release; and it seems that by reason of this they were in great peril of being despatched overseas', wrote the Spanish ambassador.

¹ Colecção de Leis; in Beirão, D. Maria I, p. 84.

In December 1777 Alorna, as 'trustee of the memory and posthumous fame' of his relatives, presented a request for the revision of the whole case, submitting that a great and notorious injustice had been done to his family. No immediate decision was taken in response to this request. To free the living was a work of clemency which had been sanctioned by José's dying wishes, but to exhume hatreds and passions, and even the discredit that the affair threw on her father, by retrying the illustrious criminals who had already expiated the outrage, revolted the queen's sense of duty. Only on August 8, 1780, did she appoint a group of magistrates to decide whether or not the case should be reopened. They decided affirmatively, and on October 9 fourteen judges were nominated to the task. At the beginning of 1781 the suit was almost ruined by a curious incident. The young Marquis of Gouveia, who had spent most of his life, from his seventeenth to his thirty-sixth year, in prison, merely because he was the son of his father, made various representations which were included by Alorna in the general case. 'There appeared an extensive memorial that contemporaries attributed to an advocate called Francisco da Costa, who carried his ardour to the point of compromising not only the case of his client, but that of the Marquis of Alorna. It was alleged in this document that D. Martinho (Gouveia) could not have been incriminated by his father's crime on account of his nobility, and that the pardon conceded by D. José had restored him to his previous estate. It was sought to show that the infamy of the crimes of fathers could not attain sons born after the crime. The problem of the origin of authority was ventilated so as to affirm that the power of kings resides originally in the people. Finally the return of the house of Aveiro and the estates of Gouveia and Santa Cruz was sought.'1 The very mention of doctrines which cast doubts upon the absolute origin of royal power raised a scandal; the unlucky author found himself banished to Brazil: Gouveia was threatened with exile; Alorna cleared himself as best he could by repudiating the memorial.

The final solution of the case was delayed. 'One morning the queen awoke very perturbed. She refused to relate to her attendant ladies what troubled her, but when the king her husband came to inquire what was the matter, she revealed that the delay in reaching the end of the case was tormenting her, and that she had a mind to call at once the judges who composed the court so that the case might be settled that day. D. Pedro failed to convince her of the difficulty of warning so many magistrates in such haste and of obtaining a decision from them with such promptness. The judges were called, and the queen revealed her purpose to them, not without recommending them to decide with all

i Beirão, D. Maria I, p. 147.

equity and justice, freely declaring the rightfulness or wrongfulness with which the accused had been condemned. The tribunal sat all night, until, in the early morning, it pronounced the culpability of the Duke of Aveiro and his accomplices, declaring the innocence of the Marquises of Távora, the Count of Atouguia and all the other persons who had been arrested as implicated in the attempted regicide.' The decision was reached by a majority of fifteen to three. It was never executed. Significantly, the first part of the long document containing the findings of the court, dated May 23, 1781, seeks to vindicate the action of José, relieving him of all responsibility for the executions now pronounced miscarriages of justice. The two 'most just and most luminous' dispositions with which the king had intervened in the case were shown to have been scandalously violated in the trial, of which fact of course he could not possibly have had knowledge. The confirmation of Aveiro's guilt naturally broke down his son's case; Gouveia was ordered by the queen to receive the treatment of an ordinary citizen, though an annual pension was granted him from the treasury.

The rehabilitated nobles took advantage of the terms of the sentence to claim the return of their houses and property. Most of these had been auctioned. Pombal had the Carvalho estate that had belonged to the Count of Atouguia: Cardinal da Cunha had Aveiro's silver. The council of state heard the plea of the Atouguias and rejected it, but later when a new confessor was appointed to the queen in the person of the Bishop of the Algarve, he by dint of great persuasion wrested a decree from her in favour of the Atouguias. After having signed, the queen picked up the pen and scratched out her signature, 'exclaiming that she was condemned to very Hell'. In a fit of delirium, the first sign of her future madness, she was carried off to her apartments.

The final scenes in the drama of Pombal were played in the small town from which he took his title. Leaving behind the wrath of the Lisbon mob, he reached Oeiras on March 6, 1777; his wife joined him the same day, and on the next they began the rough journey north. The mansion at Pombal had not been used for many years: some of the servants ran away. Fearing an aggression, the former dictator asked his son to send up some shot-guns for protection. Meanwhile claimants and creditors began to file their demands. On leaving Lisbon, Pombal had left with his son a list of debts amounting to forty-five contos; others, suddenly remembered by various bodies and individuals, included one of eight contos to the silk factories, three for baize and cloths from Covilhã, four for gems, and twelve for arrears of taxation due to the treasury. The Free-Water Board demanded the confiscation of his goods as a reprisal for his having diverted two public fountains to his own estate.

In spite of this, his estate stood up to the demands made upon it. He himself wrote in 1778, 'we have a much bigger chest in reserve than I hitherto thought'; there was enough to keep up the houses of Oeiras and Redinha, as well as for him to live decently at Pombal. Beckford, describing the possessions of the second marquis ten years after his father's fall, says: 'He possesses one of the largest landed estates in the kingdom—about one hundred and twenty thousand crowns a year.' Curiously enough, the doctrine so violently enforced against the Aveiros was not applied to Pombal; whilst his medallion was being stoned in the Terreiro do Paço by the populace, his son, then Count of Oeiras, was confirmed by the queen as president of the Lisbon municipality, and directed the programme of festivities with which the city regaled her on her acclamation in May 1777. In the following October the queenmother, Pombal's strongest pillar, retired to Spain.

After the first moment of depression, and in spite of his eighty years, Pombal took up the cudgels against his adversaries with his old vigour. spending his mornings in his study at work on vindications or refutations. There were sixteen suits to fight, most of them contesting his right to various properties he was attested to have seized when in power. His afternoons he spent in ordering the work of his estate and gardens. He was unable to understand that he might be truly unpopular: 'it is impossible that they should hate me. My actions, my conduct, all assure me of the contrary,' he told Cormatin. The first case which Pombal used to produce a general justification of his conduct was that brought by a rich gentleman of Abrantes named Mendanha. The plaintiff had bought from Pombal an estate valued at 25,000 cruzados. After a time, on the grounds that it failed to produce the rents represented by Pombal. Mendanha declared that the estate was not worth so much and refused to complete the instalments that were still due, whereupon he was arrested, and despatched untried to the Azores, remaining there until the general pardon. The accusation was generalized by the implications that Pombal had enriched himself 'at the cost of the liberties and just fear of many innocent people' and that he had used a 'despotic and absolute power'. In his Contradiction of the charge, Pombal brought forth defences he had already included in his apologias addressed to Maria I. Instead of demanding the withdrawal of the general and irrelevant charges, Pombal devoted most of his defence to dealing with them. It consisted of six parts: the first refuted the present accusation and declared that Mendanha had freely entered into a fair contract. The second sought to establish his own honesty, advancing the evidence of popes and emperors, kings and statesmen. The third denied that he had received any monies by fraud; many of his functions had been unpaid:

his only salaries had been as minister and as secretary to the house and estate of Bragança; he had never accepted grants or confiscated property and never engaged in commerce; the origins of his fortune were outlined. The fourth part justified his policy, depicting the deplorable state in which José I had found the kingdom, and asserting that no arrests had been made without the king's signature. The last two sections returned to Mendanha, accusing him of crimes which justified the paternal intervention of the minister in saving his family from ruin, and adding that in any case the affair had not been dealt with by himself but by a colleague. Both the case itself and Pombal's defence caused a general stir. There was no longer any alternative but for the state to intervene, and the question was transferred to the royal court (desembargo do paço). The whole problem of responsibilities, closely touching the memory of the late king, was opened by Pombal's defence. Consequently an order was given for the apprehension of all copies of the accusation and contradiction, the arrest of the advocates of plaintiff and defendant and the reduction of the suit to its original private nature. This done, the queen ordered that preliminary investigations should be made, based, not on the Contradiction, but on a Supplication addressed to the Queen our Lady D. Maria I, written by Pombal soon after his fall.

In October 1779 two judges, appointed for the interrogation of the minister, arrived in Pombal. They found him in a pitiable state. The man who still at the age of seventy-seven 'felt himself so sound in body and mind that he thought himself immortal and spoke of such vast schemes as his sons could barely expect to live to see fulfilled', was now bedridden, afflicted with innumerable sores that prevented his putting his feet on the ground without agonizing pains and continuous diarrhoea. Frequently carried from his bedchamber to the apartment where the interrogations took place, Pombal nevertheless maintained his vivacity of mind, 'with his memory as fresh and exact as if he were only thirty years of age'. Once interrupted when his state of health worsened, the first inquiry terminated on January 15, 1780. The Jesuits were now demanding the restoration of the society, and sought to have all stigma of blame removed from their past actions. Nevertheless a number of members of the court nominated to appreciate the results of the interrogation were for procrastination; the approaching death of Pombal was the obvious solution to the problem. Some months passed before any decision was taken, then in May 1781 the innocence of the Távoras was pronounced and the question of Pombal's responsibilities revived.

¹ Beirão, p. 174, cites Latino Coelho: 'Secretaries of State, by decree of January 4, 1754, received as salary 24,000 cruzados or 9,600,000 reis annually, a large sum for the second half of the eighteenth century...The decree of April 22, 1754, cap. 1, fixes the salary of the secretary of the House of Bragança at 360,000 reis.'

Eventually by a decree of August 16, 1781, the fallen minister was found guilty, 'culpable and deserving of exemplary punishment', ran the decree, 'which however I do not order to be executed in view of his present grave illnesses and decrepit age, preferring to exercise elemency rather than justice; and also because the said Marquis has begged for pardon, detesting the temerarious excess he committed' (the *Contradiction*). Pombal did not long survive. On his death on May 8, 1782, his family ordered a magnificent funeral which earned a rebuke from the ministry; the Benedictine who preached the funeral eulogy was said to have been despatched in disgrace to the monastery of Tibães. But already the Count of Redinha, later the third Marquis of Pombal, had married a daughter of Nuno de Távora, even before the latter's release from prison.

iii. Portugal and the french revolution; the campaign of rous-sillon; the 'war of the oranges', 1801. D. Pedro III took up the Jesuit cause. Although the Society remained officially extinct, many of its members received royal assistance in the shape of pensions and the recovery of their religious rights. Portuguese Jesuits who had been deported to Italy were voted an annual grant of 100,000 cruzados. Those who came back were at first sent to Belém, but later allowed free movement. But although a plea for the revision of the case against them was placed in the king's hands, it did not find sympathy with the queen, who, according to the Spanish ambassador, 'declared she would never give her approval to the document'. In effect the Society was only reconstituted in 1814 by Pius VII and was not readmitted to Portugal until 1828 under the rule of D. Miguel.

Since 1773 relations with Spain had become tense after an attack on the Rio Pardo district of Brazil by Spanish forces from Buenos Aires. Reinforcements had been embarked in the Algarve, but the Spanish government was ready to treat, and Pombal after some hesitation accepted the mediation of Louis XVI. Although it was agreed to suspend hostilities in November 1775, orders were not despatched from Lisbon until January 1776, too late to prevent a Portuguese counter-attack on the Rio Grande. Spain at once took umbrage, and military preparations had to be continued; France incited the Spaniards to despatch strong forces to America, and even resuscitated the scheme for conquering Portugal.¹ On the day of José's death, Spanish forces landed on the island of Santa Catarina, and preparations were under way for the capture of the Sacramento colony when hostilities were suspended. On the fall of Pombal an approximation between the two royal families, aided by D. Mariana Victoria, paved the way to the Treaty of San Ildefonso, ¹ Ballesteros, Historia de España, v, 197.

signed in October 1777, by which Spain obtained the African islands of Fernando Pó (Fernão do Pó) and Annobon (Ano Bom).

In 1786 D. Pedro III died, and the loss, followed by that of the heir to the Portuguese throne, Prince José, who fell a victim to small-pox in 1788, combined to depress Maria I. According to rumour, the alarming news from France contributed to disturb her mental balance. From October 1791 she was subject to profound melancholy and nightmares. Dr Willis, who had had experience of royal insanity, was summoned from England, but medical treatment was of no avail. The queen, possessed of the idea that she was damned, and frequently delirious, ceased to govern in 1792 and her son, the Prince of Brazil, ruled in her name, assuming the title of Prince-Regent in 1799. Maria's madness lasted until her death, twenty-four years later.

Whether or not the impression produced by the French revolution was responsible for Maria's insanity, it caused general alarm in Portugal as in the rest of Europe. The Portuguese foreign secretary, Luis Pinto, urged the formation of an alliance with England and Spain. Although negotiations were proceeding between these two countries, Portugal found no great importance attached to her suggestion, and early in 1793 France decided to try to secure her neutrality. The envoy, Antoine Darbault, was arrested on the frontier, but later allowed to proceed to Lisbon, where his credentials were refused. He was told that Portugal would not hesitate to support England and Spain, and expelled from the country. In the following July a provisional treaty was signed with Spain for mutual aid against France, whilst a treaty of mutual aid and protection of commerce was agreed to in London in September. Unofficial hostilities soon broke out. French corsairs tried to seize a Portuguese ship sailing from Setúbal to Cork, but an English frigate intervened; other cases gave rise to the fear that France might invade Brazil. A Portuguese naval division joined the English Mediterranean fleet, and another the Channel fleet, but the second, attacked by contagious disease, soon returned to Lisbon.

Military assistance was sent to Spain to take part in the war on the Catalan front. Under the command of a Scotsman, John Forbes Skellater, who had remained in Portugal after the campaign of 1762, a force of some 6,000 was embarked in September 1793 and after considerable privations landed at the Catalan port of Rosas nearly eight weeks later. Conditions on the front proved insufferable, and it was almost without provisions and hospitals that the expeditionary force succoured Céret, and played a prominent part in the capture of Villelongue and Banyuls. With the fall of Port-Vendres and Collioure the campaign of 1793 ended, and the ill-equipped Portuguese and Spanish forces were left to face a

more formidable adversary, the pelting rains of winter. According to Skellater, the Portuguese were without a shirt to change into, whilst the Spaniards lacked both stockings and boots. Continued disorganization and absence of plan told on the allied resistance, and in the spring the French were able to advance. By April the Portuguese force had been reduced to 3,842 with 622 sick: it left Catalonia after the peace of Basle between France and Spain.

This treaty, concluded in July 1795, had been negotiated secretly and left Portugal still at war with France, merely indicating Spain as a possible mediator. The volte-face of Spain, the work of Godoy, left Portugal in an unenviable position—at war with France and allied to England, she was exposed to attack by the new coalition unless she made some sort of agreement. Consequently she attempted to represent her part in the Roussillon campaign as purely auxiliary, and not implying open war with France. This pellucid evasion was coldly received. In view of French seizures of Portuguese ships, the Portuguese minister in Madrid invoked the good offices of Spain; mediation was at once offered, but Godoy demanded a definite declaration of Portuguese policy before proceeding further—the Regency must choose between an alliance or hostilities with France. Although in January 1796 Godoy arranged for an interview between Carlos IV and Prince John on the frontier in order to demonstrate the ostensible friendship of the two countries, the proposed mediation was entirely disadvantageous to Portugal, because of Godoy's position. The French minister in Madrid, Pérignon, demanded the cession of part of northern Brazil, the opening of the Amazon to navigation, commercial rights and the payment of an indemnity of ten million cruzados (25,000,000 livres). The conditions were excessively onerous, but in August 1796 an extraordinary ambassador was despatched from Lisbon to Madrid in order to continue to bargain. Little did he know that in the same month secret conditions appended to the treaty of San Ildefonso provided for the enforced termination of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance. On October 8 Spain declared war on England, and on October 12 a Portuguese envoy, António de Araújo e Azevedo, began peace negotiations in Paris, having powers to offer up to two or three millions as indemnity.

Spain was deeply divided. The war with England was extremely unpopular, and had not been taken very seriously. An English representative and many English subjects remained in Spain, whilst few Spaniards found the good graces of France a fair exchange for the exposure of their colonial trade to the activities of the English fleet. In spite of Jervis' victory off Cape St Vincent on February 14, 1797, on which occasion a Portuguese frigate had reported the presence of the Spanish

fleet, Anglo-Spanish relations remained only officially unfriendly, and the suggestion of a separate peace in March was rejected, but in very restrained terms. For France, however, the engagement of St Vincent stressed the geographical importance of Portugal to England, and Araújo, having vainly tried to bribe the Directory, was threatened with immediate expulsion from Paris in April 1797. This step followed upon the hasty rearmament of the Portuguese; in March three regiments of émigrés had reached Lisbon, and numerous French refugees continued to take shelter there. In June 6,000 English troops under Stewart and a naval division of 22 ships under Jervis arrived in the Tagus.

Until the spring of 1797 the Spaniards had resisted French blandishments which aimed at the conquest of Portugal by Spaniards, but the peace of Leoben released the republic's forces in Italy and now Pérignon was able to offer Godoy an army of 30,000 for the Portuguese campaign. Godov hesitated, not from any personal scruples, but because the Spanish royal family were reluctant to break with their Portuguese relatives, and because he feared the effect of unleashing so many revolutionary soldiers in his own country. Thus while the Spaniards placed stronger forces on the Portuguese frontier, negotiations between Portugal and the Directory were continued in Paris from August. At the same time negotiations were going on between France and England, and the Directory aimed at dividing the allies. Thus Araújo found the French amenable to a treaty which accepted four million cruzados as indemnity, though containing clauses insisting that no kind of help be given to England, and that not more than six ships of any power be admitted to Portuguese ports at once. Clearly, both of these clauses infringed the English alliance and could not therefore be ratified. Araújo's negotiations were disavowed in Lisbon, and France denounced the whole agreement. When Franco-British discussions failed, and Portugal was set free to commit herself to the two obnoxious conditions, the French were no longer willing to listen. Worse, a month later, in December 1797, Araújo was imprisoned for 'conspiring against the internal security of France', or bribing the Directory, and only released at the end of the following March.

The new Directory of the 18th Fructidor pursued a vigorous policy, stringently opposed to the hesitations of Godoy. From February 1798 the Spanish minister had no choice but to support the aims of France: soon the émigrés were driven out of Spain, and Godoy undertook to reject offers of separate peace from England and Portugal. He still hesitated to invade Portugal, aware that the Spanish royal family from whom his power derived were opposed to it and that it would entail unpredictable but undesirable events in Spain. So tenacious was he that he convinced the French envoy Truguet, whose original purpose had

been to secure the declaration of war against Portugal. However, the Directory did not change its resolutions so readily, and Godoy was accordingly unseated from his lofty position in March 1798. Carlos IV sought to persuade Prince John of the advisability of adopting Talleyrand's proposals, but Portugal feared to lose England's protection by submitting so far. In July 1798 a Portuguese squadron under the Marquis of Niza collaborated with Jervis before Alexandria and in the blockade of Malta, and Bonaparte declared in an order to his eastern army: 'There will come a day when the Portuguese nation will weep with tears of blood the outrage she has perpetrated against the French Republic.'

While Carlos IV urged Portugal to come to terms with France as the only way of keeping French troops out of Spain, Portugal sought to detach Spain from France. On the other hand, the First Consul offered Portugal peace in return for an indemnity of eighteen million livres. A clearing of the general atmosphere, the French failure in Egypt, and the attitude of the Spaniards prevented Portugal from accepting this offer. Far from it, she made a pact with Russia, an enemy of France, in September 1799.

In 1800 Spain adopted a definitely anti-Portuguese attitude. Rather than wait for Bonaparte to be disengaged, she now contemplated an invasion of Portugal on her own account, which would avoid the unpleasant consequences of a French passage through Spain and yet meet with the approval of the republic. Nothing however was done until September, when Berthier was sent to Madrid: with the interference of France, Spain was again less ready to agree to the invasion, and pointed to the prevalence of yellow fever in Andalusia. Bonaparte nevertheless demanded a Spanish conquest of Portugal by October 15, and Lucien Bonaparte was despatched to Madrid to ensure its realization. Godoy had returned to power, and Lucien Bonaparte had no difficulty in seeing that he could be made to depend entirely on France. On January 29, 1801, a convention was signed by these two, providing for the delivery of an ultimatum to Portugal. If Portugal wanted peace, she must within a fortnight abandon the English alliance, open her ports to French and Spanish ships and close them to English ones, and hand over to Spain one or more of her provinces, equal to a fourth part of her total area, as a guarantee for the recovery of Trinidad, Port Mahon, and Malta, now in English hands. Both France and Spain would claim indemnities. Should Portugal refuse these terms, France would contribute 15,000 or more infantry for the invasion, while the task of enforcing the terms of the ultimatum devolved upon Spain.

¹ História de Portugal, ed. Peres, vi, 277; Dr M. Lopes de Almeida, Negociações diplomáticas com a França.

The Portuguese army was officially composed of some 40,000 men with a rather less number of militia; in fact when a Prussian general, von Goltz, was contracted to reorganize it, he could only raise 16,000 foot and 2,000 horse. Misunderstandings between von Goltz and the Duke of Lafões only aggravated the situation. Already appeals for help had been directed to England; the request for 30,000 men received little attention, and in November 1800 Hookham Frere, arriving in Lisbon as minister, announced the necessity for withdrawing part of the English forces already there. In effect, Sir James Pulteney and his men embarked. This news naturally excited great alarm in Lisbon. Prince John gave full powers to Lafões in the same month as the agreement between Spain and France was signed. In February the contents of this treaty were made known in a note presented to the Regent, demanding acceptance of its conditions under threat of war. A Portuguese envoy was at once sent to negotiate peace in Madrid; any agreement that did not close Portuguese ports to English ships would have been countenanced by England, but the point was one which the French refused to concede, and no result was obtained from the mission.

On March 2 war was declared in Madrid. Hookham Frere could promise no help and the Portuguese forces were still unprepared in spite of the long period of alarms. Two armies, one under the Marquis de la Rosière, an émigré, in Trás-os-Montes, and one under Forbes Skellater to cover the long front from the Douro to the Algarve, faced Godoy's 20,000 men in Galicia and 10,000 in Andalusia, backed up by 15,000 Frenchmen awaiting orders to enter Spain. Only three English regiments remained in Lisbon, with some artillery and a squadron of dragoons. Even before the campaign began Araújo had been despatched to bargain for peace. In mid-April the French forces streamed across northern Spain from St Jean-de-Luz towards Ciudad Rodrigo; by the end of May some 13,000 were in Spain, but the Portuguese campaign ended without their having entered into action. On May 20 a fourfold attack was their having entered into action. On May 20 a fourfold attack was delivered on the Alentejo; Portuguese territory beyond the Guadiana was soon overrun. Olivença, though defended by one Julius-Caesar-Augustus de Chermont, fell. A group of Spaniards approached Elvas and in its vicinity plucked an orange-branch which was sent by Godoy to the Queen of Spain, whence the popular name of the 'War of the Oranges'. Godoy, enjoying his first experience of generalship, was able to send glowing reports of imaginary victories to Madrid, as his forces advanced sacking and pillaging as far as Crato. 'I lack everything, but with nothing I will go to Lisbon', he boasted.

Peace negotiations took place at Lorient, where Araújo met Napoleon Bonaparte, and at Badajoz, where the Portuguese minister Luis Pinto

de Sousa Coutinho treated with Godov and Lucien Bonaparte. The desire of the latter to distinguish himself probably led to a solution more favourable to Portugal being reached at Badajoz. Terms agreed upon included the closing of Portuguese ports to English ships, commercial advantages for French woollens, territorial concessions in Brazil and an indemnity of twenty million livres, of which only fifteen appeared in the treaty, the remainder being appropriated by the negotiators. On the day that peace was signed, June 7, a message arrived from Napoleon Bonaparte directing the Franco-Spanish representatives to insist on the occupation of the Portuguese provinces, and in order to avoid raising this point the treaty was antedated. Luis Pinto was forced to agree provisionally to the cession of Olivença. The First Consul discovered without delay the piece of jobbery that had been practised on him, and Portugal, fearing a stiffening of his demands, despatched an emissary to Madrid to negotiate a new agreement, raising the indemnity by five millions, and ceding another piece of Brazil. This treaty, signed on September 29, preceded by only two days the signature of preliminaries with a view to peace between England and France. The resulting treaty of Amiens confirmed a secret article (added to the preliminaries) that contradicted the declaration of the integrity of Portuguese territory by confirming the right of France and Spain to what they had gained at Badajoz. Occupation had been avoided at a price, but hesitations in her foreign policy were largely responsible for Portugal's weak position at the end of the year 1801.

iv. From the peace of amiens to the treaty of fontainebleau. 1802-1807. In the interlude afforded by the peace of Amiens, Portugal attempted to establish her neutrality for the future. Diplomatic relations with France were resumed, and General Lannes, the victor of Montebello, appeared to represent the First Consul in Lisbon. Lannes, a professional fire-eater, soon showed that neutrality could only be purchased by strict obedience to France's wishes. Imperious and uncivil in his conduct, he soon refused to deal with the foreign secretary and demanded the resignation of the intendant of police, Pina Manique, one of the chief obstacles to the entry of revolutionary propaganda into Portugal. As Lannes could not obtain obedience from the ministers, he went straight to the Regent, who was intimidated by his presence. In fact, when Pina Manique attempted to interfere with the commercial enterprises which Lannes carried on under cover of his diplomatic privileges, the general retired from Lisbon and refused to return until both the director of police and the foreign secretary had been replaced. After some months Lannes was ordered to return to his post, just as the resumption of the war between England and France again endangered Portuguese neutrality.

England had no obstacle to place in the way of this neutrality, which

was declared in June 1803. To facilitate the Regent's policy, orders were given for English ships to avoid Portuguese waters except in cases of emergency. But Napoleon had already devised an admirable arrangement by which neutrality could be purchased by means of a monthly contribution to his war chest: Spain agreed to pay six million livres to stay out of the war, and also to open her ports to French ships. This bargain, signed in Paris in October 1803, included a provision by which Spain was to see that Portugal in turn should supply a million a month. Meanwhile Lannes, after staging an impressive fit of fury when his residence was stoned, had succeeded in getting rid of two members of the Portuguese government. Already Pina Manique had been removed from the control of the customs-house; and, as another sign of his power, the French envoy secured the expulsion from Lisbon of the émigré regiments and the Duke of Coigny, the royalist representative. Generally fawned on and recompensed for the damage he had suffered by his hasty departure in his huff of the previous autumn, Lannes had the use of the royal gardens, received 12,000 livres in presents and had the Regent to act as godfather to his son. The English minister was quite outshone, in spite of the presence of the Dukes of Kent and Sussex in Portugal.

Lannes now put forward demands for a commercial treaty, involving the payment by Portugal of a sum of twenty-five million livres. The exaggerated demand was probably intended to make the Portuguese government glad to accept the less onerous tribute of a million a month. The irascible general refused to negotiate. When presented with counterproposals, he demanded the payment not only of a million a month, but of a lump sum of twelve millions to support an army of 15,000 men at Bayonne. This army was of course a bogey, and Lannes was making the Portuguese pay, not to scare it away, but to keep it hanging over them. In spite of the manifest piracy of the French demands, the Regency decided to adhere to its policy of appeasement and in December 1803 bound itself to pay sixteen million livres in sixteen months, whilst freely admitting French merchandise. Some of the details were further stiffened by Talleyrand before the agreement was finally signed.

In May 1804 Napoleon became emperor. Godoy did not despair of carving out for himself an independent state in Portugal. The ease with which this country had been spoliated by the French excited his cupidity, and Napoleon himself set an example to his ambition. But although he put his aims before Talleyrand in the middle of 1804, various events prevented an immediate execution of his plan. Pitt had returned to power: feeling against Spain gathered volume in England when it was known that Spain was subsidizing Napoleon's war chest without having satisfied indemnities due for the expropriation of British subjects in 1796.

In October a Spanish treasure-fleet was seized and brought into Plymouth, an act which excited the French to press Godoy for immediate war with England. Although most Spaniards disapproved of the step, the minister was able to wrest a declaration from Carlos IV in December. Early in 1805 Godoy promised France naval assistance, hoping in return to realize his ambition of a private principality in Portugal.

At the same time Junot was despatched as French ambassador to Portugal. On his way he made close contact with Godoy in Madrid. After discussing Franco-Spanish co-operation, Godoy broached the subject of Portugal, putting forward his cherished scheme, with the unlikely pretension that the Portuguese nobility had offered him the crown. It was soon agreed that Carlos IV should write to the Regent of Portugal and require him to join Spain and France: in case of a refusal French troops should support Godoy in conquering the desired principality. As far as France was concerned there was no hurry to do any such thing, since Godoy was made the more malleable by his ambitions. Thus though he showed commendable activity in arranging naval aid for France, Napoleon did not heed his pleas for the immediate reduction of Portugal. According to Godoy, the Portuguese were planning to land with the English and Russians in Andalusia, or an Anglo-Russian landing in Lisbon was imminent, and could only be forestalled by the occupation of the city: these and similar rumours were discounted in France for what they were worth.

Junot arrived in Lisbon in April 1805 with a personal letter from Napoleon to the Regent, inviting him to assist in 'bringing England to more sane and moderate ideas'. It was answered by a declaration of neutrality, which coincided with the appearance of an English naval force in the Tagus. Napoleon, surprised by the resistance of Portugal, toyed with the idea of supporting Godoy, who did not lose the opportunity to advance his private scheme once more. In October the destruction of the French and Spanish fleets at Trafalgar made the invasion of Portugal impracticable for the moment.

The task of the Portuguese government was obviously not easy; neutrality could scarcely be maintained when, on one side, a heavy subsidy had been promised to the French war chest—long in arrears, it was true—and, on the other, English ships were being supplied in the Algarve ports. A further complication derived from the uncertain sanity of the Regent; some of his symptoms, fits of profound melancholy and constant fear of death, suggested that he had inherited his mother's affliction.

The supposed incapacity of the Regent and every other damaging incident were used by Godoy to provide pretexts for the invasion. In

the early part of 1806 it was rumoured that Portugal was about to be absorbed. Godoy's scheme to possess himself of the throne became known in Lisbon. In Paris it found a promoter in the person of General Duroc, who placed it before the emperor in a somewhat modified form, providing for the division of Portugal into two parts—Estremadura, the Alentejo and Algarve for Godoy, the rest to compensate the King of Etruria whose estates were sequestered by France; the dispossessed Portuguese royal family would retire to Brazil. France would contribute an army of 25,000, to be supported at Spain's expense for the execution of this plan. Napoleon's only addition to the scheme was the reservation of the Portuguese colonies for France. Meanwhile peace negotiations had begun in June between France and England, and in July between Russia and France. Godov had everything to fear from these negotiations, in which England obtained from the emperor a guarantee of Portugal's independence and integrity. Though at first France had been unwilling to grant this on the pretext that she was not at war with Portugal, bribery in Paris and the arrival of an English force in the Tagus caused Talleyrand to accept it in September 1806. Already both sides were preparing for the collapse of negotiations. French forces, rumoured to number 90,000, had accumulated at Bayonne. An English fleet brought nine battalions under John Graves Simcoe to Lisbon, and further help was promised. But the Portuguese government still hoped to maintain neutrality, rejected the assistance and begged Napoleon's pardon for the compromising occurrence. On September 28, the English fleet left Lisbon.

Godoy, rendered impatient by the slow development of events, for a moment declared to the Portuguese ambassador his readiness to abandon France. His military preparations, he affirmed, were really intended to turn against Napoleon when the moment should be favourable; he had never intended Portugal any harm and would arrange for her to receive not only lost Olivença, but also a piece of Galicia including Vigo, if she would arm to join him. If there was ever anything but deceit in this suggestion, it did not allay the suspicions of the Portuguese, and a month or two later, in the face of Napoleon's resounding victories in Germany, Godoy resumed his place at the emperor's coat-tails. The continental blockade was decreed from Berlin on November 21. It spelt for Portugal a return to the economic situation of the Spanish occupation of 1580-1640. In January the English reply excepted Portugal from the counter-blockade, and in March a special Portuguese envoy was despatched to find Talleyrand at Warsaw and appeal for similar treatment from France, but owing to passport difficulties he never reached his destination. The events of Friedland and Tilsit made Portugal's position acute; unless the Tsar could persuade England to accept his mediation, the blockade would

be rigorously enforced. Thus, on July 19, 1807, Talleyrand demanded the closure of Portuguese ports to British shipping, to take effect from September 1. A few days later French forces collected at Bayonne and Junot received the command. Already Portuguese ships in French ports were being seized. An ultimatum was delivered on August 12. 'No people, no government,' it ran, 'has more reason to complain of England than the people and government of Portugal. The liberties taken by the English government in relation to the commerce and policy of Portugal constitute a veritable outrage against her independence. H.M. the Emperor and King has protested enough against their outrages, and often deplored the patience with which they have been borne, but he thinks proper to-day to declare that if Portugal should suffer any longer the oppression of which she is the victim, H.M. would have to consider this procedure as the renunciation of all sovereignty and independence; and, both to maintain the dignity of all the continental powers, as well as to satisfy the dearest and most sacred interest of 80,000,000 men who directly obey his laws and those of his allies, he would be obliged to constrain the government of Portugal to fulfil the duties which his intimate relations with the continental powers impose on him. Therefore, the undersigned is ordered to declare that if on September 1st following H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal has not manifested the intention of separating himself from English influence by immediately declaring war on England, dismissing the British ambassador and withdrawing his own from London, holding as hostages all Englishmen established in Portugal, confiscating English merchandise, closing his ports to English commerce, it will be understood that H.R.H. the Prince Regent of Portugal renounces the Continental cause....' The emperor's ultimatum was confirmed by a Spanish ultimatum delivered the same day.

António de Araújo, now foreign secretary, informed the British minister, Lord Strangford, who promised that if necessary the royal family should be conveyed to Brazil. Accordingly the Council of State, whilst agreeing to close its ports, refused to arrest British subjects. After further negotiations, in which the French only indulged because their army was not yet ready, the French and Spanish representatives left Lisbon on October 1. On October 27, the Treaty of Fontainebleau settled the eventual division of Portugal. Cut into three strips, Portugal would supply the King of Etruria and Godoy with principalities, the former taking the province north of the Douro with the name Septentrional Lusitania, and the latter receiving those south of the Tagus, as Prince of the Algarves. The central region from the Douro to the Tagus with Trás-os-Montes would remain in France's hands until the signing of a general peace.

v. The Peninsular war. On October 17 Junot received orders to march on Portugal within twenty-four hours. The following day the first contingent crossed the Bidassoa and proceeded at a leisurely pace towards Almeida. The road lay through Burgos, Valladolid and Salamanca, but at the latter place it was decided to accelerate the march, so as to hasten the fall of Lisbon, and a rougher but more direct route through Alcántara was selected. Here, lack of supplies took toll in sick and deserters, and by the time the vanguard had descended the Tagus valley as far as Abrantes, the invaders, though they had met with no organized resistance, presented an unimpressive picture of hunger, shoelessness and indiscipline. However, as he feared that a completely unconditional submission by the Regent would impair the lustre of the undertaking, Junot collected a small advance guard and pressed on towards Lisbon, hoping to be able to capture Prince John and his government.

These directed various letters to the emperor in which the conditions of his ultimatum were generally accepted, apart from the clause relating to the arrest of the English. Steps were even taken to put Lisbon in a condition to resist an English landing, and Strangford, receiving his passports, embarked on one of Sir Sidney Smith's ships which appeared in the Tagus on November 17 and declared a blockade of Lisbon on November 22. At this moment Junot was on the road from Castelo Branco to Abrantes, and the knowledge both that Sir John Moore had been ordered with forces to Gibraltar and that the Russian fleet of Siniavin might be caught in the Tagus, prompted him to spurt forward with a bare 1,500 men, with whom he reached the capital on November 30. A week earlier, António de Araújo had attempted a final negotiation with Junot; his envoy found the invader near the river Zêzere, and after a conversation under a tree in pouring rain, during the course of which he made lavish promises, found that there was no hope of stopping the advance. Returning to Lisbon, he brought a French emissary, Herman, entrusted with the task of persuading the Regent to stay. At the same time Smith offered the protection of his squadron. Already the Council of State had met and resolved that the royal family should withdraw to Brazil. A proclamation was issued to this effect, and a council of regency chosen. On the morning of November 27 the Prince, his court and family went on board. The fleet, consisting of fifteen ships of the Portuguese navy and various merchantmen, carried thousands of persons and much treasure. Owing to bad weather it was only possible to cross the bar two days later: the same day posters announced the arrival of Junot in Lisbon.

Slowly his advance guard was joined by stronger bodies of troops, but a bare 10,000 Frenchmen had arrived in the capital by Christmas.

Their condition had given Smith the hope that Lisbon might be held by the Portuguese garrison and two English regiments; but Araújo had already informed Junot that no resistance would be made.

On first entering Portugal Junot had announced his intention of liberating the unfortunate country from the English yoke, forcing his march in order to spare the beautiful city of Lisbon the fate of Copenhagen, and answering with his honour for the good conduct of his troops.

Once in the capital he boastfully announced the wealth and importance of his conquest to Napoleon, who replied from Italy, warning him to beware of the enmity of the Portuguese people and of English landings. The better to disarm the country it was decided to raise a Portuguese expeditionary force for service in Europe, and in effect the Portuguese Legion of six infantry and three cavalry regiments served Napoleon at Saragossa and Wagram and later in Russia, under the Marquis of Alorna. The Portuguese militia was suppressed; Herman was put in charge of the treasury, and a payment of 100,000,000 francs demanded. Ruin and spoliation accompanied the French troops through the Portuguese provinces, whilst in Lisbon the richest houses were selected for the billeting of the French officers—possibly the grounds for Junot's report to Napoleon that the city might be counted the richest in the world. In view of the difficulty of raising the indemnity, the French had gold and silver removed from churches and elsewhere to the mint.

All vestiges of Portuguese sovereignty were soon swept away. The Portuguese flag was replaced by the French on the Castle of St George. On February 1, 1808, Junot declared that the House of Bragança had ceased to reign in Portugal, which would therefore be governed in the name of the Emperor of the French by the general-in-chief of the French forces. The council of regency left by Prince John was thus suspended, and a new government of French and Portuguese took office. To cover the real situation a rosy economic future was painted in Junot's proclamations. 'Roads shall be opened, canals shall be dug to facilitate communications and render agriculture and industry flourishing', whilst the Portuguese army would 'form one single family with the soldiers of Marengo, Austerlitz, Jena, Friedland'. No more would 'public tranquillity be perturbed by horrible bandits', but 'public education would be fostered and diffused so that the provinces of Algarve and Beira Alta may yet some day come to have each its own Camões'.

During the beginning of 1808 northern Spain was gradually occupied by Murat. The Spanish crown was juggled from Carlos IV to Fernando VII, and thence to Napoleon himself. But the popular opposition fired by the Dos de Mayo in Madrid made the situation of the French armies precarious. In Portugal the general unrest almost produced a rebellion when Cotton's forces blockaded the Tagus, but no result was obtained until Junot was ordered to send away part of his forces to relieve the Spanish situation. The Spanish troops that had assisted in the invasion a few months before and now garrisoned Oporto, abandoned Portugal to join the English in Galicia; those in Lisbon were disarmed by a French ruse.

On June 6 Oporto proclaimed the Prince Regent. The French general Quesnel and a number of his compatriots were arrested, but once the deed was done enthusiasm cooled and the city was reduced to obedience. However, its example had been copied in Braga and Bragança, where a junta came into being and received support from the towns of Viana, Guimarães and finally Oporto once more. Here, under the presidency of the bishop, a Provisional Junta of the Supreme Government was formed. Quickly the movement spread southward. Loison, stationed at Almeida, moved northwards to repress the revolt, but found conditions above the Douro out of hand, and returned to his base. By the end of June, Viseu, Lamego, Aveiro and Coimbra had risen against the French; in the latter the university laboratories busied themselves in the manufacture of gunpowder and bullets. Several towns in the Algarve followed suit, until only those places where there were considerable detachments of troops remained in the hands of the French, especially Lisbon, Estremós, Elvas, Abrantes and Almeida, which defended the road of retreat, and Peniche and Setúbal, north and south of Lisbon. It is recounted that two sailors left Olhão in a fragile boat to carry the news to Brazil, where the Prince Regent declared war on France.

In spite of the general uprising the country was in no condition to support itself against Napoleon. The excitement of the population, to whom the French soldiers had set the worst examples of robbery and violence, sufficed to imperil the movements of small bodies of the enemy, but could not deal with large garrisons. Arms and trained men were scarcely to be found, and the numerous juntas only with difficulty admitted the primacy of that of Oporto, which had assumed the title of Supreme from the first. However, the disbanded militia was called to the colours, the church raised a volunteer force, and some help arrived from the Spanish juntas, whilst envoys went to England to obtain men, arms, supplies and money; and some 5,000 regulars and 2,000 militia were put into the field from Oporto.

Meanwhile, Sir Arthur Wellesley had arrived off the mouth of the Mondego, supported by Cotton's fleet. Disembarking on August 1-5, he picked up one of the Portuguese divisions at Montemór, and other English forces under Spencer at Leiria on August 12. He had already decided to move southward against Lisbon, and accordingly entered

Alcobaça two days later. Junot had ordered Loison to fall back on Tomar and sent Delaborde forward to assist in holding up the English advance. On August 16, Wellesley found Delaborde on the heights of Rolica between Caldas da Rainha and Óbidos, and on the following day delivered three assaults which ended in the retirement of the French to new positions. To protect new disembarkations, the allied troops now moved towards the coast, occupying positions at Vimeiro, near Lourinhã, where a force of 16,700 English and 2,000 Portuguese was assembled. The enemy had concentrated at Tôrres Vedras, and advanced on the morning of August 21 against Vimeiro. After an engagement lasting two and a half hours they retired with loss upon their point of departure. At Tôrres Vedras, a council of war was held, and it was decided to send Kellermann to negotiate for terms. An armistice of two days was accepted whilst discussions went on, on the basis of a French evacuation of Portugal. To the original proposal for Junot's forces to retire with their arms and baggage in English ships, Cotton insisted on the addition of a clause entailing the surrender of Russian ships in the Tagus. This was done and the agreement ratified on August 30, near Sintra, whence it derives its name of the Convention of Sintra. Although it ended the first invasion of Portugal, Sir Hew Dalrymple's agreement was severely criticized in England, Portugal and even distant Brazil for allowing the French to escape without capitulation. The commander of the Portuguese force had not been consulted, or presumably the tide of anti-French feeling would have found expression. As it was, several English brigades had to protect the embarking invaders from the wrath of the populace. which was reduced to avenging itself for their brutality and depredations on its Francophile compatriots, its indignation in no way slaked by the spectacle of the departure of considerable treasure in the hands of the evacuees.


When the Portuguese flag once more flew over Lisbon, the former council of regency was restored to its powers. One of its members was a prisoner in France, and two lost their seats for having served under the French, so that room was made for the inclusion of the Bishop of Oporto and other representatives of the movement of liberation.

The Spanish regiment disarmed by Junot now returned to Spain, where the gravity of the situation caused Napoleon to throw forward fresh reinforcements. In December his brother Joseph entered Madrid as King of Spain, whilst he himself planned the campaign of the following year destined to recover Portugal. On the Allied side a proclamation arrived from the Prince-Regent urging the continuance of the campaign, and an English general was detached to organize the Portuguese forces, William Carr Beresford, who received on January 7 the titles of marshal

and commander-in-chief of the Portuguese army. Meanwhile Moore had advanced on Salamanca in November, where other forces under Baird and Hope joined him. Acting on information brought by the latter, he decided to remain in Spain and fall on the French flank when Napoleon should deliver his new attack on Lisbon. For this purpose he could use Corunna as his base. Soult, however, moved across the north of Spain and entered Galicia with a great force. Faced with the full brunt of the French attack, Moore withdrew to Corunna, and his forces were reembarked in the middle of January.

The departure of Moore had alarmed the Portuguese. In Oporto Captain Robert Wilson raised the Loyal Lusitanian Legion, but in Lisbon the situation was disturbing, both within the government, where the Bishop of Oporto proved excessively autocratic, and in defence, since the hastily collected legions lacked discipline and training. Beresford, with the aid of English officers from the garrison of the Lisbon region, reorganized these legions with care and ability, training some 4,500 men by the end of 1809.

In March 1809, Soult entered Portugal from Galicia, occupying Chaves on the 12th. An attempt to defend Braga proved useless owing to the disorder of the population, and the Portuguese forces retired on Oporto, where it was hoped to resist, but the French cavalry forced an entry into the city on March 29, and after some fighting in the streets, the defenders sought to retire by the bridge of boats across the Douro. Such was the crowd of fugitives that pressed on to the bridge that many hundreds were thrown into the water and drowned. Chaves had been re-entered by Francisco da Silveira Pinto da Fonseca, and on April 21 Wellesley again landed in Lisbon. Striking northwards, he had two forces concentrated at Coimbra early in May, one of which was to move on Oporto by the coast road, whilst the other cut off the French retreat by crossing the Douro near Lamego. His total forces numbered 7,000 Portuguese and 17,000 English. He himself took command of the direct attack on Oporto. On arriving at the south bank of the Douro, it was found that Soult had destroyed the bridge of boats, but some fishermen pointed out a ford, and the French hastily abandoned the city, retreating rapidly across country to join Ney over the frontier at Orense. Fearing an attack on Lisbon, Wellesley relinquished the pursuit of Soult and made his headquarters at Abrantes in the Tagus valley. In July, he carried his offensive into Spain, winning the victory of Talavera which earned for him the title of Duke of Wellington. The situation did not permit of a deeper penetration into Spain, so he retired into Portugal and, in view of the emperor's plan for a direct attack on Portugal in the following year, began the defensive fortifications of Tôrres Vedras, a triple series of



X. THE PENINSULAR WAR: THE ANGLO-PORTUGUESE VICTORY AT BUÇACO



XI. THE PENINSULAR WAR: PORTUGUESE TROOPS NEAR PENAMACOR

positions, protected by artillery and capable of covering Lisbon and, if necessary, an embarkation at São Julião da Barra at the entrance to the Tagus.

Napoleon, letting his brother sink into the background, took over the affairs of the Peninsula himself, and devised a new campaign directed against Portugal and Andalusia. Soult led the army of Andalusia, whilst Masséna was given supreme command of the three armies of Reynier, Victor and Junot, which constituted the army of Portugal, numbering 60,000 men with 84 cannon. Masséna himself displayed some reluctance in undertaking the task, but was persuaded, and on May 10, 1810, began operations from Valladolid. Ciudad Rodrigo fell on July 10, and Almeida on August 27. In the month of September the French moved forward from Guarda to Viseu, where Masséna revealed his plan of striking at Coimbra across the Buçaco hills. Ney and Junot held that it would be unwise to advance farther until reinforcements arrived. Hitherto only the advanced guards had come into contact in the heart of Beira, and Wellington's forces had steadily retired, destroying all supplies in co-operation with the inhabitants, and merely defending the Viseu-Coimbra road, so that the French would have to choose between forcing their way to Coimbra or taking to the hills. Ney rightly held that if Wellington chose to defend the position of Bucaco, there would be no dislodging him, but it was Masséna's view that prevailed.

Wellington duly retired upon Buçaco, leaving small forces to impede the French advance. On September 26, the French reconnoitred his positions, and in spite of the disapproval of the majority of his council, Masséna decided to attack. The battle of Buçaco, begun early on the misty morning of September 27, ended in the discomfiture of the French with a loss of some 4,500 men.

On the following day, Masséna found a short cut to the main Coimbra-Oporto road, and, abandoning Buçaco, followed Wellington southwards. Sacking Coimbra on October 1, he attempted to leave a garrison there, but Trant's militia had no difficulty in recapturing the city. On October 9, Wellington entered the lines of Tôrres Vedras. In spite of a surprise attack inflicted on Craufurd's division on October 10, which opened the first line to immediate penetration, the French did not attempt to attack. Immediately indiscipline and shortage of food began to tell on them. Lack of forage caused Masséna to order the building of a bridge over the Tagus at Santarém in order to tap the south bank of the river. On October 29 the prospect was so bad that he sent to Napoleon for instructions, but before an answer came, he had been compelled to retire. On the night of November 14, the French troops disappeared, and owing to the heavy mist of the following day, they were able to make good their

retreat to Santarém before Wellington could be sure that the retirement was not a feint. Only on February 5 did Masséna hear that Napoleon had ordered Soult to come to his assistance with the army of Andalusia. But Soult lingered on the way to reduce Olivença and Badajoz, and by the end of the month Masséna's position in Santarém was becoming untenable. On March 6 the French army moved off towards Coimbra, reaching Pombal three days later with the intention of making a stand, but the worsting of their covering forces made a new retreat necessary. Avoiding Coimbra, which he expected to be strongly garrisoned, Masséna crossed Beira, and, dislodged from Guarda, made for Sabugal, where at length the opposing forces came face to face on April 3. Wellington delivered a general attack which was attended by complete success. The retirement of Masséna to Ciudad Rodrigo left only Almeida in the hands of the French, but after the defeat of Fuentes de Oñoro the commander of the garrison received orders to blow up fortifications and withdraw. Thus at the beginning of May, the third and last French campaign in Portugal came to an end.

In the Treaty of Paris of 1814, Portugal appeared in only one clause. Her interests, in view of the continued absence of the regent, were handled by the English representatives, and her envoy, the Count of Funchal, merely appended his signature to the agreement. Article 10 referred the Franco-Portuguese boundary dispute in South America to English mediation. No mention was made of the fate of Olivença, though the clause annulling the treaties of Madrid and Badajoz of 1801 implied its return to Portugal. The claim had already been laid by the regent in a declaration of May 1, 1808, in which he denounced the treaty, but the matter only received international attention at the Congress of Vienna. The three Portuguese representatives at Vienna had received their instructions in Rio de Janeiro before the conditions of the Treaty of Paris had reached the regent. On his learning of the shortcomings of Article 10, Prince John refused to ratify it, thus placing the Count of Palmela and his colleagues in Vienna in an unenviable position. The tasks which they had been set could only be carried through in an atmosphere of general sympathy, which was prejudiced by the stiffness of their government. However, part of their demands was conceded in Articles 105, 106 and 107 of the final treaty. The return of Olivença to Portugal was approved by the Powers in Article 105; in spite of this, Spain refused to deliver it, and it remains unredeemed to this day, a small Portuguese district under the Spanish flag. The boundary between Brazil and French Guiana was settled in Portugal's favour. A further success was the annulment of the treaty of friendship and alliance with England of May 1810, by which Portugal had contracted to cede Bissau and Cacheu for

fifty years, if she should recover Olivença through English intervention; this was granted before the signature of the treaty of Vienna, in the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of January 22, 1815, which also partially satisfied the Portuguese desire to be excluded from the projected abolition of the slave-trade. Since it was strenuously advanced that the abolition of slavery would incur the ruin of Brazil, Portugal merely bound herself to prevent her subjects from engaging in the trade north of the line. Lastly, the Portuguese claim for reparations from France was only partly satisfied, a bare two millions being set aside for her out of the total of seven hundred millions paid by France—this sum in no way corresponded with the general devastations and spoliation undergone by Portugal.

CHAPTER XXIV

EARLY CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE CIVIL WARS

i. THE REVOLUTION OF 1820. When Maria I died in March 1816, and the Prince Regent assumed the title of John VI, the Portuguese monarchy had already been implanted in Rio de Janeiro for nine years, and had to a considerable extent lost touch with the great changes that had taken place in Portugal.

During the Napoleonic era political development had been rapid, if not systematic. In the first days of the French revolution, events had been followed with a certain sympathy in Portugal, but the republican and anarchical tendencies soon made manifest caused a complete change of attitude, and rigorous censorship was applied to news from France by the intendant of police, Pina Manique. French ideas were driven underground for the time being, but secret societies spread the contagion, so that when Junot arrived in Lisbon he found sufficient partisans for his purposes. Among those who accorded him their support were José Seabra da Silva and the Count of Ega, both prominent figures in the late administration. When he contemplated assuming the crown of Portugal himself, a Portuguese constitution similar to that granted by Napoleon to the Grand Duchy of Warsaw was put forward. Its programmeincluding monarchy, state catholicism with the free exercise of other religions, equality of citizens before the law, elevation of the colonies to the rank of integral parts of the nation, freedom of the press, responsibility of ministers, separation of judicial power, proportionate taxationwas rejected by a Portuguese junta, who found it more advisable to ask Napoleon himself to appoint a king.

During the Peninsular war the political situation was profoundly affected by the miseries of the population; discontent was openly expressed with the prolonged sojourn of the royal family in Brazil, and revolutionary feeling increased as the protecting mantle of censorship was torn aside by the outbreak of war and the principles of liberalism became generally known. Various Portuguese papers printed in London assisted the diffusion of liberal doctrine, especially the *Correio Brasileiro*, first issued in 1808, and the *Português*, dating from 1814. The growth of liberalism in Spain, reaching a climax in the Constitution of 1812, also attracted many Portuguese, particularly freemasons, through whom new political ideas circulated with the greatest ease.

At the end of 1813, the council of governors had requested the regent to return to Portugal without delay, but he had given no indication of his intentions, merely thanking them for their loyalty and zeal. In fact Brazil was elevated to the category of a kingdom two years later, and John showed as little disposition to leave the country as the Brazilians did to let him go. The former colony had derived considerable benefits from its period as the seat of authority, and the return of the monarch to Portugal now became an operation which could only be carried out with very careful handling. Many Portuguese feared, with some justification, that the home country was in danger of becoming a dependency of the former colony. The safety-valve in Portugal was Beresford, who had retained his position as marshal of the Portuguese army in the service of the regent and thus, and as a foreigner, became a good target for all complaints. In August 1815 he sailed for Brazil, to return a year later with the fullest powers over the army, a measure rendered necessary by the possibility of a conflict with Spain, but viewed with mistrust by the Portuguese. Just before his departure a commander of the Portuguese forces that had served Napoleon, General Gomes Freire de Andrade, returned to Portugal; his position as grand master of the freemasonry at once gave him a prominent part in the liberal proliferation working in Lisbon. Early in 1817 two Spanish officers, Francisco Javier Cabanés and José Valls, appeared in the capital as emissaries of the Spanish liberals to Gomes Freire.

This year was a critical one. A loan of two million cruzados was contracted at its beginning by the treasury; in July, four million more were only raised with difficulty by making the purchase of stock compulsory at a reduced price. In March a republican movement broke out in Brazil and was only completely suppressed after two and a half months. In May a similar plot was traced in Lisbon, with the ostensible object of obtaining the removal of Beresford, which covered the further design of altering the government. Beresford, variously accused of excessively influencing the actions of the council of regency and of putting into effect measures of conscription without making the customary exemptions, was himself informed of the plot owing to the indiscreet boastings of an officer in a café. By means of spies introduced into the revolutionary circle, he discovered its intentions and laid his information before the Marquis of Borba, president of the governors. Various arrests were made, and Gomes Freire, after an imprisonment in circumstances of considerable cruelty in the fort of São Julião da Barra, was condemned to death with eleven others, thus providing the liberal movement with its first martyrs.

This repression drove the forces of revolution underground, but did

nothing to allay discontent. Popular vexation against the government and against Beresford had been given something to work on. Meanwhile the economic situation grew more and more difficult. Portuguese commerce had suffered a great blow by the loss of the Brazil traffic; agriculture remained in the pitiable state to which the wars had reduced it, and the army was being supported at war strength in the midst of peace. In view of this the budget presented an annual deficit of five million cruzados, and there was no prospect of improvement.

A few months after the executions of 1817 another movement was launched in Oporto, initiated by the magistrate Manuel Fernandes Tomás, who had been much struck by the constitution of Bolivia as formulated by Bolívar himself. The organization known as the Sinédrio came into being in January 1818 and gradually spread among selected persons during the two succeeding years. In January 1820 the revolution of Quiroga and Riego reimplanted the constitution of 1812 in Spain; the change in the neighbouring country encouraged the Oporto revolutionaries, who however repelled pan-Iberian projects which constituted the modern version of the old Spanish policy of absorption. At the end of March 1820, Beresford again departed for Brazil to attempt to raise money for the payment of the army, and the Sinédrio immediately accelerated its work, attracting a considerable number of higher officers in command of garrisons or depots in the north of the country. On August 21, the revolution was ready, but when its programme was prepared, divergencies between the conservative military and liberal civilians prevented agreement from being reached, except on the elementary points that the municipal chamber of Oporto should be called upon to propose to the nation the names of a provisional junta, whilst envoys were despatched to John VI beseeching him to remedy their evils by returning to Portugal. With this brief programme the more advanced liberals had to be content, hoping to take advantage of the situation when their military allies should have made the revolution for them. Having assured themselves of the neutrality of the military governor of Oporto and of the police, the conspirators selected August 24 for their pronouncement. Two days earlier, the regency had been given misleading information of the complete tranquillity of Oporto, so that when Colonels Sebastião Drago Valente de Brito Cabreira and Bernardo Correia de Castro e Sepúlveda read proclamations before their troops in the Campo de Santo Ovídio in Oporto, a salvo was fired and the revolution made.

The same afternoon a Junta Provisional do Govêrno Supremo do Reino was formed, whose proclamation to the nation announced the character of the revolution. The revival of cortes was to provide the

cornerstone of government; 'never did religion, the throne and the motherland receive such important services, never did they acquire either greater lustre or more solid greatness than when cortes flourished; and all these advantages flowed perennially from the constitution of the state, because it sustained in perfect equilibrium and in concerted harmony the rights of sovereign and vassals'. The key signature for a century of verbiage was thus established. Only in negative measures did the Junta make practical assertions, rejecting 'the unworthy project' of Iberian unity, 'the shameful tutelage of England', and the dethronement of the Braganças. A few days later the governors met in Lisbon, and condemned the 'hideous crime of rebellion'. Their first impulse was to send forces to the north to stem the revolution; but in view of its very military nature a safer course was adopted, that of sponsoring the summoning of cortes, an act which, as a prerogative of the monarchy, would take the best cards from the hands of the Junta. However the revolution spread to Coimbra and Bragança and put all the troops it could muster into the field, forming two armies with a total strength of ten infantry regiments, one of artillery, eight squadrons of cavalry and various other units. In vain on September 9 the governors convoked cortes, inviting the Junta to dissolve since its programme was being fulfilled. On September 15, the governors forbade the annual celebrations of the departure of Junot, fearing disaffection, but on that day the garrison of Lisbon collected in the Rossio and set up an interim government with the dead Gomes Freire as its Principal Elder. Amidst great popular rejoicing, and protestations of devotion to the house of Bragança, the bloodless revolution came to Lisbon.

For a moment it appeared that the precedence of the Junta of Oporto would be disputed by that of the capital, but the two interests were amicably fused by the Agreement of Alcobaça on October 27, 1820, into two bodies: one, keeping its original title, to govern, and the other to prepare the way for cortes. The latter in turn split into two committees: one to organize the convocation of cortes, and one to provide material for them to work on. Apart from the aims of raising Portugal from subservience to Brazil and of ending English military influence, there was little common programme. Fernandes Tomás intended to substitute national sovereignty through the cortes for absolutism, taking advantage of John VI's absence to create a situation he would be forced to accept. The army distrusted the growing power of lawyers and other civilians; it had tried to dissolve the Junta at Leiria, and Cabreira attempted the same at Alcobaça, but owing to the influence of Sepúlveda, the Junta was able to enter Lisbon on October 4 amidst delirious ovations with at least the appearance of unity. Loyalty to John VI was a unifying factor, and

pious monarchical sentiments found frequent expression. But the nobility, clergy and magistracy were asked for an oath of loyalty to the Junta, John VI, the cortes and the future constitution (whatever it might be) in that significant order. Practically all those concerned took the required path

On October 10 Beresford arrived in the Tagus from Rio de Janeiro, where he had been granted the rank of marshal-general with immediate authority over the regular army and militia. The Junta forbade him to land, and a week later he departed for England. The one article of the revolutionary programme which had general support was thus performed. As to the cortes, there were those who wanted the traditional separation of the three estates, more or less absolutist in design, and those to whom the cortes were a convenient or misunderstood institution that could be converted into a vehicle for the sovereignty of the people. Two facts favoured the revolutionary view, loss of prestige of the absent king and the effacement of the social distinctions on which the separation of the three orders was based. The Academy of Sciences enunciated the necessity of summoning the three orders as the only body legally capable of changing the government, and proposed in view of the variable composition of the ancient cortes that thirty noblemen, twenty-three ecclesiastics and a hundred and fifty commoners, nominated by the municipalities, should appear. In spite of the great majority conceded to the third estate, a vociferous section of the public claimed nation-wide suffrage. In November, instructions were issued for elections. All heads of families could declare their choice of electors to local committees: as there were no electoral lists it was decided that concelhos of 600 hearths might choose one elector, of 1,200 two, and so on. The electors would choose the future deputies, 'who should have scientific knowledge, character, religion, patriotism and honest means of subsistence, and if possible, be natives of the electoral district'. This sweeping but wellmeant project met with opposition from the army. Certain officers wanted to play as prominent a part as their Spanish fellows had done in the previous January. Thus on St Martin's Day, November 11, a bare fortnight before the election of the electors, a military ultimatum presented by Comandante de Exército Gaspar Teixeira demanded the Spanish constitution of 1812, certain changes in the Junta and the confirmation of himself as commander of all the armed forces. The manifestation, known as the Martinhada, carried off by a parade of troops with loaded cannon, had its effect. For a moment some of the civilians were forced to resign, but after a military council they were reinstated. The two opposing streams of army politics, advanced liberalism and military conservatism, had united in mistrust of the legal clique and in

an attempt to put the army into the limelight, but once the Spanish electoral system was adopted, the Martinhada blew over. By the new instructions issued for the elections, paper democracy was carried a large stride further; one deputy was to be elected for every 30,000 inhabitants, every village of two hundred hearths now had the right to choose its elector, whilst smaller agglomerations voted for compromissários, or electors of electors of deputies.

The elections passed off quietly. The deputies, mostly middle-class liberals of unimpeachable respectability, combined great theoretical diversity with general inexperience of the mutual repugnance of ideologies and political practice. The majority was of constitutional monarchists, fluent in French liberal phraseology and classical reference. The deputies assembled on January 24, 1821. After selecting a new regency, they debated the bases of the future constitution. There was as yet no party system, but the general tendency was radical. Article 18, beginning 'Sovereignty resides in the Nation', caused a division between radicals and moderates. The latter proposed the insertion of originally, holding that the people had the power to form a society, but that they surrendered sovereignty to their government. Originally was defeated, but the moderates managed to get essentially inserted. Once the constitution was sketched out, the cortes began to legislate. The revolutions of August 24 and September 15 were legalized, lest the king should patronize a reaction when he arrived. The same fear of royalist opposition prompted the deputies to rush through far-reaching reforms, often simply abolitions, in March, April and May 1821. All political offenders condemned since 1807 were amnestied; unauthorized salaries and pensions, the Inquisition and all personal obligations inherent in the seigniorial regime were swept away. The last measure injured the interests of many Portuguese and contributed to the coming reaction, which was especially fed by the dissatisfaction of the Church, alarmed by the sudden disappearance of its privileges, most of its seminarists and the Inquisition. When the fundamentals were approved on March 29, the patriarch would not take the oath and the nuncio, refusing to illuminate, had his windows smashed by the jubilant crowd. The patriarch's refusal led to his retirement to the monastery of Buçaco, whilst the congress deprived of Portuguese citizenship (by 88 votes to 1) all those who refused to take the oath, and declared (by 84 to 5) that those who lost Portuguese citizenship must leave the country at once.

The news of the revolution had reached Brazil on October 17. After some delay, John VI confirmed the convocation of cortes, whilst expressing displeasure that his sanction had not been sought. The publication of the royal message in the Gazeta de Lisboa of December 19, 1820,

had the effect of strengthening the Junta. Plainly, if events outstripped him, it was because he was too far away to keep up with them. John, still a little scared of the French revolution, refused to take any definite step, until on New Year's Day, 1821, a movement in support of the Portuguese revolution broke out in Brazil. On February 26 Rio de Janeiro rose, and a liberal ministry took power. Its first meeting supported immediate return to Portugal, though John would have preferred to send his elder son Pedro. The news reached Lisbon on March 26: it caused great excitement, since the king's acceptance of the parliamentary regime now became urgent; various Portuguese diplomats had refused to represent it without John's order and were tinkering with the interventionist Holy Alliance. England informed Portugal of the resolution taken by Austria. Prussia and Russia in respect of Naples, and promised to use all her weight to prevent intervention in Portugal provided that the constitution adopted was a mild one, such as John VI would have no difficulty in accepting. Unfortunately this suggestion was not followed. Touchy, and in haste, the congress incorporated all the phraseology of extreme liberalism in the constitution, a red rag to the Holy Alliance.

On April 28 it was learnt that John VI would swear to the constitution. A eulogy was received from Jeremy Bentham, and popular rejoicings again burst out. But at the same time the undercurrent of criticism and opposition strengthened as the government grew more extreme and the crisis of the king's return approached. An unhealthy nervousness and suspicion dictated the decrees of July 3, by which the king was not allowed to land until the following day, at noon and not four o'clock as he wished, and all exclamations except vivas for Religion, the Cortes, the Constitution or the Constitutional King were prohibited: the disembarkation of certain persons, including the Count of Palmela, was forbidden. The day after his arrival John, still nervous of regicides in spite of the enthusiasm of the streets, stammered out the oath, and listened to his reply to the address of welcome as it was read by its author. Its contents raised a tumult because they alluded to the exercise of legislative powers by the monarch. Congress met and decided that the bases of the constitution were infringed by this reference, and the king was constrained to proclaim the purity of his intentions through his ministry.

A projected constitution of 217 articles was published on June 30, 1821. The debates on it lasted until September 23, 1822, and a few days later the Congress and John VI took the oath to observe it. In spite of the time devoted to the discussion of its larger aspects and details, various unfortunate lapses remained in the final draft—ministers were

not allowed to belong to the chamber, so that they had no chance of direct contact with parliament; the choice of a single chamber excluded the majority of the upper clergy and nobility, who had most administrative experience; the cortes could not be dissolved by the king, so that there was no solution to a deadlock between them and the ministry. This was the regime that replaced the constituent congress on December 1, 1822. Owing to the spread of gutterpress politics, the quality of the deputies declined considerably in the first regular cortes; men with loud voices and doubtful principles soon drowned more modest and conscientious speakers with torrents of abuse.

ii. THE INDEPENDENCE OF BRAZIL. Already on December 16, 1815, Brazil had been proclaimed a kingdom, a step which was taken on the advice of Talleyrand for the purpose of consolidating Portuguese legitimacy in the New World. Once this was done, Brazil became a sovereign state, and could hardly return to its former situation as a colony of Portugal: nor, of course, were the Portuguese willing to occupy a position of subordination to Brazil. The ministers who had accompanied John across the Atlantic had been replaced by others who formed a Brazilian party opposed to any idea of a return of the monarchy to Europe, and John himself was not difficult to dissuade from such a design, since he preferred the apparent security of Brazil to the unrest of Portugal. It was in vain that Great Britain sought to persuade him to come back. Brazil was against it, and the suggestion merely aggravated the unpopularity Great Britain had incurred there through her opposition to the slave-trade. Neither would John himself return, nor would he trust his elder son D. Pedro to go in his place.

The resentment felt in Portugal found its vent in the revolution of 1820. Palmela, till then minister in London, went to Rio de Janeiro to try to persuade the king to return, but John was even more alarmed by the revolution than by the preceding unrest, and he relied upon the Holy Alliance to restore Portugal to order for him. At the moment when he agreed to let D. Pedro depart for Europe, a revolution in favour of constitutional reform broke out in Rio de Janeiro (May 1821) in which D. Pedro was himself involved, and John at last consented to 'alleviate his misfortunes by changing the scene of them'. On returning to Portugal, he left his son as regent in Brazil. Though the regency was intended to appease those Brazilians who opposed a return to the colonial status, this effect was not obtained. Those who favoured complete Brazilian independence had little difficulty in gaining the regent's ear, and their plans were, if anything, facilitated by the intransigence of the Portuguese cortes. Soon after John's departure the sensational failure of the bank of Rio de Janeiro spread poverty and dissatisfaction. In June 1821, the

regent was obliged to grant a constitution, though he thought fit subsequently to apologize for it to his father. From this point he gradually appropriated the authority of monarchy. In reply, the Lisbon congress ordered D. Pedro to resign the regency of Brazil and return to Europe to complete his education with a tour of England, France and Spain. 'We can oblige the first citizen of the nation to have the education necessary for the position he is to hold', declared Fernandes Tomás; 'as the first citizen he ought to go, and if not, lose his position.' Already independence was practically inevitable, and the attitude of congress did nothing to relax the tension. A commission of Brazilian deputies was formed on June 15, 1822 to frame the additional articles of the Portuguese constitution that should affect Brazil. Its proposals were presented two days later, but congress eventually refused even to vote upon them. It was true that they involved excessively complicated legal machinery, including three cortes—for Portugal, for Brazil, and a combined assembly for dealing with subjects of common interest—but the Portuguese deputies themselves were no more realistic.

Across the Atlantic, a large party, animated by the Brazilian free-masonry, was intent on complete independence. On the celebrations of John VI's birthday, May 13, 1822, Pedro received the title of 'Perpetual Defender and Protector', and agreed to call together representatives of the provinces of Brazil. He was on the bank of the Ipiranga on September 7 when he received the order of the Lisbon cortes to return to Portugal: he and those with him adopted the motto of Independence or Death, 'the cry of Ipiranga'; and on October 12, Pedro was acclaimed constitutional emperor of Brazil.

iii. REACTION OF D. MIGUEL; THE CIVIL WARS, 1826—1834. The Portuguese situation at the end of 1822 was critical. An annual deficit of some 3,000 contos could only be met by stringent economies, and the dismissal of numerous officials multiplied discontent. The navy had been reduced by the retention of some of the best ships in Brazil. Diplomatic representation was difficult, since the imposition of an additional 15 per cent import duty on woollens had offended England, the only possible shield against the intervention of the Holy Alliance. Queen Carlota Joaquina refused to take the oath to the constitution, and was deprived accordingly of Portuguese citizenship. Ten doctors unanimously declared her unfit to travel, or she would have been expelled from the country. Retiring to the Ramalhão palace at Sintra, she became the protectress of the counter-revolution. Already in February 1823 it was known that the Count of Amarante had established the headquarters of an insurrectionary movement at Vila Real. Legislation stopped. The legal term of the cortes ended in March, but a special convocation was made for May

in view of the threatening situation. On May 27 a pronunciamento was made at Vila Franca de Xira. The same day the ministry fell. New ministers took office in the face of immediate extinction. Even now with the counter-revolution almost at the gates of Lisbon faith in verbiage was not lost and the Abbot of Medrões proposed some form of plebiscite to decide the type of government the nation wanted. Both this and the insurrection were regarded as perjury by loyal liberals; for them it was a bitter blow to find how little binding were political oaths. 2,760 men left the garrison of Lisbon for Vila Franca. Prince Miguel, John's younger son, joined them. For a moment the tide of despair was stayed by a proclamation in which the king condemned his son's action and declared his loyalty to and confidence in the cortes. A few hours after he had given this undertaking, he himself left to join the rebels, accompanied by a numerous crowd whose great anxiety not to be on the losing side guided them to Vila Franca. Capitulation under protest was the only attitude left for the cortes: only a rump of 61 out of 211 deputies and substitutes remained to take it.

Reaction had been made inevitable by the disappearance of the few factors that unified the nation in 1820. Many hopes had since been dashed and many interests infringed. The nobility was annoyed at the loss of its influence in the government, its privileges and its sinecures. The clergy felt that both its interests and its doctrine had been trampled on. The army had hoped for influence in the government and regular pay. The magistracy had been criticized and insulted in the cortes. Public officials had been faced with dismissal or reduction of salaries. Merchants were disgruntled or ruined by the loss of Brazil. The point of departure of the reaction had been the decision of France to restore Fernando VII of Spain to his natural absolutism. When the '100,000 sons of St Louis' entered the Peninsula, Amarante had already made his pronouncement at Vila Real. On May 24 Fernando was re-established in Madrid, and Portugal trembled at the prospect of a similar invasion. The cortes' attempt to man the frontiers played straight into their enemies' hands: the unpaid army joined the counter-revolution. Prince Miguel cried viva for the absolutist monarchy, and depicted the pitiful state of the country in a letter to his father. The appearance of John VI himself at Vila Franca after his proclamation against the insurrection might not appear very noble, but it at least saved bloodshed. His wife became a queen again, and he re-entered Lisbon amidst scenes of triumph, attending a Te Deum in the cathedral to celebrate the recovery of his 'inalienable rights as absolute king'.

After the Vilafrancada as much as possible of the work of the liberals of 1820 was at once undone. Again the only unity of the government lay

in negations. John had promised to grant a constitutional charter, and the new ministers, especially Palmela, were in favour of this. A committee was appointed on June 18 to elaborate it. But the more extreme absolutists were not satisfied that John VI, whose past was an archive of tergiversations, was a suitable representative of their doctrine. On April 30, 1824, the garrison of Lisbon came out and hailed D. Miguel as king. The prince took command of the revolt and in a proclamation alleged a plot to assassinate the royal family as its pretext, arresting his opponents and placing his supporters in positions of military responsibility. On May 3 John VI signed a decree sanctioning his son's action, but three days later he acceded to the requests of the diplomatic body and went aboard the Windsor Castle, a British vessel lying in the Tagus. From this place of safety, he summoned D. Miguel to appear, and deprived him of his command of the army. The prince gave way and was permitted to travel abroad, departing for Brest, Paris and later Vienna. This episode was christened the Abrilada. Its results included the summoning of a 'traditional' cortes, the dissolution of the commission at work on the constitution, and an amnesty, which however was not extended to those responsible for the revolution of 1820.

The problem of Brazil remained to be settled. In September 1823 the Portuguese Minister in London had requested British mediation. He at first proposed conditions which Canning could not accept, but in the following year a conference was held at which the Portuguese and Brazilian cases were put before British and Austrian mediation. After sitting from July 1824 until February 1825 the Conference was broken off by the Brazilian commissioners, who refused to consider any possibility of the restoration of Portuguese dominion over Brazil. For various reasons, including the threat of a French recognition of Brazil, Canning felt compelled to promote an agreement with that country, if necessary without waiting for Portugal to acquiesce. The Portuguese displayed every reluctance to acknowledge the fact of Brazilian independence, if only because, on the death of John VI, the succession of D. Pedro seemed likely to bring the mother-country back to a state of subordination to the late colony. But by two acts of May 13 and November 15, John at length recognized the independence of Brazil. The first declared that, as the 'succession of the two crowns, imperial and royal, directly belongs to my above all beloved and esteemed son Pedro', full exercise of the sovereignty of the Empire of Brazil was therefore ceded to him. The second document fully recognized the category of an independent and separate empire and transferred the succession to his son, retaining only the imperial title for himself.

Before John died on March 10, 1826, he appointed a council of regency

under the presidency of his second daughter Maria Isabel, in the absence of his two sons, but left the question of succession completely unsettled. The council of regency was simply ordered to continue until contrary directions came from the 'legitimate heir and successor to the crown'. The omission to declare expressly whether or not this was D. Pedro led Portugal straight into civil war. The acts of the council of regency indicate that there was at first no doubt that Pedro was the successor documents were passed in his name and a deputation was sent to Brazil to recognize his succession. Pedro himself did not hesitate in accepting, and ordered the cortes to take the oath to a constitutional charter of his own elaboration, an act which custom forbade until he should have sworn to preserve the rights of the nation.1 On May 2, 1826, Pedro made a conditional abdication in favour of his daughter Maria da Glória, provided that his charter was accepted and his brother Miguel married the young queen. The constitutional charter brought to Portugal by the future Lord Stuart of Rothesay on July 7, 1826, caused considerable surprise among the council of regency, but it was at length decided to publish both it and the act of conditional abdication. Those absolutists whose hopes gravitated round D. Miguel found some protection in the projected marriage, but not a few began to contest D. Pedro's claimon the creation of Brazil as an independent state, it was claimed that he had lost Portuguese citizenship, and could not therefore succeed to the throne. Moreover it was pointed out that he had found it convenient to disparage Portugal when promoting Brazilian separation. He had declared Portuguese soldiers to be his enemies, and unofficially renounced his claim to the crown of Portugal.2

Austria supported the recognition of D. Pedro in Europe in the expectation of his abdication in favour of Maria da Glória, a grand-daughter of the Emperor Francis I, and of her marriage with D. Miguel, then in Vienna. Miguel too wrote to his sister the regent and his brother the emperor, declaring his recognition of the latter's succession and disowning any opposition that might be made in his name in Portugal. Meanwhile Pedro's constitutional charter appeared in instalments in the official press and the oath was taken amidst the usual rejoicings at the

¹ Though Portuguese writers have attributed the Charter to the inspiration of Sir Charles Stuart, the British representative in Rio de Janeiro, Stuart's despatches suggest that his advice was sought on only one or two minor points (cf. Prof. C. K. Webster, *Britain and the Independence of Latin America*, 1, 65).

The attitude of the liberals is described by Sir William à Court to Canning (October 28, 1826). While 'anti-Brazilian feeling is much too strong and too general to allow of Portugal's being governed for any indefinite period from the other side of the Atlantic,' nevertheless 'the Liberals would certainly rather submit to D. Pedro's continued rule than run even the slightest chance of the alternative put forward by the Ultras, of D. Miguel as absolute King' (Webster, ibid. 11, 275).

Ajuda Palace. The Queen-Mother Carlota Joaquina was naturally absent. Supporters of D. Miguel began to rise in various places, but for lack of striking power they crossed the frontier into Spain, where the reactionary Junta Apostólica allowed them to bide their time. On August 1, the regent, D. Maria Isabel, appointed a ministry, which proceeded to carry through elections. From Vienna D. Miguel had sworn to observe the charter, and signed the contracts of betrothal, reserving his right to the regency, which according to Article 92 should be held by the nearest relative over 25 years of age during the minority of the sovereign. Meanwhile, attempts to persuade the Spaniards to disarm or disband the waiting absolutists had failed, and at the end of November these armed émigrés began to enter Portugal, advancing on Oporto, where they were repelled, but seizing the cities of the Beira frontier. At once the government asked for English aid, asserting the attitude of Spain to constitute 'unprovoked aggression'. At length Canning announced that England would send troops to prevent the intervention of any other power, and on December 24 forces under General Clinton arrived in the Tagus. The move was purely preventive, for the memory of French intervention in Spain rankled in England.

In the first months of 1827 most of the absolutist forces retired into Spain, and this time they were disarmed, because of the presence of English forces in Portugal. In spite of this the government was weak and unrest continued. In October D. Miguel reached the age of 25, and, piloted by Metternich, claimed the regency until his future wife should attain her majority—in ten years time. But as Pedro's abdication was conditional on Miguel's marriage to his daughter, which had not yet taken place, and therefore Maria da Glória was not yet queen, there was no need for a regent on the grounds of her minority, but merely on the grounds of D. Pedro's absence. The conditional abdication had put the country in a false position, laying an unnecessary strain on the newly woven and already taut political fabric. Metternich, with the consent of the other powers, sent an envoy to Brazil to urge Pedro to make his abdication complete and his brother regent, but Maria Isabel and the minister Saldanha urged the emperor to maintain the present arrangement, and D. Pedro adopted their view. Anxious to keep the situation in his own hands, he tried to persuade his brother to return to Brazil, where he would be secure, but Miguel refused to go. Both Metternich and Canning hoped that D. Pedro would thus be forced to send D. Maria da Glória to Europe and settle the matter. Saldanha feared a Miguelite rising, and, having failed to obtain a guarantee that the English troops would support his party, was prepared to compromise. In September 1827 D. Pedro proclaimed his brother as his lieutenant, at the same time

urging George IV and Francis I to obtain the continuation of the charter, which in October D. Miguel promised to observe. To the joy of the absolutists, D. Miguel left for Paris and London, where he took ship for Lisbon. Already the centre of Portuguese politics had moved from Maria Isabel to her mother Carlota Joaquina at Queluz.

D. Miguel landed on February 22, 1828. Four days later, he gave his oath of fidelity to D. Pedro IV and the charter, and chose a new ministry. Reaction was immediate. Those suspected of liberalism were insulted and maltreated, and wild and cruel disorders took place in the provinces. Vivas for D. Pedro, D. Maria and the charter were forbidden, and the chamber of deputies dissolved. Liberalism had collapsed, and those who came to power on the Miguelite wave used every method to establish themselves. Orders were issued to all the municipalities to send petitions for D. Miguel to assume the crown: those who refused to petition were dismissed. On March 3, 1828, Pedro at last abdicated, leaving the liberals in a pitiful plight. Tempers ran high. Some liberal students from Coimbra waylaid a university deputation on its way to congratulate D. Miguel, killed two and were themselves hanged. In April D. Miguel was persuaded to call the 'traditional' cortes to settle the legitimacy of his claim to the throne. Orders were at once issued to this effect. Municipalities were bidden to choose well-affected Miguelites: votes in favour of D. Pedro were automatically adjudged 'suborned'. The diplomatic body met on May 7 and protested against the illegality of the convocation in the name of the Holy See, England, Austria, France, Spain and Naples. A few days later, a constitutional revolt began at Aveiro and Oporto. Various towns of the north, with considerable military forces, joined the movement, but the most capable liberal generals had already fled abroad. After an indecisive action near Coimbra the liberal forces retreated in confusion, and the arrival of Saldanha and a group of other generals and politicians on the Belfast, chartered in England, was too late to prevent the collapse. Saldanha persuaded the troops to retire into Galicia before himself rejoining the liberal leaders on board the Belfast. Early in July the liberal army, accompanied by many civilians, retired towards Galicia, where, after the defection of a large part, the remainder were interned. Of those who had taken part in the rising some thousand were arrested in the following spring, and in May 1829, when clemency was generally expected, a dozen executions and many other punishments were carried out. A plot to restore the regency of Maria Isabel, discovered in December 1828, provided five more victims.

The three orders of the traditional cortes assembled in Lisbon at the end of June 1828, and discovered D. Pedro's succession to have been

illegitimate, declaring his brother to have been 'rightful King of Portugal since the death of John VI'. Meanwhile, D. Pedro had decided at length to send his daughter to Europe. On her arrival at Gibraltar, her guardians thought it wiser, in view of the situation in Portugal, to take her to England. George IV received Maria da Glória with regal honours and prepared to send her back to Brazil, her father having heard of the action of the Lisbon cortes and denounced the marriage contract. Her departure took place in August 1829. It now only remained for D. Miguel's government to obtain international recognition, which had already been conceded by Spain, the United States and Russia. Wellington decided to follow suit in 1830, but when the ship carrying the necessary despatch was driven by storm into Plymouth, he had been replaced by Grey, who cancelled the instructions.

The liberal refugees in Galicia, numbering over 3,000, were expelled by Fernando VII and arrived in England in the autumn of 1828. They were installed in a large warehouse at Plymouth. The leaders, divided into two main parties under Palmela and Saldanha, eventually decided to send an expedition to the Azores, where the island of Terceira sustained the liberal cause. Under pretence of sailing to Brazil, as Wellington had demanded, a force of some 600 men under Saldanha left Plymouth in January 1829, and after an incident with two English frigates, arrived in Brest. Here they received help, and were able to garrison Terceira. The Plymouth concentration camp almost disappeared in May 1829. In August the Miguelites delivered a naval attack on Terceira, which was driven off with loss; and in March 1830, Palmela, deeply in debt in London, retired to the liberal stronghold as president of D. Pedro's council of regency, and organized the reduction of the remaining islands of the group, completed by August 1831.

Meanwhile D. Miguel had lost favour in the eyes of Europe by the reign of terror with which his ministers, the Count of Basto and Teles Jordão, repressed liberal risings in February and August 1831. On the second occasion bitter fighting resulted in the loss of 200 lives, and both were punished by summary executions. As to D. Pedro, he had to face rising opposition in Brazil, until in April 1831 the situation passed out of his control, and he abdicated in favour of his son, D. Pedro de Alcântara. Sailing to England in the hope of raising support for the conquest of Portugal, he was officially received only as Duke of Bragança, but privately was able to borrow money from the firms of Ardouin, Mendizábal, and Sanson and Ricardo, in sufficient quantity to procure men and ships. The latter, at first seized under the Foreign Enlistment regulations, were later released, and a number of mercenaries under an ardent liberal, Major Hodges, were enlisted. In March 1832 D. Pedro

and his supporters arrived at Terceira, where he formed a government with Palmela, Mousinho da Silveira and Agostinho José Freire. Mousinho da Silveira embarked on a large programme of reforms, whilst D. Pedro and his adjutant Cândido Xavier prepared the expedition that was to attack the mainland. At the end of June this was ready, and various sailing ships, with 18 lighters and one steamer, bore his force of some 7,500 men towards Portugal, where the absolutists concentrated on the defence of the Lisbon region with forces estimated to number 80,000. In spite of this impressive number of men, the government had the greatest difficulty in financing defence operations, having recourse to a forced loan of 1,200 contos at 5 per cent in November 1831, and another of 40,000,000 francs contracted in Paris under the most onerous conditions, since it was obliged to accept a mere 69 per cent of the nominal value of the loan (April 1832).

The liberal fleet first appeared off Oporto, but when the alarm was given, sailed north to the mouth of the Mindelo, near Vila do Conde, where a disembarkation was made without the slightest opposition. Although a Miguelite force of 13,000 was defending Oporto, it retreated and D. Pedro entered the city on July 9. But there was no national rising in his favour, and while he organized administration and conscription. the Miguelite forces recrossed the Douro and began the siege of the city. Supplies were lacking, and at the beginning of August Oporto was all but lost. Yet when at last on September 29 the Miguelites attempted a general assault, they were beaten off with the loss of 4,000 men. and other efforts to penetrate the defences of the city in October met with no better success. D. Miguel appeared to inspect his forces, and both sides changed their commanders, D. Pedro himself substituting Vila Flor, who was nevertheless rewarded with the title of Duke of Terceira, in command of the defenders. In November the liberals attempted to obtain an Anglo-French mediation based on the recognition of Maria II, but international confidence in their victory had waned because of the indiscipline of their troops and the bankruptcy of their treasury, and Grey would only envisage mediation on condition that both Miguel and Pedro left Portugal and the two parties combined round Maria II. On the failure of these negotiations, which resulted in the resignation of Palmela, England and France decided to abide by the fortunes of war. In the beginning of 1833, a French general, Baron Solignac, a decrepit veteran of Napoleon's, took over the military direction of D. Pedro's affairs; with him came warriors from France, Belgium and Scotland. At the same time cholera broke out with great violence in Oporto, and political quarrels began to rage on the reappearance of Saldanha, who received the title of marshal and command of a division in February. In March the liberal admiral,

Captain George Rose Sartorius, threatened to abandon the service unless nine months' arrears of pay were settled, and was with difficulty persuaded to stay. Now after ten months of siege the position was no better than at the beginning; although the liberal army had increased to 17,800 men, the Miguelites had 24,000 in front of Oporto.

In June 1833 Charles Napier, a capable sailor contracted by Palmela, replaced Sartorius. He proposed a direct attack on Lisbon from the sea, but Saldanha successfully advocated a landing in the Algarve. Solignac and Sartorius left the country, and Saldanha became commander-in-chief. On June 21 Napier sailed, taking the Duke of Terceira as commander of the landing-force and Palmela as governor of whatever territory might be conquered. Landing the troops without opposition on a beach near Tavira, Terceira at once seized the towns of Olhão and Faro. The Miguelite fleet, sent out from Lisbon completely unprepared, was destroyed by Napier on July 5; a week later he began the blockade of the Tagus. Terceira, after some hesitation, marched straight upon Lisbon. Brushing aside the enemy near Setúbal and Almada, in spite of his own inferior numbers, he reached the south bank of the Tagus, which was now at the mercy of Napier's fleet. Next day, July 24, the Miguelites abandoned Lisbon, and at once a liberal rising placed Palmela and Terceira in possession of the city. D. Pedro entered the capital and ordered the assembly of cortes forthwith, while his brother after a vain attempt to storm the defences of Oporto resolved to surround Lisbon. A large Miguelite force assembled at Coimbra but only appeared outside the capital on September 4, by which time Saldanha had taken advantage of the weakening of the besiegers to free Oporto. A few days before, Lord William Russell had presented his credentials to D. Pedro; the capture of Lisbon was the essential step towards international recognition. In September Maria II arrived from England.

D. Miguel's cause was now in decline. His attacks on Lisbon were beaten off, and he retreated before Saldanha's numerically inferior forces to Santarém. Although his supporters held most of northern and central Portugal, he had lost the Algarve and especially the two great cities. In February 1834 he suffered another reverse at Almoster. Meanwhile Fernando VII of Spain had died, and his brother D. Carlos, refusing to acknowledge the succession of the three-year-old Isabella II, took refuge with D. Miguel. The situations of Portugal and Spain were strangely similar, and the governments of Lisbon and Madrid agreed in principle to combined military action against the two absolutists. Thus, in the spring of 1834, while Portugal north of the Douro was reduced by Terceira, D. Carlos was driven out of Almeida by the threat of a Spanish attack and arrived in Évora, where he was soon joined by D. Miguel.

On various occasions Lord Howard de Walden, who had succeeded Russell as English minister, attempted to bring about a peace, but without success. The Quadruple Alliance, signed in London by England, France, Spain and Portugal at the end of April 1834, followed by Terceira's occupation of Viseu, Coimbra and Tomar early in May, irrevocably condemned the absolutist cause. After a final defeat at Asseiceira, below Tomar, D. Miguel's forces retreated to Santarém, then to Évora. Threatened by the armies of Terceira and Saldanha, as well as Spanish forces under Rodil and Serrano, D. Miguel held a last council on May 23, when it was decided to open negotiations.

On instructions from Lisbon, Saldanha and Terceira refused to accept anything but an unconditional surrender, but on May 26 in an interview at Évora-Monte they agreed to a number of concessions, which formed the so-called Convention of Évora-Monte. These included a general amnesty for political offenders, officers being allowed to retain their ranks and civilians receiving the 'consideration they deserved in view of their services and qualities'. D. Miguel would receive an annual pension of 60 contos on condition he left Portugal within a fortnight and undertook never to return to the Peninsula. All those who had supported him would be ordered to obey Maria II. On June 1 D. Miguel embarked at Sines on the Stag and sailed for Genoa, where he at once lodged a protest against the capitulation, which had been signed under compulsion 'and must therefore be considered void and of no effect'. On the same day as D. Miguel, his Spanish counterpart embarked for England, soon to escape and launch Spain into the turmoil of the Carlist wars.


CHAPTER XXV

THE NINETEENTH CENTURY

i. Maria II; Chartism and Septemberism, 1834–1842. The Convention of Évora-Monte aroused expressions of disgust in Lisbon, where Miguel's escape with a large pension was greeted as a scandal; at the São Carlos opera-house noisy manifestations compelled Pedro and Maria to withdraw. It was necessary to make some concession to the extreme liberals, who, in spite of appeals for oblivion in the Lisbon press, practised or countenanced acts of violence against the defeated party. Thus on May 30, 1834, a decree, rejected by the council of state but promoted by Pedro himself and his Minister of Justice, Joaquim António de Aguiar, abolished all the religious orders and confiscated their houses and possessions, the state promising to pay a pension to those dispossessed until they should be able to support themselves. The measure was not calculated to heal the breach between the victorious liberals and the very considerable part of the nation, comprising especially country priests and their flocks, that remained profoundly Miguelite. This breach was deepened by cases of reprisals; in Estremós the butchery of certain liberals in prison in July 1833 was now repaid by that of captured Miguelites. When parliament opened, the news of Miguel's repudiation of the Convention of Évora-Monte caused such indignation that deputies demanded the death-penalty for him and the stoppage of his pension, so far unpaid.

On September 24 Pedro himself succumbed at the age of thirty-six to tuberculosis, said to have been contracted during the privations of the siege of Oporto. His legacy to his fifteen-year-old daughter was a situation complicated by the political pre-eminence of the leaders who had won the civil war, especially the Dukes of Terceira and Saldanha and the Viscount of Sá da Bandeira. Terceira, whose military prowess was combined with affability and honesty, had the highest prestige among the liberal leaders. Saldanha, a politician with the renown of a general and a gift for conspiracy, was a typical figure of the restless age of the pronunciamento.

Maria II's reign began inauspiciously. On December 1 she married her stepmother's brother Prince August Charles Eugene Napoleon of Leuchtenberg, who died after less than three months' residence in Portugal: in February 1836, she married Prince Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha, with whom her domestic life was enriched by the birth of eleven children before she died at the age of thirty-four.



Map 7. Modern Portugal, showing the division into modern Provinces and communications.

Portugal was in a serious plight. Heavy loans had been contracted, and to these were added the abusive indemnities by which the liberals recouped their losses during the war, and the cost of numerous pronunciamentos; the ghost of the Miguelite wars was to dog every ministry until a recrudescence of financial crises eventually brought down the monarchy in 1910. In November 1835 the Palmela cabinet was reduced to the expedient of proposing to sell blocks of national property, in particular the rich *lezirias* of the Tagus and Sado, which by a law of the previous April should have been marketed in small lots. The legality of the sale was questioned by the opposition, but it, on coming to power, was reduced to advocate the same step in March 1836, and raised a loan on the estimated value of the lands, 2,000 contos or over £800,000. Not only had credit almost vanished, but future revenues were already pledged against past over-expenditure. Economies and cuts in the civil service provoked discontent without affording much relief.

The cabinets of Palmela, Saldanha and Terceira had short lives; either their financial measures or the question of the despatch of Portuguese troops to fight for the Spanish constitutionalists laid them low, and in the elections of July 1836 the radical opposition carried the north. With the Spanish revolution of La Granja of August 12, which restored the Constitution of 1812, before them, the Portuguese radicals of the Douro entered Lisbon on September 9 amidst popular demonstrations and, supported by the declaration of the National Guard and part of the garrison, ousted the government, declared the Charter replaced by the Constitution of 1822 and formed a ministry which included Manuel da Silva Passos (Passos Manuel), Sá da Bandeira and Vieira de Castro. These radicals, or Septemberists, were the heirs of early Portuguese liberalism, from which they took their Constitution, and were opposed by the moderate Chartists, or supporters of D. Pedro's system.

For two years, those from 1836 to 1838, whilst the Constitution of 1822 was being adapted into that of 1838, the Septemberists governed semi-dictatorially, but from the latter date they gradually lost their hold, until the opposition restored the Charter in 1842. The first Septemberist ministry faced the desperate financial situation by making drastic cuts of functionaries and of their salaries, some of the latter by as much as 40 per cent: the Minister for the Interior, Passos Manuel, remarked that his arm ached with signing dismissals.

The orgy of bureaucratic changes upset, amongst innumerable others, Maria II, who was led to fear for the security of the throne, despite the protestations of Sá da Bandeira and his colleagues. The King of Belgium even had the idea of promoting an expedition to rescue her and debiting Portugal with some of the African colonies to cover the expenses.

However on November 3, 1836, Maria moved to the Belém palace, where she was covered by the guns of British warships, and, calling the cabinet together overnight, dismissed them and nominated a strongly Chartist ministry under the Marquis of Valença. Although the outgoing government had calmly signed the decrees appointing its successors, the National Guard and garrison of Lisbon came out in opposition to the coup and a junta of left-wing Septemberists was created which entrusted Manuel Passos with an intimation to the queen. The military display was decisive: Maria was not prepared for violence, and summoned Passos to a conference, out of which issued a Sá da Bandeira-Manuel Passos-Vieira de Castro administration. The incident, known as the Belémzada, produced an overwhelmingly Septemberist majority in the Constituent Cortes of January 1837. A number of useful measures were adopted, including the administrative reorganization of the country, the adoption of a new penal code, the foundation of public health services, laws against the slave-trade and a determined struggle on the part of Sá da Bandeira to redeem the colonies from the confusion into which they had lapsed.

Yet far from obtaining peace and stability, Septemberism gradually disintegrated. A Miguelite chief, Sousa Reis, known as O Remexido, carried on a guerrilla campaign in the Algarve and defied all attempts at capture for over two years. The so-called 'conspiracy of the Marnotas', a village movement in favour of D. Miguel, was easily and tolerantly suppressed. In July 1837 a new Chartist movement, the 'Revolt of the Marshals' (Terceira and Saldanha), broke out in the north, spreading at once to the Tagus valley. In spite of the military ability of their leaders, the rebels were not numerous enough to obtain success, nor did they receive support in the capital: at the end of August government forces under Sá da Bandeira and the Baron do Bomfim met Saldanha near Batalha and after two hours' fighting negotiations were begun for an armistice. When they failed the Chartists retired northwards, and on September 20 Saldanha obtained terms. The Chartist leaders agreed to leave the country, while their forces were allowed to retain their ranks and pay.

Septemberism now had the field to itself, and accordingly split. The ministerial group led by Sá da Bandeira was moderate, while the extremists centred round the Lisbon arsenal, whence their name of Arsenalists. The latter attempted a rising in March 1838, and although it was suppressed, a large part of the National Guard had been involved and the disbandment of various battalions became necessary. In the parliament which assembled at the end of 1838 Arsenalists and even Septemberists, such as Passos Manuel, joined the Chartist opposition,

because the government had suppressed the National Guard, while allowing those implicated in the Revolt of the Marshals to go unpunished.

The Constitution adopted in March 1838 substituted direct representation and a temporary, elective second chamber for the two-stage elections and life-long nominated senate of the Charter. Sá da Bandeira's ministry did not survive its inception. The period from 1839 to 1842 was marked by transition ministries which prepared the way for a return to the Charter. The rising politician was António Bernardo da Costa Cabral, future Count and Marquis of Tomar, who had begun his career as an advanced Arsenalist but rapidly evolved into the most pronounced Chartist. From the elections of March 1840 the pendulum swung sharply away from Arsenalism; two small Septemberist risings were mastered without difficulty, and although the Constitution of 1838 was not repudiated, the atmosphere was entirely Chartist.

Two incidents coloured the foreign relations of this period. The resistance to the suppression of the slave-trade in Moçambique involved Sá da Bandeira in a brush with Palmerston, whose proposed treaty led to prolonged discussions and almost to the severance of diplomatic relations in April 1839. A year later a coolness with Spain proceeded from the delay in the ratification of the Luso-Spanish treaty of 1835, by which the Douro was declared open to the navigation of both countries. This treaty was subsequently represented as so injurious to Portuguese interests that no cabinet dared ratify it, until in December 1840 the Spaniards delivered an ultimatum. Saldanha went to Spain and negotiated a settlement in which ratification was given, but the Spaniards apparently made no use of the concessions they obtained.

ii. THE RETURN TO CHARTISM; MARIA DA FONTE; COSTA CABRAL; INTERVENTION AND THE CONVENTION OF GRAMIDO; THE END OF CABRALISM; REGENERATION; THE DEATH OF MARIA II, 1853. Costa Cabral appeared as the chief exponent of Chartism in 1842. On January 2 the municipal elections of Oporto revealed a strongly Chartist majority; and he, though still a member of a ministry that was governing under the Constitution of 1838, visited Oporto and promoted the declaration of the Charter in the northern capital, an act widely believed to have resulted from an understanding between himself and the queen. Although when the news first reached Lisbon Costa Cabral was disowned and dismissed, the other ministers did not want to suppress the Oporto movement for fear of falling into a Septemberist alliance. Terceira refused to take command against his more precipitate fellow-Chartists. The ministry resigned on February 7: for three days Palmela governed with the 'Shrove-tide ministry', and on the 10th Terceira replaced him and declared for the Charter in Lisbon.

From 1842 till 1846 Costa Cabral was the vital force of a ministry of which Terceira held the presidency. His cry was for order, and he assured himself in the saddle by arranging the elections of June 1842 for the lower chamber and by creating simultaneously thirty peers, who would carry the upper house. The effect was a dictatorship resting on an oligarchy; the lower middle-class masses which had been the mainstay of Septemberism gave place to the wealthy bourgeoisie created by the civil wars, those who had risen on the tide of ecclesiastical sequestrations and the politico-commercial dealings of the days of D. Pedro, and now occupied positions of unimpeachable respectability. These early capitalists thrived under the Chartist administration, and brought a wave of prosperity to Portugal, but in spite of this the national deficits continued to defy the solutions proposed by Costa Cabral and Terceira. After four years of their government indebtedness had increased by 40 per cent the internal funded debt from 22,708 to 31,181 contos; the external debt from 38,847 to 40,238. The additional taxation with which it was sought to combat the deficits met with resistance from the commercial and other classes. As early as October 1843 the municipality of Évora presented to the queen a petition for a change of ministry, which only resulted in the suppression of the câmara, followed by that of other local bodies which took the same line. In February 1844 a pronunciamento at Tôrres Vedras led to the siege of Almeida, which held out till the end of April. The result was merely additional expenditure of some 2,000 contos.

Meanwhile the press was muzzled and opposition stifled, particularly as the elections of August 1842 approached. A little before them, Costa Cabral named his brother José Bernardo da Silva Cabral Minister of Justice, to the wrath of the opposition. Conducted in a storm of vituperations and without scruples of justice, the polling resulted in the election of only six oppositionists. Costa Cabral consolidated his victory with the creation of eight new peers and the assumption of the title of Count of Tomar, the latter conceded by the queen in return for the honour of being accommodated in the minister's house, a wing of the former Convent of Christ at Tomar.

In May 1845 Costa Cabral's major reform, the reduction of the many varieties of tribute and duties to three direct taxes, was carried through. Yet the necessary investigations embarked on for the collection of information aroused suspicion and dissatisfaction in rural districts, aggravated by the fact that the road-tax was allowed to survive. Popular feeling was fired by the introduction of mechanical looms in the Covilhã wool industry, and outraged by a public health order of November 1845, which forbade burials in churches, and instituted public cemeteries well outside the villages.

From the Minho in April 1846 came the insurrection of Maria da Fonte. Who Maria da Fonte was, whether she even existed, and when her rebellion began are questions which have received conflicting answers, though the village of Fonte Arcada seems to supply the title of the movement, which probably began as a conflict between the authorities and the village women, personified by Maria da Fonte, who sought to continue performing burials in the holier ground of the churches. Local government offices and barracks were attacked, and their files and documents burned. Braga was entered, but though the troops cleared the town, they could not pin down the countryside. The popular rising spread rapidly, a phenomenon remarkable for its spontaneity and mixture of civic sense and ignorance, and which stands out from the succession of professionally political or military pronunciamentos. Martial law did not stop its spread; Miguelites and Septemberists joined hands against the government troops, many of whom deserted or were defeated. In the first half of May, the whole movement changed its nature, taking on a strong political colour as oppositionist groups declared against Costa Cabral and his brother throughout the centre of the country. Themselves the personal targets of the local juntas which were springing up, the brothers first called for strong measures, then tried to meet the rebellion half-way by cancelling the cemetery legislation, and lastly withdrew from the ministry into Spain, a departure that Lisbon celebrated with all-night bonfires and open-air dances.

It was perhaps not surprising that the momentary elimination of Cabralism, brought about by the union of such opposing elements, did not produce peace. Rid of Costa Cabral, the country had to decide what it wanted, and as a safe compromise the queen called upon Palmela, who formed a government with Terceira and, nominally, Saldanha, though the latter was still in Vienna and in fact refused to join the cabinet. The survival of Terceira, so recently a partner of the Cabrals and therefore a target of Septemberist hatred, barely lasted a few days, when Palmela in view of the general mistrust found it necessary to drop him. Funds had slumped heavily; the programme of public works stopped abruptly and threw thousands out of employment. Owing to the strain on the banks the circulation of paper money had to be enforced, which did nothing to increase confidence. A contemporary calculated the loss suffered by the state and private persons through the troubles of 'Maria da Fonte' to amount to 31,000 contos (77,000,000 cruzados).

To add to the difficulties of Palmela's ministry, reformed in a more liberal sense with the inclusion of Sá da Bandeira in July, Miguelites controlled the country districts and D. Miguel's old general Macdonnel reappeared in the Douro. The followers of the Cabrals, especially in the

army, were transferred or dismissed, but seemed to thrive on this martyrdom; they could triumphantly point to the financial decline that had at once followed the dismissal of their leader. The ministry was far from easy. The Spanish government, instigated by its ambassador in Lisbon, González Bravo, a man of the same stamp as Costa Cabral, professed to believe that the situation in Portugal was a menace to its security and that Spanish political refugees were being actively succoured, and accordingly moved troops to the frontier, with the manifest intention of intervening. Palmerston reminded Spain of England's obligation to defend Portugal, and in face of his firmness the Spanish troops were withdrawn.

Elections were to be held on October 11; on October 1 evidence of a widespread Miguelite plot came to light, and on October 5 the Septemberists published a declaration of their policy, stressing the sovereignty of the nation, the reform of the upper chamber, direct representation, freedom of the press, the restoration of the National Guard and other measures recalling their programme of ten years before. Already negotiations had taken place between Saldanha, Terceira and the queen, who feared lest a radical victory should lead to her deposition. Saldanha, on his arrival in Lisbon, had been summoned to the palace and asked not to take the radical side; towards the end of September he at length assumed control of the Cabralist and Chartist party. Since he failed to persuade Palmela to join in a coalition, the queen resolved on a bold step. After expounding her intentions before the consort, Saldanha and her advisers, Fr. Marcos and the German tutor Dietz, she overruled the opposition of Saldanha and Dietz and, calling Palmela, obtained his resignation on October 6. Both he and the Count of Bomfim were forbidden to leave the palace. Saldanha and Terceira led a numerous band of Cabralist officers into Lisbon and restored them to the command of the garrison. Next morning the new government was announced in the official press. The elections were suspended, newspapers forbidden, the National Guard suppressed and Cabralist officials reinstated.

The coup d'état, the so-called 'ambush of October 6', was the signal for resistance and civil war. The opposition (the Patuleia) reacted in Oporto. José da Silva Passos, the brother of Manuel, exercised a high civic and political influence in the city, and when Terceira arrived as lieutenant in the north he was promptly arrested and secluded in the Foz castle. On October 10, a junta, presided over by Count das Antas and José Passos, came into being for the purpose of obtaining the resignation of the Saldanha cabinet. An appeal in this sense was despatched to the queen. Only now did the full reach of her act become clear; the coup d'état had created a situation which could scarcely avoid leading

to civil war. The implication of the crown in the political situation was deepened by the appointment of the consort, D. Fernando, as commander-in-chief of the army and by the assumption of full powers by the queen. Saldanha proceeded to call up all men between the ages of 18 and 45, and to arrest all Septemberists. In spite of this display of authority, he could only muster a bare 4,000 regulars to the 6,300 of the opposition.

The outpost of the junta was Santarém, held by Antas, who, however, had to fall back on Oporto with the surrender of his colleague Bomfim at Tôrres Vedras on December 23; those captured were deported to Angola. Miguelites, who had opened a guerrilla movement in the north, were fiercely suppressed, and after the defeat and subsequent assassination of Macdonnel, the majority of them pooled their resources with the Oporto junta. Neither side could claim a decided advantage until the junta resolved to despatch Sá da Bandeira to the Algarve in order to threaten Lisbon from the south. In effect Setúbal was occupied by the patuleias on April 16, 1847. However, Sá da Bandeira had not the strength to advance on the capital without the guarantee of a rising; most of the radical leaders had been arrested and an attempt to release them, involving the simultaneous escape of many criminals, led to further bloodshed.

Meanwhile mediation had been appealed for, and England and France agreed on April 19 to promote a reconciliation. On April 30 a Colonel Wilde, already empowered by Maria II, asked Sá da Bandeira's assent to an armistice, which on various grounds was refused. The following day the patuleias launched an attack which resulted in the drawn engagement of Alto do Viso, ended by the good offices of Wilde, though for the moment the suspension of hostilities applied only to the Lisbon front.

The idea of intervention originated in Spain. Costa Cabral had been named Portuguese minister in Madrid by Saldanha, and had an understanding with González Bravo behind his president's back: Saldanha himself had the idea that the approach of Spanish forces to the frontier would cow his rebellious compatriots; and by the end of October 1846 a Spanish army was awaiting orders. The possible consequences of unilateral intervention preoccupied Palmerston, who urged Maria II to come to a settlement and combated the schemes of the Spanish government and Costa Cabral. In Madrid, the English minister Bulwer, brilliant but unreliable, reported various tittle-tattle—that Passos Manuel had gone to Rome to fetch D. Miguel, that D. Carlos had advised D. Miguel to make good his claims, that Saldanha had actually asked for Spanish troops to enter Portugal—the fruits of the fertile brain of Costa Cabral, whose one aim was to induce Palmerston to tolerate Spanish intervention on behalf of the Cabralists and their leader by invoking the Miguelite

bogey. Palmerston's attitude in resisting unilateral intervention, 'decorous and sensible', and above all patient, eventually had its effect; four points, a complete amnesty, the withdrawal of all unconstitutional decrees issued since October, the summoning of cortes immediately after elections, and the creation of a temporary administration without Cabralists or adherents of the junta, were accepted by the queen on April 28. The junta put forward a number of unacceptable amendments, and negotiations collapsed in the middle of May. At once England, Spain and France agreed to intervene on behalf of the queen. When on May 30 the Oporto junta despatched Antas with a new force against Lisbon, this was arrested by an Anglo-Spanish naval division blockading the Douro and brought to Lisbon. A Spanish army commanded by General Manuel de la Concha entered Trás-os-Montes on June 14, followed by other forces which penetrated the upper Alentejo: these forces had orders to end the war, and the junta accordingly collapsed. On June 29, 1847 the Convention of Gramido was signed by the representatives of the junta, the Marquis of Loulé and César de Vasconcelos, and by Concha and Wilde.

Saldanha resigned two months later to make way for a ministry of conciliation, constituted by his supporters. Whilst the proposal that the ministry should stand aside to allow free elections seemed a good one, in practice it countenanced a vigorous Cabralist reaction. Saldanha returned to power in February 1848, but at length gave way to a ministry presided over by Costa Cabral, who had vigorously attacked the Saldanha administration in the upper chamber. Once again Portugal was deep in a financial morass; the recent war had cost more than 30,000 contos. The Public Credit Board and other funds had been drawn on and overdrawn by the treasury; future receipts were mortgaged; such was the lack of money that tradesmen daily threatened to cease supplying the barracks, whilst officers vainly applied for arrears of pay.

The two years of Costa Cabral's administration from June 1849 until April 1851 began with an amnesty and ended with a pronunciamento. The ambition, energy and radical past of the minister made him the object of all the opposition's hostility, redoubled by his failure entirely to clear himself of various scandals. He was declared to have received a calèche in return for a decoration, whence 1849 was nicknamed the Year of the Calèche. The London Morning Post—a strongly Miguelite organ—made revelations about his private wealth, and later suggested that he had been appointed 'through the light behaviour of an exalted personage with this favourite' (January 12, 1850). The minister brought an action against the newspaper on each occasion, giving rise to a storm on the second because his affidavit contained the words 'denies expressly

¹ História de Portugal, vi, 328, Prof. Joaquim de Carvalho.

and positively that he has been chosen as minister through any immoral conduct on the part of the Queen of Portugal or himself, or that there has been in the conduct of Her Majesty or of himself anything of an immoral or improper nature'. In spite of the uproar in the chamber it was decided by five votes not to discuss the affidavit. Saldanha's vote had been given against Costa Cabral, and the marshal-duke was thereupon dismissed from his posts of honour at court. In February Costa Cabral's press law aroused the heated opposition of such figures as Alexandre Herculano and Almeida Garrett, but was passed. The Alfeite scandal—Costa Cabral had secured the lease of this royal property to himself for 99 years at a low rent—brought him perilously low; even his brother joined the opposition.

The pronunciamento that ended this ministry was begun by Saldanha from Sintra; it seemed to have fallen flat, and its leader was preparing to leave the country, when the garrison of Oporto came out. On April 29 Costa Cabral calmly departed to return to the post of ambassador in Madrid.

Though the rising had been prompted chiefly by Saldanha's own ambitions, its result was a reconfiguration of the political scene. The moderate Regenerators had evolved from the old Chartists and formed round Saldanha and later António Maria de Fontes Pereira de Melo. In opposition were the successors of Septemberism and the Patuleia, now called Historicals and later Progressists, led by the Duke of Loulé. Regeneration, the order of the day from 1851 to 1856, allowed Fontes. the first Minister of Public Works, to put into practice an extensive programme of economic reform, embracing the creation of a General Council for agriculture, trade and industry, and an organization to direct industrial legislation, education and development, measures which, though they added to the national debt, were necessitated by the movement of the times. In July 1852 decrees reformed the customs, modified taxation, and converted loans to a uniform 3 per cent in the hope of wiping out the deficit, dictatorial measures which were pushed through by the creation of twenty peers. To the Charter an Additional Act was applied in 1852, a measure of appeasement which instituted direct voting and annually voted budgets. Thus modified, the Charter remained the constitution of Portugal until the fall of the monarchy.

On November 15, 1853, Maria II died at the age of thirty-four, in giving birth to her eleventh child.

iii. AFRICA IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY; THE SLAVE-TRADE. The nineteenth century opened with the loss of Portugal's second empire, in Brazil, and closed with the consolidation of her third empire, in Africa. The adverse effects of the secession of Brazil, closely following the devastations of the Peninsular War and followed by the costly quarrels

of the Miguelites and the Constitutionalists, told heavily on Portuguese colonial efforts in the first half of the nineteenth century, and, entirely apart from these economic handicaps, ideological dislocation made the pursuit of any continuous colonial policy almost impossible, even though some statesmen, notably Sá da Bandeira, were eminent colonialists. Angola remained a collection of trading stations until late in the century, when the more temperate highlands of the interior began to be colonized: except for the group of Boers who settled at Humpata in 1880, almost all colonists were Portuguese, but the whole of Angola was too vast for rapid expansion. Moçambique came into more direct contact with the affairs of other powers, and the main feature of its history of the early nineteenth century was the stubborn rearguard action fought by the colony in defence of its slave-trade.

As early as 1810 the Portuguese prince regent had undertaken by the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of Friendship and Alliance to collaborate in the gradual abolition of the slave-trade, forbidding his subjects to engage in it except between their own possessions. Very soon after, British warships, with more zeal than legality, began to seize Portuguese slavers. At the same time Mocambique was seriously disturbed by British operations against the French islands of Réunion and Mauritius, and the consequent interruption of the lucrative slave traffic with them. There were strong protests against the illegal restraint of the slavers, and by the Convention and Treaty of January 1815 Great Britain undertook to pay £300,000 in compensation for the seizures, whilst Portugal agreed to forbid all traffic in slaves north of the equator, though permitting Portuguese subjects to operate between Portuguese territories south of the equator and the 'transatlantic possessions' of Portugal 'until the trade should universally cease'. Great Britain also agreed to write off the balance of a loan of £600,000 dating from 1809.

The agreements of 1815 had little effect. Brazil and the Portuguese African possessions north of the equator opposed the whole affair: the settlements south of the equator hoped to obtain the entire trade, but Moçambique objected to the disability to trade with the French, which was most profitable. By the Additional Convention of 1817, the legitimate trading area in East Africa was designated as from Cape Delgado to Lourenço Marques Bay, and the Portuguese government undertook to take steps against illicit traders. This was found equally objectionable by the colonists, and it is doubtful whether the result was other than to increase the number of slaves sent from Moçambique to Brazil. The mother country was felt to have been disloyal to the interests of the colonies, and whilst the Portuguese revolution of 1820 was reflected in Angola and Moçambique, the Brazilian revolution of 1822 was hailed with equal sympathy,

and the idea of a Brazilian Confederation, embracing the two African colonies, found supporters. This political confusion and the clash of humanitarian aspirations with the interests of various nations rendered life in Moçambique less disciplined and less settled. Although the Lourenço Marques Company was launched in 1827 to develop the economic life of the colony, it soon degenerated into a competitor in the traffic. When in 1836 Sá da Bandeira did prohibit the slave-trade generally from Lisbon, the Governor of Moçambique merely suspended the decree on the ground that it was impracticable. In 1839 Palmerston tried out the extreme policy of authorizing British warships to search ships showing the Portuguese flag. Whilst this measure increased animosity against England and lent currency to the belief that she was profiting from her campaign against the slave-trade by weakening the commerce of other countries and by disposing of the slaves she high-handedly confiscated, the Governor of Moçambique at least attempted to suppress the traffic and made efforts to promote more useful industries. In July 1842, by the Slave-Trade Treaty, all slave-trading was prohibited to Portuguese subjects.

Such prosperity as Moçambique still enjoyed was further undermined by the invasions of the Gaza peoples under Sotshangana. These forces attacked Lourenço Marques and massacred its garrison in 1833; they then forced their way to the Zambesi and occupied Sena, from which place they were bought off by a ransom which continued to be paid until 1868. When finally the Gazas recognized Portuguese sovereignty, the half-caste prazo-holders began to give trouble. Of these the most noteworthy were one Inhaunde and his son António Bonga. The first was a rebel in 1853, and the second, having been given official rank as a measure of appeasement, rebelled, killed the Governor of Tete in 1869 and ruled that region in independence until his death in 1885.

iv. PEDRO V, 1853–1861. Pedro V, the eldest of Maria's five surviving sons, had been born in 1837, so that it was necessary for D. Fernando to act as regent until he should reach his eighteenth birthday in September 1855.

Pedro had received a good middle-class upbringing and a sound classical education, reinforced by tours through England, France, Holland, Belgium, Germany and Switzerland in the years 1854 and 1855. Exceedingly conscientious, he never passed a law without having carefully studied it; during the terrible outbreaks of cholera, which killed over three thousand persons in Lisbon alone in the fourteen months from October 1855, and of yellow fever, responsible for some five thousand deaths in 1857, Pedro remained at his post in the capital. In 1858 Pedro married Stéphanie of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, who succumbed to diphtheria only two months after her arrival in Lisbon.

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Opposition to the Regenerators swelled in 1856 when, in spite of the threat of bad or no harvests, Fontes proposed still higher taxation. Saldanha proposed to pack the upper house, where he and Costa Cabral made a display of each other's dirty linen, by creating a batch of peers, but the king refused to permit the device, and in June 1856 the Historicals, with the Duke of Loulé and Sá da Bandeira, formed a ministry, which survived, but only with difficulty, disturbances provoked by the great dearth at the end of the year and attacks on its questionable election tactics.

In the case of the Charles et Georges, a French slaver arrested off Moçambique, Portugal was made to suffer for the honour of the Emperor of the French. The 110 natives found on the barque were declared by the captain to be free colonists; by themselves, to have been taken aboard against their will. The captain was accordingly condemned in Moçambique to pay a heavy fine and to serve two years' hard labour. Although the Portuguese government had promptly put its version of the affair into the hands of the French minister in Lisbon, the latter sought to justify his compatriot and made high-handed demands for his release. When the vessel was brought into the Tagus in August 1858, the captain, although admitting that the first eleven natives had gone aboard with their hands tied, still sought to maintain that they had done so willingly, in which the French minister supported him, declaring that the alleged presence of a representative of the French government on the ship was sufficient guarantee of this. The French could not now draw back without exposing the emperor to the charge of countenancing slavery. In spite of the blustering of the French envoy, divergencies between Loulé and Sá da Bandeira injured the Portuguese case, and they only proposed mediation to the French (September 17), and asked for the good offices of the British government (October 8) too late, at a time when the full invocation of the Anglo-Portuguese treaty of 1842 would have been necessary to obtain results. On October 21 the French accepted the mediation of the Low Countries, but only as to the amount of the indemnity to be paid by Portugal. Their fleet ostentatiously anchored in the Tagus: Loulé took the only possible course, that of liberating the Charles et Georges and its captain. He refused mediation, and in January 1859 the emperor claimed the sum of 349,045 francs.

From March 1859 until July 1860 the Regenerators governed with Terceira as president and Fontes as minister for the interior, obtaining a large majority in the elections at the end of the former year and reaching a concordat with Rome, which embodied recognition of the Portuguese patronage of dioceses in the Far East. The death of Terceira in 1860 brought in Joaquim António de Aguiar as president, but the

Regenerators had lost credit and resigned. A Historical cabinet under Loulé took power in July.

Anti-clericalism, slumbering since 1834, reappeared in the public and political controversy which raged over the activities of the French sisters of charity. Their refusal to accept the nomination of a Portuguese superior in March 1861 eventually led to their re-embarkation for France a year later.

During the reign of Pedro V the foundations of modern transport and communications were established. The first Portuguese railway, from Lisbon to Carregado, was opened in October 1856 and in the following twenty years nearly a thousand kilometres of track were laid. In the previous month the first telegraph was completed, between Lisbon and Sintra, whilst an agreement had already been made for the first cable from Lisbon to the Azores and thence to the United States.

On September 29, 1861, Pedro V and his youngest brothers Fernando and Augusto went for a short hunting trip to Vila Viçosa. Less than a fortnight earlier the second and third brothers, Luis and João, had embarked to begin a European tour from Antwerp. Three months later only Luis and Augusto were alive. On the return of the hunting party the king and his brothers fell ill. Fernando died on November 6, and Pedro five days later. Suspicions of crime were dispelled by an autopsy; the deaths were ascribed to typhoid fever. Luis and João were summoned from abroad, and João at once fell ill, dying on December 27, five days after the acclamation of Luis I. On Christmas Day large crowds gathered in Lisbon to demand the taking of precautions for the new king's life by the calling of an extraordinary session of cortes.

v. Luis i; reformism; pan-iberianism and the spanish succession, 1861–1870. By the beginning of the reign of Luis I the constitutional regime seemed to have settled down to work fairly smoothly; the age of the pronunciamento, if not over, seemed moribund, for an attempt at a revolt at Braga in 1862 quickly collapsed. In the following year parliament worked on reforms of the public accounts, the army and the tobacco monopoly. But while constitutionalism was generally accepted, the party system lacked stability; a typical case was the fate of the Loulé-Sá da Bandeira Historical ministry of March 1863, which possessed a majority that it could not control. Loulé was for an understanding with the Regenerator opposition, but Sá da Bandeira hoped to preserve party unity—in vain, for in the middle of 1865, he had to give way to a fusion of Regenerators under António Augusto de Aguiar and Historicals under Loulé. This repulsion of likes and attraction of opposites indicated a tendency towards disintegration.

The Civil Code, begun in 1850, was promulgated in July 1867, together with penal reforms. The introduction of civil marriage raised a storm,

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being defended by Herculano and attacked by the original promoter of the code, Seabra. The death penalty, not applied since 1846, was officially abolished.

The great outstanding problem was still that of finance. The budgets presented the following picture (1 conto = 1 million reis = c. 2400):

Whilst the opposition clamoured for measures of economy, the government maintained that expenditure was reduced to the limits dictated by efficiency and progress, and proposed rather to increase revenue by augmenting existing taxation and creating a new sales tax. The latter aroused resistance: when it came into effect on January 1, 1868, the Commercial Association of Oporto refused to present their wares for inspection until its withdrawal. This threat, the 'Janeirinha', overthrew the ministry, which gave way to a group pledged to undo the new taxation. In July, this was replaced by an administration led by the now Marquis of Sá da Bandeira and by the Bishop of Viseu, who sought to reduce expenditure by heavy cuts affecting large numbers of civil servants -victims less vociferous than the commercial classes. Reformism was the cry from July 1868 until August 1869; it cut auditors, inspectors, assessors, treasurers and officers right and left. Dissolving the chamber, it reduced the civil list by 10 per cent and cut the salaries of officials by from 21 to 10 per cent; various subsidies and offices were suppressed. The successful resistance of the commercial classes to paying for an efficient civil service was perhaps one of the great misfortunes of the period.

In spite of this activity, the ministry was forced back to the idea of raising a loan. At length the government was brought down by the accusation of sheltering pan-Iberian ideas, strongly generated from Spain since the deposition of Isabella II. Its Historical successor (Loulé and Anselmo Braamcamp) faced the same financial difficulties; the estimates for 1870–71 were, expenses 21,931 contos; revenue 16,636; deficit, 5,295. Of this, interest on public debt amounted to 9,153 contos. Portuguese funds were quoted at 36. Whilst the press clamoured for sensational cuts in the civil list, the appropriation of crown property and the sale of diamonds 'that must be in the treasury', the government estimated the value of taxable property at 30,000 contos and calculated that a tax of 8 or 9 per cent would give ample revenue; but attempts to make assessments were resisted with violence, and modifications of the scheme had scarcely been agreed to when the government fell.

The inner story of the last revolt of Saldanha and of the invitation extended by Prim to D. Fernando, the king's father, to present his

candidature for the vacant Spanish throne has not been published; it represents a climax in the development of pan-Iberianism. In October 1869 Saldanha, now in his late seventies, returned from the Portuguese legation in Paris, where he had been honourably retired, to relive his old pronunciamentos rather than trouble the country with more. His reappearance produced exactly the effect the government feared. Publicly welcomed by discontented officers, who were promptly removed from Lisbon, he attempted in vain to persuade D. Luis to dismiss the ministry. When asked to return to his post, he entered into a controversy with the minister for foreign affairs, and stayed. The coalition government, feeling itself weakening, dissolved the chamber in January 1870, and obtained a majority in the fourth election in four years. The opposition left the chamber and sent in a collective resignation on May 18. On the same night Saldanha made his pronunciamento, turning the opportunity to his own ends. Various troops assembled outside his house and the old marshal rode at their head to the palace. A few shots were exchanged, and D. Luis then called Saldanha to a parley which resulted in the substitution of the Loulé cabinet by one man-all the retiring ministers refused to sign Saldanha's appointment, leaving him to name himself universal minister. This position he maintained until May 26, when he managed to form an administration, which governed dictatorially and obtained some applause for its energy. But the main political bodies, Reformists, Regenerators and Historicals, objected to the origins of the new situation and to Saldanha's pan-Iberian ideas. On August 29 Luis obtained Saldanha's last resignation, and the elderly dictator retired to occupy the London legation, whilst Sá da Bandeira formed a ministry.

By a curious accident Adolphe Ollivier, a brother of Napoleon III's minister, arrived in Lisbon on the very day of Saldanha's coup, bringing a letter from the emperor to urge Fernando to become a candidate for the Spanish throne. Already in the previous decade Italian and German aggrandisement had occasioned a certain apprehensiveness in Portugal with regard to the intentions of Spain. After the Spanish revolution of 1868 and the abdication of Isabella II, Prim put forward the candidature of D. Fernando for the Spanish throne, sending Fernández de los Ríos in January 1869 to sound him and assure him that he could obtain a majority in the election. Prim hinted fairly plainly at his pan-Iberian schemes when he said that 'with this candidate came a great idea that would undoubtedly satisfy the Spanish cortes and the whole nation'. Naturally the vast majority of Portuguese felt that it was safer to be free of the whole affair, and when Madrid proposed to despatch a mission to Lisbon for the purpose of finding out whether Fernando would take the crown if it were offered him, Sá da Bandeira sent a curt

telegram of refusal. Nevertheless in August Fernández de los Ríos presented his credentials as Spanish ambassador, and it was promptly rumoured that he had been entrusted with the task of inviting D. Luis himself to accept the Spanish crown, the two countries retaining their autonomy, and that D. Luis favoured the plan. This report was officially scouted by Luis, by Prim and by Fernández de los Ríos at the end of September.

Saldanha had passed through Madrid, where he was received with military honours, and arrived in Lisbon in October, and it was at once rumoured that his object was to press D. Fernando's candidature.

Yet until May 1870 it appeared certain that D. Fernando's refusal had been accepted as final and that the candidature of his son-in-law Leopold of Hohenzollern united the support of Spaniards with that of Bismarck. Among those who objected to the German were Napoleon III and Olózaga, the Spanish ambassador to France. The latter and Ríos were called to Madrid early in May; on the 12th the minister in Lisbon renewed his persuasions with Fernando and on the same day Napoleon III wrote his letter to D. Luis. A week later the letter was delivered and Saldanha made his extraordinary pronunciamento—supported by Spanish gold, according to the opposition press. Although D. Luis' reply to Napoleon III, dated May 25, was still negative, D. Fernando. almost certainly under the influence of Saldanha, began to change his views. July 20 had been fixed for the assembly of the Spanish cortes: on July 9 at a council of the Portuguese royal family the king read a note from Saldanha which depicted Fernando's acceptance as capable of clearing up the European situation. On the 15th Fernando agreed: his acceptance was, however, conditional on a Spanish guarantee of the continued separation of Spain and Portugal, the support of threequarters of the Spanish cortes, the elaboration of an agreement with England and France, and approval of the Portuguese government. Other points, the assurance of his pension in case of abdication and of the treatment of his morganatic wife, were conceded, but the Spaniards could not guarantee him three-quarters of the votes and would not agree to the succession clause—Prim refused categorically to renounce his pan-Iberian intentions. Napoleon and Bismarck had been at war since July 19 and their influence was therefore withdrawn. The Portuguese political parties probably learnt of the tenacity with which the Spaniards refused to exclude 'the great idea' of Iberianism and their onslaughts were doubtless a factor in the sudden liquidation of the Saldanha coup.¹

¹ In February 1873 the Spanish Minister in London called at the Foreign Office to say that there was a 'disposition on the part of the Republican party in Spain towards an union with Portugal', and that the Spanish Government 'might not be able to stop some aggressive movement'. Earl Granville replied that the Spaniards 'could not count on the indifference

vi. LATER YEARS OF LUIS I, 1870–1889. During the last forty years of the monarchical regime constitutionalism passed through a new phase, which, originating in the Fontes ministry of 1871, established tranquillity until the end of Luis' reign, but degenerated during those of Carlos I and Manuel II until its final collapse dragged down the throne. Rotativism, or government by temporarily like-minded cabinets rather than by parties, sprang out of the loss of unity of the main political groups of Historicals, Regenerators and Reformists. While served by experienced and distinguished ministers, such as were not wanting in the seventies, it benefited the country, but as a system it was too loose to maintain itself.

Fontes maintained his majority from September 1871 until March 1877, during which time the railway from Oporto to the Galician frontier was opened, together with the steamship services to the Algarve and to the islands, the construction of docks and railway sidings for the port of Lisbon, which was to develop into one of the most important in the world, the Lisbon-Madeira-Cape Verde-Pernambuco cable and the D. Maria Pia railway bridge over the Douro at Oporto. Funds rose from 37 to $52\frac{1}{2}$, as the deficit dropped from 4,500 contos in 1870–71 to 2,800 in 1875–76.

However, the tide of prosperity was soon interrupted; an excess of enthusiasm in the founding of banks was accompanied by equally excessive speculation. Spanish stocks, in which large quantities of Portuguese capital were invested, depreciated suddenly in 1876, when the rates of interest were reduced to a third. The Bank of Portugal, the Ultramarino and the Lusitano closed their doors on Black Friday, August 18, 1876. However, a moratorium gave time to negotiate a loan of a million pounds in London, which effectively restored confidence.

Politically the Fontes administration was conservative, and its long duration drove the opposition to unite to form the Progressista party in September 1876. The doctrines of full suffrage, constitutional reform, popular primary education and the protection of the individual were those adopted by the new group which gathered about Braamcamp and the Bishop of Viseu, who unseated the Fontes administration in March 1877. The heterogeneous cabinet of the Marquis of Ávila was able to fill the gap until Fontes returned to power in January 1878; and it was only in June 1879 that the Progressists began to govern, obtaining an elective majority in the lower house and creating one in the upper by the nomination of twenty-six peers. From this point the parties rotated smoothly until the death of Luis I in October 1889.

of England to an external attack on Portugal'. The Spanish Minister expressed the opinion that 'everything depended upon the attitude of England: that if England opposed herself to such a plan no attempt would be made; otherwise it was sure to happen'. British Documents on the origins of the War, 1898-1914, Vol. 1, p. 51.

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vii. carlos i, 1889-1908; manuel ii, 1908-1910; the 'ultimatum'; THE TREATY OF WINDSOR: THE REGICIDE AND THE FALL OF THE MONARCHY. The rotativist parties had secured peace during the last ten years, but they offered little scope for vitality, nor apparently could they do much to alleviate Portugal's financial troubles. Already the intellectuals of the seventies, notably Antero de Quental, displayed strongly republican tendencies. In 1872 Socialism made its appearance in Portugal, together with the first strike, and from it issued early Federal Republicanism. This lost much of its impetus with the collapse of the Spanish Republic in 1874, whilst Unitarian Republicanism, the form that was to survive, derived encouragement from the success of the French régime of 1876. In 1878 the first Portuguese republican deputy was elected at Oporto. Thereafter the progress of the republicans was gradual until the events connected with the 'Ultimatum' of 1890 gave them an opportunity to train all their guns on the throne and its ministers. They were not immediately successful—the rising of January 31, 1891 in Oporto was suppressed without difficulty—but they did contrive to shake the throne to its very foundations. Portugal was soon 'a monarchy without monarchists', and it only remained for the republicans gradually to improve the opportunities offered by the lack of conviction and disintegration of their opponents.

The crisis of 1890, that of the 'Ultimatum', of deep consequence to the Portuguese régime, to the development of Southern Africa and to the reconstitution of the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance, had its sources in events in Africa in the previous twenty years. For the first half of the nineteenth century Portugal was too exhausted by her domestic tribulations to embark on new enterprises in the African field. Whilst certain disputes had arisen about the coastal extent of her colonies and trading rights, in which English, Dutch and even Austrians were involved, the major questions of European activities in Africa did not take shape until the last quarter of the century. In 1876 Stanley's travels led to the formation of the 'International African Association' under the patronage of Leopold II of Belgium, and soon after to the founding of Leopoldville. France, emulous of Belgium, sent out Brazza, who staked claims on the right bank of the river Congo, whilst Stanley, on behalf of Leopold II, obtained privileges on the left. These movements might have forewarned Portugal that some such test as that of 'effective occupation' would eventually be applied to claims in Africa. She did indeed react in 1877 by sending out to Angola the explorers Hermenegildo Capêlo, Roberto Ivens and Alexandre Serpa Pinto, of whom the two former studied the courses of the Cunene, Cubango, Cuanza and Cuango, whilst Serpa Pinto continued from Bié to the Victorià Falls and so to Pretoria and Durban, where he

arrived in March 1879, being subsequently received with honour by the Royal Geographical Society in London. Unfortunately the courage and resourcefulness of these explorers was wasted by the failure to found stations, which would have given their work the highest political importance and perhaps assured Portugal of the 'Rose-coloured Map'—the possession of a coast-to-coast colony embracing the territory between Angola and Moçambique—though already in 1875 the Scotch mission and settlers were implanted on the shores of Lake Nyasa, and in 1878 the African Lakes Company came into being.

For the moment, however, international attention was fixed on the Congo. By the treaty of February 1884 England recognized Portuguese rights north of Ambriz in exchange for free navigation on the Congo river (Zaire) and the Zambesi. Foreign interests were not slow to object to the agreement. France protested, and Germany demanded its annulment. Bismarck pronounced that when direct annexation by a European power had not taken place, new extensions of sovereignty such as that accorded by the Anglo-Portuguese treaty should not be permitted, where they prejudiced existing commercial relations. Germany's attitude was not precisely altruistic: she wanted a colonial empire, and she was ready to exploit every favourable opportunity to get it. Great Britain compromised on the German claim to Angra Pequena in June, and Germany proclaimed a protectorate over South-West Africa in August 1884. In November the Conference of Berlin began its sessions, and, by its General Act of February 1885, the doctrine of 'effective occupation' as proof of sovereignty was adopted. Portugal's claims, based on priority of discovery, were brushed aside, and the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of the previous year was undone. The Germans, by exploiting England's uncertain international position and by wooing France, made their influence felt in colonial affairs with alarming ease.

Although to the north of the Congo Portugal was restricted to the enclave of Cabinda, her dominion on the south bank was recognized from Ambriz to Noqui, and this was perhaps not an unsatisfactory result. What was unfortunate was that the cancellation of the Anglo-Portuguese Treaty of 1884 was interpreted in Portugal, not in terms of England's international difficulties, but as a proof of her indifference to Portuguese interests. Germany seemed to be the rising star, and there were some Portuguese politicians who concluded that the harm done at Berlin could only be repaired by dint of an approximation with her.

In February 1886 a new Government was formed in Lisbon with José Luciano de Castro as Prime Minister and Barros Gomes as Minister for Foreign Affairs. The latter at least was one of those who were ready to receive German support—in particular for the project of a Portuguese

African colony stretching from coast to coast. In May 1886 a treaty was concluded with the French, who, having no interests whatever in those parts, readily agreed to the Portuguese project. In December, after negotiations about the frontier of Angola and of German South-West Africa, a treaty was reached with the Germans by which they recognized Portugal's rights to the territories between Angola and Moçambique in exchange for handsome territorial concessions between Angola and German South-West Africa, and Mocambique and German East Africa. Germany thus secured territories stretching from Cape Cold to the mouth of the Cunene merely as the price of inciting Portugal to collide with the expanding interests of British South Africa, and without giving the least offer of assistance in the event of such a collision. On the strength of German and French assent, Barros Gomes put before Parliament the scheme which gained fame under the name of the 'Rose-coloured Map': by it Angola and Moçambique were united as a solid block of territory. On the publication of the Rose-coloured Map, Great Britain delivered an immediate protest on the grounds that Portugal did not control Nyasaland or Matabeleland. Unfortunately, the existence of this protest was not at once made generally known in Portugal. In 1888 Lord Salisbury again made the position clear, but the Portuguese Government had neither proceeded with the occupation, which might have given basis to the Rose-coloured Map, nor begun negotiations to put forward their point of view in London. When Barros Gomes, with regrettable ingenuousness, told the British Minister in Lisbon that Germany ought to be associated with Portugal in settling outstanding African problems, he was told, not unnaturally, that Germany had no concern with the frontiers of Matabeleland and the Portuguese possessions.

Early in 1889 Portugal decided to send to Moçambique a new expedition, ostensibly to survey the course of a railway from Nyasa to the sea, but in fact to join hands with a column moving eastwards from Angola, and thus to execute the design of the Rose-coloured Map. Once again Salisbury warned the Portuguese Government: the relations between the two countries were being exposed to a strain they could not for long support. He was assured that clear instructions had been given to the leader of the new expedition, Major Serpa Pinto. In November 1889 the expedition was held up by the Makalolos, whom Consul Buchanan declared to be under British protection: there followed an armed conflict at Mupaça, south of the river Ruo. In December accounts of the fight reached England and a note (December 18) was sent to Lisbon asking the Portuguese Government not to allow its forces to attack the British stations of Nyasa or the Shire, or Makalololand or Matabeleland. On December 20 Barros Gomes replied, insisting on the technical nature of

the expedition, reserving the right to take account of Serpa Pinto's version, and declaring that orders had already been telegraphed to Moçambique to secure respect for British interests. A British telegram of January 2, 1890 repelled Barros Gomes' arguments and asked for the terms in which instructions had been given to Moçambique. Barros Gomes sought to avoid this imposition by a subterfuge, which Salisbury did not accept. On January 11 a British memorandum, known to all Portuguese as 'the Ultimatum', intimated that Serpa Pinto had himself declared that he was occupying the Shire, Catunga and other places in Makalololand, and that unless the British Minister in Lisbon received a satisfactory undertaking that an immediate withdrawal was being made from Makalololand and Mashonaland he had orders to leave Lisbon. The Council of State met the same night and resolved to accept the immediate demands, whilst proposing mediation. This proposal was refused.

The orders were despatched, but the 'Ultimatum' aroused an extraordinary outburst of feeling in Portugal. The whole issue had been suddenly flung in the face of a hitherto unconcerned public, and offended pride expressed itself in the collection of funds to purchase a cruiser, innumerable demonstrations, and the composition of the present national anthem. Resentment against Great Britain ran high, whilst the obscure but sinister role of agent provocateur played by Germany passed almost unnoticed.

The ministry resigned, and wounded national pride was turned to political account by the republicans, who sought to throw the main responsibility on the monarchy. The Northern Patriotic League formed itself round the figure of Antero de Quental in Oporto: similar groups came into being in Lisbon and elsewhere. The ranks of the army were vigorously proselytized, especially in the north, and on January 31, 1891 the first attempt at the proclamation of a republic was made in Oporto. Only three officers accompanied the republican troops, which were directed by sergeants. They were dislodged from the Municipal Chamber after an hour and a half's fighting, and for the moment the movement went no further.

Meanwhile, as soon as the crisis of the 'Ultimatum' was over, negotiations for a treaty were begun in London, and in spite of the agitation of Rhodes, favourable terms were obtained. If Portugal could not obtain a block of territory from east to west because of Britain's claim from north to south, she at least secured the use of a road and railway zone giving free communication across Africa. But when this treaty was put before the cortes, the state of feeling in the country was such that no support could be found for it. The government again fell and a modus

vivendi was resorted to. In May 1891 a fresh—but less favourable—treaty was negotiated and passed through cortes with only five dissentient votes. The colonial question had yielded first place to the perennial problem of finance.

This, the heritage of the civil wars, had been treated with excessive complacency in the early years of rotativism. Against the background of a national debt of 592,000 contos, some £12,000,000, there stood the mounting deficits of the public accounts—14,950 contos in 1890. Lenders to D. Miguel still badgered the government for recognition. Portugal was thus at the mercy of every international crisis, particularly that of 1891, with the failure of Barings, and financial and civil disturbances in Brazil which affected the copious stream of remittances that normally flowed from Portuguese emigrants back to their families. In June 1892 Dias Ferreira tried to cut the external loan by two-thirds but only succeeded in provoking a menacing clamour from the foreign bondholders. A further aggravation was pending with the Delagoa Railway question: an American, Colonel MacMurdo, had been granted a concession to build a railway from Lourenço Marques to the Transvaal and had formed a company for the purpose with British capital. The contract was rescinded by the Luciano de Castro-Barros Gomes cabinet in June 1889. and as MacMurdo demanded compensation, the case was submitted to arbitration in Switzerland: there could be no doubt that a heavy indemnity would be awarded—the amount was, in fact, fifteen million francs. However, towards the end of 1892 confidence had been temporarily restored. The government put a large sum at the disposal of the Bank of Portugal, and the pound sterling, which had been quoted at 2,000 reis, returned to 960. Yet when the ministry found itself unable to devise fresh economies to reduce the deficit below 5,000 contos without increasing taxation, the opposition delivered an onslaught which brought it down in February 1893. From this time a Regenerator cabinet led by Ernesto Rodolfo Hintze Ribeiro and João Franco governed, for a time without cortes, but after the opposition abstained from the elections of 1895, with parliamentary trappings.

In May 1897 the possibility of financial aid being extended to Portugal without compromising the situation of Lourenço Marques was studied by Chamberlain and the Marquis de Soveral, the Portuguese Minister in London. Shortly afterwards, Luciano de Castro and Barros Gomes returned to power and negotiations were broken off. The Germans, meanwhile, demanded of Salisbury the right to share in any arrangement to grant Portugal financial assistance, a claim which was duly rejected. In 1898, however, Great Britain was preparing to abandon her isolation in favour of a system of alliances, and Bülow was ready to offer terms—

as he himself put it, 'an understanding with Great Britain on African questions, having regard to the Portuguese possessions. Portugal was a bad debtor, and was in the throes of a financial crisis of which England and Germany were the victims.' In a note to his ambassador in London, Bülow claimed as 'objects of compensation' southern Angola, Moçambique as far south as the Shire and the Zambesi, and Timor. The German idea of a partition of the Portuguese colonies seems not to have been altogether new—as early as 1890 the head of the Colonial Department of the Berlin Foreign Office had told the Portuguese minister that Germany with England could have taken all Portuguese Africa, implying a debt of gratitude for her restraint, and in 1889 Bülow recalled Salisbury's repugnance for the word partition 'six or seven years ago'.

Germany now made every effort to secure the right to share in any loan to Portugal—'we must decide whether any understanding with Great Britain is possible, for Portugal's financial difficulties are such that monetary help must be accepted sooner or later, and be based on territorial guarantees', wrote Bülow. According to Soveral, Portugal would need £8,000,000, which would be guaranteed against customs-receipts. In order to bring England to terms, Germany was ready to use as weapons her influence over France in the Anglo-French tension in the Upper Nile, and her friendship with the Boers. Salisbury went so far as to agree that if Germany should make a loan to Portugal, Great Britain would not object to her taking as security the customs of northern Moçambique and southern Angola. Germany was not satisfied: she required a suitable reward for abandoning her 'effective sympathy' for the Boers.

At this stage, in August 1898, Salisbury handed over the Foreign Secretaryship to Balfour, who, yielding to the necessity for an assurance that Germany would not be 'effectively sympathetic' to the Boers, apparently considered that as Portugal was aware of Germany's territorial and financial designs, she would naturally steer clear of entanglements. The urgent need was to keep Germany quiet for the moment. On August 30, 1898, an Anglo-German Convention was signed, by which, if Portugal should come to contract a loan with her colonies as security, spheres of influence were assigned to Germany and Great Britain.

On the English side the Convention was made with great reluctance and regarded as an awkward compromise, undertaken in the knowledge that the contingency to which it referred was unlikely to occur. On the German side, William II regarded it as 'a triumph of perspicacity'; it

¹ Luis Vieira de Castro, D. Carlos I, p. 153; this book has an excellent account of the 'Ultimatum', the Anglo-German Convention, and the Treaty of Windsor of 1899.

only remained to persuade or force Portugal to conclude a loan. At the moment negotiations were afoot in Paris for financing the conversion of her foreign debt. The German Minister in Lisbon, Tattenbach, with true rudeza germânica, saw the Portuguese Prime Minister and advised him to 'leave the wrong track he was on and put forward, as soon as possible, proposals in harmony with the Anglo-German agreement'.¹ Tattenbach was not the only German who interpreted the agreement as an instrument for bringing Portugal to contract a loan. On May 12, 1899, the Kiel squadron arrived in the Tagus to add force to his arguments, but this force was counterbalanced by the arrival of a British fleet the previous evening. At about the same time, the Germans tried to gain a foothold in Angola by the simple device of landing and setting up a flag near Lobito, though the prompt action of the governor led to their withdrawal.

In 1899 Great Britain was faced with the prospect of conflict in the Transvaal, and was concerned to stop the passage of arms to the Boers through Lourenço Marques. Once the question was raised by Salisbury, Soveral proposed a new Anglo-Portuguese pact. On October 14, 1899, two days after the Boers had invaded the Cape, a secret Anglo-Portuguese Declaration was signed, by which the old treaties of alliance were stated to be in full vigour. The revival of the ancient alliance was made manifest a year later on the occasion of the visit of a British fleet to the Tagus. In 1903 King Edward VII visited Lisbon, and expressed his concern for the integrity and conservation of the Portuguese territories. D. Carlos returned the visit in 1904, and a Treaty of Arbitration was signed between the two countries at Windsor—in the palace where the original alliance was concluded in 1373.

Although D. Carlos, ably aided by Soveral, played a conspicuous part in rebuilding Portugal's foreign relations, his work in this field contributed little to stabilize his throne. In internal politics stagnation and schism were general. For the last three years of the nineteenth century a Progressist cabinet governed. In 1899 Oporto returned three republicans; the result was annulled, but a second election merely emphasized it. When in 1900 the Regenerators returned to power, the party split, Hintze Ribeiro taking office and João Franco, its most vigorous member, leading a group of twenty-five deputies into opposition. To complete the rift, Hintze Ribeiro altered the electoral districts in such a way that no republican and only one follower of Franco could secure election. For the moment the external debt was kept in hand: each day the customs paid a three-hundredth of the sum required to the Public Credit Board, the government at once making good any deficit; but it could scarcely be claimed that there was any true improvement in the situation.

In 1904 Franco on the one hand and the republicans on the other carried on an active campaign. The dissolution of rotativism was accelerated by the failure of Franco to come to an understanding with the Progressists. When in 1906 Hintze Ribeiro had to ask for the postponement of cortes. the king refused and called João Franco. The chamber was dissolved without having met, and in new elections Franco came to an agreement with the Progressists, and obtained a victory over the vigorously struggling regular Regenerators. Franco proposed to govern with energy and to rouse monarchical sentiments from the indifference that was now widespread. At once the republicans attacked him on these grounds, accusing him of permitting increases in the civil list and unauthorized advances to the king. In March 1907 demonstrations at Coimbra, resulting from the failure of an examination candidate, led to a students' strike: no lectures were attended, and when seven undergraduates were expelled, the rest refused to return until their reinstatement; disorders continued although the rector of the university was changed. Cortes were closed in June 1907, and Franco increased the advances to the royal household by decree. Although D. Carlos himself recognized the danger, Franco preferred to settle the royal accounts before he should be obliged to appear before cortes, and accordingly raised 771 contos for the king, partly as rents for crown property, partly on the royal yacht, which had been bought for 306 contos by the state. This and D. Carlos' published explanation of the necessity of a dictatorship stirred the opposition to great anger. Several leading monarchists adhered to republicanism, and a revolution failed on January 28, 1908. On the 31st the Minister of Justice brought back from Vila Vicosa an order which allowed the deportation of those accused of various political crimes. On the following day the royal family itself returned from Vila Viçosa; it landed at the Terreiro do Paço and entered open landaus, which had scarcely started when a shot came from the middle of the western arcade. In the confusion a young man stepped forward and shot the king twice through the head. As he slumped sideways, the queen rose to her feet waving a bouquet she had been given on landing, the heir Prince Luis Filipe pulled out a revolver, and the landau jerked forward. On the corner of the arcade a bearded man with a carbine shot the prince dead and wounded his brother D. Manuel in the arm.

After this appalling scene, the first regicide in the history of Portugal, the bodies were taken back to the Arsenal, the streets emptied, and the shops closed. Next day D. Manuel issued a proclamation deploring the outrage and promising to obey the constitution. A ministry of pacification took office, and those decrees of the dictatorship deemed violent were withdrawn. But there was no reconciliation. The trial of the regicides

was secret, and efforts were made to involve the republican party. They in return prepared energetically for the electoral campaign of April 1908. A vigorous republican secret society, the Carbonária, worked among the armed forces; its adherents became too numerous to trace or control. A former minister of finance admitted that he had advanced sums from the treasury to the late king, and retired from public life. The Século newspaper had a large republican circulation. The monarchist counterblast Portugal was said to be run by Jesuits. Republicanism became sharply anti-clerical; and there were those who demanded the enforcement of the laws of Pombal and Aguiar.

In July 1910, fourteen republican deputies were returned, eleven for Lisbon. On October 4 the revolution came. The complacency of monarchical officers and the degeneration of party politics gave the conspirators every reason for optimism. On October 1, a Brazilian ironclad arrived in the Tagus with the president-elect of the daughter-nation on board. His presence provided a motive for the playing of the Marseillaise and general ovations for the Republic. On the night of October 3-4 everything was ready, but the agreed signals were not heard. Admiral Cândido dos Reis, who had arranged to board the warships in the Tagus and declare the republic among their well-prepared crews, could not make contact because of the failure of a river-boat to get up steam; he was found dead the following day. When the regular officers, convinced of failure, advised the troops to return to their barracks, António Machado dos Santos, the president of the Carbonária, directed the revolution from the Rotunda with a bare 500 men. As the hours passed, likelihood of success improved. At 7 a.m. on October 5 the German chargé d'affaires appeared at the headquarters of the monarchist forces to ask for an armistice of an hour to get away German residents. He advanced up the Avenida da Liberdade under the protection of a white flag to converse with the commander of the Rotunda, and the republicans, convinced that the flag meant surrender, at once occupied the Rossio. When Machado dos Santos entered the monarchist headquarters, the opposing general complained that the armistice had been violated, whereupon the leader of the revolution coolly pointed out that there was still a minute before it was due to begin. Portugal was a republic.

The royal family, after the shelling of the Necessidades palace by republican cruisers, had returned to Mafra, whence it moved to Ericeira, embarked on the royal yacht for Gibraltar, and was later brought in the *Victoria and Albert* to England. The Provisional Government of the Republic included such figures as Teófilo Braga (President of the Council), António José de Almeida (Interior), and Bernardino Machado (Foreign Affairs).

CHAPTER XXVI

THE REPUBLIC: 1910-1940

i. EARLY YEARS, 1910–1914. The revolution was completed in an orderly fashion. Whilst some of the populace sang patriotic songs in the streets, others spontaneously formed guards for public buildings: the numerous volunteers for the defence of the Republic were formed into new battalions of the army. The green and red banner that had flown over the Rotunda was adopted, with the addition of a shield and armillary sphere in gold, as the flag of Portugal, in place of the blue and white colours of the Monarchy, and other external alterations were made. Negative measures included the abolition of the religious form of oath, of indirect forms of taxation, of decorations, except the Tôrre e Espada, and of titles of nobility. Positive action was taken by the creation of universities at Lisbon and Oporto, the legalization of divorce, and the reform of the tenancy laws. The recognition of the right to strike led at once to experiments by carters, tramwaymen, railwaymen and others, who did not always choose the best pretexts for stopping work.

In general the republicans found the negative side of their policy the easier to carry through, and they showed a superficial unity in acts of anti-clericalism. In face of this general republican tendency even monarchists had begun to turn on the Church in the hope that by this concession they would save the regime: thus Teixeira de Sousa had thought it advisable 'to do something liberal to take the wind out of the republicans' sails', and a decree dissolving a Jesuit house in Lisbon had appeared on the very day of the revolution. Legal persecution of the Church began on October 8. Dr Afonso Costa, the Minister of Justice, restored Pombal's legislation against the Society of Jesus and Joaquim António de Aguiar's against religious houses, and abolished the chair of Ecclesiastical Law at Coimbra, religious teaching in schools, and saints' days as public holidays, and forbade the army to appear in religious ceremonies. After an anti-monarchist riot on October 17 at Coimbra, where the staff was thought reactionary, Dr Manuel de Arriaga was appointed rector: religious oaths in universities and the theology course were abolished. Henceforth student opinion had a considerable nuisance value in politics.

The reaction of the Church was not long in coming. Prelates meeting at São Vicente de Fóra published a pastoral dated December 24, 1910 which censured the Government, but the Minister of Justice ordered its

suspension on the grounds that it had not been submitted for governmental approval. Only the Bishop of Oporto stood out, ordering the priests of his diocese to read the document in the churches, and he was bidden to Lisbon and deposed. Anti-clerical action came to a head with the Law of Separation of April 20, 1911, which controlled Catholic activities through the foundation of lay corporations called 'associações cultuais'.

At first the monarchist leader, Paiva Couceiro, had undertaken to recognize the republic so long as it represented the will of Portugal, adding that if there were resistance he would fight to the last. However, he soon issued a demand for a military government, giving the ministry twenty-four hours in which to reply: before these had elapsed, he retired to Vigo and numbers of monarchists joined him.

The provisional government fixed May 28, 1911 for elections, which would bring into being a Constituent Assembly of 220 deputies. The result was an all-republican chamber which began its sessions amidst general popular optimism on June 19. Various proposals for the future constitution were put forward, but it was agreed that a president of the state, independent of the ministry and with powers to dissolve parliament, should be elected, and on August 24 Dr Manuel de Arriaga was chosen by 121 votes to 86 obtained by Dr Bernardino Machado. At the beginning of the same month the republican government was recognized by the U.S.A. (August 3), and England, Germany, Spain, Italy and Austro-Hungary (August 11); Brazil had already named a minister-plenipotentiary on November 20, 1910, and Argentina in December.

As the republican leaders who formed the provisional government had their own followers and their own organs of the press, it was not long before groups, easily convertible into parties, formed within the Assembly. The more conservative tendency was represented by Dr António José de Almeida, founder of the *República* newspaper, and Machado dos Santos (*Intransigente*), but these were outnumbered by the more extreme followers of Afonso Costa, whilst Brito Camacho (*A Luta*) led a centre group. By the middle of 1911 these tendencies definitely appeared in party form. António José de Almeida's followers formed the compact group of Evolutionists. Afonso Costa led the Democratic or Portuguese Popular Party, and the common use of the adjective 'democratic' in a depreciative sense in the Portugal of the New State is largely due to its close connections with the fortunes of Dr Costa and his adherents.

The third party was numerically weaker, but strong in intellectual and diplomatic circles—Dr Brito Camacho's Unionists. A number of prominent republicans, such as João Pinheiro Chagas, Bernardino Machado and Duarte Leite, remained outside the three parties. When Dr Arriaga

sought to compose the first constitutional ministry of the Republic, he aimed at the exclusion of those who had served in the provisional government and, Duarte Leite having failed to form a cabinet, called upon João Pinheiro Chagas, then Portuguese minister in Paris. The resulting ministry contained the following names: Prime Minister and Home Affairs, João Chagas; Justice, Melo Leote; Finance, Duarte Leite; War, Pimenta de Castro; Marine, João de Meneses; Colonies, Celestino de Almeida; Foreign Affairs, Augusto de Vasconcelos; and Development, Sidónio Pais. For support it depended on Evolutionists and Unionists, and the difficulty of reaching agreement, so soon after the enthusiasm of the early days, came as an unpleasant surprise to many. In fact the ministry was announced on September 3 and fell on November 7.

Hardly was the cabinet formed when the first monarchist rising began. Preceded by a weak military action in Oporto, Paiva Couceiro's forces crossed the northern frontier in the first days of October and occupied Chaves: however, dismayed by the prompt appearance of superior republican forces and by lack of support, they were worsted in a skirmish and retired into Spain to reorganize themselves. A special court was set up to impose heavy sentences on captured monarchists, but this acted rather as a stimulus than as a deterrent to opponents of the régime.

The second ministry of the Republic was formed by Dr Augusto de Vasconcelos, already with the idea of promoting conciliation between republicans. However, at the end of the year the patriarch and four bishops who had refused to recognize the cultuais were banished from their dioceses. As the patriarch continued in Lisbon and still received visitors, the rumour of a clerical-monarchical understanding was spread, and led to political demonstrations, whereupon the patriarch left the capital. In January 1912 labour troubles darkened the picture. Rural distress in the Alentejo brought labourers into Évora to demonstrate, and the Civil Governor called up troops from Lisbon and shut the premises of labour organizations. In sympathy Lisbon workers announced a general strike, demanding the release of those arrested and the dismissal of the Civil Governor of Évora. After two days, the government ordered the occupation of the headquarters of the Lisbon Workers' Union, and the arrest of some 580 persons, who were taken aboard ships in the Tagus. The declaration of a state of siege in Lisbon led to a return to external normality, whilst impelling less scrupulous agitators to devise their reply by violence, with the secret manufacture of bombs.

With the fall of Dr Augusto de Vasconcelos' ministry on July 4, twelve days passed before a new cabinet could be constituted. Dr Arriaga still attempted to lessen party hostility in the Assembly by promoting coalition governments, and the new group, under Dr Duarte Leite, consisted

of three members of the Democratic party, two each of the Evolutionists and the Unionists and one independent.

In 1912 the two groups of monarchists in exile, the followers of D. Manuel and those who formed the Miguelite faction, came to terms: by the pact of Dover D. Manuel's claims were recognized by all royalists: he was reported to be about to marry D. Isabel de Bragança, a granddaughter of D. Miguel, and if there were no issue of this match, the succession would go to D. Miguel's grandson, D. Duarte Nuno. This agreement prompted Paiva Couceiro to make a new attempt at a monarchist incursion, which was planned for July 1912. Relying perhaps excessively on the value of letters of adhesion from Portugal, he thought to enter Valença and other frontier districts easily and with small forces, but this project failed: and though he marched on Chaves at the head of some 800 men, the town was successfully defended by 100 soldiers and 160 volunteers. Local risings at other points were no more successful, and while this monarchist attempt was on a more serious scale than the last, its failure to call forth any real enthusiasm was significant. A third monarchist rising in Lisbon in October 1913 was little more than a disorder.

When Dr Duarte Leite resigned on January 8, 1913, it was hoped that party government might now be attempted. As the Evolutionists were not in a position to command a majority, the lead passed to Dr Afonso Costa and his Democratic party. This leader of the radical left, 'energetic, authoritarian, possessed by one idea, so firm in his tenets that he publicly declared his resolution to extinguish Catholicism in two generations, was the most vigorous and combative figure of the new régime. In his first term of office, January 1913 to January 1914, he demonstrated his force of character, harshness and obedience to a dominating purpose. Hated, but feared, he governed, and even sought to restore some order and economy to the public accounts', says a by no means friendly historian. The new régime had so far made no progress with the financial position, and budgetary deficits had became an established custom: Afonso Costa's announcement of an estimated surplus merely aroused malevolent mockery among his opponents, and his proposed financial reforms were hotly contested on purely political grounds.

A railwaymen's strike, begun on January 14, 1914, was partially broken by the calling in of sappers to run the train-service, but this step led to strikes of drivers, metal-workers and builders. Though a compromise was reached, the railway strike was renewed at the end of February, with no apparent advantage to the strikers. Political arrests had filled the prisons, and the closure of societies and clubs had aroused

¹ João Ameal, História de Portugal, p. 746.

resentment. Dr Arriaga deplored these circumstances and asked for a renunciation of political strife until the following elections, announcing his intention to resign unless a coalition or non-party government were formed to concede an amnesty and revise the Law of Separation. Afonso Costa resigned on January 24, and Dr Bernardino Machado, till recently minister in Brazil, formed a mixed cabinet. Against this background, the debate of January 26 in the Chamber was heated. The president of the Congress, Anselmo Braamcamp, refused to consider a government proposal as constitutional and left his position. On February 4, Machado dos Santos headed a deputation to Dr Arriaga to ask for the dismissal of the ministry.

On February 22 a political amnesty was conceded to those not accused of personal violence or bomb outrages, and eleven leaders of subversive movements were allowed to leave prison for exile; and though the Law of Separation remained unrevised, the patriarch and the bishops were permitted to return to their dioceses. Thus a measure of pacification was obtained, and a sense of unity was temporarily instilled by the outbreak of the Great War.

From the first Portugal was assured of protection within the terms of the Anglo-Portuguese alliance in the event of hostile action by Germany; Grey's suggestion was that Portugal should adopt an attitude of undeclared neutrality. On August 7, 1914, an extraordinary session of Parliament conferred on the government such powers as might be necessary to deal with the situation, and the leaders of the three parties declared their full confidence in it and support of it. It was decided to reinforce Angola and Moçambique, both bordering on German possessions, and the first expeditionary forces to these colonies left Portugal in September. Soon after the arrival of the Angolan contingent there occurred a brush with a German mission in the Cuanhama territory. In an action between a Portuguese reconnaissance unit and the Germans three of the latter were killed, and in retaliation German forces assaulted the Cuanguar outpost. On December 18 a Portuguese force was worsted at Naulila.

ii. PORTUGAL AND THE GREAT WAR; THE FIRST DICTATORSHIPS. An extraordinary session of parliament on November 23 authorized the ministry to enter the war, whenever it should judge the interests of Portugal to render intervention necessary. Barely a month later, the cabinet fell, and the Democratic party formed a ministry under the presidency of Vítor Hugo de Azevedo Coutinho, unkindly baptized by its enemies 'Les Misérables'. The beginning of 1915 was marked by divergencies between the government and the army. A military pronunciamento was stifled in Lisbon, and Machado dos Santos returned his

sword-'the sword of the Rotunda'-to Dr Arriaga, who refused to accept it. The government proposed to disband the regiments that had taken part in the pronunciamento, but these appealed to General Pimenta de Castro against the measure. The president hereupon withdrew his support from the Democratic cabinet, and asked Pimenta de Castro to form a ministry. This, when constituted, turned out to be composed entirely of officers, except for two non-party civilians, and it aroused the immediate animosity of all the political parties except the Evolutionists and the group led by Machado dos Santos, now on the extreme right of republicanism. As the military government had been formed whilst Congress was not in session, the politicians demanded the resumption of sittings on March 4. This was refused. The president was under no legal obligation to open parliament on the 4th, but the Democratic party could afford to adopt a threatening tone in view of the cabinet's weak prospects in the Chamber. On March 4 the politicians duly assembled before the Congress building and were refused admittance by the guard, upon which they retired to the Palácio da Mitra and declared themselves a legally constituted assembly, denying any authority to the dictatorship of Pimenta de Castro. Though the session was for the moment merely an indication of the strength of the Democratic party, the life of the dictatorship barely exceeded four months. During this time the associações cultuais were abolished, to the annoyance of the Democrats, who organized a mass-meeting of protest against the dictatorship.

The government did not waver. A monarchist organization was permitted to open, and three monarchist papers gave their support to it. Paiva Couceiro and other members of the party were amnestied. As a result of these concessions to the past, Pimenta de Castro and his supporters—Machado dos Santos and António José de Almeida—were branded as traitors to the Republic, and the Unionist party, which had so far condoned the dictatorship, now detached itself.

On May 14, 1915 the storm broke. The Democratic party had carefully prepared the naval forces of the Tagus, and commanded strong popular support. Leote de Rêgo obtained the adhesion of four cruisers; the naval arsenal was a strong point for the revolution, and members of the Fiscal Guard and Republican Guard joined the movement. Hostilities lasted two days. Pimenta de Castro and Machado dos Santos were arrested and despatched to Angra do Heroismo. On May 17 a new ministry was formed under the presidency of João Chagas: its composition was strongly Democratic and the grand-master of the Portuguese masonry appeared in it as Minister for Education. During the revolution, Dr Manuel de Arriaga had already announced his intention of resigning

the presidency of the Republic, and on May 26 Dr Teófilo Braga assumed the position, until presidential elections should be held on the following October 5. As a result of these Dr Bernardino Machado was chosen. Meanwhile the parliamentary elections of June produced a sweeping Democratic victory.

The political effervescence had all the nervous excitement, and some of the dangers, of civil war. On his way from Oporto to Lisbon, João Chagas was shot at by a political opponent, losing the sight of one eye: in July Dr Afonso Costa, while travelling in a tram, took the throbbing of the starting motor for that of a detonating bomb, jumped through the window, and fractured his skull. It was not long, however, before he was able to resume his political activities, holding the premiership from November 29 in a cabinet which included António Maria da Silva (Development), Augusto Soares (Foreign Affairs), Azevedo Coutinho (Marine) and Norton de Matos (War).

It was at this stage that the War became a crucial issue in Portugal. There had been no significant developments of the situation in Africa, but the facilities afforded by Portugal to England were the subject of a protest, so energetic as to appear threatening, by the German minister in Lisbon. Sounded about her attitude towards Portugal's entry into the War, England offered naval co-operation in the defence of coasts, but could not undertake to provide money or supplies unless she were permitted to lease or buy German ships anchored in Portuguese ports. This answer was given on February 17, 1916, and the ships, numbering thirty-six, were commandeered on the 24th. On March 9 Germany declared war on Portugal.

The immediate effect of the declaration was to produce a 'Sacred Union' between the parties led by Afonso Costa and António José de Almeida. In the coalition cabinet Almeida became Prime Minister; Afonso Costa, Minister of Finance; Norton de Matos, of War; Augusto Soares, of Foreign Affairs; Vítor Hugo de Azevedo Coutinho, of Marine; and António Maria da Silva, of Labour. This government was pledged to wage war on all fronts, while the Unionist party in opposition held that action should be limited to the defence of the colonies. It was in Africa that Portugal might gain from her entry into the War, by seeking the recovery of the Kionga territory (Moçambique), some 400 square miles at the mouth of the Rovuma river, seized by German forces in 1894. This objective was attained on April 11, 1916, when forces under the command of Major Portugal da Silva occupied the district, which had already been evacuated by the Germans.

Meanwhile preparations were in course for full participation in the war in Flanders. Several thousands of men were called up and trained

in the 'canvas city' of Tancos, where all these forces paraded before the President of the Republic on July 22. Afonso Costa and Augusto Soares departed for England to make arrangements for the transport of Portuguese troops to the battle area. In January 1917 the Portuguese Expeditionary Force (C.E.P.) under the command of General Tamagnini de Abreu e Silva and numbering 25,000 men (later increased to 40,000) sailed for France. In March the sectors of Neuve Chapelle and Ferme du Bois were handed over to Portuguese troops. These lost their first man on April 4, but became the object of heavy enemy activity only in the spring of 1918. Meanwhile fresh forces had been sent to Moçambique, and the town of Ponta Delgada in the Azores was shelled by a German submarine.

During 1917 the internal situation of the country became serious: a number of labour stoppages, resulting from the rise in cost of living, shortage of supplies and profiteering, induced the government to issue a decree applying mobilization to the services affected. The National Workers' Union retorted with a day's general strike: other individual strikes followed. This situation led to the second attempt to establish an authoritarian form of government, the régime of Sidónio Pais, frequently considered to have been the precursor of the New State. Major Sidónio Pais had served as minister-plenipotentiary in Berlin till the declaration of war. On his return he began to conspire against the Democratic régime, and prepared his coup for December 5, 1917. With the support of troops from various regiments of infantry, cavalry and artillery, Sidónio Pais and his supporters, Machado dos Santos and Feliciano da Costa, made themselves strong in the Rotunda and Parque Eduardo VII, repelling naval forces which attacked these positions on behalf of the government. On December 7 the revolution succeeded: Norton de Matos and Leote do Rêgo took refuge on an English ship, whilst Afonso Costa and Augusto Soares were arrested in Oporto. Bernardino Machado was deposed from the presidency of the Republic and crossed the frontier, and Sidónio Pais was left with a country in which the disorder that had prompted his movement had been increased by raids on food shops and stores.

The dictatorial or 'presidentialist' régime, known as the 'New Republic', formed its first ministry of the three leaders of the revolution, together with three Unionists and three independents. When Sidónio Pais toured the north of the country in the beginning of 1918, he received an enthusiastic welcome, which was repeated on his return to Lisbon, and later in the Alentejo and the Algarve. Popular applause did not lessen political opposition. His long residence in Germany had made him vulnerable to the charge of pro-Germanism, and of failure to support the

army in France. His acceptance of monarchist assistance was seen as enmity of the Republic. His revocation of an order of August 1917 by which the Cardinal-Patriarch of Lisbon and Bishop of Oporto had again been exiled, and his re-abolition of the 'cultuais' aroused the secularists: their hostility was redoubled when, after negotiations in Madrid, relations were resumed with the Vatican. In March 1918 the Unionist party ceased to support the dictatorship, and the government was extensively reorganized. In spite of this defection Sidónio Pais obtained electoral confirmation of his nomination of himself as president of the Republic, the political groups abstaining from presenting candidates. At the same time, and for the same reason, the new National Republican party obtained the majority of seats in both chambers, and the Monarchical Youth the minority.

Meanwhile the campaign in Flanders had reached its climax for the Portuguese forces. During the first months of 1918 the Portuguese sector was heavily bombarded, and on April 9 the German Sixth Army Corps launched the attack that developed into the battle of the Lys, and in it the Portuguese Second Division, holding a front of some twelve kilometres in three lines of defence, suffered crippling losses.

Hostility to 'presidentialism' redoubled in the later part of 1918. First a plot to kidnap Sidónio Pais failed, as did two projects to begin a general revolution. In consequence of various labour demonstrations, the headquarters of the National Workers' Union was put under guard. The insecurity of the government's position was shown when, after popular indignation against the official purchase of railway shares at prices above those current, the Minister of Finance had to be removed, and when in October a reconstruction of the cabinet became necessary. In the same month a revolution began, but collapsed through the failure of expected support; a movement in Evora the following day was easily crushed. Numerous arrests were made; in Lisbon particularly the prisons were crowded with republicans. When some 140 of these were being marched down to the river for embarkation, shots were heard and a general mêlée began, in which a number of police and prisoners were wounded and three killed. The occurrence added to the passions nursed by the enemies of Sidónio Pais.

There were only two more festivities before the régime disappeared with its author—the Armistice of November 11, received with an outburst of joy, and the anniversary of the New Republic on December 5. On this latter day an attempt on the president's life failed: when it was known that the would-be assassin was the son of a Freemason, the Pro-Patria lodge was sacked by the mob. The situation grew instantly tenser. It was decided to form military juntas for the defence of the

régime in the north: for this purpose the president was to travel to Oporto. As he was entering the Rossio station on December 14, Sidónio Pais was shot and fatally wounded. His funeral was at once a demonstration of sympathy and indignation, and an indication of the extensive following he commanded outside the ranks of the political parties.

iii. POST-WAR. The murder of Sidónio Pais did not bring an immediate return to Democratic government. Rear-Admiral Canto e Castro, who had held the Ministry of Marine, was elected president of the Republic, and the ministry continued to be led by Tamagnini Barbosa until the end of January. After a transition ministry (José Relvas), power returned to the Democrats on March 30, 1919, and a period of extreme ministerial instability was entered upon. In the course of 1919 there were four governments, in 1920 seven and in 1921 five. The fever of parliamentary life was reflected in the country: in 1919 there were attempts at a military revolution, and at a restoration of the monarchy, and strikes of corkworkers, railwaymen-lasting over July and August-municipal employees and metal-workers. In 1920 civil servants, electrical workers. telephonists, tramwaymen, seamen and printers came out, and the offices of the General Confederation of Labour were closed down. The motive for the strikes was the raising of the cost of living, consequent on the decline in value of the escudo, which had a par value of 4s. $5\frac{1}{2}d.$, was worth 4s. in 1917, 2s. 10d. in 1918, and 2\frac{1}{2}d. in 1922.

The revolution of October 19, 1921, was one of the bloodiest Portugal has known. Its origin remains mysterious, though its immediate pretext was the unpopularity of Dr António Granjo, accused of various reactionary measures. Apart from the by now consecrated conflict in the Rotunda, this revolution had a grimmer aspect in the murders committed from the Arsenal. A band of a dozen men in sailors' uniform, one with a conspicuous gold tooth, carried off and assassinated not only António Granjo, but also Carlos de Maia-a republican of 1911, but a Minister of Marine under Sidónio Pais-his secretary Freitas da Silva, Colonel Botelho de Vasconcelos, and the former hero of October 5, Machado dos Santos. Though several of the perpetrators of these murders were arrested and sentenced, the whole affair was never fully cleared up. After October 19 Dr António José de Almeida, who had been elected president of the Republic in 1919, expressed his desire to resign, though he was eventually persuaded to remain in office: General Gomes da Costa and other officers resigned their commissions as a sign of protest.

There followed a degree of stabilization. António Maria da Silva was Prime Minister from February 5, 1922 till November 1923 (though with two cabinet reshuffles), a record for the Republic. In 1922 Brazil was brought nearer to Portugal by the first transatlantic flight between


the two countries, performed by the Portuguese pioneer aviators, Gago Coutinho and Sacadura Cabral. Using Fairey aeroplanes and guided by a sextant invented by Gago Coutinho, the airmen lost their first machine on the rocks of São Pedro e São Paulo, and their second off Fernando de Noronha, and eventually arrived in Rio de Janeiro in a third, amidst great enthusiasm. In 1924 a first Portuguese flight was made from Lisbon to Macau.

In 1923 Dr António José de Almeida completed his term of office, the first of Portugal's six presidents to do so. His successor was Senhor Teixeira Gomes, Portuguese minister and ambassador in London since the formation of the Republic.

iv. THE MILITARY REVOLUTION, 1925–1926. The first symptom of the coming army movement was an unsuccessful rising on March 5, 1925, stifled by the arrest of its promoters. On April 18, a second attempt, led by Comandante Filomeno da Câmara, General Sinel de Cordes and Lt-Colonel Raul Esteves, also failed. A third, on July 19, led by Captain Mendes Cabeçadas, had only limited support and met with a similar fate. Special tribunals were set up for the trial of political prisoners, and when General Sinel de Cordes and his colleagues defended their action with a bitter attack on the politicians, the military court pronounced for their acquittal. Their release in such circumstances gave them the opportunity to organize the successful revolution of May 28, 1926.

At the end of 1925 Teixeira Gomes resigned the presidency of the Republic, and Bernardino Machado was elected in his place. Instability continued to mark the working of the parliamentary system: there were five cabinets in the course of the year: the Democratic ministry of Dr Domingos dos Santos, formed at the end of November 1924, fell in February; Major Vitorino Guimarãis, also a Democrat, formed a cabinet which lasted until June 30; António Maria da Silva's group fell on August 1; that of Dr Domingos Pereira on December 17, and another of António Maria da Silva saw the year out and was swept away in the military rising of the following May.

At this time Portugal had the doubtful distinction of being the scene of the boldest, if not the largest, detected fraud of modern times, known in England as the Portuguese Bank-Note Case and in Portugal as the affair of the Banco Angola e Metrópole. By means of counterfeit orders, a group of conspirators were able to persuade the London firm of Waterlow to print off 580,000 500-escudo notes of the Bank of Portugal with numbers duplicating those already in existence. These were passed into Portugal in the diplomatic bags of the Venezuelan minister in Lisbon, and introduced into circulation through the floating of a new Bank, the Angola e Metrópole, which distinguished itself for the boldness of its



XIIb. JOAQUIM MOUSINHO DE ALBUQUERQUE



XIIa. D. PEDRO I OF BRAZIL AND IV OF PORTUGAL



XIII. DR ANTÓNIO DE OLIVEIRA SALAZAR

financial policy. The presence of notes with duplicate numbers was eventually detected, and the Bank of Portugal at once decided to call in all those of the design in question and pay them in notes of other denominations, since it was then impossible to discriminate between genuine 500-escudo notes and those illegally printed off the same plates. By the liquidation of the Bank of Angola the sum of £488,430 was recovered, and in 1930 Messrs Waterlow, in obedience to a majority verdict of the House of Lords, were required to find a further £610,392. The injection of this large sum of money into the Portuguese currency produced a temporary inflation in the course of 1926.

The movement of May 28, 1926 was prepared chiefly in the north and headed by General Gomes da Costa, Portugal's outstanding leader of the Great War. He issued his pronunciamento in Braga: 'Portuguese! For men of dignity and honour the political situation of the country is inadmissible! A revolutionary junta appeared in Lisbon, and many garrisons joined the movement: resistance was offered only at Santarém and Caldas da Rainha. On May 30 Mendes Cabeçadas obtained the resignation of Dr Bernardino Machado, and Gomes da Costa entered Lisbon in triumph on June 3. Parliament was closed, and government was exercised by a triumvirate composed of Mendes Cabecadas, Gomes da Costa and Gama Ochôa. To compose a government, as had been amply proved, was less difficult than to govern. At first a ministry was formed in which Mendes Cabeçadas was Prime Minister and Minister for Home Affairs, Gomes da Costa Minister for War and for Colonies, and General António Óscar de Fragoso Carmona Minister for Foreign Affairs. However when it became apparent that the Prime Minister's aversion to political parties was not so strong as that of his associates, he was deposed and Gomes da Costa assumed full leadership on June 17. Barely three weeks later, on July 9, Gomes da Costa was in turn deposed, sent to Angra do Heroismo for the space of a year and then promoted marshal.

The new head of the government was General Carmona, interim president of the Republic from November 1926, elected president from March 1928, and re-elected in 1935 and 1942. The possibilities of such permanency did not seem strong in the first year of the régime. The political parties, especially after the temporary arrest of a number of leaders in June, were in a state of ferment: politicians visited foreign embassies in Lisbon and repudiated any future responsibility for acts of the dictatorship, and attempted by the same methods to impede General Sinel de Cordes from raising a loan in Geneva. Those concerned were sent to the colonies. On February 2, 1927 a revolution of Democratic colouring began in Oporto, but after severe fighting was suppressed.

Its southern counterpart burst five days later, and developed into one of the most serious experienced in Lisbon. A milder movement was suppressed without difficulty in August 1927; of two others in 1931, one in Madeira and the Azores, christened 'the Atlantis Republic', and the other in Lisbon, the first lasted a month, and the second a bare day. By this time the new régime had consolidated itself sufficiently to withstand any ordinary political opposition.

The military régime came to power with no other programme than that of establishing order. Whilst no one was better equipped than the army for the forcible suppression of the party system, the army was no better equipped than the parties for the restoration of economic order, in particular for breaking the series of budgetary deficits which, with the exception of the brief period 1913–1915 when Afonso Costa had produced surpluses, had now acquired almost the rank of an institution. Although prices and wages had readjusted themselves, the effects of the monetary collapse remained—lack of confidence, lack of credit, and usurious interest rates. No real attempt had been made to halt public expenditure, and the purely financial situation was steadily worsening.

The Ministry of Finance had been accepted by General Sinel de Cordes, who decided upon the necessity for a foreign loan, and sent General Ivens Ferraz to Geneva to make arrangements to borrow £12,000,000. The League of Nations agreed to provide this sum, but stipulated that a delegate of the League should be appointed to exercise powers of investigation into the subsequent conduct of Portuguese finances, a condition which was found offensive to national sovereignty and which led to the rejection of the loan. It was at this stage that a creative personality was discovered, who not only had remedies for his country's difficulties, but was willing to accept the responsibility, and able to secure conditions, for putting them into execution.

v. SALAZAR. Dr António de Oliveira Salazar was at this time professor of economics at Coimbra University. Born in 1889 at Santa Comba, in the valley of the Dão, the son of country people, and educated in his village and in the seminary at Viseu, Salazar went to Coimbra in 1908, read law, and on graduating in 1914 began to lecture on Economic Sciences, in which he obtained a lectureship in 1917. An early interest in education and pronounced religious feeling led him to see the purpose of politics as the fusion of the moral and economic needs of the nation: his political associations were with the Academic Centre of Christian Democracy, a group of Catholic intellectuals whose social studies derived from the Rerum Novarum and who believed that Catholicism was not compatible with demagogy, but might be with democracy. In 1921, Salazar was elected to parliament as one of the three Catholic deputies:

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he sat for one day before retiring to Coimbra. Already he had produced papers on such subjects as the gold standard and the wheat problem; in 1923 his *Reduction of public expenditure* was discussed at a Lisbon Commercial Congress. At the beginning of the military revolution of 1926 he was invited to become Minister of Finance, but, unable to obtain full powers, retired at the end of a week. When, on April 27, 1928, the idea of borrowing money from the League of Nations was dropped, Salazar was again invited to take the Ministry of Finance, and this time on his own terms—full powers over the expenditure and revenue of the country, and the prohibition of any other minister from taking measures that would involve increased expenditure or decreased revenue without first consulting him.

With this authority Salazar embarked on a labour of reform which was designed to penetrate the whole of Portugal's economic, political and social life. All the reins of power were concentrated in his hands: and possibly no country has in recent times been influenced by the work of one man so deeply and in such various departments. Minister of Finance from April 1928 to August 1940, Salazar became Prime Minister on July 5, 1932, and Minister for Foreign Affairs and Minister of War in May 1936, having held the portfolio of Colonies in 1930. Whilst his work has lain in all fields, it was as an economist that he approached his nation's problems, and his programme began with the unravelling of the financial tangle. He was confronted by a tradition of deficits and inflation: the public debt had steadily mounted, and borrowing had taken place at high rates of interest—in 1923 a loan was floated at half its face value, so that the actual interest offered was 13 per cent. The general lack of confidence and scarcity of capital were a strong factor in impeding the development of industry and agriculture: production was held up, and along with it the advancement of social conditions; without general social progress a stable political situation was beyond reach. This was Salazar's analysis, and it was therefore natural that he should begin his work with the budget. From his first assumption of office he was able to produce balanced estimates: in the event, each financial year brought a large surplus, and during the eleven years of Salazar's tenure of the ministry these surpluses totalled 1,963,000 contos. a sum well in excess of the total budget estimates for any one year in the period. In contrast, the total of deficits from 1917 to 1928 had amounted to 2,574,000 contos. The methods by which financial recovery was obtained included curtailment of expenditure, increased taxation. and unification of accountancy. 'Orthodox finance' demanded the strict observation of various rules—the covering of ordinary expenditure by ordinary revenue, the limitation of extraordinary revenue and especially

of borrowing, the legal responsibility of heads of departments for any additional expenditure they might contract, a prohibition against the public financing of private enterprises, and the obligation of colonial authorities to balance their own budgets. A portion of the surpluses was spent on rearmament, public works and social assistance: the prospect of their continuation permitted the government to adopt a fifteen-year economic plan for the period 1936–1950, which would disburse 6,500,000 contos on a variety of schemes—ports, communications, irrigation, hydro-electric works and schools, as well as rearmament.

Public debt had increased heavily with the devaluation of the escudo and the succession of financial deficits, rising from 692,000 contos in 1910 to 7,449,000 in 1927: of this sum floating debt accounted for almost a third. By 1933, however, the latter had been totally extinguished by consolidation on advantageous terms, and a reduction of over a million contos was thus made. In a series of conversion schemes interest rates paid by the state fell from $6\frac{3}{4}$ to $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent.

vi. THE 'NEW STATE'. In 1933, just over a year after Salazar had become Prime Minister, the basis of the Corporative system and the New State was laid in the Political Constitution, the National Statute of Labour, and the Colonial Act. However, in the economic field the work of the New State dates from 1929, when the first Wheat Campaign was begun with the aim of increasing national production, in order to wipe out the annual drain of some 200,000 contos spent on imported grain. From this date a series of decrees gradually imposed organization on the most essential import and export industries wherever intervention was thought necessary. Those branches on which co-ordination was enforced included the sardine industry, depressed after the war-boom and suffering from over-production and keen competition; the fruit export trade, which had been partly surrendered to countries producing on a larger scale and with guaranteed standards; the production of port-wine, and of such staple commodities as rice and dried cod. Over this framework of compulsory Guilds (organizations of employers), Regulating Commissions and National Boards, was fitted the theory of corporativism, which allowed for the complementary voluntary organization of the rest of Portugal's economic life.

Corporativism as a national system aimed at animating the whole economic structure with a spirit of collaboration in the nation's destinies. Ultimately the creation of some twenty-four corporations, each integrating all interests in a particular sector of activity, was envisaged; and through a Corporative Chamber the structure could play its part in the government as an advisory element. The units of organization for which provision was made were Guilds of employers and National Syndicates

of employees, which came into being on the approval of the statutes by the government, when half of the production in a given district was represented in a Guild and at least a hundred workers engaged in similar work in a Syndicate. Each of the two elements was to pay dues, which would be largely devoted to the development of social insurance schemes, and study how best to improve conditions, absorb the unemployed, set up professional schools, and similar projects. But the principal contact between the Guild and the Syndicate was the signing of collective contracts between workers and employers, fixing wages, hours of work and other relevant points, with the government, in the person of the Under-Secretary of State for Corporations, acting as arbitrator or negotiator. Whilst membership of Guilds and Syndicates was voluntary. collective contracts between them were binding on both members and non-members in the respective districts. Strikes and lock-outs were forbidden, and the nationalist colouring of the structure reinforced by the requirement of a promise of loyalty to the New State, and the prohibition of contact with foreign workers' or employers' organizations. Groups of Syndicates and Guilds were formed into Federations and Unions, but the mingling of employers and employees in the same organization was omitted till the final stage of the Corporations might be reached. Special forms of organization were required for agriculture and fishing: the Casas do Povo and Casas dos Pescadores were created as centres for labourers and fishermen with the same ends as the Syndicates.

The political doctrine and structure of the nation were set forth in the Constitution of 1933, by which the rights of the family were recognized as being at the root of the development of the race, and the sovereignty of the state was stated to be limited in internal affairs by the interests of morality and order: until the promulgation of the Constitution of Eire, that of Portugal was perhaps unique in basing political action on a direct appeal to Christian ethics.

The Constitution provided for the following governmental offices and bodies: a President of the Republic elected every seven years and having powers to nominate and dismiss ministers, approve legislation and convoke the National Assembly; a Council of State to advise the president in times of crisis; and a Council of Ministers, normally composed of a Prime Minister (or President of the Council of Ministers) and Ministers of the Interior, Justice, Finance, War, Marine, Foreign Affairs, Works and Communications, Colonies, National Education, and Economy (uniting the departments of commerce, industry and agriculture).

The National Assembly consists of ninety members 1 and sits for three months a year to legislate, authorize the acts of the government, and

¹ Raised to 120 by the Act of August 17, 1945.

deliberate periodically on alterations in the Constitution. The Assembly is elected by direct though not universal suffrage, but as the elector has only the choice of voting for or against a block-list of ninety names, or of striking off any names from the block-list, it is not unnatural that the result of the election can hardly be in doubt. Opposition block-lists can be presented so long as they are approved by the government. Concurrently with the National Assembly sits the Corporative Chamber, not as a body but in sections, each of which may give a report on any matter submitted to it for specialized or technical appreciation. The government party, the National Union, dates from 1930.

vii. THE PORTUGUESE COLONIAL EMPIRE. Whilst the first Portuguese Empire was centred in Asia and the second in Brazil, the modern Colonial Empire is especially African. Portugal still holds two small colonies on the Asiatic mainland and a third among the islands of Oceania, but her five African colonies include two, Angola and Moçambique, which dwarf the rest, and are comparable in area with half the continent of Europe.

Angola, some fourteen times the size of metropolitan Portugal, forms a massive block of territory behind the thousand miles of coastline running from the mouth of the river Congo to that of the Cunene, the frontier with South-West Africa, and includes the enclave of Cabinda north of the Congo. Moçambique, nine times the size of Portugal, has an even longer coastline, stretching from the Swahili coast down to Natal. The comparatively small territory of Guinea forms the third colony on the African mainland, and Portugal also possesses two groups of African islands, the Cape Verde Archipelago and the two tropical islands of São Tomé and Príncipe: in addition to the latter, she claims the residency of São João Baptista de Ajudá on the Dahomey coast.

Until the close of the nineteenth century Angola remained essentially a trading colony based on the three coastal towns of Luanda, Benguela and Mossâmedes. Much of the commerce with the inhabitants of the hinterland, especially in ivory and rubber, was done through the agency of coastal natives. However, such explorers as Serpa Pinto, who travelled through Bié to the upper waters of the Zambesi in 1877, Silva Pôrto, a romantic figure both as trader and as discoverer, and Capêlo and Ivens, who travelled over the Angolan highlands, gradually made known the general configuration of the interior. The penetration of the highlands, which proved to be the most favourable part of the country for white settlement, was followed by a gradual increase in the rhythm of colonization. In such a vast territory there was little attempt to define frontiers; to the east and south this indefiniteness was on such a scale as to permit the major misunderstanding of the Rose-Coloured Map. Owing also to the immensity of the country there was insufficient control over the

activities of unscrupulous traders, whose exactions led to the Bailundo rising of 1902.

The occupation of Angola was completed in the early years of the present century. In the north-eastern region of Lunda Portuguese administration was established in 1895, and penetration was comparatively peaceful except for a short-lived rebellion in 1900; but in the south and south-east the Cuamatos and Cuanhamas remained unreduced. The fort of Humbe for long marked the limit of Portuguese authority. Established in 1859, abandoned in 1863, and reoccupied in 1880, it was the scene of several raids, and was relieved with some trouble in 1898. In 1899 the Cuanhamas and in 1903 the Cuamatos were in rebellion, and the latter were able to cut to pieces a column of troops, seriously threatening Portuguese prestige in the whole region. In 1907 vengeance was taken by Alves Roçadas in the victory of Mufilo. Portuguese forts were built in the country, and by 1910 most of southern Angola was reduced.

Before and during the war of 1914–1918 there was considerable economic development in Angola: commercial activity increased, communications were improved and the valuable diamond deposits of Lunda were discovered. Once the war was over the Lisbon government took the view that rapid expansion and self-expression were necessary; and from 1921 the High Commissioner exercised powers amounting almost to autonomy, including that of contracting large loans for the purposes of development. As a result, at the end of ten years the colony was saddled with a greatly multiplied debt, nearly ten times as large as that of all the other colonies together, without being able to manifest any corresponding increase in foreign trade or general revenue. This policy of high expenditure without any adequate return was ended by the application of strictly orthodox economic principles after the publication of the Colonial Act (1930). This also rejected the doctrine of colonial autonomy, and marked the path towards closer imperial contact with the central government.

Moçambique, though considerably smaller in area than Angola, is larger in population and, generally speaking, a more developed colony. The treaty of 1891, if it shattered some dreams, at least resulted in the demarcation of the frontiers of Moçambique and set the course for future development. Measures of effective occupation were clearly overdue, and the Lisbon government, though crippled by financial and other difficulties, was able to rise to the occasion. Some of the responsibility for development was removed from the central administration by the concession of a Charter to the Moçambique Company (February 1891), whereby the company undertook the administration and exploration of a broad strip of territory between the Zambesi and the Save for a period

of fifty years. In the same year a second Charter was granted to the Nyassaland Company, and in 1892 a group of *prazos* which had been abandoned was leased to the Zambesi Company.

Portugal's hold on the territory was still precarious, and in August 1894 the warlike Vatuas were able to attack Lourenço Marques itself. The chief of the Vatuas, Gungunhana, had done homage to the King of Portugal in 1885, but later made agreements with representatives of the British South Africa Company, whereby he was to receive arms from them. This, and the fact that Gungunhana received a silver cup as a present from Queen Victoria, aroused Portuguese mistrust of the company's attitude towards the Vatuas. When these invested Lourenço Marques, the capital resisted for seventy-six days until the arrival of reinforcements by sea. Early in 1895 a new governor, António Enes, gathered under his orders a group of enterprising officers who were largely responsible for the formation of modern Moçambique. Already in February 1895 the victory of Marracuene secured Lourenço Marques; that of Coolela broke the power of the Vatuas, and at Chaimite their chief was captured. The hero of this final episode was Mousinho de Albuquerque, later governor of Moçambique, a figure which has struck the Portuguese imagination as a modern Nun' Álvares Pereira. In a further campaign in 1897 Gazaland was pacified with the victory of Macontene, and the remnants of Chaka's empire swept away. Between these two campaigns, Mousinho began the occupation of the north-western part of the province, which was completed in 1910 by Massano de Amorim.

An important factor in the development of Moçambique has been its relations with the neighbouring territories of the Transvaal, the two Rhodesias and Nyasaland, all landlocked countries which find their principal outlet to the sea through the ports of Moçambique, especially Beira and Lourenço Marques. Since 1909 the transport traffic of the Transvaal has been regulated by the Moçambique Convention, which also determines the conditions under which Portuguese native labour is recruited for work in the Rand mines. Both the transit trade and export of native labour are sources of considerable revenue to Moçambique, and have played a predominating part in its development.

The Charters of the Nyasaland and Moçambique Companies expired in 1928 and 1942 respectively, and since the latter date the colony has been reunited under a single administration. The *prazo* system has also been completely extinguished.

The tropical colony of São Tomé and Príncipe is principally remarkable for the richness of its soil, particularly in the production of cocoa. The plant was introduced in 1822 and is grown on estates known as *roças*, which cover the majority of the islands. In the early years of the present

century, São Tomé and Príncipe furnished about a sixth of the world's supply, but this position was later lost with the rise of the Gold Coast as a producer, and the multiplication of pests in the Portuguese islands.

as a producer, and the multiplication of pests in the Portuguese islands. The Cape Verde Archipelago and Portuguese Guinea formed one colony until 1879. The former is best known by the fuelling-station established on São Vicente, till recently one of the largest in the world. Portuguese Guinea is at once the oldest of the Portuguese colonies and the latest to be occupied and developed. Throughout the nineteenth century only Bissau was securely held: as late as 1911 their Papel neighbours were able to prevent the Portuguese from making a football ground outside the walls. The main body of the colony was pacified by Teixeira Pinto in 1915, but the Bissagos Islands were only finally reduced in 1936. During the governorship of Lieut.-Colonel Carvalho Viegas (1932–1940) much was done to turn Guinea into a model colony.

On the west coast of India Portugal possesses a number of scattered territories known collectively as the *Estado da Índia*. The largest of these is Gôa, the seat of the Portuguese Patriarch of the Indies and the shrine of St Francis Xavier. Farther north lies Damão, with the enclave of Nagar-Aveli embedded in British territory; on the Kathiawar Peninsula the town of Diu is Portuguese.

Macau, standing on a peninsula in the delta of the Canton river, was the first factory to be established by Europeans in China. Its use was authorized by the Celestial authorities in 1557, and though rent was paid for some three centuries, the Portuguese interpreted the concession as conferring sovereign rights. In 1583 a Senate was set up to administer the city-properly the Cidade do Santo Nome de Deus de Macauand from 1833 Macau was treated as a colony, and as capital of a province comprising itself and Timor. The Loyal Senate was thereupon reduced to municipal rank. In 1846 the Chinese customs-house was closed down, and the islands of Taipa and Colowan occupied. Chinese resentment led to the assassination of the Governor, but Portuguese sovereign rights were admitted by China in the Treaty of 1887, in return for co-operation in the collection of taxes. In the heyday of the Canton trade Macau prospered because all foreign ships were required to put in to obtain permission to proceed up the river to Canton, and because European traders were obliged to live there from the end of one trading season till the beginning of the next. This period of activity came to an end with the rise of Hongkong after 1842. Macau has since become a pleasure resort where the retired Chinese merchant or defeated war-lord can indulge in oriental pastimes.

Timor, the largest of the Lesser Sunda Islands, was long a bone of contention between the Dutch, holding Koepang at its western end, and

the Portuguese, at Lifau and Dili, the eastern half. In 1851 both parties agreed to settle their differences, and the Portuguese representative assented to a frontier resembling that of to-day, to the relinquishment of Portuguese claims in other of the Lesser Sunda Islands and to receive 200,000 florins from the Dutch in compensation. Though he was disowned by the Lisbon government, the treaty of 1859 followed his recommendations. Nevertheless no demarcation took place until Swiss arbitration was accepted in 1914. Timor became a separate colony by separation from Macau in 1896. Its first governor, Celestino da Silva, founded the coffee plantations which constitute its chief source of wealth.

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Adjacent Islands. The Azores and Madeira are regarded as adjacent to continental Portugal, not as forming part of the Portuguese Colonial Empire. They are administered as 'autonomous districts', corresponding to the districts of the mainland, but with a higher degree

of local power invested in the governors.

Administrative Divisions. Continental Portugal was traditionally divided into six Provinces. In 1835 Mousinho da Silveira introduced administrative reforms leading to the division of the country into 17 Districts (now 18), each District taking its name from its capital town: in addition the Azores form three districts and Madeira one. They are: Viana do Castelo, Braga, Oporto, Vila Real, Bragança, Aveiro, Viseu, Guarda, Coimbra, Castelo Branco, Leiria, Santarém, Lisbon, Setúbal, Portalegre, Évora, Beja and Faro on the mainland; Angra do Heroismo, Horta and Ponta Delgada in the Azores, and Funchal on Madeira. Each district is under the authority of a Civil Governor. In 1933 a new project was adopted by which 11 Provinces, based on natural and sociological distinctions, came into existence parallel with the Districts. The smaller administrative divisions are concelhos or municipalities, which number 272, and are divided into three classes according to their importance, each being administered by a câmara municipal (municipal chamber); and freguesias or parishes, numbering 3,788. The Adjacent Islands have 30 concelhos and 178 freguesias.

Agriculture. Nearly two-thirds of Portugal's population is engaged in agriculture: till comparatively recently the proportion was probably even higher. There are great local variations of crops, productivity, tenure and usages: from a sociological aspect, see P. Descamps, Le Portugal, la vie sociale actuelle, Paris, 1935. While the climate is hospitable to a wide variety of vegetation, and there exist regions of considerable fertility, Portugal's soil is not generally speaking rich, even apart from pine, heath and dunes, productivity is much below the European average. Very roughly, a tenth of Portugal is under fruit, two-tenths uncultivated, three under forest and four under arable crops. The principal agricultural areas are: (a) the northern coastal district (Minho) where maize, beans and the vine are grown intensively: the system of tenure is of minutely subdivided plots: oak and pine forests are found; (b) Trás-os-Montes, with bleak, scrub-covered ranges, but olive, vine, cereal and potato-bearing valleys, and forests of evergreen oak and chestnut; (c) the Portwine area, consisting of the enclosed valleys of the Upper Douro and its tributaries; (d) western Beira, with intensive cultivation of cereals, vine and potatoes, interspersed with pines; (e) eastern Beira, consisting of various elements: in the north (Guarda) a prolongation of the Trás-os-Montes country, in the centre the Estrêla range with a scrubby area towards the Spanish frontier, and in the south (Castelo Branco) a district of extensive cereal cultivation with olives and cork-trees; (f) the Tagus valley (Ribatejo), a very intensively farmed alluvial region, growing cereals, fruits, rice, olives, wine and market produce: the lezirias or fertile fields of the Tagus are characteristic; (g) the Alentejo, a region of extremely extensive cultivation of wheat and other cereals, rich in cork and olives, but also with large stretches of heath; and (h) the Algarve, whose northern strip is mountainous heath, but whose coastal region is rich in fruit trees, especially the almond and the fig. Angola. Portuguese West Africa is the largest colony of the empire, stretching from the mouth

of the River Congo (Zaire) to that of the Cunene, which forms the frontier with South-West Africa, together with the enclave of Cabinda north of the Congo. In spite of its tropical situation (between 4° 20′ and 18° 2′ south), parts of Angola are rendered temperate by the cold Benguela current which sweeps the coast and by the height of the tableland of its interior. Angola is divided into five provinces: Luanda, Malange, Benguela, Bié and Huila. The capital is at Luanda, and the principal ports are Lobito, Benguela and Mossâmedes. Of the population of 3.7 million, 44,000 are whites and 28,000 of mixed blood. The uplands provide good farming country. Angola's flora includes the coffee plant, coconut palm, banana, sisal, etc. Exports comprise diamonds from the Lunda area, coffee, cotton, maize, sisal, vegetable oils and dried fish.

By the Organic Laws of 1914 Angola, with the other colonies, obtained a high degree of autonomy, and in 1921 its High Commissioner was able to publish an organic charter for the colony. From 1926 the authority of the central government was strengthened, and in 1930 the Colonial Act introduced a new system which stressed especially the solidarity of the empire; the Governor-general is now the instrument of and responsible to the

Ministry for the Colonies and the Colonial Council in Lisbon.

Archaeology. Portugal's most important sites are those of Muge on the Tagus, Citânia de Briteiros, Palmela and Conímbriga.

Architecture. Some of the most remarkable buildings are the Mozarabic church at Lourosa (Oliveira do Hospital), a number of Romanic churches, the Cistercian Abbey of S. Maria at Alcobaça, begun under Afonso Henriques c. 1148; the Convent of Christ at Tomar, begun by the Templars, with additions of various periods; the monastery of S. Maria da Vitória (Batalha) founded by John I after Aljubarrota, and the Jerónimos at Belém (Lisbon) in Manueline style. See under Cathedrals. Castles are numerous, those of Lisbon, Almourol and Leiria being good examples, many have been much restored recently. Obidos is a walled town. There is a wide range of domestic architecture: the country house or quinta of traditional style affords some of the best examples of Portuguese architecture.

Area. The area of continental Portugal is 34,254 sq. miles; or 35,582 (89,625 sq. kilometres)

with the Adjacent Islands.

Army. The oldest regiment of the Portuguese army, the First Artillery regiment, dates from the period of the Restoration. There are 16 infantry regiments, 3 cavalry, 8 artillery and 1 motorized, apart from other groups. peace strength is 3,200 officers and about 26,000 other ranks. The whole of the mainland is divided into four military regions, the first with headquarters at Oporto, the second at Combra, the third at Tomar, and the fourth at

Evora: Lisbon has a military governor, as have the Azores and Madeira.

Azores. A group of Islands of volcanic origin some 700 miles west of Lisbon. Those nearest Europe are São Miguel and Santa Maria with the Formigas Islets; the central group comprises Terceira, Graciosa, São Jorge, Pico and Faial; whilst Flores and Corvo lie farther west. Knowledge of the Azores is shown on maps of the fourteenth century, but their effective discovery was made by Gonçalo Velho Cabral, who reached Santa Maria in 1432. The island, like the rest of the archipelago, was uninhabited, and the discoverer founded the town of Ponta Delgada in 1444 Subsequent settlers, though principally Portuguese, included some Flemings. The population in 1940 was 284,755, having increased by some 10 per cent since 1930: the area of the nine islands is 922 sq. miles. São Miguel (41 miles long and 9 broad) is the largest island and carries over half the total population. For administrative purposes the islands constitute three districts, each with a governor: São Miguel and Santa Maria are governed from Ponta Delgada (population-18,000); Terceira, São Jorge and Graciosa from Angra do Heroismo (11,000) on the first named, and the rest from Horta (7,000) on Faial.

Broadcasting. The main home station is the Emissora Nacional (476 m.) with studios in Lisbon and transmission at Barcarena: regional stations retransmit from Oporto (212 m.) and Coimbra (209 m.). There are also a transmission for the Azores and an Empire shortwave service. The principal private stations are Radio Club Português (Parêde, near Lisbon, 291 m.) and Radio Renascença, a Catholic station with a re-transmitter in Oporto.

Moçambique and Angola have their own short-wave services.

Cape Verde İslands. A group of fourteen islands, mostly of volcanic nature, some 300 miles west of Dakar: the inhabited islands are Santo Antão, São Vicente, São Nicolau, Boa Vista, Sal and Santa Luzia (Barlavento or windward), and Santago, Maio, Fôgo and Ilha Brava (Sotavento or leeward). St Vincent or Mindelo on São Vicente is the world's fourth largest coaling station. Santiago is the largest of the group (388 sq. miles) Fôgo is an almost perfectly formed volcano (Pico do Cano, 8,800 ft.). See A. Lyall, Black and White make Brown, London, 1938.

Cathedrals. At Lisbon, founded by Afonso Henriques, restored under Afonso IV, west front built under Fernando (1980); Aveiro, sixteenth century; Braga, rebuilt in Manueline style in sixteenth century; Bragança; Coimbra, the Sé Velha, dating from the twelfth century, with Romanic front, and Sé Nova, c. 1580; Elvas, late Manueline Gothic, Évora; Faro, Renascence; Guarda, original building destroyed by D. Fernando, rebuilt in late but pure Gothic; Leiria, built 1571, much altered in eighteenth century; Oporto, founded twelfth century, rebuilt in Gothic style, cloisters c. 1385, much restored in seventeenth, eighteenth

and twentieth centuries; Portalegre; Viseu.

Climate. In the north the climate is mild, temperate and damp in winter months; in the south, the Algarve and the Alentejo, summer is hot and rainfall very restricted. Along the central Portuguese coast summer heat is tempered by a regular evening wind (nortada). Low temperatures are usual only in the north and frontier districts, and on heights such as the Serra de Estrêla. In large areas rainfall is insufficient, but in coastal and certain other districts the climate permits the growth of perthern, subtropical and even tropical vegetation. Rainfall at Lisbon is about 27 inches a year (61 April-September; 201 October-March). Mean temperature in Lisbon is 60° F. extremes are 29° and 105° F.

Colonial Empire. Portugal's colonial empire is the fourth largest (after the British, French and Dutch in population, and British, French and Belgian in area). It consists of the following colonies: In Africa—Angola, population (1940) 3,738,010, area 481,351 sq. miles; Moçambique (Portuguese East Africa), pop. 5,081,266, area 297,731 sq. miles; Guinea, pop. 351,089, area 13,948 sq. miles; Cape Verde Islands, pop. 181,286, area 1,557 sq. miles; São Tomé and Príncipe Islands, pop. 60,490, area 372 sq. miles. In Asia—Portuguese India (1936), pop. 579,970, area 1,537 sq. miles; Macau (China), pop. (1940) 374,937 (including many refugees; previous census 157,175), area 6 sq. miles. In Oceania—Timor (1936), pop. 463,996, area 7,332 sq. miles Total area 803,834 sq miles, almost 24 times the area of Portugal, total population 10,831,044.

Cork. Portugal is the world's principal cork-producing country with an output of between one and two hundred thousand tons a year, whose value is from half a million to two and a half million sterling. The cork tree occurs in almost every district, but the principal producing areas are Evora, Santarém, Portalegre, Setúbal and Beja, the first two of which

each account for over a fifth of the total production.

Crops. Portugal's most valuable crops are wine, including especially port and Madeira and the table wines of Colares, Setúbal (Moscatel), Barcelos, etc.; olive oil; wheat; maize; rye; rice and oats. Olive oil is the most valuable crop after port-wine, though the quantity collected varies considerably from year to year. The principal area of production is the Tagus valley, especially Santarém and the Alentejo. Wheat reached 840 million litres in 1934, of which some 520 million were produced in the three provinces of Beja, Evora and Portalegre: after a period of heavy imports (up to £3 millions a year) a production campaign was launched which brought self-sufficiency in the early thirties, though this has not been maintained. The maize crop was 411 million litres in 1934; of this two-fifths was produced in Oporto and Braga. Rye is chiefly grown in Trás-os-Montes: oats and barley in the Alentejo. Rice is grown in Santarém (reaches of the Tagus), Setúbal (the Sado), Coimbra and elsewhere. String beans, French beans and potatoes are large crops, but chick-peas are comparatively small. The Algarve produces important crops of almonds which afford a valuable export. Figs are widespread, especially in the south, and the sweet chestnut grows widely in the north-eastern districts. The Algarve locust crop is exported.

Currency In the early times of the Portuguese monarchy the modio or moio of corn was the usual standard of exchange; various cloth measures were also used. The first minted coin was the gold morabitino, adopted from the Moslems; its Moorish equivalent, the soldo, or sou of Leon, and Byzantine and French coins were also current: in 1146 a mare and foal fetched 12 morabitinos and 7 ells of linen. From the time of Afonso III the French system (12 dinheiros—1 soldo, 20 soldos—1 libra) was used, though only dinheiros were minted, the other units being used only for reckoning. A morabitino of Afonso Henriques was reckoned at 30 soldos, and one of Afonso III at 22. In the following reigns the libra was devalued; the mark of silver equalled 12 libras under Afonso III, 14 under Denis, 18 and 14 soldos under Afonso IV. Fernando made 195 libras from the mark, and introduced the silver real, originally worth 10 soldos; his barbuda dropped from 20 soldos to 2 soldos 4 dinheiros. Under John I and his successors the financial situation was chaotic, and the silver mark came to be worth 29,000 libras. In 1415 John minted the real de dez reais (real branco) worth 35 libras, to finance the expedition to Ceuta. During the reigns of Afonso V, John II, Manuel and John III, the real declined from 1,896 to the mark to 2,280, 2,840, and 2,500 respectively. The vintém (20 reis) and tostão (100 reis) made their appearance. Afonso V issued gold cruzados at first worth 253 reis and later worth 400 (after 1517). In 1643 silver cruzados were minted, values being reckoned in them, or in reis, or in contos (1 conto = 1,000,000 reis). The xerafim and paraca of the East were each 300 reis.

The modern escudo consists of 100 centavos: 1,000 escudos make a conto. The par value of the escudo was about $4\frac{1}{2}$ to the £1: after falling heavily during and after the last war, it was fixed at about 110 to the pound, giving it a value of roughly $2\frac{1}{2}d$. and the conto a value of over £9. In 1944 it stood at 100. Bronze coins are minted for 5, 10 and 20 centavos; alpaca for 50 centavos and 1 escudo; and silver for $2\frac{1}{2}$, 5 and 10 escudos. Notes are printed for 20, 50, 100, 500 and 1,000 escudos.

Escudos are frequently referred to as 'milreis', and reis are used for counting, especially outside Lisbon (thus, 'dois mile trezentos' is 2,300 reis or 2 escudos, 30 centavos). Popular names are tostão for 10 centavos, cruzado for 40, and corôa for 50.

Colonial comage is similar, except that in Angola 100 centavos make an angolar (introduced in 1928), in India 16 tangas are one rupia, and Macau and Timor use the pataca (equals about one Hongkong dollar).

The following table, based on that in J. Lúcio de Azevedo, Épocas de Portugal económico, pp. 487–9, shows the principal currency at various periods, its value in terms of gold reis, its value in paper escudos, the factor by which this must be multiplied to allow approximately for differences in purchasing power, and the approximate value in modern English currency (at 100 escudos to the \mathcal{L}).

	•				Value in
			Value in		terms of
		Value in	paper		modern
Date	Currency	gold reis	escudos	Factor	currency
1150-1200	Gold maravedi	2,324	51 \$17	4.5	£2. 6s.
1250	Gold maravedı	23	33	4	£2 1s.
1250	Libra	1,550	34\$11	,,	£1. 7s. 3d.
1280	Libra	1,329	29 \$23	,,	£1. 3s. 6d.
1325	Libra	1,033	27 \$74	35	16s.
1360	Libra	979	21 \$54	,,	15s.
1375	Libra	510	11\$22	<i>ິ</i> ່ວ	6s. 9d.
1386	Libra	43.2	\$95	4	9d.
1400	Libra	4.32	\$095	,,	1 <i>d</i> .
1422	Libra	0.43	\$0095	4.5	$\frac{1}{10}d$.
1435	Real branco (35 libras)	15.12	\$332	,,	$3\frac{1}{2}d$.
1450	Real branco	11.1	\$24 4	"	$2\frac{1}{2}d$.
1457	Real branco	8.53	\$187	6	$2\frac{1}{2}d$.
1457	Cruzado (253 reais)	2,160	47 \$52	,,	£2. 17s.
1472	Real branco	6.66	\$1 4 6	,,	2d.
1472	Cruzado (324 reais)	2,160	47\$52	,,	£2. 17s.
1500	Real branco	5.53	\$121	,,	1 ≩ d.
1500	Cruzado (390 reais)	2,160	47\$52	,,	£2. 17s.
1517	Real branco	5.4	\$118	5	$1\frac{1}{2}d$.
1517	Cruzado (400 reais)	2,160	47 \$52	,,	£2. 7s. 6d.
1537	Real branco	5.14	\$113	4	1d.
1537	Cruzado [gold content reduced] (400 reas)	2,057	45 \$25	,,	£1. 16s. 6d.
1560	Real [plural reis]	4 53	\$10	3	<i>≩d</i> .
1580	Real	4.33	\$095	2.5	$\frac{1}{2}d$.
1646	Real	1.97	\$043	,,	$\frac{1}{2}d$.
	•		•	••	Value of
	•				silver cruzado
1662	Real	1.72	\$034	2	5s. 11d.
1668	Real	1.56	,,	,,	5s. 5d.
1688	Real	1.26	\$027	,,	4s. 4d.
1700	Real	٠,,	,,	2.3	4s. 11d.
1725	Real	,,	,,	3	6s. 3d.
1750	Real	"	,,	2.3	4s. 11d.
1800	Real	**	,,	2	4s. 4d.

[The revenues of the State were said to amount to 48 million reis in 1477, 279½ million in 1584 and 1,672 million in 1607.]

Emigration. In normal times some 10,000 Portuguese emigrate annually. About nine-tenths of these go to Brazil, and their remittances form an important item in redressing Portugal's adverse balance of trade. Portuguese abroad are estimated to number—Brazil, 800,000; U.S.A., 300,000; Spain, 35,000; Hawaii, 25,000. The principal Portuguese colonies in the U.S.A. are at New Bedford, New York and in California.

Employment. Rough estimates of the proportion of the population engaged in various occu-

pations are agriculture 60, industry 20, fishing 11 per cent.

Ethnology. All the earliest races of Portugal appear to have been of Mediterranean derivation. After the last ice-age a Mediterranean man of small stature without cattle or cereals left traces in the Tagus area; after 5000 B.C. a second Mediterranean race, also short, but possessing animals and cultivating corn, arrived from North Africa; after 2000 B.C. a taller race of Mediterranean origin settled in the Peninsula, and finally a type resembling the Phoenicians arrived from the eastern Mediterranean and settled in coastal areas. In the millennium before Christ the Celtic invasion of the Peninsula took place, but probably did not much affect Portugal, which preserved its Mediterranean type. In the third century B.C.

the Carthaginians made contact with the southern and eastern Peninsula and were followed by the Romans. The last invaders were the barbarians in the fifth century and the Moslems at the beginning of the eighth. In later times new blood has been introduced by Burgundians, Flemish and other settlers, by slaves and by members of the colonial peoples.

Exports. Portugal's traditional exports are port-wine, cork, fruits, nuts and salt. The sardine industry was introduced in 1880. Wolfram, tin and copper are also exported Pit-props are sold in England and France, and an export trade in resin and turpentine has been created. Cottons are supplied chiefly to the colonies, as are various table wines. Madeira produces its characteristic wine, embroideries, much exported to the U.S.A., and, in common with the other Atlantic islands, fruit and vegetables, especially pineapples.

Fauna. The wolf is still common in the Serra da Estrêla and other regions; wild goats, deer, fox, wild boar and Iberian hare are found. The last bear is said to have been killed at Gerez in the seventeenth century. On birds, see W. Tait, Birds of Portugal, Witherby, London.

Fishing. The most valuable catch is naturally the sardine; the canning industry was introduced from France in 1880 and affords a principal export. The horse-mackerel (carapau) is the sardine of the poor, frequently eaten grilled. Hake (pescada), shad, tunny, bream, cuttle-fish (lulas), sole and lobsters are other important catches. Portuguese vessels go annually to Newfoundland for the cod, which is dried to make bacalhau

Foods. Staple foods are rice, olive-oil, potatoes, beans, fruit, dried cod-fish, bread, horse-mackerel (carapau), wine, coffee and sugar. The poor see little meat. Dried codfish (bacalhau), familiarly known as 'the faithful friend', is a staple among all classes; it is reputed to be capable of preparation in 217 modes. Potatoes, string-beans and rice are the commonest vegetables. Bread is usually of wheat, though maize is used in the north. Chestnuts were formerly widely used for meal. Olive-oil is generally employed in cooking.

Fruit. Oranges and mandarins (especially in Setúbal district), almonds, figs (Algarve), pineapples (Azores), chestnuts (eastern Portugal) are exported. Almonds (Algarve) are the most valuable nut trees: the carob or locust tree is also common in the Algarve.

Guinea. This colony was discovered probably in 1446 by Nuno Tristão. From 1462 rights to establish factories on this part of the mainland were granted to colonists of the Cape Verde Islands, and Bissau became a centre for the slave-trade. In the nineteenth century England laid claims to part of the Guinea coast, but when the question was submitted to arbitration, the President of the U.S.A. decided in favour of Portugal. In 1879 Guinea was separated from the Cape Verde Islands as a full colony. The subjection of the tribes of the Bissagos Islands took place within living memory. Guinea exports palm-oil, coconut, rice, etc.: it has considerable reserves of timber. The principal towns are Bissau, Bolama, Cacheu and Bubaque. See A. Lyall, Black and White make Brown; Col. Carvalho Viegas, A Guint Portuguesa, 3 vols.

Health. In 1933 the death-rate was 17·13 per 1000, and the birth-rate 28·92. Deaths numbered 120,096 including 44,521 up to 4 years of age. The principal cause of death among infants is enteritis and diarrhoea: adult mortality is chiefly due to tuberculosis, heart disease, pneumonia and strokes. The first of these appears to be especially common in

Illiteracy. Some two-thirds of the population are illiterate.

Imports: Main imports are coal, cotton, dried codfish, machinery, petrol and mineral oils, sugar and coffee. Industry, transport and defence depend largely on equipment from abroad.

India. Portuguese India (the State of India) consists of a number of pieces of territory in three main divisions: Gôa (1,301 sq. miles), Damão (148 sq. miles) and Diu (20 sq. miles). Gôa, some 250 miles south of Bombay, comprises the districts about the estuaries of the Mandovi and Juari and the island of Angediva. Damão itself is accompanied by the small enclave of Dadrá and the larger of Nagar-Aveli, from which it is divided by a strip of territory carrying the main Bombay, Baroda and Central India Railway. Diu is an island south of the Kathiawar peninsula, with the village of Gogolá on the mainland and the fort of Simbor on an islet 14 miles away. The principal towns of Portuguese India are Panjim (Nova Gôa), Mormugão, Margão and Mapuça, all in the Gôa area.

Industry. Except for the traditional port-wine industry development is recent Sardinecanning, the preparation of cork and that of resins and turpentine are the chief export industries: wolfram, tin and a variety of other minerals, mostly in small quantities, are mined. The rest of industry is mainly engaged in the manufacture of textiles, production of food-stuffs, cement and other construction materials, paper, glass, soap and fertilizers.

Kings and Queens. House of Burgundy: Afonso (Henriques) I, born?, acceded 1128, married Mafalda of Maurienne and Savoy 1146, died 1185; Sancho I, b. 1154, m. Dulce of Barcelona 1174, a 1185, d. 1211; Afonso II, b. 1186, m. Urraca of Castile, a. 1211, d. 1223; Sancho II,

b. ?, a. 1223, m Mécia López de Haro, d. 1248; Afonso III, b. ?, m. (i) Matilde, Countess of Boulogne, (ii) Beatriz de Guillén 1253, a. 1245, d. 1279; Denis, b. 1261, a. 1279, m. Isabel of Aragon 1282, d. 1325; Afonso IV, b. 1291, m. Beatriz of Castile 1309, a. 1325, d. 1357; Pedro I, b. 1320, m. (i) Blanca of Castile 1328, (ii) Constanza of Castile 1336,
 a. 1357, d. 1367; Fernando, b. 1345, a. 1367, m. Leonor Teles 1372, d. 1383.

House of Avis: John (João) I, b. 1858, a. 1385, m. Philippa of Lancaster 1385, d. 1483; Duarte, b. 1391, m. Leonor of Aragon 1428, a. 1433, d. 1438; Afonso V, b. 1432, a. 1438, m. Isabel of Portugal 1441, d 1481; John II, b. 1455, m. Leonor of Portugal 1471, a. 1481, d. 1495; Manuel I, b. 1469, a. 1495, m. (i) Isabel of Castile 1497, (ii) Maria of Castile 1500, (iii) Leonor of Spain 1518, d. 1521; John III, b. 1502, a. 1521, m. Catarina of Spain 1525, d. 1557; Sebastian, b. 1554, a. 1557, d. 1578; Henry, b. 1512, a. 1578, d. 1580; António, b. 1531, a. 1580, d. 1595.

House of Austria: Philip I (II of Spain), b. 1527, a. 1580, d. 1598; Philip II (III), b. 1577,

a. 1598, d. 1621; Philip III (IV), b. 1605, a. 1621, d. 1665. House of Bragança John IV, b. 1604, m. Luisa de Guzmán 1633, a. 1640, d. 1656; Afonso VI, b. 1643, a 1656, m. Maria-Francisca-Isabel of Savoy 1666, d. 1683; Pedro II, 17. 1048, regent 1668, a. 1683, m. (i) Maria-Francisca-Isabel of Savoy 1668, (ii) Maria-Sofia-Isabel of Neuburg 1687, d. 1706; 30hn V, b. 1689, a. 1706, m. Maria-Ana of Austria 1708, d. 1750; 30sé, b. 1714, m. Mariana Victoria of Spain, 1729, a. 1750, d. 1777; Maria I, b. 1784, m. Pedro III (her uncle) 1760, a. 1777, d. 1816; 30hn VI, b. 1767, m. Carlota-Joaquina of Spain 1784, regent 1792, a. 1816, d. 1826; Pedro IV, b. 1798, m. (1) Maria Leopoldina of Austria 1817, (11) Maria Amelia of Leuchtenberg 1829, a. 1826, d. 1834; Miguel, b. 1802, a. 1828, m. Adelaide-Sofia of Loewenstein-Rosenberg 1851, d. 1866; Maria II, b 1819, m. (i) August of Leuchtenberg 1834, (ii) Ferdinand of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha 1836, d 1853; Pedro V, b. 1837, a. 1853, m. Estefania of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen 1858, d 1861; Luis, b. 1838, a 1861, m. Maria-Pia of Savoy 1862, d. 1889; Carlos, b. 1863, m. Maria Amalia of Orleans 1886, a. 1889, d. 1908; Manuel II, b. 1889, a. 1908, m. Augusta-Victoria of Sigmaringen 1913, d. 1932. The present pretender is D Duarte (b. 1907), a grandson of D. Miguel.

Literature. See A. F. G. Bell, Portuguese Literature, Oxford.

Livestock. Oxen are widely used for ploughing and traction, especially in the north. Over a third of Portugal's cattle are concentrated in the coastal district above Oporto: the most important local breeds are the Arouquesa and the Barrosa. The majority of milk, especially for cheese-making, is supplied by sheep and goats. The donkey is the usual beast of burden. The total number of sheep is between 3 and 4 million, of which the greater part are found in the eastern districts: wool production is normally some 3,500 tons. Pigs and mules are commonest in the Alenteio.

Macau. The peninsula of Macau adjoins Heungshan Island in the delta of the Canton river, and is some 3 miles long by 1½ wide. The first Portuguese visitor to the Canton river arrived in 1514 or 1516, but it was not until 1557 that negotiations with the Chinese government led to the granting of Macau. In 1849 its governor expelled Chinese officials and was assassinated, but Portuguese possession was recognized by treaty in 1887. For many years Macau was the summer home of all foreign merchants to Canton, but with the rise of Hongkong Macau has lost much of its commercial importance. The Nhons or

Macaists are a Sino-Portuguese race speaking their own dialect.

Madeira. Like the Azores, Madeira forms a district of continental Portugal, comprising the main island (area 314 sq. miles), that of Porto Santo, and the uninhabited Desertas and Selvagens. Madeira is volcanic and mountainous; its highest peak, Pico Ruivo, reaches 6,056 ft. Its population was 211,601 in 1930 and 269,771 in 1940. The capital, Funchal, is the third largest city of Portugal. The island of Porto Santo was discovered in 1418 and Madeira in 1420 by João Gonçalves Zarco. Both were uninhabited when discovered, but Madeira was rapidly colonized and prospered on the introduction of the Malmsey vine and Sicilian sugar-cane. Until the rise of the West Indies, Madeira was the principal European sugar-producer.

Minerals. A variety of minerals, including several rare ones, is found in Portugal: tin, wolfram, copper, sulphur, uranium, titanium, manganese, lead, zinc and kaolin. Coal, especially anthracite, is found in western Portugal; in normal times annual production is

less than 300,000 tons.

Moçambique. Portuguese East Africa was discovered by Vasco da Gama's fleet in 1498 and colonized from 1505. Formerly divided into (1) government-administered territory, (2) the Moçambique Company's territory (provinces of Manica and Sofala), and (3) the Nyassaland Company's territory, the whole colony is now unified since the expiration of the Nyassaland Company's 50-year charter in 1929 and the Moçambique Company's in 1942. The capital is at Lourenço Marques (population 47,390 in 1936), which is the seat of the Governor-General. The four provinces into which the colony is divided are Sul do Save (capital, Lourenço Marques), Zambézia (capital, Quelimane), Niassa (capital, Nampula), and Manica and Sofala (capital, Beira). Of the total population of 5,081,266, 24,365 are white Portuguese, 15,238 of mixed blood, 5,195 Portuguese Indians, giving with the addition of other whites, British Indians, Chinese, etc. a total of 55,451 non-indigenous inhabitants. The natives are all of Bantu race. A considerable number (63,000 in 1940) go to the Transvaal as mine-workers.

Mountains. The principal ranges are continuations of the Spanish north-western and central systems. The highest land is on the Galician frontier, and in the Serra da Estrêla range, which forms a backbone to the province of Beira and reaches a height of 6,500 ft. The Serra do Gerez and Serra de Larouco on the Galician frontier reach 5,000 ft., and ranges that flank the northern tributaries of the upper Douro are slightly less high. South of the Tagus the land is comparatively low, though the northern Algarve has the rolling Serra de Monchique. The contrast is illustrated by the fact that whilst north of the Tagus some half of the land lies above 1,300 ft, only 3 per cent of Portugal below the Tagus reaches that height.

Navy. Portugal's navy consists of 7 sloops, 5 destroyers, 7 gunboats, 3 submarines, 3 surveying vessels and a number of coastal and auxiliary units. Peace establishment is 711 officers and 5,400 other ranks. Its air-arm has 46 flying machines. The merchant navy totals about a quarter of a million tons. The principal companies are: Companhia Nacional de Navegação with 6 passenger-cargo, 4 cargo boats and several tramps; Companhia Colonial de Navegação with 5 passenger-cargo and 7 cargo-vessels. These companies run to the African colonies, to America and to Brazil. The Sociedade Geral de Transportes (C.U.F.) has some 20 cargo vessels which ply between Africa and Portugal, and England and the northern ports. The Empresa Insulana and Carregadores Açoreanos have each 4 vessels.

Newspapers. Lisbon: morning: Diário de Notícias, Século (popular); Diário da Manhã (government); Novidades and Voz (Catholic); Jornal do Comércio; evening: Diário de Lisbôa, Diário Popular, Republica. Oporto: Primeiro de Janeiro, Comércio do Porto.

Painting. The principal public collections are the Museu das Janelas Verdes in Lisbon, Museu Machado de Castro (Coimbra), and Museu Grão-Vasco (Viseu). A representative collection of Portuguese primitives was formed for the centenary celebrations of 1940.

Popes. Portuguese popes were St Damasus I (October 366-December 11, 384), and John XXI (Petrus Hispanus, September 8, 1276-May 20, 1277), celebrated as a theologian, student of Natural Sciences and of Arabic medicine, author of Summulae Logicales, a text-book in logic for some three centuries.

Population. The population of the mother-country, Azores and Madeira was, according to the 1940 census, 7,709,425, of whom 3,700,055 were males. Recent development of the population was, in thousands: 1864, 4,188; 1874, 4,551; 1890, 5,050; 1909, 5,423; 1910, 5,960; 1920, 6,080; 1930, 6,826. The average density was in 1864, 45-5 a sq. km.; in 1890, 55 and in 1930, 74: in the Oporto district there were 335 inhabitants to the sq. km., in the Lisbon district 330, Funchal 260, Braga 152. The average rate of increase for the years 1930–1940 was 88,364 annually.

Ports. The mouth of the Tagus affords easily the best natural harbour in the country: it is entered by a long channel about a mile wide which opens into an inland sea (Mar de Palha) some twelve miles long. The port installations of Lisbon are situated on the north side of the channel, but a new naval base has been built on the south side at Alfeite. Some two-thirds of Portugal's imports and half of her exports pass through Lisbon. Oporto with its natural harbour in the Douro and artificial sea-port at Leixões has about a third of Lisbon's traffic: port-wine, sardines and cottons are shipped there. Three ports north of Oporto are chiefly important for their part in the fishing of sardines and Newfoundland cod: Viana do Castelo, Póvoa de Varzim and Vila do Conde. Between Oporto and Lisbon, Aveiro and Figueira da Foz figure in the cod-fishing industry, and Peniche fishes for sardines: Nazaré is held to be a typical fishing village. South of Lisbon Setúbal in the estuary of the Sado is an export centre for cork and sardines: the Algarve ports of Lagos, Portimão, Olhão, Faro and Tavira export the almonds and other products of the region, and fish sardines and tunny. Vila Real de Santo António in the mouth of the Guadiana deals with the exports of the São Domingos mines.

Presidents. [The title President is used of the head of the State and also of the Prime Minister (Presidente do Conselho or President of the Council of Ministers). Each municipality (concelho) also has a president (Presidente da Câmara Municipal), whose powers resemble but exceed those of a mayor.]

The presidents of the Portuguese Republic are Dr Manuel de Arriaga (24. viii. 1911–26. v. 1915); Dr Teófilo Braga (28. v. 1915–5. x. 1915); Dr Bernardino Machado (5. x. 1915–8. xii. 1917); Sidónio Pais (9. v. 1913–14. xii 1918); Admiral João de Canto e Castro (16. xii. 1918–5. x. 1919); Dr António José de Almeida (5. x. 1919–5. x. 1923); Manuel Teixeira Gomes (5. x. 1923–11. xii. 1925); Dr Bernardino Machado (11. xii. 1925–31. v. 1926); General António Óscar de Fragoso Carmona (b. 1870; elected 25. iii. 1928; re-elected 1935 and 1942)

Provinces. The six traditional provinces are Minho, Trás-os-Montes, Beira, Estremadura, Alentejo and Algarve. The modern provinces, planned in 1930 as natural and human divisions, are Minho (capital, Braga), Douro Litoral (Oporto), Trás-os-Montes and Alto Douro (Vila Real), Beira Alta (Viseu), Beira Baixa (Castelo Branco), Beira Litoral (Combra), Estremadura (Lisbon), Ribatejo (Santarém), Alto Alentejo (Évora), Baixo Alentejo (Beja), and Algarve (Faro).

Public Holidays. The following are observed: January 1; January 31, Martyrs of the Republic; May 3, Discovery of Brazil; June 10, Luis de Camões; October 5, Proclamation of the Republic; December 1, the Restoration; December 25. Lisbon has a municipal holiday on

October 25, commemorating its recovery from the Moslems.

Railways. Portugal has 1,752 miles of broad and 472 of narrow gauge railways, of which two-thirds belong to the Caminhos do Ferro Portugueses. The first stretch of Portuguese railway, from Lisbon to Carregado, some twenty-three miles up the Tagus valley, was inaugurated in 1856. The line was subsequently continued to Entroncamento, near Tomar. where it was taken eastwards for Elvas and Spain and northwards for Oporto, being completed in 1864. Most of the remaining network was built before 1900. Portugal's principal line is that running from Lisbon to Oporto via Coimbra. From Oporto lines go northwards to the Galician frontier (international bridge over the Minho between Valença and Tuy) and eastwards up the Douro valley to the Barca de Alva-Fregeneda frontier for Salamanca. In central Portugal the Beira-Alta line crosses the main Lisbon-Oporto line at Pampilhosa just north of Coimbra and reaches the Spanish frontier near Guarda (at Vilar Formoso, for Salamanca, etc.): from Guarda it curves down the eastern districts of Portugal to join the Lisbon-Oporto line at Entroncamento. Through Entroncamento an international line passes towards the Spanish frontier station of Valencia de Alcántara for Madrid, and another reaches out to Elvas and Badajoz for Madrid and Seville. Passengers from Lisbon to the south of Portugal cross the Tagus by boat to Barreiro, whence lines lead to Évora and the Algarve via Setúbal.

Religious Organization. The Patriarch of Lisbon, since 1787 a Cardinal, is the head of the Portuguese church: he is assisted by the titular Archbishop of Mytilene, and the Bishops of Guarda, Leiria, Portalegre, Angra do Heroismo, Funchal and Cape Verde are his suffragans. The Archbishopric of Braga is of great antiquity and carries the title of Primate of the Peninsula: suffragan bishoprics are Aveiro, Bragança, Combra, Lamego, Oporto, Vila Real and Viseu. The Archbishopric of Évora governs the sees of Beja and Faro. The ancient Patronate of the Orient held by the Portuguese since the sixteenth century is now reduced to parts of India: the Bishop of Bombay is alternately Portuguese and English Under the new concordat of 1940 the Metropolitan Sees of Luanda in Angola and of Lourenço Marques in Moçambique were created. Extinct sees in Portugal are Penafiel,

Miranda, Pinhel, Elvas, Silves and Castelo Branco.

Rivers. The chief rivers of Portugal are the Tagus, Douro, Guadiana, Minho and Lima, all of which have their source and a part of their course in Spain, and the Mondego (the longest river whose course is entirely in Portugal, 140 miles), Sado, Vouga, Zézere, Cávado and Ave which rise in Portugal. There are few lakes, the chief being the tarns of the Serra da Estrêla.

São Tomé and Príncipe. These two islands, whose total area is about 320 sq. miles, lie in the gulf of Guinea about 125 miles from the African coast. São Tomé is on the equator. Both islands are of volcanic formation and very mountainous: the Pico de São Tomé reaches 7,021 ft. Discovered in about 1471, São Tomé was then uninhabited; colonization took place after 1493, and the stock introduced included Jewish children separated from their parents and freed negro slaves. The introduction of the sugar-cane was extremely successful and São Tomé was thickly populated in the sixteenth century. With the rise of the Brazilian sugar industry, this trade fell into a decline, which became complete with the abolition of slavery. However, cocoa had been introduced in 1822, and before the Great War the two islands produced about a sixth of the world's supply: since then the Gold Coast has become a successful competitor. Of the population of 60,490 (1940) 995 were Europeans, 2,804 half-castes, 112 Indians and 56,666 negroes, the latter largely consisting of labourers contracted in Angola.

Sociology. See P. Descamps' excellent study, Le Portugal: la vie sociale actuelle, Paris, 1935. Timor. Portugal's possession in Oceania consists of half of Timor, the largest of the Lesser Sunda Islands. It was known in about 1516, and the Portuguese were said to have made a capital at Lifau as early as 1520. In 1618 the Dutch settled at Koepang and held the western end of the island amidst numerous vicissitudes. Settlement of frontiers between the Portuguese and Dutch was begun in 1851 and completed in 1914, and the Portuguese now possess the northern part of the island as well as the Ocussi enclave, giving a total area of some 7.330 sq. miles. The capital and only useful port is at Dili.

Towns. According to the census of 1940 the population of Lisbon was 704,669, and that of Oporto 267,790.

	1864	1900	1910	1920	1930
Lisbon	163,763	356,009	435,359	486,372	594,390
Oporto	86,751	167,955	194,009	203,091	232,280

The principal other towns are. Funchal (Madeira) 75,000; Setúbal est. 50,000; Coimbra 27,000; Braga 27,000; Évora 22,000; Ponta Delgada (Azores) 17,000; Covilhã 15,000; Santarém 13,000; Beja, 13,000; the following towns are estimated to have between 10 and 15,000: Viana do Castelo, Aveiro, Figueira da Foz, Elvas, Estremós, Portalegre, São Bras de Alportel, Silves, Tavira, Angra do Heroismo (Azores). The following have from 8,000 to 10,000: Guimarãis, Lamego, Tomar, Viseu, Guarda, Caldas da Rainha, Abrantes and Lagos. The following have from 5,000 to 8,000: Vila Real, Bragança, Chaves, Leiria and Horta (Azores).

Universities. The present University of Coimbra was founded in Lisbon in 1290, established in Coimbra in 1307, in Lisbon 1398–1354 and re-established in Coimbra from 1354–1377; it returned to Lisbon in the latter year and was only finally settled in Coimbra in 1537. It has faculties of Letters, Law, Medicine, and Science and a School of Pharmacy: it had some 1,750 students in 1929: this university strongly preserves ancient traditions. Lisbon, founded in 1911, has faculties of Letters, Law, Medicine, and Science and a School of Pharmacy: it had 2,192 students in 1929. Oporto (1911) has faculties of Medicine, Science, Engineering and Pharmacy, that of Letters having been suppressed.

The new Technical University of Lisbon comprises Schools of Economics, Agronomy,

Engineering and Veterinary Medicine.

A Jesuit university existed at Évora from 1557 to 1757.

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